FUTU 


OF  WAR 


.  S,  BLOCH 


mmmmtmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmBi 


(H    ' 


1  ^  ^i" 


The 
Future    of    War 


rhe 
FUTURE  OF  WAR 

IN   ITS  TECHNICAL 

ECONOMIC  AND 

POLITICAL 

RELATIONS 


BY 

JEAN   DE    BLOCK 


\ 


TRANSLATED    BY    R.   C.   LONG,   AND    WITH    A    CONVERSATION 

WITH    THE    AUTHOR    BY    W.    T.    STEAD,    AND    AN 

INTRODUCTION    BY    EDWIN    D.    MEAD 


BOSTON  CCLLEGE  LIS-^^RY 
'"■'  iLL,  MASS. 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  INTERNATIONAL  UNION 

GINN  &  COMPANY,  BOSTON 
1902 


Copyright,  i899,  by 
DOUBLEDAY  &  McCLURE   CO. 


71465 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction,  by  Edwin  D.  Mead. 
Conversations  with  the  Author,  by  W.  T. 

Stead       .......       vii 

Author's  Preface Ixiii 


PART    I 
MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  DEVELOPMENTS 


CHAP. 


I.  How  War  will  be  Waged  on  Land      .         .  3 

IL  Plans  of  Campaign  :  Possible  and  Impossible  6^ 

III.  The  Future  of  Naval  Warfare  ...  93 

IV.  Does  Russia  Need  a  Navy?          .         .         .  113 

V.  What  Wars  have  Cost  in  the  Nineteenth 

Century         .         .         .         .         .         .128 

VI.  What  they  will  Cost  in  the  Future  .         .  140 

Vn.  The  Care  of  the  Wounded  .         .         .         «  146 


CONTENTS 

PART    II 

ECONOMIC    DIFFICULTIES    IN   TIME 
OF   WAR 


CHAP. 


I.  In  Russia    .         .         .         .         .         .         .163 

II.  In  Britain             .         .         „         .         .         .  251 

III.  In  Germany          ......  266 

IV.  In  France    .......  2"]^ 

V.  Effect  of  War  on  the  Vital  Needs  of  Peoples  294 

VI.  Probable  Losses  in  Future  Wars     .         .  319 

VII.  Militarism  and  its  Nemesis         .         .  347 


LIST   OF   MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS 


Map  of  Russian  Defensive  System 74 

Map  of  Paths  of  Advance  of  the  Austro-German  Armies  from 
Points  of  Concentration  to  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  Theatre 
of  War     ...........         77 

Map  of  Paths  of  Advance  of  the  German  and  Austrian  Armies  on 
the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  Theatre  of  War,  from  Pierron  and 
Brailmont        ..........         78 

Plan  of  Invasion  by  Russia  of  Prussian  Territory         ...         89 
Diagram  of  Expenditure  on  the  Crimean  War  .129 

Diagram  of  Expenditure  on  the  War  of  1859  130 

Diagram  of  Expenditure  by  Russia  on  the  War  of  1877-78  .  131 

Diagram  of  Expenditure  of  Europe  on  War  in  the  second  half 

of  the  Nineteenth  Century 132 

Diagram  of  Increase  per  cent,  of  Military  Expenditure  between 

1874  and  1896  .........       134 

Diagrams  of  Probable  Daily  Expenditure  on  a  Future  War         142-144 
Diagram  of  Percentage  Distribution  of  the  Revenues  .  145 

Diagram  of  Result  of  Firing  from  an  ii-mil.  Rifle         .  149-150 

Plate  showing  effect  of  a  Bullet  fired  from  a  distance  of  3500 

metres  on  the  Human  Tibia,  and  on  the  Bone  of  an  Ox        .       153 
Diagram  showing  Depreciation  of  Russian  Securities  at  the  Out- 
break of  War  ..........       168 

Plan  showing  Expenditure  by  Russia,  per  Inhabitant,  on  Army 

and  Navy         ..........       170 

Diagram  of  Russian  Exports  and  Imports  (1889-94)     .         ,         .172 
Diagram  of  Percentage  of  Russian  Export  to  Production  (1890-94)       175 
Plan  of  Russian  Grain  Production  per  Inhabitant         .  1 76 

Diagram  of  Classification  of  Russian  Imports       .         .  .178 

Plan  of  Russian  Commercial  Undertakings  in  1892,  per  100,000  of 

the  Population         .         .         .  .         .         .         .180 

Plan  of  Russian   Expenditure  on  Posts  and  Telegraphs  per  In- 
habitant ...........       181 

Plan  of  Output  of  Russian  Factories     .         .  .  .183 

Diagram  of  Percentage  Comparison  of  Wages  in  Russia,  Great 

Britain,  and  North  America 186 


LIST  OF  MAPb  AND  DIAGRAMS 

PAGE 

Plan  of  Percentage  Growth  of  Russian  Population  between  1885 

and  1897 189 

Plan  of  Average  Number  of  Houses  in  a  Russian  Settlement  191 

Plan  of  Average  Value  of  one  Property  destroyed  by  Fire  in 

Russia,  between  1860-87         .......       194 

Plan  of  Average  Losses  by  Fire  in  Russia  per  100  Inhabitants 

(1860-68) 195 

Plan  of  Number  of  Large  Cattle  in  Russia,  per  1000  desaytins 

(1888) 199 

Plan  of  Comparative  Yields  of  Agricultural  Countries  of  Europe  200 
Plan  of  Comparative  Number  of  Large  Cattle  in  Agricultural 

Countries  of  Europe        ........       201 

Diagram  of  Russian  Harvest  in  1893  ..-■..  205 
Diagram  of  Growth  of  the  Orthodox  Population  in  Russia,  and 

the  General  Population  of  other  Countries,  per  1000  .       207 

Diagram  of  the  Number  of  Marriages,  per  1000,  of  the  Population 

of  the  Countries  of  Europe     .......       208 

Diagram  of  the  Number  of  Births,  per  1000,  of  the  Population 

of  the  Countries  of  Europe     .......       208 

Diagram  of  the  Mortality,  per   1000,  of  the  Population  of  the 

Countries  of  Europe        ........       209 

Diagram  of  Percentage  Mortality  of  Children  under  one  year,  in 

the  Countries  of  Europe  .         .  .210 

Diagram  of  the  Number  of  Survivors  out  of  1000  Children  born 

at  all  ages  up  to  75  .  .212 

Diagram  of  the  Value  of  Human  Life  at  Various  Ages  214 

Plan  of  Outlay  on  Instruction  in  Russia  in  1887,  per  Inhabitant .  215 
Diagram  of  Percentage  of  Illiterates  accepted  for  Military  Ser- 
vice in  chief  European  Countries  .  .  .  .217 
Diagrams  showing  Number  of  Students  in  Higher  and  Interme- 
diate Russian   Educational   Institutions,  per  100,000  of  the 

Population 218-219 

Diagram  of  Number  of    Doctors   in   European  Countries,  per 

100,000  of  the  Population        .......       220 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Quadratic  Kilometres  for  every  Doctor  .  221 
Plan  of  Outlay  on  Medicine  in  Russia,  per  Inhabitant  .  222 

Plan  of  Number  of  Deaths  from  Typhus  in  Russia,  per  1000  Cases  224 
Diagram  of   Number  of  Illegitimates  in   1000  Births,  in  chief 

European  Countries         ........       225 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Suicides  per  100,000  of  the  Population, 

in  chief  European  Countries  .......       226 

Diagram  of  Consumption  of  Spirits  per  100  of  the  Population, 

in  chief  European  Countries,  in  1868  and  1888      .  229 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Deaths  from  Drunkenness  per  Million  of 

the  Population,  in  chief  European  Countries  .  230 

Diagram  of  Average  Number  of  Convictions  per  200,000  of  the 

Population  of  Russia      .......  231 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS 

PAGB 

Diagrams  of  Numbers  of  Various  Classes  condemned  for  Murder 
per  Million  of  the  corresponding  Population  in  chief  Euro- 
pean Countries         .........       232 

Diagrams  of  Numbers  of  Various  Classes  convicted  for  Theft 
per  Million  of  the  corresponding  Population  in  chief  Euro- 
pean Countries        .........       233 

Diagrams  of  Numbers  convicted  for  Highway  Robbery  per  Mil- 
lion  of    the   corresponding    Population  in   chief  European 
Countries        ..........       234 

Diagrams  of  Numbers  convicted  for  Swindling  per  Million  of  the 

corresponding  Population,  in  chief  European  Countries  235 

Diagram  of  Percentage  Relation  of  Men  and  Women  convicted 

in  chief  European  Countries  .......       236 

Diagram  of  Percentage  Increase  in  Russia  in   the  Fifteen  Chief 

Forms  of  Crime      .........       236 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Convictions  in  Great  Britain  per  100,000 

of  the  Population    .........       237 

Diagram  of  Comparative  Convictions  in  France  and  Austria  237 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Convictions  per  100,000  of  Population  in 

Germany         ..........       238 

Plan  of  Expenditure  on  Justice  and  Prisons  in  Russia  per  Inha- 
bitant     ...........       239 

Plan  of  Percentage  of  Grown  Horses  in  Russia  .         .         .         .241 

Plan  of  Amount  of  Production  of  Iron  and  Steel  in  Russia  .         .       243 
Diagram  of  Number  of  Native  and  Imported  Cattle  in  England  .       256 
Diagram  of  Classification  by  Occupation  of  1000  of  the  Popula- 

of  Great  Britain      .........       259 

Diagram  of  Distribution  of  the  Income  of  the  Population  of  Eng- 
land        ...........       260 

Diagram  of  State  of  Savings  in  Great  Britain  in  1895  •         •         •       261 
Diagram  of  Expenditure  of  England  on  Armed  Forces  between 

1864  and  1895  .........       264 

Diagram  of  Classification  of  Workers  in  Germany  according  to 

Wages      ...........       273 

Diagram  of  Emigration  from  Germany  to  America  (1891-1894)  .       274 
Diagram  of  Value  of  Foreign  Securities  stamped  in  Germany  276 

Diagram  of  French  Imports  and  Exports  (1860-1894)  .         .         .       278 
Diagram  of  French  Trade  (i860- 1894)  .         .....       279 

Diagram  of  French  Trade  (1883-1894) 280,  281 

Diagram  of  French  Revenue  and  Expenditure  (1861-1893)  •       281 

Diagram  of  French  Debt  (1852-1895)    ......       282 

Diagram  of  French  Savings  (1869-1895)        .....       282 

Diagram  of  Average  Value  of  Properties,  in  Francs,  passing  by 

Legacy     ...........       283 

Diagram  of  the  Distribution  of  the  French  Population  according 

to  Occupation  in  i886 284 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS 

PAGE 

Diagram  of  Assistance  given  to  the  Poor  in  France  in  1889  .       288 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Old  Men  and  Children  in  Percentage 

Relation  to  Population  in  chief  European  Countries  .  .  289 
Diagram   of  Number  of  Bachelors  in    Percentage   Relation  to 

Population  in  chief  European  Countries  ....  290 
Diagram  of  Increase  or  Decrease  of  the  Population  in  France 

and  Germany  per  1000  .         .         .         .         .         .         .291 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Population  in  chief  European  Countries 

in  1788  and  1888  in  Millions  .......       292 

Diagram  of  Value  by  Growth  of  Population  in  France  and  Ger- 
many, from  1788  to  1888        .......       293 

Diagram  showing  the  Number  of  Days  on  which  Food  would  be 

Lacking  in  Time  of  War  in  chief  European  Counties  .  .  296 
Diagram  showing  the  Number  of  Days  on  which  Oats  would  be 

Lacking  in  time  of  War  in  chief  European  Countries  .  .  298 
Diagram  of  Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Meat  in  chief  European 

Countries        ..........       304 

Diagram  of  Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Salt  in  chief  European 

Countries       ..........       305 

Diagram  of  Superfluity   or   Deficiency   of    Kerosene   in   chief 

European  Countries       ........       306 

Diagram  of  Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Stone  Coal  in  chief 

European  Countries       ........       306 

Chart  showing  Comparative  Development  of  Socialists  and  Free- 
thinkers in  Germany  according  to  the  Elections  of  1891  .  312 
Diagram  of  Percentage  of   Horses  which  would  be  taken   for 

Military  Purposes  in  chief  European  Countries  .  .  .  316 
Diagram  showing  Amount  of  Living  Force  of  a  Bullet  .  .  320 
Diagram  showing  Penetrative  Power  cf  the  Mauser  Bullet  on 

Numbers  of  Horses'  Carcases         .         .         .         .         .         .321 

Diagram  of  Rotation  and  Weight  of  Bullets  of  various  Rifles  .  322 
Diagram  of  Zone  of  Effective  Fire  against  Infantry  by  Chassepot 

and  Mannlicher  Rifles  respectively  .....  323 
Diagram  of  Breadth  of  Zone  of  Effective  Fire  against  Cavalry  by 

the  Chassepot  and  Mannlicher  Rifles  respectively         .         .       324 
Diagram  of  Distance  of  Useful  Fire     ......     ^  325 

Diagrams  of  Percentage  of  Hits  in  Fire  at  One  Infantryman  by 

French  and  German  Soldiers  .....  326-327 
Diagram  of  the  Deviation  of  the  Paskevitch  Instrument  .  ,  327 
Diagram  of  the  Number  of  Cartridges  Carried  by  One  Soldier 

with  Different  Rifles       .  .         .         .         ,         .         .       328 

Diagram  of  Number  of  Sappers  to  100  Infantrymen  in  Various 

European  Countries       ........       333 

Diagram  of  Losses  in  the  German  Army  in  the  War  of  1870  .  336 
Diagram  showing  Influence  of  the  Quality  of  Firearms  on   the 

Relations  of  Killed  to  Wounded 343 


INTRODUCTION 

The  death  of  M.  Jean  de  Bloch,  which  occurred  at 
Warsaw  just  as  the  year  (1902)  began,  is  a  misfortune 
for  the  whole  world.  It  is  peculiarly  so  at  this  imme- 
diate juncture ;  for  the  imperative  problem  with  the 
world  at  this  time  is  how  to  get  rid  of  war  and  sub- 
stitute for  it  a  rational  way  of  settling  international 
differences,  and  no  other  man  in  our  time  Has  studied 
this  problem  so  scientifically  or  contributed  so  much 
to  its  solution  as  Jean  de  Bloch.  Indeed,  I  think  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  M.  Bloch  was  the  most  thor- 
ough and  important  student  of  the  question  of  War 
in  all  its  details  and  upon  its  many  sides  who  has  ever 
lived,  and  that  his  great  book  upon  ''The  Future  of 
War"  will  remain  the  chief  armory  from  which  the 
men  of  the  twentieth  century  who  are  warring  against 
war  will  continue  to  draw  until  their  sure  victory 
comes,  and  all  national  and  international  disputes  are 
settled  in  the  courts,  as  to-day  personal  disputes  are 
settled. 

I  think  that  no  book  ever  written  in  the  cause  of  the 
peace  and  order  of  the  world,  save  Hugo  Grotius's 
great  work  alone,  has  rendered  or  is  likely  to  render 
such  influential  practical  service  as  Bloch's  "Future 
of  War,"  supplemented  as  it  has  been  by  his  articles 
in  the  various  reviews  during  the  years  since  the  work 
was  first  published.  Dante's  "De  Monarchia,"  the 
"Great  Design"  of  Henry  IV,  William  Penn's  "Plan 
for  the  Peace  of  Europe,"  Immanuel  Kant's  "Eternal 
Peace,"  the  essays  of  LaCroix,  Saint  Pierre,  Bellers 
and  Bentham,  Sumner's  "True  Grandeur  of  Nations," 
— these  high  appeals  and  such  as  these  have  pierced 
to  the  hearts  of  thinking  men  in  the  successive  cen- 
turies, and  their  general  and  cumulative  effect  in  ele- 


INTRODUCTION 

vating  the  tone  and  broadening  the  outlook  of  society 
upon  the  question  of  War  and  its  evils  has  been  im- 
mense. It  would  be  hard,  however,  to  lay  the  hand 
upon  any  distinct  practical  reform  or  progress 
wrought  by  any  of  them  in  its  own  day  or  days  that 
followed.  But  Grotius's  ''Rights  of  War  and  Peace" 
wrought  almost  a  revolution,  and  it  did  it  almost  at 
once.  With  it,  it  may  be  said  with  a  high  degree  of 
justice,  international,  law  was  born  into  the  world 
almost  full  grown ;  and  from  the  time  of  its  appear- 
ance war,  horrible  at  its  best,  has  been  in  its  usages  a 
very  different  thing  from  what  it  was  before.  Equally 
definite,  distinct  and  practical  has  been  the  influence 
of  Bloch's  "Future  of  War";  and  I  believe  that  it  will 
be  seen  at  the  end  of  this  twentieth  century  that  its 
influence  has  been  equally  powerful  and  far-reaching. 
Bloch's  monumental  work  upon  "The  Future  of 
War,"  in  six  volumes,  was  published  in  Russian  five 
or  six  years  ago.  It  was  the  result  of  a  decade's  spe- 
cial study  by  this  eminent  financier  and  economist, 
whose  whole  life's  experience  had  fitted  him  to  under- 
stand so  well  those  phases  of  the  question  which  he 
felt  it  most  important  to  emphasize  to  Europe.  Edi- 
tions of  the  complete  work  have  been  brought  out  in 
German  and  in  French,  under  the  distinguished 
author's  own  supervision.  No  edition  has  yet  ap- 
peared in  English ;  only  this  translation  of  the  last 
volume,  in  which  the  conclusions  are  summarized,  has 
'been  published  for  popular  use.  It  is  a  pleasure,  how- 
ever, to  be  able  to  state  that  the  preparation  of  a  com- 
plete English  edition  is  about  to  be  undertaken.  No 
library  in  America  or  England,  no  university  or  col- 
lege, no  editorial  room  or  minister's  study  should  be 
without  it.  Meantime  it  is  a  satisfaction  to  know  and 
to  assure  the  public  that  the  present  volume  contains 
the  gist  of  the  whole  work,  the  clear  statement  of  all 
its  important  principles.  It  will  always  be  the  best 
thing  for  the  ordinary  reader,  giving  all  which  he  re- 
quires. I  count  it  a  peculiar  benefaction  that  a  cheap 
edition  of  this  work  is  now  given  to  the  public  by  a 
publisher  whose  heart  is  in  it,  making  it  possible  for 


INTRODUCTION 

all  men  to  possess  it  and  for  the  friends  of  peace  to 
circulate  it  by  the  thousand.  I  trust  that  they  will 
earnestly  unite  to  do  it.  The  Peace  cause  has  suf- 
fered because  so  much  of  its  best  literature  is  not 
available  in  attractive  and  cheap  form  and  is  not 
widely  circulated.  This  need  we  are  assured  is  now 
to  be  effectively  met ;  and  the  present  publication  is 
surely  a  good  beginning. 

The  matter  of  really  greatest  moment  in  our  time 
for  the  student  of  War  and  the  worker  for  Peace  has 
not  been  the  war  in  South  Africa  nor  the  war  in  the 
Philippines,  but  the  Hague  Conference.  The  Hague 
Conference  did  not  come  into  existence  without  an- 
cestry, without  intellectual  forces  which  made  it 
imperative  and  certain.  It  came  not  simply  because 
the  Czar  sent  out  his  Rescript ;  it  was  because  the 
Czar  himself  had  been  converted,  that  commanding 
intellectual  forces  had  been  in  operation  in  Russia. 
I  think  there  was  none  of  these  intellectual  forces 
more  potent  than  that  exerted  by  Jean  de  Bloch. 
Bloch's  book  was  an  epoch-making  book.  It  startled 
the  Czar  and  his  ministers ;  it  startled  all  serious 
thinkers  in  Europe ;  it  was  one  of  the  cardinal  forces 
that  compelled  the  Conference  at  the  Hague.  At 
that  Conference,  in  a  private  and  unofficial  capacity, 
Bloch  himself  was  present  throughout.  He  always 
declined  the  honor  paid  1  im  of  having  suggested  the 
Conference  to  the  Czar  by  his  book  ;  the  idea  he  de- 
clared was  the  result  of  general  evolution,  which  was 
forcing  upon  all  serious  minds  the  conviction  of  the 
folly  and  impossibility  of  continuing  the  war  system. 

If  ever  a  man  is  born  under  conditions  which  natu- 
rally compel  him  to  think  of  the  tragedies  of  war,  of 
its  horrors  and  burdens,  and  of  the  evils  of  those  race 
antagonisms  which  so  often  lead  to  war,  I  think  it 
must  be  a  Polish  Jew.  The  very  word  Jew  brings  up 
the  thought  of  the  sufferings,  the  social  and  political 
ostracism,  the  injustices  and  wrongs  of  every  sort, 
which  have  been,  the  lot  of  the  Jew  through  all  these 
centuries.  The  name  of  Poland  reminds  us  equally 
impressively  of  those  scarce  slum'bering  hatreds  and 


INTRODUCTION 

antagonisms  there  still  after  a  hundred  years,  a  monu- 
ment to  the  cruelty  and  wickedness  of  the  wars  which 
ended  Poland's  national  life,  as  the  close  of  one  of  the 
most  mournful  and  shameful  chapters  in  human  his- 
tory. 

Jean  de  Bloch  was  a  Polish  Jew,  a  poor  Polish  Jew, 
beginning  his  life  as  a  pedlar,  hawking  his  wares 
about  the  streets  of  Warsaw.  Finally  getting  through 
good  fortune  a  sum  of  money,  he  resolved  that  he 
would  push  out  of  the  ignorance  and  narrowness  into 
which  he  was  born,  and  he  found  his  way  to  Berlin. 
There  he  studied  for  three  years,  largely  with  French 
and  English  tutors,  and  then  went  back  to  Warsaw. 
He  was  a  man  if  immense  energy  and  a  devoted  stu- 
dent. He  rapidly  acquired  a  fortune  as  a  banker  and 
also  obtained  a  high  reputation  as  a  sociologist  and 
an  economist.  He  married  a  rich  and  talented  woman, 
and  their  home  became  a  notable  intellectual  centre. 
He  wrote  exhaustive  works  in  many  volumes  upon 
Russian  railways,  Russian  finance,  and  Russian  local 
government.  It  was  to  him  presently  that  the  Rus- 
sian commercial  folk  and  the  Russian  government 
itself  were  turning  to  finance  their  operations.  He 
became  the  leading  banker  of  Poland — a  sort  of  Polish 
Rothschild — and  he  became  the  president  of  impor- 
tant railway  systems.  He  was  led  as  a  result  of  all 
this  to  understand  what  were  the  menaces  to  the 
economy  of  states  of  the  war  system  o'btaining  in 
Europe.  Seeing  that  war  lay  at  the  root  of  the 
trouble,  he  devoted  himself  for  years  to  the  prepara- 
tion of  his  exhaustive  work  upon  "The  Future  of 
War,"  the  most  powerful  arraignment  of  war  and  the 
most  powerful  argument  for  the  peace  of  the  world 
which  has  been  written  in  our  time,  or  perhaps  in  any 
time.  From  his  youth  he  had  studied  war,  and  he 
had  written  many  pamphlets  on  military  subjects;  but 
"The  Future  of  War"  was  his  supreme  efifort. 

With  that  work  Bloch  came  to  the  Hague  Confer- 
ence. He  came,  he  said,  as  a  learner;  but  he  came 
also  as  a  teacher  and  a  helper.  He  came  to  bring  his 
book,  to  distribute  it,  to  explain  it,  and  to  acquire  in- 


INTRODUCTION 

formation  and  education  for  himself.  He  sincerely 
believed  that  his  book  was  the  Bible  of  this  cause. 
He  was  not  a  vain  nor  an  opinionated  man,  but  he 
had  the  profoundest  confidence  in  his  insight  and  in 
the  things  which  he  had  learned.  His  argument  was, 
on  the  whole,  and  in  the  place  where  he  laid  the  em- 
phasis, a  new  one.  The  peace  societies  had  in  the 
main  appealed  to  the  moral  side  of  this  matter ;  Jean 
de  Bloch  appealed  to  the  business  side.  The  appeals 
of  the  apostles  of  peace  have  been  for  the  most  part 
to  the  world's  humanity  and  piety ;  although  it  would 
be  a  mistake  and  a  wrong  not  to  remember  that  from 
William  Penn's  time  to  Charles  Sumner's  they  have 
not  failed  to  urge  again  and  again  the  economic  argu- 
ment and  point  out  what  would  result  if  the  world 
would  apply  to  constructive  ends  what  it  wastes  on 
war.  Jean  de  Bloch  said :  We  must  appeal  to  the 
purse,  to  common  sense,  and  make  men  see  that  this 
war  system  is  the  most  stupid  thing  in  creation. 
That  was  where  he  directed  almost  his  whole  argu- 
ment. He  said  that  if  it  came  to  a  great  European 
war,  that  war  could  only  cease  with  the  annihilation 
of  one  combatant  and  the  financial  ruin  of  the  other. 
He  said  that,  so  far  from  this  question  of  an  interna- 
tional court  being  a  Utopian  thing,  it  was  the  men 
who  were  going  on  with  their  schemes  for  wars  who 
were  really  dealing  in  chimeras ;  that  the  time  has 
come  when  we  should  apply  our  resources,  not  to  the 
things  which  waste  and  devastate,  but  to  the  things 
that  build  up  states  and  the  industries  and  the  social 
welfare  of  men.  He  appealed  to  the  facts  of  war  as 
they  unrolled  themselves  before  the  eyes  of  Europe ; 
he  showed  what  the  real  results  of  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian War  were ;  he  drew  the  lessons  from  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War.  The  destructiveness  of  modern  war- 
fare, with  its  frightful  new  weapons,  becomes  so  ap- 
palling that  a  general  European  war  would  bring  the 
universal  bankruptcy  of  nations.  The  present  armed 
peace,  indeed,  is  so  costly  that  the  burdens  of  it  al- 
ready threaten  social  revolution  in  almost  every  coun- 
try in  Europe. 


INTRODUCTION 

Bloch,  unlike  most  peace  men,  was  one  of  the  most 
critical  students  of  military  affairs ;  he  met  the  mili- 
tary men  upon  their  own  ground.  He  lectured  last 
summer  to  the  United  Service  Institution  in  London, 
a  body  of  military  experts,  with  a  major-general  in 
the  chair ;  and  he  proved  himself  the  superior  of  those 
practical  and  learned  military  men  upon  every  tech- 
nical point,  and  worsted  them  in  the  debate. 

In  the  last  years  of  Bloch's  life  he  was  engaged 
chiefly  in  drawing  from  the  South  African  War  the 
warning  lessons  which  the  world  needs  to  learn.  He 
has  shown  that  the  Boers  have  been  so  successful  not, 
as  has  been  often  said,  because  of  the  topography  of 
the  country  or  because  they  are  particularly  good 
marksmen,  but  because  they  have  profited  by  the 
utterly  changed  conditions  of  war.  Bloch  shows  that 
the  fundamental  change  came  in  with  the  American 
Civil  War.  The  American  Civil  War,  he  was  never 
tired  of  telling  the  people  of  Europe,  settled  it  that 
the  alleged  superiority  of  disciplined  armies  over  vol- 
unteer troops  amounts  to  nothing;  that  the  ordinary 
military  training  is  often  a  positive  disadvantage  in 
preparing  for  modern  warfare.  War  is  no  longer  the 
clash  of  solid  phalanxes  with  solid  phalanxes  in 
showy,  heroic  combat  upon  battlefields.  Cavalry 
and  artillery  are  rapidly  becoming  useless.  Soldiers 
cannot  be  compacted,  but  must  be  spread  apart,  and 
each  must  rely  upon  himself  as  never  before.  One 
man  in  defence  is  a  match  for  ten  in  offence ;  the 
methods  of  guerilla  warfare  become  more  and  more 
common  and  necessary ;  and  the  civilian  soldier,  the 
simple  volunteer,  is  as  good  as  the  regular,  and  often 
better. 

This  is  a  thing  of  immense  moment;  for  if  it  is  true 
it  makes  the  whole  effort  to  maintain  great  arma- 
ments a  vain  thing.  Robert  Peel  said  with  discern- 
ment that,  instead  of  wasting  the  resources  of  a  coun- 
try to  maintain  great  armies  and  navies,  the  sensible 
nation  in  the  future  will  rely  upon  its  own  latent 
energies,  perfectly  sure  that  if  it  has  inherent  energy 
it  can  always  improvise  powers  necessary  for  any  de- 


INTRODUCTION 

fence  at  very  short  notice.  There  is  no  practical 
demand  or  excuse  longer  for  costly  armies  and  navies; 
all  this  great  armament  is  waste.  Bloch  has  shown 
that  thing  to  the  modern  world, — that  from  the  scien- 
tific point  of  view  armies  and  navies  are  not  a  source 
of  strength  to  any  nation,  but  rather  a  source  of  weak- 
ness ;  that  they  do  not  defend,  but  rather  drain  and 
endanger.  He  has  not  been  answered  ;  I  do  not  be- 
lieve he  can  be  answered.  We  are  his  debtors, — the 
foolish  and  long-suffering  world  is  his  debtor, — for  the 
thoroughness  and  power  with  which  he  has  taught 
this  great  lesson, 

"The  Future  of  War"  was  but  the  culmination  of 
M.  Bloch's  remarkable  activities  in  his  life's  campaign 
for  peace  and  an  organized  world.  His  articles  in  the 
reviews  and  magazines — Russian,  French,  German 
and  English — were  innumerable.  His  impressive  ar- 
ticle upon  ''Militarism  in  Politics,"  in  the  last  Decem- 
ber number  of  the  Contemporary  Rcz'iczv,  should  be  read 
by  all  Americans  as  well  as  by  all  Englishmen,  at  this 
time.  His  earlier  article  in  the  same  review  (Septem- 
ber, 1901)  on  ''The  Wars  of  the  Future"  is  the  most 
striking  statement  in  brief  of  the  main  principles  of 
his  great  book ;  it  should  be  printed  as  a  tract  and 
scattered  'broadcast  up  and  down  the  land.  Another 
powerful  statement  of  his  position  has  appeared  in 
our  own  North  American  Review  since  his  death 
(April,  1902). 

Bloch  was  not  only  present  at  the  Hague  during 
the  Conference,  but  at  Paris  during  the  Exposition, 
always  indefatigable  in  his  work  of  enlightenment. 
When  necessary  he  took  the  platform  ;  and  so  it  was 
that  we  had  the  privilege  of  seeing  and  meeting  him 
when  he  came  to  London  last  summer  to  deliver  his 
lectures  on  the  Transvaal  War  before  the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution,  to  which  I  have  referred. 
After  one  of  these  lectures  he  invited  us  to  a  personal 
meeting;  and  at  this  meeting  he  unfolded  with  great 
earnestness  his  scheme  for  having  established  at  sev- 
eral of  the  world's  leading  centres  what  he  called  War 
and  Peace  Institutions.     These  were  to  be  large  mu- 


INTRODUCTION 

seums,  in  which,  by  pictures,  panoramas,  models, 
charts  and  many  means,  the  real  character  and  sig- 
nificance of  modern  warfare  should  be  brought  home 
to  the  actual  perception  of  men  and  women,  who  now 
for  the  most  part  have  no  adequate  comprehension  of 
what  war  is.  Especially  did  he  wish  to  have  the  prac- 
tical and  economic  aspects  emphasized,  to  make  men 
see  how  and  why,  in  the  changed  military  conditions, 
a  really  successful  war  on  the  part  of  one  great  power 
upon  another  really  great  power  is  impossible. 

At  the  time  of  his  death  M.  Bloch  was  actually 
engaged  in  the  establishment  of  the  first  of  these  re- 
markable museums  at  Lucerne  ;  and  he  provided  for 
its  generous  endowment.  He  chose  Lucerne  as  a 
point  to  begin,  since  it  is  a  place  so  much  visited,  and 
he  felt  that  the  knowledge  of  the  work  would  spread 
thence  to  all  the  world,  and  the  work  be  largely 
copied.  He  had  secured  a  large  and  imposing  build- 
ing at  Lucerne  and  was  prosecuting  the  work  of  prep- 
aration at  large  personal  expense ;  for  M.  Bloch  was 
a  man  of  great  wealth,  and  put  much  money,  as  well 
as  thought  and  zeal,  into  his  peace  propaganda. 

He  was  anxious  that  what  he  was  planning  in 
Lucerne  should  also  be  done  in  London ;  and  he  gave 
me  a  long  typewritten  outline  of  his  scheme  to  submit 
to  William  Mather,  George  Cadbury  and  other  lead- 
ing peace  men  in  England,  whose  cooperation  might 
be,  enlisted.  I  believe  that  London  will  yet  have  such 
an  institution.  I  sincerely  hope  that  America  will 
have  such  a  one ;  and  this  was  M.  Blocli's  earnest  de- 
sire. He  spoke  of  New  York  and  Washington  ^s 
appropriate  locations ;  and  in  one  of  these  cities, 
through  the  munificence  of  some  one  of  our  haters  of 
war  and  lovers  of  peace,  who  could  certainly  put  a 
half  million  dollars  to  no  more  useful  or  necessary 
service  to-day,  this  institution  should  surely  rise  and 
continue  to  teach  its  lessons  until  they  are  no  longer 
needed. 

I  wish  that  it  might  be  founded  noAv,  while  the 
workers  for  peace  through  all  the  world  are  mourn- 
ing for  Bloch,  as  a  strong  assurance  that  his  work  and 


INTRODUCTION 

influence  shall  be  perpetuated  and  shall  grow.  I  wish 
that  in  memory  of  him  it  might  'be  called  simply  The 
Block  Institution.  I  wish  that  the  things  which  he  sug- 
gests in  the  outline  which  he  prepared,  and  which  I 
hope  will  soon  be  published,  might  all  be  carried  out ; 
and  I  wish  that,  in  sympathetic  hands,  catching  his 
great  inspiration,  the  institution  might  be  developed 
with  a  fulness  of  which  even  he  hardly  dreamed.  I 
wish  that  one  great  hall  might  be  devoted  to  copies  of 
all  of  Verestchagin's  pictures,  and  that  other  halls 
might  serve  similar  ends.  I  wish  that  year  by  year 
addresses  might  be  given  at  the  institution  by  the 
world's  best  thinkers  in  behalf  of  a  rationally  organ- 
ized world ;  that  peace  and  arbitration  conferences 
might  there  be  regularly  held  ;  that  from  that  centre 
all  the  world's  best  literature  upon  this  commanding 
interest  might  be  widely  circulated  ;  and  that  useful 
publications  might  there  have  their  source.  I  can 
think  of  no  institution  that  would  be  of  greater  service 
in  America  at  this  time.  I  can  think  of  no  worthier 
monument  which  we  could  rear  to  Jean  de  Bloch. 
His  noblest  and  immortal  monument  he  has  himself 
created  in  his  great  work  on  "The  Future  of  War." 

Edwin  D.  Mead. 


CONVERSATIONS    WITH    M.    BLOCH 

By  William  T.   Stead 

*'  The    Fuhire   of   War''  is   the   title   of  M,  de 
BlocJis  voluniinotLs  cyclopcedia  on  the  art  of  luar, 
past,  present,  and  to  come.     But  that  is  a  mistake. 
For  M.  B loch's  thesis  is  that  there  is  no  war  to 
come,  that  war  indeed  has  ab^eady  become  impossible. 
It  would  really  have  been  clearer  therefore  to 
call  this  translation  of  the  sixth  and  concluding 
volume  of  his  inwiense  book  "'Is  IV ai^  Noiu  Impos- 
sible ?  " — as  in  the  English  edition, — for  this  title 
gives  a  mtcch  clearer  idea  of  the  contents.    For  M. 
Block  contends  in  all  sober  seriousness  that  war — 
great  war  in  the  usual  acceptation  of  the  word — 
has  already,  by  the  natural  and  normal  develop- 
ment of  the  art  or  science  of  warfare,  become  a 
physical  impossibility  I 
^     That  is  what  this  book  was  written  to  prove. 


PREFACE 

But,  before  reading  the  chapters  crammed  with 
statistics  and  entering  tipon  the  arguments  of  the 
great  Polish  economist,  the  reader  may  find  it 
convenient  to  glance  over,  as  a  preliminary  intro- 
duction to  the  book,  the  following  free  rendering 
of  the  conversations  which  I  have  had  the  privi- 
lege of  enjoying  with  the  author  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  in  London. 

"  Utopians,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  **  and  they  call  us  Utopians, 
idealists,  visionaries,  because  we  believe  that  the  end  of 
war  is  in  sight  ?  But  who  are  the  Utopians,  I  should 
like  to  know  ?  What  is  a  Utopian,  using  the  term  as  an 
epithet  of  opprobrium  ?  He  is  a  man  who  lives  in  a 
dream  of  the  impossible  ;  but  what  1  know  and  am  pre- 
pared to  prove  is,  that  the  real  Utopians  who  are  living 
in  a  veritable  realm  of  phantasy  are  those  people  who 
believe  in  war.  War  has  been  possible,  no  doubt,  but 
it  has  at  last  become  impossible,  and  those  who  are  pre- 
paring for  war,  and  basing  all  their  schemiCS  of  life  on  the 
expectation  of  war,  are  visionaries  of  the  worst  kind,  for 
war  is  no  longer  possible." 

•'That  is  good  news,  M.  Bloch,"  I  replied  ;  "  but  is  it 
not  somewhat  of  a  paradox  ?  Only  last  year  we  had  the 
Spanish-American  war;  the  year  before,  the  war  between 
Turkey  and  Greece.  Since  when  has  war  become 
impossible  ?  " 

^*  Oh,"  replied  M.  Bloch,  with  vivacity,  ^*  I  do  not  speak 
of  such  wars.  It  is  not  to  such  frontier  brawls,  or 
punitive  operations  such  as  you  in  England,  for  instance, 
are   perpetually    engaging   in    on    the    frontiers  of  your 


X  PREFACE 

extended  empire,  that  I  refer  when  I  say  that  war  has 
become  impossible.  When  soldiers  and  statesmen  speak 
about  the  War  of  the  Future,  they  do  not  refer  to  such 
trumpery  expeditions  against  semi-barbarous  peoples. 
The  war  of  the  future,  the  war  which  has  become  impos- 
sible, is  the  war  that  has  haunted  the  imagination  of 
mankind  for  the  last  thirty  years,  the  war  in  which  great 
nations  armed  to  the  teeth  were  to  fling  themselves  with 
all  their  resources  into  a  struggle  for  life  and  death 
This  is  the  war  that  every  day  becomes  more  and  more 
impossible.  Yes,  it  is  in  preparations  against  that  im- 
possible war  that  these  so-called  practical  men,  who  are 
the  real  Utopians  of  our  time,  are  wasting  the  resources 
of  civilisation." 

'*  Pray  explain  yourself  more  clearly,  M.  Bloch." 
*'  Well,"  said  he,  "  I  suppose  you  will  admit  that  war 
has  practically  become  impossible  for  the  minor  States. 
It  is  as  impossible  for  Denmark  or  for  Belgium  to  make 
war  to-day  as  it  would  be  for  you  or  for  me  to  assert  the 
right  of  private  war,  which  our  forefathers  possessed. 
We  cannot  do  it.  At  least,  we  could  only  try  to  do  it, 
and  then  be  summarily  suppressed  and  punished  for  our 
temerity.  That  is  the  position  of  the  minor  States.  For 
them  war  is  practically  forbidden  by  their  stronger  neigh- 
bours. They  are  in  the  position  of  the  descendants  of  the 
feudal  lords,  whose  right  of  levying  war  has  vanished 
owing  to  the  growth  of  a  strong  central  power  whose 
interests  and  authority  are  incompatible  with  the  exercise 
of  what  used  to  be  at  one  time  an  almost  universal 
right.  For  the  minor  States,  therefore,  war  is  impos- 
sible." 

"Admitted,"   I  replied.     ''Impossible,   that  is  to  say, 
without  the  leave  and  licence  of  the  great  Powers." 


PREFACE  xi 

"Precisely,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  *^  and  hence,  when  we 
discuss  the  question  of  future  war,  we  always  deal  with  it 
as  a  war  between  great  Powers.  That  is  to  say,  primarily, 
the  long  talked-of,  constantly  postponed  war  between 
France  and  Germany  for  the  lost  provinces;  and,  secondly, 
that  other  war,  the  thought  of  which  has  gradually  replaced 
that  of  the  single-handed  duel  between  France  and 
Germany,  viz.,  a  war  between  theTriplice  and  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance.  It  is  that  war  which  constantly  pre- 
occupies the  mind  of  statesmen  and  sovereigns  of  Europe, 
and  it  is  that  war  which,  I  maintain,  has  become  absolutely 
impossible." 

"  But  how  impossible,  M.  Bloch  ?  Do  you  mean 
morally  impossible  ? '' 

**  No  such  thing,"  he  replied.  ''  I  am  dealing  not  with 
moral  considerations,  which  cannot  be  measured,  but  with 
hard,  matter-of-fact,  material  things,  which  can  be  esti- 
mated and  measured  with  some  approximation  to  absolute  ©/ 
accuracy.  I  maintain  that  war  has  become  impossible 
alike  from  a  military,  economic,  and  political  point  of 
view.  The  very  development  that  has  taken  place  in  the 
mechanism  of  war  has  rendered  war  an  impracticable 
operation.  The  dimensions  of  modern  armaments  and 
the  organisation  of  society  have  rendered  its  prosecution 
an  economic  impossibility,  and,  finally,  if  any  attempt 
were  made  to  demonstrate  the  inaccuracy  of  my  assertions 
by  putting  the  matter  to  a  test  on  a  great  scale,  we  should 
find  the  inevitable  result  in  a  catastrophe  which  would 
destroy  all  existing  political  organisations.  Thus,  the 
great  war  cannot  be  made,  and  any  attempt  to  make  it 
would  result  in  suicide.  Such,  I  believe,  is  the  simple 
demonstrable  fact." 

'*  But  where  is  the  demonstration  ?  "   I  asked. 


Xll 


PREFACE 


M.  Bloch  turned  and  pointed  to  his  encyclopaedic  work 
upon  ''The  Future  of  War,"  six  soHd  volumes,  each  con- 
taining I  do  not  know  how  many  quarto  pages,  which 
stood  piled  one  above  the  other. 

'*  Read  that,"  he  said.  ''  In  that  book  you  will  find  the 
facts  upon  which  my  demonstration  rests." 

"  That  is  all  very  well,"  I  said ;  *'  but  how  can  you, 
M.  Bloch,  an  economist  and  a  banker,  set  yourself  up  as 
an  authority  upon  military  matters  ?  " 

"  Oh,"  said  M.  Bloch,  ''  you  have  a  saying  that  it  is 
often  the  outsider  that  sees  most  ;  and  you  must 
remember  that  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  mihtary 
experts  are  by  no  means  inaccessible  to  the  general 
student.  In  order  to  form  a  correct  idea  as  to  the  changes 
that  have  taken  place  in  the  mechanism  of  war,  it  is 
quite  conceivable  that  the  bystander  who  is  not  engaged 
in  the  actual  carrying  out  of  the  evolution  now  in  progress 
may  be  better  able  to  see  the  drift  and  tendency  of  things 
than  those  who  are  busily  engaged  in  the  actual  detail  of 
the  operation.  I  can  only  say  that  while  at  first  hand 
I  have  no  authority  whatever,  and  do  not  in  any  way  pose 
as  a  military  or  naval  expert,  I  have  taken  all  imaginable 
pains  in  order  to  master  the  literature  of  warfare,  espe- 
cially the  most  recent  treatises  upon  military  operations 
and  the  handling  of  armies  and  fleets,  which  have  been 
published  by  the  leading  military  authorities  in  the 
modern  world.  After  mastering  what  they  have  written, 
I  have  had  opportunities  of  discussing  personally  with 
many  officers  in  all  countries  as  to  the  conclusions  at 
which  1  have  arrived,  and  I  am  glad  to  know  that  in  the 
main  there  is  not  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
accuracy  of  my  general  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of 
future  warfare." 


PREFACE  xiii 

*'  But  do  they  also  agree  with  you,"  I  said,  **  that  war 
has  become  impossible  ?  " 

"  No,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  that  would  be  too  much  to 
expect.  Otherwise  Othello's  occupation  would  be  gone. 
But  as  they  have  admitted  the  facts,  we  can  draw  our 
own  conclusions." 

**  But  I  see  in  your  book  you  deal  with  every  branch  of 
the  service,  armaments  of  all  kinds,  manoeuvres,  questions 
of  strategy,  problems  of  fortification — everything,  in  fact, 
that  comes  into  the  consideration  of  the  actual  conduct 
of  modern  war.  Do  you  mean  to  tell  me  that  military 
men  generally  think  you  have  made  no  mistakes  ?  " 

"That  would  be  saying  too  much.  The  book  was 
referred  by  the  Emperor  of  Russia  at  my  request  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  with  a  request  that  it  should  be  sub- 
jected to  examination  by  a  council  of  experts.  The 
results  of  that  council  were  subsequently  communicated 
to  the  Emperor  in  the  shape  of  a  report,  which  set  forth 
that  while  in  dealing  with  so  very  many  questions  it  was 
impossible  to  avoid  some  mistakes,  it  was  their  opinion 
that  the  book  was  a  very  useful  one,  and  that  it 
was  most  desirable  that  it  should  be  placed  in  the 
hands  of  all  staff  officers.  They  also  added  an  expres- 
sion of  opinion  that  no  book  could  contribute  so  much 
to  the  success  of  the  Conference  or  to  the  information 
of  those  who  were  to  take  part  in  its  deliberations. 

**The  one  question  upon  which  strong  difference  of 
opinion  existed  was  that  concerning  the  use  of  the 
bayonet.  I  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion,  based  upon  a 
very  careful  examination  of  various  authorities,  that  the 
day  of  the  bayonet  is  over.  In  the  Franco-German  war 
the  total  mortality  of  the  Germans  from  cold  steel 
amounted  to  only  one  per  cent.     The  proportion  on  the 


xiv  PREFACE 

French  side  was  higher,  but  I  think  it  can  be  mathe- 
matically demonstrated  that,  in  future,  war  will  be  decided 
at  ranges  which  will  render  the  use  of  the  bayonet  impos- 
sible. General  Dragomiroff,  however,  a  veteran  of  the 
old  school,  cannot  tolerate  this  slight  upon  his  favourite 
weapon.  In  his  eyes  the  bayonet  is  supreme,  and  it  is 
cold  steel  which  at  the  last  will  always  be  the  deciding 
factor  in  the  combats  of  peoples.  He  therefore  strongly 
condemns  that  portion  of  my  book  ;  but  it  stands  on  its 
own  merits,  and  the  reader  can  form  his  own  judgment  as 
to  the  probability  of  the  bayonet  being  of  any  practical 
use  in  future  war." 

**  General  Dragomiroff's  devotion  to  the  bayonet,"  I 
remarked,  "  reminds  me  of  our  admirals'  devotion  to  sails 
in  our  navy.  Fifteen  years  ago  it  was  quite  obvious  that 
the  fighting  ship  of  the  future  had  no  need  for  sails — 
that,  indeed,  sails  were  an  encumbrance  and  a  danger  ; 
but  all  the  admirals  of  the  old  school  attached  far  more 
importance  to  the  smartness  in  furling  and  unfurling  sail 
than  they  did  to  proficiency  in  gunnery  or  in  any  of  the 
deciding  factors  in  naval  battles.  They  clung  to  masts 
and  yards  for  years  after  all  the  younger  officers  in  the 
service  knew  that  they  might  as  well  have  clung  to  bows 
and  arrows ;  and  I  suppose  you  will  find  the  same  thing 
in  regard  to  the  bayonet." 

^*  Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  the  bayonet  seems  to  me  alto- 
gether out  of  date.  No  doubt  it  is  a  deadly  enough 
weapon,  if  you  can  get  within  a  yard  of  your  enemy;  but 
the  problem  that  I  have  been  asking  myself  is  whether  in 
future  combatants  will  ever  be  able  to  get  within  one 
hundred  yards  of  one  another,  let  alone  one  yard." 

"  But  then,"  I  rejoined,  ''  if  that  be  so,  wars  will  be 
much  less  deadly  than  they  were  before." 


PREFACE  XV 

^' Yes  and  no,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  ''they  will  become  less 
deadly  because  they  have  become  more  deadly.  There 
is  no  kind  of  warfare  so  destructive  of  human  life  as  that 
in  which  you  have  bodies  of  men  face  to  face  with  each 
other,  with  nothing  but  cold  steel  to  settle  the  issue. 
The  slaughter  which  took  place  in  the  old  wars  between 
barbarians,  or  between  the  Romans  and  the  barbarian 
tribes  on  their  frontiers,  "was  simply  appalling.  There  is 
nothing  like  it  in  modern  warfare,  and  this  diminution 
of  the  mortality  in  battle  has  been,  paradoxically  enough, 
produced  by  the  improved  deadliness  of  the  weapons  with 
which  men  fight.  They  are,  indeed,  becoming  so  deadly 
that  before  long  you  will  see  they  will  never  fight  at  all." 

''That,"  I  replied,  "was  the  faith  of  Rudyard  Kipling, 
who  wrote  me  a  few  months  ago  saying  that  he  relied  for 
the  extinction  of  war  upon  the  invention  of  a  machine 
which  would  infallibly  slay  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  com- 
batants whenever  battle  was  waged.  *  Then,*  he  said, 
'  war  would  cease  of  itself.'  The  same  idea  was  expressed 
by  Lord  Lytton  in  his  novel  of  'The  Coming  Race,'  in 
which  he  attributed  the  final  disappearance  of  war  from 
the  planet  to  the  discovery  of  vril,  a  destructive  so  deadly 
that  an  army  could  be  annihilated  by  the  touch  of  a 
button  by  the  finger  of  a  child." 

"Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch;  "that  is  so;  but  until  mankind 
has  made  experience  of  the  deadliness  of  its  weapons 
there  will  be  terrible  bloodshed.  For  instance,  at  Omdur- 
man  the  destruction  inflicted  upon  the  forces  of  the 
Khalifa  came  very  near  the  fifty  per  cent,  standard  of 
Rudyard  Kipling.  That  one  experience  was  probably 
sufficient  even  for  the  Dervishes.  They  will  never  again 
face  the  fire  of  modern  rifles.  The  experience  which  they 
have  learned  is  rapidly  becoming  generalised  throughout 


xvi  PREFACE 

the  armies  of  Christendom,  and  although  tlicre  may  be 
some  frightful  scenes  of  wholesale  slaughter,  one  or  two 
experiences  of  that  kind  will  rid  our  military  authorities 
of  any  desire  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  their 
adversaries." 

"  What  a  paradox  it  is  !  "  I  replied.  '*  We  shall  end  by 
killing  nobody,  because  if  we  fought  at  all  we  should  kill 
everybody.  Then  you  do  not  anticipate  increased 
slaugliter  as  the  result  of  the  increased  precision  in 
weapons  ?  " 

^' You  mistake  me,"  said  M.  Bloch.  '^At  first  there 
will  be  increased  slaughter — increased  slaughter  on  so 
terrible  a  scale  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  get  troops  to 
push  the  battle  to  a  decisive  issue.  They  will  try  to, 
thinking  that  they  are  fighting  under  the  old  conditions, 
and  they  will  learn  such  a  lesson  that  they  will  abandon 
the  attempt  for  ever.  Then,  instead  of  a  war  fought  out  to 
the  bitter  end  in  a  series  of  decisive  battles,  we  shall  have 
as  a  substitute  a  long  period  of  continually  increasing 
strain  upon  the  resources  of  the  combatants.  The  war, 
instead  of  being  a  hand-to-hand  contest  in  which  the 
combatants  measure  their  physical  and  moral  superiority, 
will  become  a  kind  of  stalemate,  in  which  neither  army 
being  able  to  get  at  the  other,  both  armies  will  be 
maintained  in  opposition  to  each  other,  threatening  each 
other,  but  never  being  able  to  deliver  a  final  and  decisive 
attack.  It  will  be  simply  the  natural  evolution  of  the 
armed  peace,  on  an  aggravated  scale." 

*'  Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  accompanied  by  entire  disloca- 
tion of  all  industry  and  severing  of  all  the  sources  of  supply 
by  which  alone  the  community  is  enabled  to  bear  the 
crushing  burden  of  that  armed  peace.  It  will  be  a  multi- 
plication of  expenditure  simultaneously  accompanied  by  a 


PREFACE  xvii 

diminution  of  the  sources  by  which  that  expenditure  can 
be  met.  That  is  the  future  of  war — not  fighting,  but 
famine,  not  the  slaying  of  men,  but  the  bankruptcy  of 
nations  and  the  break-up  of  the  whole  social  organisation." 

*'  Now  I  begin  to  perceive  how  it  is  that  we  have  as  a 
prophet  of  the  end  of  war  a  political  economist,  and  not 
a  soldier." 

''Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "it  is  as  a  political  economist  that 
I  discovered  the  open  secret  which  he  who  runs  may  read. 
The  soldier  by  natural  evolution  has  so  perfected  the 
mechanism  of  slaughter  that  he  has  practically  secured 
his  own  extinction.  He  has  made  himself  so  costly  that 
mankind  can  no  longer  afford  to  pay  for  his  maintenance, 
and  he  has  therefore  transferred  the  sceptre  of  the  world 
from  those  who  govern  its  camps  to  those  who  control  its 
markets." 

''But  now,  M.  Bloch,  will  you  condescend  to  particulars, 
and  explain  to  me  how  this  great  evolution  has  been 
brought  about  ?  " 

"  It  is  very  simple,"  said  M.  Bloch.  "  The  outward  and 
visible  sign  of  the  end  of  war  was  the  introduction  of  the 
magazine  rifle.  For  several  hundred  years  after  the  dis- 
covery of  gunpowder  the  construction  of  firearms  made 
little  progress  The  cannon  with  which  you  fought  at 
Trafalgar  differed  comparatively  little  from  those  which 
you  used  against  the  Armada.  For  two  centuries  you 
were  content  to  clap  some  powder  behind  a  round  ball  in  an 
iron  tube,  and  fire  it  at  your  enemy. 

"The  introduction  of  the  needle  gun  and  of  breech- 
loading  cannon  may  be  said  to  mark  the  dawn  of  the  new 
era,  which,  however,  was  not  definitely  established  amongst 
us  until  the  invention  of  the  magazine  rifle  of  very  small 
calibre.     The  magazine  gun  may  also  be  mentioned  as  an 

b 


xvili  PREFACE 

illustration  of  the  improved  deadlinessof  firearms  ;  but,  as 
your  experience  at  Obdurman  showed,  the  deciding  factor 
was  not  the  Maxim,  but  the  magazine  rifle." 

"Yes,"  I  said;  '*  as  Lord  Wolseley  said,  it  was  the 
magazine  rifle  which  played  like  a  deadly  hose  spouting 
leaden  bullets  upon  the  advancing  enemy." 

"  Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  and  the  possibility  of  firing 
half  a  dozen  bullets  without  having  to  stop  to  reload  has 
transformed  the  conditions  of  modern  war." 

"  Do  you  not  exaggerate  the  importance  of  mere  rapidity 
of  fire  ?  "  I  asked. 

"  No,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  '^  rapidity  of  fire  does  not  stand 
alone.  The  modern  rifle  is  not  only  a  much  more  rapid 
firer  than  its  predecessors,  but  it  has  also  an  immensely 
wider  range  and  far  greater  precision  of  fire.  To  these 
three  qualities  must  be  added  yet  a  fourth,  which  completes 
the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  new  firearm,  and  that  is 
the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder." 

*'  The  Spanish-American  campaign,"  I  said,  *'  illustrated 
the  importance  of  smokeless  powder ;  but  how  do  you 
think  the  smokelessness  of  the  new  explosives  will  affect 
warfare  in  the  future  ?" 

"  In  the  first  case,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  it  demolishes  the 
screen  behind  which  for  the  last  400  years  human  beings 
have  fought  and  died.  All  the  last  great  battles  have  been 
fought  more  or  less  in  the  dark.  After  the  battle  is  joined, 
friends  and  foes  have  been  more  or  less  lost  to  sight  in  the 
clouds  of  dense  smoke  which  hung  heavy  over  the  whole 
battlefield.  Now  armies  will  no  longer  fight  in  the  dark. 
Every  soldier  in  the  fighting  line  will  see  with  frightful 
distinctness  the  havoc  which  is  being  made  in  the  ranks 
by  the  shot  and  shell  of  the  enemy.  The  veil  which  gun- 
powder spread  over  the  worst  horrors  of  the  battlefield  has 


PREFACE 


XIX 


been  withdrawn  for  ever.  But  that  is  not  the  only  change. 
It  is  difficult  to  over-estimate  the  increased  strain  upon  the 
nerve  and  morale  of  an  army  under  action  by  the  fact  that 
men  will  fall  killed  and  wounded  without  any  visible  or 
audible  cause.  In  the  old  days  the  soldier  saw  the  puft'  of 
smoke,  heard  the  roar  of  the  gun,  and  when  the  shell  or 
shot  ploughed  its  way  through  the  ranks,  he  associated 
cause  and  effect,  and  was  to  a  certain  extent  prepared  for 
it.  In  the  warfare  of  the  future  men  will  simply  fall  and 
die  without  either  seeing  or  hearing  anything." 
**  Without  hearing  anything,  M.  Bloch  ?  " 
**  Without  hearing  anything,  for  although  the  smokeless 
powder  is  not  noiseless,  experience  has  proved  that  the 
report  of  a  rifle  will  not  carry  more  than  nine  hundred 
yards,  and  volley-firing  cannot  be  heard  beyond  a  mile. 
But  that  brings  us  to  the  question  of  the  increased  range 
of  the  new  projectiles.  An  army  on  march  will  suddenly 
become  aware  of  the  comparative  proximity  of  the  foe  by 
seeing  men  drop  killed  and  wounded,  without  any  visible 
cause ;  and  only  after  some  time  will  they  be  able  to 
discover  that  the  invisible  shafts  of  death  were  sped  from 
a  line  of  sharp-shooters  l3ing  invisible  at  a  distance  of  a 
mile  or  more.  There  will  be  nothing  along  the  whole 
line  of  the  horizon  to  show  from  whence  the  death- 
dealing  missiles  have  sped.  It  will  simply  be  as  if  the 
bolt  had  come  from  the  blue.  Can  you  conceive  of 
anything  more  trying  to  human  nerves  ?  " 

"  But  what  is  the  range  of  the  modern  rifle  ?  " 
"  The  modern  rifle,"  said  M.  Bloch,  **  has  a  range  of 
3000  or  4000  metres — that  is  to  say,  from  two  to  three 
miles.  Of  course,  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  it  will  be 
used  at  such  great  distances.  For  action  at  long  range, 
artillery  is  much  more  effective.     But  of  that  I  will  speak 


XX 


PREFACE 


shortly.  But  you  can  fairly  say  that  for  one  mile  or  a 
mile  and  a  half  the  magazine  rifle  is  safe  to  kill  anything 
that  stands  between  the  muzzle  and  its  mark  ;  and 
therein,"  continued  M.  Bloch,  "  lies  one  of  the  greatest 
changes  that  have  been  effected  in  modern  firearms.  Just 
look  at  this  table  "  (see  page  4).  "  It  will  explain  better 
than  anything  I  can  say  the  change  that  has  been  brought 
about  in  the  last  dozen  years. 

^*  In  the  last  great  war,  if  you  wished  to  hit  a  distant 
mark,  you  had  to  sight  your  rifle  so  as  to  fire  high  up  into 
the  air,  and  the  ball  executing  a  curve  descended  at  the 
range  at  which  you  calculated  your  target  stood.  Between 
the  muzzle  and  the  target  your  bullet  did  no  execution. 
It  was  soaring  in  the  air,  first  rising  until  it  reached  the 
maximum  height,  and  then  descending  it  struck  the  target 
or  the  earth  at  one  definite  point  some  thousand  yards 
distant.  Contrast  this  with  the  modern  weapon.  There 
is  now  no  need  for  sighting  your  gun  so  as  to  drop  your 
bullet  at  a  particular  range.  You  aim  straight  at  your 
man,  and  the  bullet  goes,  as  is  shown  in  the  diagram, 
direct  to  its  mark.  There  is  no  climbing  into  the  air  to 
fall  again.  It  simply  speeds,  say,  five  feet  from  the  earth 
until  it  meets  its  mark.  Anything  that  stands  between 
its  object  and  the  muzzle  of  the  rifle  it  passes  through. 
Hence  whereas  in  the  old  gun  you  hit  your  man  only  if 
you  could  drop  your  bullet  upon  the  square  yard  "of 
ground  upon  which  he  was  standing,  you  now  hit  him  so 
long  as  you  train  your  rifle  correctly  on  every  square 
yard  of  the  thousand  or  two  thousand  which  may  inter- 
vene between  the  muzzle  of  your  gun  and  the  end  of  the 
course  of  the  shot.  That  circumstance  alone,  even 
without  any  increase  in  the  rapidity  of  the  fire,  must 
enormously  add  to  the  deadliness  of  the  modern  firearms." 


PREFACE  xxi 

*'  Could  you  give  me  any  exact  statistics  as  to  the 
increased  rapidity  of  fire  ?  " 

^'Certainly,''  said  M.  Bloch.  "That  is  to  say,  I  can 
give  you  particulars  up  to  a  comparatively  recent  time, 
but  the  progress  of  the  science  of  firearms  is  so  rapid  that 
no  one  can  say  but  that  my  statistics  may  be  old  before 
you  print  your  report  of  this  talk.  The  ordinary  soldier 
will  fire  twelve  times  as  many  shots  per  minute  as  he 
was  able  to  do  in  1870,  and  even  this  is  likely  to  be 
rapidly  improved  upon.  But  you  may  take  it  that  what 
with  increased  rapidity  of  fire,  greater  penetrative  power, 
and  the  greater  precision  that  the  gun  which  the  soldier 
will  carry  into  the  battle  will  possess,  the  rifle  of 
to-morrow  will  be  forty  times  as  effective  as  the  chassepot 
was  in  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  Even  the  present  gun 
is  five  times  as  deadly." 

"  But  do  not  you  think  that  with  this  rapid  firing  a 
soldier  will  spend  all  his  ammunition  and  have  none 
left  ?  " 

**  There,  again,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  the  improvement  in 
firearms  has  enormously  increased  the  number  of  cart- 
ridges which  each  man  can  carry  into  action.  In  1877, 
when  we  went  to  war  with  Turkey,  our  soldiers  could 
only  carry  84  cartridges  into  action.  When  the  cahbre 
of  the  rifle  was  reduced  to  5  mm.  the  number  which  each 
soldier  was  furnished  with  rose  to  270.  With  a  bullet  of 
4  mm.  he  will  carry  380,  and  when  we  have  a  rifle  of 
3  mm.  cahbre  he  will  be  able  to  take  575  into  action,  and 
not  have  to  carry  any  more  weight  than  that  which 
burdened  him  when  he  carried  84,  twenty  years  ago. 
At  present  he  carries  170  of  the  762  mm." 

*'  But  we  are  a  long  way  oft  3  mm.  calibre,  are  we  not, 
M.  Bloch  ?  " 


xxii  PREFACE 

"  Not  so  far.  It  is  true  that  very  many,  countries  have 
not  yet  adopted  so  small  a  bore.  Your  country,  for 
instance,  has  between  7J  and  8  mm.  The  United  States 
have  adopted  one  with  6 ;  Germany  is  contemplating 
the  adoption  of  5  ;  but  the  3  mm.  gun  will  probably  be 
the  gun  of  the  future,  for  the  increased  impetus  of  the 
small  bore  and  its  advantage  in  lightness  will  compel  its 
adoption." 

"  You  speak  of  the  increased  penetrative  power  of  the 
bullet.  Do  you  think  this  will  add  considerably  to  the 
deadliness  of  rifle-fire  ?  " 

^*  Oh,  immensely,"  said  M.  Bloch.  "  As  you  contract 
the  calibre  of  the  gun  you  increase  the  force  of  its 
projectile.  For  instance,  a  rifle  with  a  calibre  of  only 
6'5  mm.  has  44  per  cent,  more  penetrative  power  than 
the  shot  fired  by  an  8  mm.  rifle.  Then,  again,  in  previous 
wars,  if  a  man  could  throw  himself  behind  a  tree  he  felt 
comparatively  safe,  even  although  the  bullets  were  hurt- 
ling all  round.  To-day  the  modern  bullet  will  pierce  a 
tree  without  any  difficulty.  It  also  finds  no  obstacle  in 
earthworks  such  as  would  have  turned  aside  the  larger 
bullets.  There  is  therefore  less  shelter,  and  not  only 
is  there  less  shelter,  but  the  excessive  rapidity  with  which 
the  missile  travels  (for  it  is  absurd  to  call  the  slender 
projectile,  no  thicker  than  a  lead  pencil,  a  ball)  will  add 
enormously  to  the  destructive  power  of  the  shot.  Usually 
when  a  bullet  struck  a  man,  it  found  its  billet,  and 
generally  stopped  where  it  entered ;  but  with  the  new 
bullet  this  will  not  be  the  case.  At  a  near  range  it  will 
pass  through  successive  files  of  infantry,  but  what  is  more 
serious  is  that  should  it  strike  a  bone,  it  is  apt  to  fly 
upwards  or  sideways,  rending  and  tearing  everything 
through  which   it  passes.     The  mortality  will    be  much 


PREFACE  xxiil 

greater  from  this  source  than  it  has  been  in  the 
past." 

"  But  is  this  not  all  very  much  theory  ?  Have  you  any 
facts  in  support  of  your  belief  that  the  modern  bullet  will 
be  so  much  more  deadly  than  its  predecessor  ?  In  Eng- 
land quite  the  opposite  impression  prevailed,  owing  to  the 
experience  which  we  gainedtin  Jameson's  raid,  when  many 
of  the  combatants  were  shot  through  and  seemed  none  the 
worse,  even  although  the  bullet  appeared  to  have  traversed 
a  vital  part  of  the  body." 

M.  Bloch  replied  :  "  I  do  not  know  about  the  Jame- 
son raid.  I  do  know  what  happened  when  the  soldiers 
fired  recently  upon  a  crowd  of  riotous  miners.  It  is 
true  that  they  fired  at  short  range,  not  more  than  thirt}^ 
to  eighty  paces.  The  mob  also  was  not  advancing  in 
loose  formation,  but,  like  most  mobs,  was  densel}- 
packed.  Only  ten  shots  were  fired,  but  these  ten  shots 
killed  outright  seven  of  the  men  and  wounded  twenty-five, 
of  whom  six  afterwards  died.  Others  who  were  slightly 
wounded  concealed  their  injuries,  fearing  prosecution. 
Each  shot,  therefore,  it  is  fair  to  estimate,  must  have  hit 
at  least  four  persons.  But  ignoring  those  unreported 
cases,  there  were  thirty-two  persons  struck  by  bullets. 
Of  these,  thirteen  died,  a  proportion  of  nearly  40  per  cent., 
which  is  at  least  double  the  average  mortality  of  persons 
hit  by  rifle-bullets  in  previous  wars.  It  has  also  been 
proved  by  experiments  made  by  firing  shots  into  carcases 
and  corpses,  that  when  the  bullet  strikes  a  bone  it  acts 
virtually  as  an  explosive  bullet,  as  the  point  expands  and 
issues  in  a  kind  of  mushroom  shape.  Altogether  I  take  a 
very  serious  view  of  the  sufferings,"  continued  M.  Bloch, 
*'  and  of  the  injury  that  will  be  inflicted  by  the  new 
weapons." 


XXIV 


PREFACE 


^*  Is  the  improvement  in  the  deadHness  of  weapons  con- 
fined to  small-arms  ?  Does  it  equally  extend  to  artillery 
firing  ?  " 

"  There,"  said  M.  Bloch,  ^'  you  touch  upon  a  subject 
which  I  have  dealt  with  at  much  length  in  my  book.  The 
fact  is  that  if  the  rifle  has  improved,  artillery  has  much  more 
improved.  Even  before  the  quick-firing  gun  was  intro- 
duced into  the  field  batteries  an  enormous  improvement 
had  been  made.  So,  indeed,  you  can  form  some  estimate 
of  the  evolution  of  the  cannon  when  I  say  that  the  French 
artillery  to-day  is  held  by  competent  authorities  to  be  at 
least  one  hundred  and  sixteen  times  more  deadly  than  the 
batteries  which  went  into  action  in  1870." 

"  How  can  that  be  ?  "  I  asked.  **  They  do  not  fire  one 
hundred  and  sixteen  times  as  fast,  I  presume  ?  " 

"  No  ;  the  increased  improvement  has  been  obtained 
in  many  ways.  By  the  use  of  range-finders  it  is  possible 
now  to  avoid  much  firing  into  space  which  formerly  pre- 
vailed. An  instrument  weighing  about  60  lb.  will  in  three 
minutes  give  the  range  of  any  distance  up  to  four  miles, 
and  even  more  rapid  range-finders  are  being  constructed. 
Then,  remember,  higher  explosives  are  used  ;  the  range 
has  been  increased,  and  even  before  quick-firing  guns  were 
introduced  it  was  possible  to  fire  two  and  a  half  times  as 
fast  as  they  did  previously.  The  effect  of  artillery-fire 
to-day  is  at  least  five  times  as  deadly  as  it  was,  and  being 
two  or  three  times  as  fast,  you  may  reckon  that  a  battery 
of  artillery  is  from  twelve  to  fifteen  times  as  potent  an 
instrument  of  destruction  as  it  was  thirty  years  ago.  Even 
in  1870  the  German  artillerists  held  that  one  battery  was 
able  absolutely  to  annihilate  any  force  advancing  along  a 
line  of  fire  estimated  at  fifteen  paces  in  breadth  for  a  distance 
of  over  four  miles. 


PREFACE  XXV 

'*  If  that  was  so  then,  you  can  imagine  how  much  more 
deadly  it  is  now,  when  the  range  is  increased  and  the 
explosive  power  of  the  shell  has  been  enormously 
developed.  It  is  estimated  that  if  a  body  of  10,000 
men,  advancing  to  the  attack,  had  to  traverse  a  distance 
of  a  mile  and  a  half  under  the  fire  of  a  single  battery,  they 
would  be  exposed  to  1450  rounds  before  they  crossed  the 
zone  of  fire,  and  the  bursting  of  the  shells  fired  by  that 
battery  would  scatter  275,000  bullets  in  fragments  over 
the  mile  and  a  half  across  which  they  would  have  to  march. 
In  1870  an  ordinary  shell  when  it  burst  broke  into  from 
nineteen  to  thirty  pieces.  To-day  it  bursts  into  240. 
Shrapnel  fire  in  1870  only  scattered  thirty-seven  death- 
deding  missiles.  Now  it  scatters  340.  A  bomb  weighing 
about  70  lb.  thirty  years  ago  would  have  burst  into  forty- 
two  fragments.  To-day,  when  it  is  charged  with  peroxi- 
lene,  it  breaks  up  into  1200  pieces,  each  of  which  is 
hurled  with  much  greater  velocity  than  the  larger  lumps 
which  were  scattered  by  a  gunpowder  explosion.  It  is 
estimated  that  such  a  bomb  would  effectively  destroy  all 
life  within  a  range  of  200  metres  of  the  point  of  explosion. 
The  artillery  also  benefits  by  the  smokeless  powder, 
although,  as  you  can  easily  imagine,  it  is  not  without  its 
drawbacks." 

"What  drawbacks?" 

"The  fact  that  the  artillerymen  can  be  much  more 
easily  picked  off",  when  they  are  serving  their  guns,  by 
sharp-shooters  than  was  possible  when  they  were 
enveloped  in  a  cloud  of  smoke  of  their  own  creation.  It 
is  calculated  that  one  hundred  sharp-shooters,  who  would 
be  quite  invisible  at  a  range  of  five  hundred  yards,  would 
put  a  battery  out  of  action  in  four  minutes  if  they  could 
get  within  range  of  one  thousand    yards.     At  a  mile's 


xxvi  PREFACE 

range  it  might  take  one  hundred  men  half  an  hour's  shoot- 
ing to  put  a  battery  out  of  action.  The  most  effective 
range  for  the  sharp-shooter  is  about  eight  hundred  paces. 
At  this  range,  while  concealed  behind  a  bush  or  improvised 
earthv^^ork,  a  good  shot  could  pick  off  the  men  of  any 
battery,  or  the  officers,  vv^ho  could  not  avail  themselves  of 
the  cover  to  which  their  men  resort." 

**  How  will  your  modern  battle  begin,  M.  Bloch  ?  " 
*'  Probably  with  attempts  on  outposts  made  by  sharp- 
shooters to  feel  and  get  into  touch  with  each  other. 
Cavalry  will  not  be  of  much  use  for  that  purpose.  A 
mounted  man  offers  too  good  a  mark  to  a  sharp-shooter. 
Then  when  the  outposts  have  felt  each  other  sufficiently 
to  give  the  opposing  armies  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts 
of  their  antagonists,  the  artillery  duel  will  commence  at  a 
range  of  from  four  to  five  miles.  As  long  as  the  artillery 
is  in  action  it  will  be  quite  sufficient  to  render  the  nearer 
approach  of  the  opposing  forces  impossible.  If  they  are 
evenly  matched,  they  will  mutually  destroy  each  other, 
after  inflicting  immense  losses  before  they  are  put  out  of 
action.  Then  the  turn  of  the  rifle  will  come.  But  the 
power  of  rifle-fire  is  so  great  that  it  will  be  absolutely 
impossible  for  the  combatants  to  get  to  close  quarters 
with  each  other.  As  for  any  advance  in  force,  even  in 
the  loosest  of  formations,  on  a  front  that  is  swept  by  the 
enemies'  fire,  that  is  absolutely  out  of  the  question.  Flank 
movements  may  be  attempted,  but  the  increased  power 
which  a  magazine  rifle  gives  to  the  defence  will  render 
it  impossible  for  such  movements  to  have  the  success 
that  they  formerly  had.  A  small  company  can  hold  its 
own  against  a  superior  attacking  force  long  enough  to 
permit  of  the  bringing  up  of  reinforcements.  To  attack 
any  position   successfully,  it  is  estimated  that  the  attack- 


PREFACE 


XXVll 


ing  force  ought  to  outnumber  the  assailants  at  least  by 
8  to  I.  It  is  calculated  that  lOO  men  in  a  trench  would 
be  able  to  put  out  of  action  336  out  of  400  who  attacked 
them,  while  they  were  crossing  a  fire-zone  only  300  yards 
wide." 

"  What  do  you  mean  by  a  fire-zone  ?  " 

'*  A  fire-zone  is  the  space  which  is  swept  by  the  fire  of 
the  men  in  the  trench." 

"  But  you  assume  that  they  are  entrenched,  M. 
Bloch  ?  " 

"  Certainly,  everybody  will  be  entrenched  in  the  next 
war.  It  will  be  a  great  war  of  entrenchments.  The 
spade  will  be  as  indispensable  to  a  soldier  as  his  rifle. 
The  first  thing  every  man  will  have  to  do,  if  he  cares  for 
his  life  at  all,  will  be  to  dig  a  hole  in  the  ground,  and 
throw  up  as  strong  an  earthen  rampart  as  he  can  to 
shield  him  from  the  hail  of  bullets  which  will  fill  the  air." 

*'  Then,"  I  said,  ''  every  battlefield  will  more  or  less 
come  to  be  like  Sebastopol,  and  the  front  of  each  army  can 
only  be  approached  by  a  series  of  trenches  and  parallels?  " 

''Well,  that,  perhaps,  is  putting  it  too  strongly,"  said 
M.  Bloch,  ^'  but  you  have  grasped  the  essential  principle, 
and  that  is  one  reason  why  it  will  be  impossible  for  the 
battle  of  the  future  to  be  fought  out  rapidly.  All  digging 
work  is  slow  work,  and  when  you  must  dig  a  trench 
before  you  can  make  any  advance,  your  progress  is  neces- 
sarily slow.  Battles  will  last  for  days,  and  at  the  end  it 
is  very  doubtful  whether  any  decisive  victory  can  be 
gained." 

^'Always  supposing,"  I  said,  ''that  the  ammunition 
does  not  give  out." 

"  Ammunition  will  not  give  out.  Of  powder  and  shot 
there  is  always  plenty." 


xxviii  PREFACE 

"  I  doubt  that/'  I  replied.  **The  weak  point  of  all  this 
argument  as  to  the  impossibility  of  war  implies  that  the 
modern  mechanism  of  war,  which  is  quite  sufficient  to 
prevent  armies  coming  into  close  contact,  also  possesses 
qualities  of  permanence,  or  rather  of  inexhaustibility.  What 
seems  much  more  probable  is  that  with  the  excessive 
rapidity  of  fire,  armies  will  empty  their  magazines,  and 
the  army  that  fires  its  last  cartridge  first  will  be  at  the 
mercy  of  the  other.  Then  the  old  veteran  Dragomiroff 
will  rejoice,  for  the  bayonet  will  once  more  come  into 
play." 

M.  Bloch  shook  his  head. 

^*  I  do  not  think  that  armies  will  run  short  of  ammuni- 
tion. All  my  arguments  are  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  the  modern  war  is  to  be  fought  with  modern  arms. 
I  do  not  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  there  will 
be  a  reversion  to  the  primitive  weapons  of  an  earlier 
day." 

^'  Well,  supposing  that  you  are  right,  and  that  ammu- 
nition does  not  run  short,  what  will  happen  ?  " 

"  I  have  quoted  in  my  book,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  the  best 
description  that  I  have  ever  seen  of  what  may  be  expected 
on  a  modern  battlefield.  I  will  read  it  to  you,  for  it  seems 
to  convey,  more  vividly  than  anything  that  I  could  say, 
just  what  we  may  expect : — 

"The  distance  is  6000  metres  from  the  enemy.  The 
artillery  is  in  position,  and  the  command  has  been  passed 
along  the  batteries  to  '  give  fire.'  The  enemy's  artillery 
replies.  Shells  tear  up  the  soil  and  burst ;  in  a  short  time 
the  crew  of  every  gun  has  ascertained  the  distance  of  the 
enemy.  Then  every  projectile  discharged  bursts  in  the 
air  over  the  heads  of  the  enemy,  raining  down  hundreds 


PREFACE  xxix 

of  fragments  and  bullets  on  his  position.  Men  and  horses 
are  overwhelmed  by  this  rain  of  lead  and  iron.  Guns 
destroy  one  another,  batteries  are  mutually  annihilated, 
ammunition  cases  are  emptied.  Success  will  be  with 
those  whose  fire  does  not  slacken.  In  the  midst  of  this 
fire  the  battalions  will  advance. 

"  Now  they  are  but  2000  metres  away.  Already  the 
rifle-bullets  whistle  round  and  kill,  each  not  only  finding 
a  victim,  but  penetrating  files,  ricocheting,  and  striking 
again.  Volley  succeeds  volley,  bullets  in  great  handfuls, 
constant  as  hail  and  swift  as  lightning,  deluge  the  field  of 
battle. 

**The  artillery  having  silenced  the  enemy  is  now  free 
to  deal  with  the  enemy's  battahons.  On  his  infantry, 
however  loosely  it  may  be  formed,  the  guns  direct  thick 
iron  rain,  and  soon  in  the  position  of  the  enemy  the  earth 
is  reddened  with  blood. 

"  The  firing  lines  will  advance  one  after  the  other, 
battalions  will  march  after  battalions  ;  finally  the  reserves 
will  follow.  Yet  with  all  this  movement  in  the  two  armies 
there  will  be  a  belt  a  thousand  paces  wide,  separating 
them  as  by  neutral  territory,  swept  by  the  fire  of  both 
sides,  a  belt  which  no  living  being  can  stand  for  a  moment. 
The  ammunition  will  be  almost  exhausted,  millions  of 
cartridges,  thousands  of  shells  will  cover  the  soil.  But 
the  fire  will  continue  until  the  empty  ammunition  cases 
are  replaced  with  full. 

"  Melinite  bombs  will  turn  to  dust  farmhouses,  villages, 
and  hamlets,  destroying  everything  that  might  be  used  as 
cover,  obstacle,  or  refuge. 

"  The  moment  will  approach  when  half  the  combatants 
will  be  mowed  down,  dead  and  wounded  will  lie  in  parallel 
rows,   separated   one   from   the  other   by   that    belt   of   a 


XXX 


PREFACE 


thousand  paces  which  will  be  swept  by  a  cross  fire  of 
shells  which  no  living  being  can  pass. 

"  The  battle  will  continue  with  ferocity.  But  still  that 
thousand  paces  unchangingly  separate  the  foes. 

"Who  shall  have  gained  the  victory?     Neither. 

"  This  picture  serves  to  illustrate  a  thought  which,  since 
the  perfection  of  weapons,  has  occupied  the  minds  of  all 
thinking  people.  What  will  take  place  in  a  future  war  ? 
Such  are  constrained  to  admit  that  between  the  combatants 
will  always  be  an  impassable  zone  of  fire  deadly  in  an 
equal  degree  to  both  the  foes. 

"  With  such  conditions,  in  its  application  to  the  battles  of 
the  future,  the  saying  of  Nrpoleon  seems  very  question- 
able :  *  The  fate  of  battle  is  the  result  of  one  minute,  of 
one  thought,  the  enemies  approach  with  different  plans, 
the  battle  becomes  furious ;  the  decisive  moment  arrives, 
and  a  happy  thought  sudden  as  lightning  decides  the  con- 
test, the  most  insignificant  reserve  sometimes  being  the 
instrument  of  a  splendid  victory.' 

"  It  is  much  more  probable  that  in  the  future  both  sides 
will  claim  the  victory." 

"  Pleasant  pictures,  certainly  ;  and  if  that  authority  is 
right,  you  are  indeed  justified  in  believing  that  there  will 
be  no  decisive  battles  in  the  war  of  the  future." 

''  There  will  be  no  war  in  the  future,"  said  M.  Rloch  ; 
'*  for  it  has  become  impossible,  now  that  it  is  clear  that 
war  means  suicide." 

"  But  is  not  everything  that  you  are  saying  an  assump- 
tion that  people  will  make  war,  and  that  therefore  war 
itself  is  possible  ?  " 

**  No  doubt,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  ^*the  nations  may  endeavour 
to  prove   that   I    am   wrong,  but  you  will  see   what   will 


PREFACE  xxxi 

happen.  Nothing  will  be  demonstrated  by  the  next  war 
if  it  is  made,  in  spite  of  warnings,  but  the  impossibihty  of 
making  war,  except,  of  course,  for  the  purpose  of  self- 
destruction.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  deny  that  it  is  possi- 
ble for  nations  to  plunge  themselves  and  their  neighbours 
into  a  frightful  series  of  catastrophes  which  would  probably 
result  in  the  overturn  of  all  civilised  and  ordered  govern- 
ment. That  is,  of  course,  possible  ;  but  when  we  say  that 
war  is  impossible  we  mean  that  it  is  impossible  for  the 
modern  State  to  carry  on  war  under  the  modern  conditions 
with  any  prospect  of  being  able  to  carry  that  war  to  a 
conclusion  by  defeating  its  adversary  by  force  of  arms  on 
the  battlefield.  No  decisive  war  is  possible.  Neither  is 
any  war  possible,  as  I  proceed  to  show,  that  will  not  entail, 
even  upon  the  victorious  Power,  the  destruction  of  its 
resources  and  the  break-up  of  society.  War  therefore 
has  become  impossible,  except  at  the  price  of  suicide. 
That  would,  perhaps,  be  a  more  accurate  way  of  stating 
the  thesis  of  my  book." 

**  I  understand ;  but  do  you  think  you  have  proved 
this  ?  " 

"  Certainly,"  said  M.  Bloch.  *'  So  far  1  have  only 
spoken  about  the  improvements  that  have  been  wrought 
in  two  branches  of  the  service,  viz.,  in  the  magazine  rifle 
and  the  greater  efficiency  of  artillery.  Taken  by  them- 
selves, they  are  sufficiently  serious  to  justify  grave  doubt 
as  to  w^hether  or  not  we  have  not  reached  a  stage  when 
the  mechanism  of  slaughter  has  been  so  perfected  as  to 
render  a  decisive  battle  practically  impossible ;  but  these 
two  elements  are  only  two.  They  are  accompanied  by 
others  which  are  still  more  formidable  to  those  who  persist 
in  contemplating  war  as  a  practical  possibility." 

"  To  what  are  you  referring  ?  "  I  asked. 


xxxii  PREFACE 

"Chiefly  to  the  immensity  of  the  modern  army.  The 
war  of  1870-71  was  a  contest  of  giants,  but  the  German 
armies  operating  in  France  did  not  exceed  half  a  milHon 
men,  whereas  if  war  were  to  break  out  to-day,  the  Germans 
would  concentrate  over  a  million  men  on  their  front,  while 
the  French  would  be  no  whit  behind  them  in  the  energy 
with  which  they  would  concentrate  all  their  available 
fighting  men  on  the  frontier.  In  a  war  between  the  Triple 
and  the  Dual  Alliance  there  would  be  ten  millions  of  men 
under  arms." 

*'  How  would  you  make  up  the  total  of  ten  millions 
which  you  say  would  be  mobilised  in  case  of  a  war  between 
the  Dual  and  Triple  Alliance  ?  " 

"  The  figures  in  millions  are  briefly :  Germany, 
2,500,000;  Austria,  i  3-ioths  millions;  Italy,  i  3-ioths 
millions,  making  a  total  of  5,100,000  for  the  Triple 
Alliance.  France  would  mobilise  2J  millions,  and  Russia 
2,800,000,  making  5,300,000 — 10,400,000.  It  has  yet  to 
be  proved  that  the  human  brain  is  capable  of  directing  the 
movements  and  providing  for  the  sustenance  of  such 
immense  masses  of  human  beings.  The  unwieldiness  of 
the  modern  army  has  never  been  adequately  taken  into 
account.  Remember  that  those  millions  will  not  be  com- 
posed of  veterans  accustomed  to  act  together.  More  than 
half  of  the  German  and  French  troops  which  will  be  con- 
fronting each  other  on  mobilisation  in  case  of  war  will  be 
drawn  from  the  reserves.  In  Russia  the  proportion  of 
reserves  would  be  only  three  hundred  and  sixty,  in  Italy 
two  hundred  and  sixty,  per  thousand ;  but  even  this  pro- 
portion is  quite  sufficient  to  indicate  how  large  a  mass  of 
men,  comparatively  untrained,  would  find  their  place  in 
the  fighting  front." 

*^  But  have  not  great  generals  in  the  past  commanded 


PREFACE  xxxiii 

armies  of  millions  ? — Xerxes,  for  instance,  and  Tamerlane, 
and  Attila  at  the  head  of  his  Huns  ?  " 

'*No  doubt,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "that  is  quite  true;  but  it 
is  one  thing  to  direct  a  horde  of  men  living  in  the  simplest 
fashion,  marching  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  great  masses, 
and  it  is  an  altogether  different  thing  to  manoeuvre  and 
supply  the  enormously  complex  machine  which  we  call  a 
modern  army.  Remember,  too,  that  in  the  old  days  men 
fought  in  masses,  whereas  the  very  essence  of  modern 
war  is  that  you  must  advance  in  loose  order  and  never 
have  too  big  a  clump  of  soldiers  for  your  enemy  to  fire  at. 
Hence  the  battle  will  be  spread  over  an  enormous  front, 
and  every  mile  over  which  you  spread  your  men  increases 
the  difficulties  of  supply,  of  mutual  co-operation,  and  of 
combined  effort." 

"  But  has  not  the  training  of  officers  kept  pace  with  the 
extension  and  development  of  modern  armaments  ?  " 

"Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "and  no.  It  is  true,  no  doubt, 
that  an  effort  has  been  made  to  bring  up  the  technical 
training  of  officers  to  the  necessary  standard  ;  but  this  is 
quite  impossible  in  all  cases.  A  very  large  proportion  of 
the  officers  who  will  be  in  command  in  a  general  mobilisa- 
tion would  be  called  from  the  reserve,  that  is  to  say,  they 
would  be  men  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  latest  develop- 
ments of  modern  tactics,  and  who  would  find  themselves  sud- 
denly called  upon  to  deal  with  conditions  of  warfare  that 
were  almost  as  different  from  those  with  which  they  were 
trained  to  deal  as  the  legionaries  of  Caesar  would  have 
been  if  they  had  been  suddenly  summoned  to  face  the 
musketeers  of  Frederic  the  Great." 

"  Is  that  not  an  exaggeration,  M.  Bloch  ?  Do  you  think 
that  the  art  of  war  has  changed  so  much  ?  " 

"  Changed  ?  "  said  M.  Bloch  ;  "  it  has  been  so  thoroughly 

c 


xxxiv  PREFACE 

revolutionised  in  the  last  thirty  years,  that  if  I  had  a  son 
who  was  preparing  for  a  mihtary  career,  I  would  not  let 
him  read  a  book  on  tactics  or  strategy  that  had  not  been 
written  in  the  last  fifteen  years,  and  even  then  he  would 
find  that  great  changes  had  taken  place  within  that  period. 
It  is  simply  appalling  to  contemplate  the  spectacle  of 
millions  of  men,  half  of  whom  have  been  hurriedly  sum- 
moned from  the  field,  the  factory,  and  the  mine,  and  the 
whole  placed  under  command  of  officers  not  one  in  a 
hundred  of  whom  has  ever  been  under  fire,  and  half  of 
whom  have  been  trained  in  a  more  or  less  antiquated 
school  of  tactics.  But  even  then  that  is  not  the  worst. 
What  we  have  to  recognise  is  the  certainty  that  even  if  all 
officers  were  most  efficient  when  the  war  began,  the  war 
would  not  last  many  weeks  before  the  majority  of  the 
officers  had  been  killed  off." 

''But  why?"  I  said. 

"The  percentage  of  officers  killed  and  wounded  in 
action  was  much  greater  even  in  1870  than  the  proportion 
of  privates  killed  and  wounded.  The  Germans,  for 
instance,  lost  two  officers  killed  and  three  wounded  to 
each  private  who  was  similarly  disabled.  But  that  was 
before  the  improved  weapon  came  into  play.  In  the 
Chilian  war  the  proportion  of  officers  killed  was  23  per 
cent,  and  75  per  cent,  wounded,  whereas  among  the  men 
only  13  per  cent,  were  killed  and  60  per  cent,  wounded." 

''To  what  do  you  attribute  this?"  I  asked. 

"  The  cause  is  very  simple.  The  officers  are  compelled 
to  expose  themselves  much  more  than  the  men  under 
their  orders.  They  have  to  be  up  and  about  and  moving, 
while  the  men  are  lying  in  the  shelter  of  the  trenches. 
This  is  so  well  recognised  that  every  Continental  army 
pays  special  attention  to  the  training  of  sharp-shooters, 


PREFACE  XXXV 

whose  word  of  command  is  tliat  they  should  nc\  er  waste 
a  shot  upon  any  one  but  an  officer.  Hence  the  general 
conviction  on  the  part  of  the  officers  abroad  that  if  the 
great  war  broke  out  they  would  never  survive  to  see  the 
conclusion  of  peace." 

"  When  I  was  in  Paris,  M.  Bloch,  that  conviction  did 
not  seem  to  be  very  general  on  the  part  of  the  French 
officers." 

"  It  is  different  in  Germany,"  said  M.  Bloch,  **  and  in 
Austria-Hungary,  and  the  French  would  not  be  long  in 
finding  it  out.  Again  and  again  officers  have  said  to  me 
that  while  they  would  of  course  do  their  duty  if  they  were 
ordered  to  the  front,  they  would  take  their  place  at  the 
head  of  their  men  knowing  that  they  would  never  return. 
So  general  is  this  conviction  that  you  will  find  very  little 
trace  of  any  war  party  among  the  officers  in  Germany. 
They  know  too  well  what  war  would  mean  to  them.  But 
I  am  not  thinking  so  much  of  the  fate  of  the  individuals 
as  the  result  which  will  inevitably  follow  when  this 
massed  million  of  men  found  themselves  deprived  of  their 
commanders. 

**  An  army  is  a  very  highly  specialised  organisa- 
tion. Without  competent  officers,  accustomed  to  com- 
mand, it  degenerates  into  a  mere  mob,  and  of  all 
things  in  the  world  nothing  is  so  helpless  as  a  mob.  It 
can  neither  march,  fight,  manoeuvre,  nor  feed  itself.  An 
army  without  leaders  is  not  only  a  mob,  but  it  is  apt  to 
degenerate  into  a  very  cowardly  mob.  Remember  that 
every  man  is  not  naturally  brave.  It  was  said  long  ago 
that  a  very  good  fighting  army  consisted  of  three  sorts  of 
soldiers :  only  one-third  of  the  men  in  the  ranks  were 
naturally  brave,  another  third  were  naturally  cowards, 
while  the  last  third  was  capable  of  being  brave  under 


xxxvi  PREFACE 

circumstances  when  it  was  well  led  and  kept  up  to  its 
work.  Take  away  the  officers,  and  this  middle  third 
naturally  gravitate  to  the  cowardly  contingent,  with 
results  which  have  been  seen  on  many  a  stricken  field. 
Hence,  under  modern  conditions  of  warfare  every  army 
will  tend  inevitably  to  degenerate  into  such  a  mob.  It  is 
for  those  practical  military  men  who  persist  in  regard- 
ing war  as  a  possibility  to  explain  how  they  hope  to 
overcome  the  difficulty  created  by  the  very  magnitude 
and  unwieldiness  of  the  machine  which  they  have 
created." 

"  But  do  not  you  think,  M.  Bloch,  that  if  the  nations 
discover  that  their  armies  are  too  big  to  be  used,  they 
will  only  fight  wath  such  manageable  armies  as  they  can 
bring  to  the  front,  manoeuvre,  feed,  and  supply  with  the 
munitions  of  war  ?  " 

M.  Bloch  shook  his  head.  "  The  whole  drift  and 
tendency  of  modern  tactics,"  he  sa*id,  ''  is  to  bring  up  the 
maximum  number  of  men  to  the  front  in  the  shortest 
possible  loss  of  time  and  to  hurl  them  in  the  largest 
possible  numbers  upon  the  enemy's  position.  It  is  abso- 
lutely necessary,  if  you  take  the  offensive,  to  have  a 
superior  force.  It  is  from  a  military  point  of  view  an 
impossibility  to  attack  a  superior  force  with  an  inferior, 
and  the  effect  of  the  improvement  in  modern  weapons  has 
been  to  still  further  enhance  the  necessity  for  superiority 
of  force  in  attacking.  There  will,  therefore,  be  no 
question  of  fighting  with  small  armies.  The  largest 
possible  force  will  be  brought  to  the  front,  and  this  effort 
will  inevitably  result  in  the  breakdown  of  the  whole 
machine. 

*'  You  must  have  the  maximum  ready  to  hand  at 
the  beginning.     Remember  the  fighting  force  of  an  army 


PREFACE  xxxvii 

weakens  with  every  mile  that  it  advances  from  its  base 
Napoleon  entered  Russia  with  400,000  men  ;  but  although 
he  had  only  fought  one  battle,  he  had  only  130,000  men 
with  him  when  he  entered  Moscow.  The  Germans,  when 
they  were  in  France,  emplo^^ed  one-sixth  of  their  infantry 
in  covering  their  communications  and  defending  their 
rear.  This  proportion  is  likely  to  be  much  increased  in 
future  wars.  The  opportunity  for  harassing  the  line  of 
communications  in  the  rear  of  an  invading  army  has  been 
enormously  multiplied  by  the  invention  of  smokeless 
powder.  The  franc  tircur  in  the  Franco-German  war 
took  his  life  in  his  hand,  for  the  range  of  his  gun  was  not 
very  great  in  the  first  place,  and  in  the  second  his  where- 
abouts was  promptly  detected  by  the  puff  of  smoke  which 
showed  his  hiding-place.  Now  the  whole  line  of  com- 
munications will  be  exposed  to  dropping  shots  from  marks- 
men who,  from  the  security  of  thicket  or  hedge,  will  deal 
out  sudden  death  without  any  tell-tale  smoke  to  guide 
their  exasperated  and  harassed  enemy  to  the  hiding- 
place. 

"  I  have  now  dealt,"  said  M.  Bloch,  '*  with  the  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  modern  war,  arising  first  from  the  immense 
improvement  that  has  been  wrought  in  the  mechanism  of 
slaughter,  and  secondly  with  the  unmanageability  of  the 
immense  masses  of  men  who  will  be  mobilised  at  the  out- 
break of  war.  Let  us  now  proceed  to  the  third,  and  what 
to  my  mind  constitutes  far  the  most  serious  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  modern  war — viz.,  the  economic  impossibility 
of  waging  war  upon  the  scale  on  which  it  must  be  waged 
if  it  is  waged  at  all. 

'^  The  first  thing  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  the 
next  war  will  be  a  long  war.  It  was  the  declared 
opinion  of  Moltke  that  the  altered  conditions  of  warfare 


XXXVlll 


PREFACE 


rendered  it  impossible  to  hope  that  any  decisive  result 
could  be  arrived  at  before  two  years  at  the  least. 
The  Franco-German  war  lasted  seven  months,  but  there 
is  no  hope  of  any  similar  war  being  terminated  so  rapidly. 
Of  course  this  is  assuming  that  war  is  to  be  terminated 
by  fighting.  In  reality  the  war  of  the  future,  if  ever  it 
takes  place,  will  not  be  fighting ;  it  will  be  terminated  by 
famine." 

^*  Why  should  wars  be  so  excessively  prolonged  ?  " 
^'  Because   all   wars    will  of   necessity  partake  of  the 
character  of  siege  operations.     When  we  invaded  Turkey 
in  1877  we  were  detained  for  months  behind  the  impro- 
vised earthworks  of  Plevna.     If  war  were  to  break  out  in 
Europe    to-day,   each    combatant   would   find    itself  con- 
fronted,  not  by  an   isolated  and  improvised  Plevna,  but 
by  carefully  prepared  and  elaborately  fortified  networks 
of  Plevnas.     It    is    so   on   all   frontiers.     The   system  of 
defence  has  been  elaborated  with  infinite  skill  and  abso- 
lute   disregard  of  financial   considerations.      Whether   it 
will  be  a  German  army  endeavouring  to  make  its  way  into 
Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg,  or  a  Russian  army  striking 
at   Berlin   or  at  Vienna,    or   a   German   army   invading 
France — in  every  case  the  invading  army  would  find  itself 
confronted  by  lines  upon  lines  of  fortresses  and  fortified 
camps,  behind  which  would  stand  arrayed  forces  equal  or 
superior  in  number  to  those  which  it  could  bring  into  the 
field  against  them.     These  fortresses  would   have   to  be 
taken  or  masked. 

**  Now  it  is  calculated  that  to  take  a  modern  fortress 
adequately  defended,  even  by  superior  forces,  is  an  opera- 
tion which  cannot  be  put  through  in  less  than  one  hundred 
and  twenty  days — that  is,  supposing  that  everything  goes 
well  with  the  assailants.     Any  reverse  or  any  interruption 


PREFACE  xxxix 

of  the  siege  operations  would,  of  course,  prolong  this 
period.  But  it  is  not  merely  that  each  fortress  would 
have  to  be  reduced,  but  every  field  would  more  or  less 
become  an  improvised  fortified  camp.  Even  when  an 
army  was  defeated  it  would  retreat  slowly,  throwing  up 
earthworks,  behind  which  it  would  maintain  a  harassing 
fire  upon  its  pursuers ;  and  the  long  line  of  invisible 
sharp-shooters,  whose  presence  would  not  be  revealed 
even  by  the  tell-tale  puff  of  smoke,  would  inevitably 
retard  any  rapid  advance  on  the  part  of  the  victors.  It 
is  indeed  maintained  by  many  competent  authorities  that 
there  is  no  prospect  of  the  victorious  army  being  able  to 
drive  the  defeated  forces  from  the  field  of  battle  so  com- 
pletely as  to  establish  itself  in  possession  of  the  spoils  of 
war.  The  advantage  is  always  with  the  defending  force, 
and  every  mile  that  the  assailants  advance  from  their 
base  would  increase  their  difficulties  and  strengthen  their 
opponents.  Long  and  harassing  siege  operations  in  a 
war  of  blockade  would  wear  out  the  patience  and  exhaust 
the  resources  of  armies." 

^'But  armies  have  stood  long  sieges  before  now,"  I 
objected. 

"Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "in  the  past;  but  we  are  talking 
of  the  future.  Do  not  forget  that  the  wear  and  tear 
would  be  terrible,  and  the  modern  man  is  much  less 
capable  of  bearing  it  than  were  his  ancestors.  The 
majority  of  the  population  tends  more  and  more  to 
gravitate  to  cities,  and  the  city  dweller  is  by  no  means  so 
capable  of  lying  out  at  nights  in  damp  and  exposed  posi- 
tions as  the  peasant.  Even  in  comparatively  rapid  cam- 
paigns sickness  and  exhaustion  slay  many  more  than 
either  cold  steel  or  rifle-bullets.  It  is  inevitable  that  this 
should  be  the  case.     In  two  weeks'  time  after  the  French 


xl  PREFACE 

army  is  mobilised,  it  is  the  expectation  of  the  best  authori- 
ties that  they  would  have  100,000  men  in  hospital,  even 
if  never  a  shot  had  been  fired." 

*'That  I  can  v^ell  understand.  I  remember  when 
reading  Zola's  *  La  Debacle '  feeling  that  if  the  Germans 
had  kept  out  of  the  way  altogether  and  had  simply 
made  the  French  march  after  them  hither  and  thither, 
the  whole  Napoleonic  army  would  have  gone  to  pieces 
before  they  ever  came  within  firing  distance  of  their 
foes." 

*'Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch.  "The  strain  of  marching  is 
very  heavy.  Remember  that  it  is  not  mere  marching,  but 
marching  under  heavy  loads.  No  infantry  soldier  should 
carry  more  than  one-third  of  his  own  weight ;  but  instead 
of  the  average  burden  of  the  fully  accoutred  private  being 
52  lb.  it  is  nearer  80  lb.,  with  the  result  that  the  mere 
carrying  of  weight  probably  kills  more  than  fall  in  battle. 
The  proportion  of  those  who  die  from  disease  and  those 
who  lose  their  lives  as  the  consequence  of  wounds  received 
in  fighting  is  usually  two  or  three  to  one.  In  the  Franco- 
German  war  there  were  four  times  as  many  died  from 
sickness  and  exhaustion  as  those  who  lost  their  lives  in 
battle.  In  the  Russo-Turkish  war  the  proportion  was  as 
16  to  44.  In  the  recent  Spanish  war  in  Cuba  the  propor- 
tion was  still  greater.  There  were  ten  who  died  from 
disease  for  one  who  fell  in  action.  The  average  mortality 
from  sickness  tends  to  increase  with  the  prolongation  of 
the  campaign.  Men  can  stand  a  short  campaign,  but 
when  it  is  long  it  demoralises  them,  destroys  the  spirit  of 
self-sacrifice  which  sustained  them  at  the  first  in  the 
opening  weeks,  and  produces  a  thoroughly  bad  spirit 
which  reacts  upon  their  physical  health.  At  present  there 
is  some  regard  paid  to  humanity,  if  only  by  the  provision 


PREFACE  xli 

of  ambulances,  and  the  presence  of  hospital  attendants, 
nurses,  and  doctors.  But  in  the  war  of  the  future  these 
humanities  will  go  the  wall." 

^*What!"  I  said,  "  do  you  think  there  will  be  no  care 
for  the  wounded  ?  " 

**  There  will  be  practically  no  care  for  the  wounded," 
said  M.  Bloch,  '*  for  it  will  be  impossible  to  find  adequate 
shelter  for  the  Red  Cross  hospital  tent  or  for  the  hospital 
orderlies.  It  will  be  impossible  to  take  wounded  men  out 
of  the  zone  of  fire  without  exposing  the  Red  Cross  men  to 
certain  death.  The  consequence  is  they  will  be  left  to  lie 
where  they  fall,  and  they  may  lie  for  days.  Happy  they 
will  be  if  they  are  killed  outright.  Why,  even  in  the  last 
great  war  the  provision  for  attendance  on  the  wounded 
was  shamefully  inadequate.  After  Gravelotte  there  were 
for  some  time  only  four  doctors  to  attend  to  10,000 
wounded  men,  and  the  state  of  things  after  Sadowa  was 
horrible  in  the  extreme.  It  is  all  very  well  to  inveigh 
against  this  as  inhumanity,  but  what  are  you  to  do  when 
in  the  opinion  of  such  a  distinguished  army  physician  as 
Dr.  Billroth  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  as  many  hos- 
pital attendants  as  there  are  soldiers  in  the  fighting  line  ? 
What  is  much  more  likely  to  be  done  is  that  the  dying 
and  the  dead  will  be  utilised  as  ramparts  to  strengthen 
the  shelter  trenches.  This  was  actually  done  at  the 
battle  of  Worth,  where  Dr.  Forth,  cliief  military  physician 
of  the  Bavarian  army,  reported  that  he  found  in  some 
places  in  the  battlefield  veritable  ramparts  built  up  of 
soldiers  who  had  fallen  by  the  side  of  their  comrades,  and 
in  order  to  get  them  out  of  the  way  they  had  piled  them 
one  upon  the  top  of  the  other,  and  had  taken  shelter 
behind  their  bodies.  Some  of  these  unfortunates  built 
into   this  terrible  rampart  w^ere  only  wounded,  but  the 


xlii  PREFACE 

pressure  of  the  superincumbent  mass  soon  relieved  them 
from  their  sufferings." 

'*  What  a  horrible  story  !  " 

''  Yes,"  Scid  M.  Bloch  ;  "  but  I  believe  that  v^rar  will  be 
decided  not  by  these  things — not  even  by  fighting-men 
at  all,  but  by  the  factors  of  which  they  at  present  take  far 
too  little  account." 

"  And  what  may  those  factors  be  ?  "  I  asked. 

*'  Primarily,  the  quality  of  toughness  or  capacity  of 
endurance,  of  patience  under  privation,  of  stubbornness 
under  reverse  and  disappointment.  That  element  in  the 
civil  population  will  be,  more  than  anything  else,  the 
deciding  factor  in  modern  war.  The  men  at  the  front 
will  very  speedily  be  brought  to  a  deadlock.  Then  will 
come  the  question  as  to  how  long  the  people  at  home  will 
be  able  to  keep  on  providing  the  men  at  the  front  with  the 
necessaries  of  life.  That  is  the  first  factor.  The  second 
factor,  which  perhaps  might  take  precedence  of  the  moral 
qualities,  is  whether  or  not  it  is  physically  possible  for 
the  population  left  behind  to  supply  the  armies  in  front 
with  what  they  need  to  carry  on  the  campaign." 

*'  But  have  they  not  always  done  it  in  the  past  ?  " 

M.  Bloch  shook  his  head  impatiently.  "  What  is  the 
use  of  talking  about  the  past  when  you  are  dealing  with 
an  altoo^ether  new  set  of  considerations  ?  Consider  for 
one  moment  what  nations  were  a  hundred  years  ago  and 
what  they  are  to-day.  In  those  days  before  railways, 
telegraphs,  steamships,  &c.,  were  invented,  each  nation 
was  more  or  less  a  homogeneous,  self-contained,  self- 
sufficing  unit.  Europe  was  built  in  a  series  of  water-tight 
compartments.  Each  country  sufficed  for  its  own  needs, 
grew  its  own  wheat,  fattened  its  own  cattle,  supplied  itself 
for  its  own   needs  within  its  own  frontiers.     All  that  is 


PREFACE  xliii 

changed ;  with  the  exception  of  Russia  and  Austria  there 
is  not  one  country  in  Europe  which  is  not  absolutely 
dependent  for  its  beef  and  its  bread  supplies  from  beyond 
the  frontiers.  You,  of  course,  in  England  are  absolutely 
dependent  upon  supplies  from  over  sea.  But  you  are 
only  one  degree  worse  off  than  Germany  in  that  respect. 
In  1895,  if  the  Germans  had  been  unable  to  obtain  any 
wheat  except  that  which  was  grown  in  the  Fatherland, 
they  would  have  lacked  bread  for  one  hundred  and  two 
days  out  of  the  three  hundred  and  sixty-five.  Ever}^  year 
the  interdependence  of  nations  upon  each  other  for  the 
necessaries  of  life  is  greater  than  it  ever  was  before. 
Germany  at  present  is  dependent  upon  Russia  for  two 
and  a  half  months'  supply  of  wheat  in  every  year.  That 
supply  would,  of  course,  be  immediately  cut  off  if  Russia 
and  Germany  went  to  war ;  and  a  similar  state  of  things 
prevails  between  other  nations  in  relation  to  other  com- 
modities. Hence  the  first  thing  that  war  would  do  would 
be  to  deprive  the  Powers  that  made  it  of  all  opportunity 
of  benefiting  by  the  products  of  the  nations  against  whom 
they  were  fighting." 

''Yes,"  I  objected,  "but  the  world  is  wide,  and  would 
it  not  be  possible  to  obtain  food  and  to  spare  from  neutral 
nations  ?  " 

*'  That  assumes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  *'  first  that  the 
machinery  of  supply  and  distribution  remains  unaffected 
by  war.  Secondly,  that  the  capacit}^  for  paying  for 
supplies  remains  unimpaired.  Neither  of  those  things  is 
true.  For  you,  of  course,  it  is  an  absolute  necessity 
that  you  should  be  able  to  bring  in  food  from  beyond 
the  seas  ;  and  possibly  with  the  aid  of  your  fleet  you  may 
be  able  to  do  it,  although  I  fear  the  rate  of  war  premium 
will   materially  enhance  the    cost    of   the    cargoes.     The 


xliv  PREFACE 

other  nations  are  not  so  fortunate.  It  was  proposed  some 
time  ago,  I  know,  in  Germany,  that  in  case  of  war  they 
should  endeavour  to  replace  the  loss  of  Russian  wheat  by 
importing  Indian  wheat  through  the  Suez  Canal — an 
operation  which  in  the  face  of  the  French  and  Russian 
cruisers  might  not  be  very  easy  of  execution.  But  even 
supposing  that  it  was  possible  to  import  food,  who  is  to 
pay  for  it  ?  And  that  is  the  final  crux  of  the  whole 
question." 

''  But,"  again  I  objected,  "  has  the  lack  of  money  ever 
prevented  nations  going  to  war  ?  I  remember  well  when 
Lord  Derby,  in  1876,  was  quite  confident  that  Russia 
would  never  go  to  war  on  behalf  of  Bulgaria  because  of 
the  state  of  the  Russian  finances  ;  but  the  Russo-Turkish 
war  took  place  all  the  same,  and  there  have  been  many 
great  wars  waged  by  nations  which  were  bankrupt,  and 
victories  won  by  conquerors  who  had  not  a  coin  in  their 
treasury." 

'*  You  are  always  appealing  to  precedents  which  do  not 
apply.  Modern  society,  which  is  organised  on  a  credit 
basis,  and  modern  war,  which  cannot  be  waged  excepting 
at  a  ruinous  expenditure,  offer  no  points  of  analogy 
compared  with  those  times  of  which  you  speak.  Have 
you  calculated  for  one  moment  what  it  costs  to  maintain 
a  soldier  as  an  efficient  fighting  man  in  the  field  ol 
battle  ?  The  estimate  of  the  best  authorities  is  that  ypu 
cannot  feed  him  and  keep  him  going  under  ten  francs  a 
day — say,  eight  shillings  a  day.  Supposing  that  the  Triple 
and  Dual  Alliance  mobilise  their  armies,  we  should  have  at 
once  confronting  us  an  expenditure  for  the  mere  mainten- 
ance of  troops  under  arms  of  ^4,000,000  a  day  falling 
upon  the  five  nations.  That  is  to  say,  that  in  one  year  of 
war  under  modern  conditions   the   Powers  would  spend 


PREFACE  xlv 

;^ 1, 460,000,000  Sterling  merely  in  feeding  their  soldiers, 
without  reckoning  all  the  other  expenses  that  must  be 
incurred  in  the  course  of  the  campaign.  This  figure  is 
interesting  as  enabling  us  to  compare  the  cost  of  modern 
wars  with  the  cost  of  previous  wars.  Take  all  the  wars 
that  have  been  waged  in  Europe  from  the  battle  of 
Waterloo  down  to  the  end  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  and 
the  total  expenditure  does  not  amount  to  more  than 
;^ 1, 2 5 0,000, 000  sterling,  a  colossal  burden  no  doubt,  but 
one  which  is  nearly  ;^200,000,000  less  than  that  which 
would  be  entailed  by  the  mere  victualling  of  the  armies 
that  would  be  set  on  foot  in  the  war  which  we  are 
supposed  to  be  discussing.  Could  any  of  the  five  nations, 
even  the  richest,  stand  that  strain  ?  " 

"  But  could  they  not  borrow  and  issue  paper  money  ?  " 

"Very  well,"  said  M.  Bloch,  **  they  would  try  to  do  so, 
no  doubt,  but  the  immediate  consequence  of  war  would 
be  to  send  securities  all  round  down  from  25  to  50  per 
cent.,  and  in  such  a  tumbling  market  it  would  be  difficult 
to  float  loans.  Recourse  would  therefore  have  to  be  had 
to  forced  loans  and  unconvertible  paper  money.  We 
should  be  back  to  the  days  of  the  assignats,  a  temporary 
expedient  which  would  aggravate  the  difficulties  with 
which  we  have  to  deal.  Prices,  for  instance,  would  go  up 
enormously,  and  so  the  cost,  8s.  a  day,  would  be  nearer 
20s.  if  all  food  had  to  be  paid  for  in  depreciated  currency. 
But,  apart  from  the  question  of  paying  for  the  necessary 
supplies,  it  is  a  grave  question  whether  such  supplies 
could  be  produced,  and  if  they  could  be  produced, 
whether  they  could  be  distributed." 

"  What  do  you  mean  by  '  distributed  '  ?  "  I  asked. 

"  Distributed  ?  "  said  M.  Bloch.  ''  Why,  how  are  you 
to  get  the  food  into  the  mouths  of  the  people  who  want  it 


xlvi  PREFACE 

if  you  had  (as  you  would  have  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war)  taken  over  all  the  railways  for  military  purposes  ? 
Even  within  the  limits  of  Germany  or  of  Russia  there 
would  be  considerable  difficulty  in  securing  the  transit  of 
food-stuffs  in  war  time,  not  merely  to  the  camps,  but  to 
the  great  industrial  centres.  You  do  not  seem  to  realise 
the  extent  to  which  the  world  has  been  changed  by  the 
modern  industrial  system.  Down  to  the  end  of  the  last 
century  the  enormous  majority  of  the  population  lived  in 
their  own  fields,  grew  their  own  food,  and  each  farm  was 
a  little  granary.  It  was  with  individuals  as  it  was  .with 
nations,  and  each  homestead  was  a  self-contained,  self- 
providing  unit.  But  nowadays  all  is  changed.  You  have 
great  industrial  centres  which  produce  absolutely  nothing 
which  human  beings  can  eat.  How  much,  for  instance, 
do  you  grow  in  the  metropolitan  area  for  the  feeding  of 
London  ?  Everything  has  to  be  brought  by  rail  or  by 
water  to  your  markets.  So  it  is  more  or  less  all  over  the 
Continent,  especially  in  Germany  and  France.  Now  it  so 
happens  (and  in  this  I  am  touching  upon  the  political  side 
of  the  question)  that  those  districts  which  produce  least 
food  yield  more  Socialists  to  the  acre  than  any  other  part 
of  the  country.  It  is  those  districts,  rife  with  all  elements 
of  political  discontent,  which  would  be  the  first  to  feel  the 
pinch  of  high  prices  and  of  lack  of  food.  But  this  is  a 
matter  on  which  we  will  speak  later  on." 

''  But  do  you  think,"  I  said,  *'  that  the  railways  would 
be  so  monopolised  by  the  military  authorities  that  they 
could  not  distribute  provisions  throughout  the  country  ?  " 

''  No,"  said  M.  Bloch.  '^  It  is  not  merely  that  they 
would  be  monopolised  by  their  military  authorities,  but 
that  they  would  be  disorganised  by  the  mobilisation  oi 
troops.    You  forget  that  the  whole  machinery  of  distribu- 


PREFACE  xlvii 

tion  and  of  production  would  be  thrown  out  of  gear  by 
mobilisation ;  and  this  brings  me  to  the  second  point 
upon  which  I  insist — viz.,  the  impossibility  of  producing 
the  food.  At  the  present  moment  Germany,  for  instance, 
just  manages  to  produce  sufficient  food  to  feed  her  own 
population,  with  the  aid  of  imports  from  abroad,  for 
which  she  is  able  to  pay  by  the  proceeds  of  her  own 
industry.  But  in  the  case  of  war  with  Russia  she  would 
not  be  able  to  buy  two  and  a  half  months'  supply  of 
wheat  from  Russia,  and  therefore  would  have  to  pay 
much  more  for  a  similar  supply  of  food  in  the  neutral 
markets,  providing  she  could  obtain  it.  But  she  would 
have  to  buy  much  more  than  two  and  a  half  mcmths'  from 
Russia,  because  the  nine  months'  corn  which  she  pro- 
duces at  present  is  the  product  of  the  whole  labour  of  all 
her  able-bodied  agricultural  population  ;  and  how  they 
work  you  in  England  do  not  quite  realise.  Do  you  know, 
for  instance,  that  after  the  *  Busstag,'  or  day  of  penitence 
and  prayer,  at  the  beginning  of  what  we  call  the  farmers' 
year  or  summer  season,  the  whole  German  agricultural 
population  in  some  districts  work  unremittingly  fifteen 
hours  a  day  seven  days  a  week,  without  any  cessation, 
without  Sundays  or  holidays,  until  the  harvest  is  gathered 
in  ;  and  even  with  all  that  unremitting  toil  they  are  only 
able  to  produce  nine  months'  supply  of  grain.  When  you 
have  mobilised  the  whole  German  army,  you  will  diminish 
at  least  by  half  the  strong  hands  available  for  labour 
in  the  field.  In  Russia  we  should  not,  of  course,  be  in 
any  such  difficulty,  and  in  the  scrupulous  observance  of 
Sunday  we  have  a  reserve  which  would  enable  us  to 
recoup  ourselves  for  the  loss  of  agricultural  labour.  We 
should  lose,  for  instance,  17  per  cent,  of  our  peasants; 
but  if  those  who  w^ere  left  worked  on  Sunday,  in  addition 


xlviii  PREFACE 

to  weekdays,  we  should  just  be  able  to  make  up  for  the 
loss  of  the  men  who  were  taken  to  war.  Germany  has 
no  such  reserves,  nor  France  ;  and  hence  it  is  that,  speak- 
ing as  a  political  economist,  I  feel  extremely  doubtful  as 
to  whether  it  would  be  possible  for  either  Germany  or 
France  to  feed  their  own  population,  to  say  nothing  of 
their  own  soldiers,  when  once  the  whole  machine  of 
agricultural  production  had  been  broken  up  by  the 
mobilisation  en  masse  of  the  whole  population." 

^*  But  has  this  point  never  been  considered  by  the 
sovereigns  and  statesmen  of  Europe  ?  "  I  inquired. 

*'You  know/'  replied  M.  Bloch,  *' how  it  is  with  human 
beings.  We  shall  all  die,  but  how  few  care  to  think  of 
death  ?  It  is  one  of  the  things  inevitable  which  no  one 
can  alter  by  taking  thought.  So  it  is  with  this  question. 
War  once  being  regarded  as  unavoidable,  the  riUers  shut 
their  eyes  to  its  consequences.  Only  once  in  recent 
history  do  I  remember  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  a 
European  Government  gravely  to  calculate  the  economic 
consequences  of  war  under  modern  conditions.  It  was 
when  M.  Burdeau  was  in  the  French  Ministry.  He 
appointed  a  committee  of  economists  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  how  the  social  organism  would  continue  to 
function  in  a  time  of  war,  how  from  day  to  day  their 
bread  would  be  given  to  the  French  population.  But  no 
sooner  had  he  begun  his  investigation  than  a  strong 
objection  was  raised  by  the  military  authorities,  and  out 
of  deference  to  their  protests  the  inquiry  was  indefinitely 
suspended.  Hence  we  are  going  forward  blindfold,  pre- 
paring all  the  while  for  a  war  without  recognising  the  fact 
that  the  very  fundamental  first  condition  of  being  able  to 
wage  it  does  not  exist.  You  might  as  well  prepare  for  a 
naval  war  without  being  sure   that  you  have  a   sea  ia 


PREFACE  xllx 

which  your  ships  can  float  as  to  continue  to  make  pre- 
parations for  a  land  war  unless  you  have  secured  in 
advance  the  means  by  which  your  population  shall  live. 
Every  great  State  would  in  time  of  war  he  in  the  position 
of  a  besieged  city,  and  the  factor  which  always  decides 
sieges  is  the  factor  which  will  decide  the  modern  war. 
Your  soldiers  may  fight  as  they  please ;  the  ultimate 
decision  is  in  the  hands  oi famine'^ 

"  Well,  it  is  an  old  saying  that  *  armies  always  march 
upon  their  bellies,'  "  said  I.  **  *  Hunger  is  more  terrible 
than  iron,  and  the  want  of  food  destroys  more  armies  than 
battles,'  was  a  saying  of  the  first  Napoleon,  which  holds 
good  to-day." 

**  But,"  interrupted  M.  Bloch,  ''  I  am  not  speaking  so 
much  of  the  armies,  I  am  speaking  of  the  population  that 
is  behind  the  armies,  which  far  outnumbers  the  armies  and 
which  is  apt  to  control  the  policy  of  which  the  armies  are 
but  the  executive  instrument.  How  long  do  you  think  the 
populations  of  Paris  or  of  Berlin  or  of  the  great  manufac- 
turing districts  in  Germany  would  stand  the  doubling  of 
the  price  of  their  food,  accompanied,  as  it  would  be,  by  a 
great  stagnation  of  industry  and  all  the  feverish  uncer- 
tainty and  excitement  of  war  ? 

"  What  is  the  one  characteristic  of  modern  Europe  ?  Is 
it  not  the  growth  of  nervousness  and  a  lack  of  phlegmatic 
endurance,  of  stoical  apathy  ?  The  modern  European  feels 
more  keenly  and  is  much  more  excitable  and  impres- 
sionable than  his  forefathers.  Upon  this  highly  excitable, 
sensitive  population  you  are  going  to  inflict  the  miseries  of 
hunger  and  all  the  horrors  of  war.  At  the  same  time  you 
will  enormously  increase  their  taxes,  and  at  the  same  time 
also  you  will  expose  your  governing  and  directing  classes 
to  more  than  decimation  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy's  sharp- 

d 


1  PREFACE 

shooters.  How  long  do  you  think  your  social  fabric  will 
remain  stable  under  such  circumstances  ?  Believe  me, 
the  more  the  ultimate  political  and  social  consequences  of 
the  modern  war  are  calmly  contemplated,  the  more  clearly 
will  it  be  evident  that  if  war  is  possible  it  is  only  possible, 
as  I  said  before,  at  the  price  of  suicide." 

*'  From  which,  therefore,  it  follows,  in  your  opinion, 
M.  Bloch,  that  the  Peace  Conference  has  not  so  much  to 
discuss  the  question  of  peace  as  to  inquire  into  whether  or 
not  war  is  possible  ?  " 

"  A  committee  of  experts,  chosen  from  the  ablest  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Powers  sent  to  the  Hague,"  replied  M. 
Bloch,  *'  would  have  very  little  difficulty  in  coming  to  a 
conclusion  upon  the  facts  whfch  I  have  just  set  forth  in  my 
book.  Those  experts  might  be  soldiers  and  political 
economists,  or  the  inquiry  might  be  divided  into  two  heads, 
and  the  two  questions  relegated  to  different  committees  of 
specialists.  I  am  quite  sure  that,  as  the  result  of  such  a 
dispassionate  international  investigation  into  the  altered 
conditions  of  the  problem,  they  could  only  arrive  at  one 
conclusion — viz.,  that  the  day  when  nations  could  hope  to 
settle  their  disputes  by  appealing  to  the  arbitrament  of  war 
has  gone  by  :  first,  because  from  that  tribunal  no  definite 
decision  can  speedily  be  secured  ;  and  secondly,  the  costs 
of  the  process  are  ruinous  to  both  the  suitors." 

"  It  is  rather  a  happy  idea,  that  of  yours,  M.  Bloch,'' 
said  I,  *'  that  of  the  last  Court  of  Appeal  of  nations  having 
broken  down  by  the  elaboration  of  its  own  procedure,  the 
excessive  costliness  of  the  trial,  and,  what  is  much  more 
serious  than  anything  else,  the  impossibility  of  securing  a 
definite  verdict.  Hitherto  the  great  argument  in  favour  of 
war  is  that  it  has  been  a  tribunal  capable  of  giving  un- 
mistakably a  decision  from  which  there  was  no  appeal." 


PREFACE  li 

*'  Whereas,  according  to  my  contention,"  said  M.  Bloch, 
"  war  has  become  a  tribunal  which  by  the  very  perfection 
of  its  own  processes  and  the  costliness  of  its  methods  can 
no  longer  render  a  decision  of  any  kind.  It  may  ruin 
the  suitors,  but  the  verdict  is  liable  to  be  indefinitely 
postponed. 

**  Therefore  the  ultimate  Court  of  Appeal  having  broken 
down,"  I  said,  "  it  is  necessary  to  constitute  another, 
whose  proceedings  would  not  be  absolutely  inconsistent 
with  economic  necessity  or  with  the  urgent  need  for 
prompt  and  definite  decision.  But  if  this  be  admitted, 
what  immense  world-wide  consequences  would  flow  from 
such  a  decision." 

*'  Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  the  nations  would  no  longer  go 
on  wasting  i^2 50,000,000  sterhng  every  year  in  preparing 
to  wage  a  war  which  can  only  be  waged  at  the  price 
of  suicide,  that  is  to  say,  which  cannot  be  waged  at  all, 
for  no  nation  willingly  commits  suicide.  Then  we  may 
hope  for  some  active  effort  to  be  made  in  the  direction  of 
ameliorating  the  condition  of  the  people.  The  fund 
liberated  from  the  w-ar-chest  of  the  world  could  work 
marvels  if  it  were  utilised  in  the  education  of  the  people. 
At  present,  as  you  will  see  fromx  the  tables  which  I  have 
compiled  in  my  book,  the  proportion  of  money  spent  on 
education  compared  with  that  spent  on  war  is  very  small. 
In  Russia,  for  instance,  we  have  an  immense  deal  to  do  in 
that  direction.  In  some  provinces  no  fewer  than  90  per 
cent,  of  the  recruits  are  illiterate.  In  fact,  as  you  will 
see  from  what  I  have  written,  I  have  been  as  much  at- 
tracted to  this  subject  from  the  desire  to  improve  the  con- 
dition of  the  people  as  from  any  other  source.  Hence  my 
book  took  in  part  the  shape  of  an  investigation  of  the 
moral,  social,  and  material  conditions  in  which  the  masses 


lil  PREFACE 

of  the  Russian  peasants  pass  their  lives.  It  is  a  painful 
picture,  and  one  that  cannot  fail  profoundly  to  touch  the 
hearts  of  all  those  who  have  followed  the  results  of  my 
investigation.  The  condition  of  the  mass  of  the  people  in 
every  country  leaves  much  to  be  desired,  but  especially  is 
this  the  case  in  my  own  country,  where  the  resources  of 
civilisation  have  hardly  been  drawn  upon  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  condition  of  the  peasants." 

*'Yet,  M.  Bloch,  I  think  I  gather  from  you  that  Russia 
was  better  able  to  support  a  war  than  more  highly 
organised  nations." 

**  You  are  quite  right,"  said  M.  Bloch.  '*  It  is  true  that 
Russia  can,  perhaps  better  than  all  other  countries,  con- 
template the  dangers  or  impossibilities  of  modern  war; 
but  that  is  precisely  because  she  is  not  so  highly  organised 
and  so  advanced  or  developed  in  civilisation  as  her  neigh- 
bours. Russia  is  the  only  country  in  Europe  which  pro- 
duces sufficient  food  for  her  own  people.  She  is  not  only 
able  to  produce  enough  grain  to  feed  her  own  people,  but 
she  exports  at  present  four  millions  of  tons  every  year. 
A  war  which  stopped  the  export  trade  would  simply  place 
this  immense  mass  of  food  at  the  disposal  of  our  own 
people,  who  would  be  more  in  danger  of  suffering  from  a 
plethora  of  food  than  from  a  scarcity.  But  nevertheless, 
although  this  is  the  case,  the  very  backwardness  of  Russia 
renders  it  more  important  that  she  should  avoid  exposing 
her  nascent  civilisation  to  the  tremendous  strain  of  a  great 
war.  Practically  we  may  be  invulnerable,  but  if,  when 
having  beaten  back  our  invaders,  we  were  to  endeavour  in 
turn  to  carry  the  war  across  our  frontiers,  we  should  find 
ourselves  confronted  by  the  same  difficulties  which  make 
offensive  war  increasingly  difficult,  not  to  say  impossible. 
Neither  is    there   any  conceivable   territorial  or  political 


PREFACE  liii 

result  attainable  by  force  of  arms  here  or  in  Asia  which 
would  be  any  adequate  compensation  for  the  sacrifices 
which  even  a  victorious  war  would  entail." 

"All  this  may  be  true,  but  nations  do  not  always  count 
the  cost  before  going  to  war."   , 

*'  No,"  said  M.  Bloch  ;  "  if  they  did,  they  would  very 
seldom  go  to  war.  Take,  for  instance,  the  civil  war  in 
the  United  States  of  America.  According  to  some  calcu- 
lations it  would  have  cost  the  United  States  four  milliards 
of  francs,  that  is  to  say  ;^  160,000,000  sterling,  to  have 
bought  up  all  their  slaves  at  ;^200  a  head,  and  emancipated 
them.  Instead  of  taking  that  method  of  solving  a  danger- 
ous and  delicate  problem,  they  appealed  to  the  sword, 
with  the  result  that  it  is  estimated  that  the  war  occasioned 
the  country  losses  of  one  kind  and  another  amounting  to 
twenty-five  milliards  of  francs,  or  ;^  1,000,000,000  sterling, 
to  say  nothing  of  all  the  bloodshed  and  misery  entailed 
by  that  war.  The  cost  of  emancipation  thus  ciphered  out 
at  ;^I200  a  head  per  slave  instead  of  ;£"200  per  head,  at 
which  the  bargain  could  easily  have  been  arranged.  The 
economic  condition  of  our  peasants  in  many  of  our  pro- 
vinces," continued  M.  Bloch,  "  is  heartrending.  Their 
ignorance,  their  innocence,  their  simplicity,  render  them 
an  easy  prey  to  money-lenders,  who  have  in  many  cases 
succeeded  in  establishing  a  veritable  system  of  slave 
labour." 

"How  could  that  be?"  I  asked.  "The  serfs  were 
emancipated  in  1 861.'* 

"Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  they  were  emancipated,  but 
their  emancipation  without  education  left  them  an  easy 
prey  to  the  Kulaks,  who  advance  money  upon  their  labour. 
A  peasant,  for  instance,  has  to  pay  his  taxes,  say,  in  winter 
time,  and  the  Kulak   will  advance  the  twenty  or  thirty 


liv  PREFACE 

roubles  which  he  may  have  to  pay  in  return  for  what  is 
called  his  '  summer  labour.'  The  price  of  labour  in 
Russia  in  summer  is  twice  or  thrice  as  much  as  it  is  in 
winter.  The  Kulak  buys  the  summer  labour  at  the  winter 
rates,  and  then  having  purchased  in  advance  the  summer 
labour  of  the  unfortunate  peasant,  he  collects  his  chattels 
in  droves  and  farms  them  out  wherever  he  can  dispose  of 
them.  It  is  veritable  slavery.  But  even  this  is  less  terri- 
ble than  that  which  can  be  witnessed  in  some  provinces, 
where  parents  sell  their  children  to  speculators,  who  buy 
them  up  and  send  them  to  St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow  as 
calves  are  sent  to  market,  where  they  are  sold  out  for  a 
term  of  years  as  apprentices  to  those  who  have  no 
scruples  against  securing  cheap  labour  on  those  terms. 

"  No  one  who  has  seen  anything  of  the  squalor  and 
wretchedness,  the  struggle  with  fever  and  famine,  in  the 
rural  districts  of  Russia,  especially  when  there  has  been  a 
failure  of  harvest,  can  be  other  than  passionate  to  divert 
for  the  benefit  of  the  people  some  of  the  immense  volume 
of  wealth  that  is  spent  in  preparing  for  this  impossible  war. 
The  children  of  most  Russian  peasants  come  into  the 
world  almost  like  brute  beasts,  without  any  medical  or 
skilled  attendance  at  childbirth,  and  they  are  brought  up 
hard  in  a  way  that  fortunately  you  know  little  of  in  wealthy 
England.  Can  you  imagine,  for  instance,"  said  M.  Bloch, 
speaking  with  great  fervour  and  feeling,  "  the  way  in 
which  infants  are  left  inside  the  home  of  most  Russian 
peasants,  whose  mothers  have  to  leave  them  to  labour  in 
the  fields  ?  The  child  is  left  alone  to  roll  about  the  earthen 
floor  of  the  hut,  and  as  it  will  cry  for  hunger,  poultices  of 
chewed  black  bread  are  tied  round  its  hands  and  feet,  so 
that  the  little  creature  may  have  something  to  suck  at  until 
its  mother  comes  back  from  the  fields.     At  every  stage  in 


PREFACE  Iv 

life  you  find  the  same  deplorable  lack  of  what  more 
prosperous  nations  regard  as  indispensable  to  human 
existence.  In  some  provinces  we  have  only  thirty-seven 
doctors  per  million  inhabitants,  and  as  for  nurses,  school- 
masters, and  other  agents  of  civilisation,  there  are  whole 
vast  tracts  in  which  they  are  absolutely  unknown.  All 
this  makes  our  population  hardy,  no  doubt — those  who 
survive ;  but  the  infant  mortality  is  frightful,  and  the  life 
w^hich  the  survivors  lead  is  very  hard  and  sometimes  very 
terrible." 

"  The  contrasts  between  the  vital  statistics  of  Russia 
and  of  France  are,  I  suppose,  about  as  wide  as  could  be 
imagined." 

''  Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch.  "  But  although  the  French 
system  of  limiting  the  family  and  keeping  infant  mortality 
down  to  a  minimum  has  some  great  advantages,  it  has 
great  disadvantages.  In  a  limited  family  much  greater 
pains  are  taken  to  preserve  the  life  of  the  sickly  children. 
Hence,  instead  of  allowing  them  to  be  eliminated  by 
natural  process,  whereby  the  race  would  be  preserved  from 
deterioration,  they  are  sedulously  kept  alive,  and  the 
vitality  of  the  nation  is  thereby  diminished.  In  other 
respects  our  Russian  people  are  very  different  from  what 
you  imagine.  For  instance,  it  may  surprise  you,  but  it  is 
undoubtedly  true,  that  the  amount  of  spirit  consumed  by 
our  people  is  very  much  less  per  head  than  that  which  is 
drunk  in  England,  and  also  that  the  number  of  illegitimate 
births  in  Russia  is  lower  per  thousand  than  in  an  other 
country  in  Europe.  This  is  due  to  the  prevalence  of  early 
marriages,  for  our  people  marry  so  early  that  when  our 
young  men  are  taken  for  the  army  from  30  to.  60  per  cent, 
are  married  before  they  enter  the  ranks.  You  may  smile," 
said  M.  Bloch,  *'  at  me  for  thinking  that  those  questions 


Ivi  PREFACE 

must  be  considered  in  a  discussion  of  the  future  war  ;  but 
it  is  the  moral  stamina  of  a  population  which  will  ultimately 
decide  its  survival,  and  I  therefore  could  not  exclude  the 
discussion  of  all  the  elements  which  contribute  to  the  well- 
being  of  a  population  in  endeavouring  to  forecast  the  future 
of  war." 

''  Now,  M.  Bloch,  let  us  turn  to  another  subject.  We 
have  talked  hitherto  about  armies,  and  only  about  armies. 
What  is  your  idea  about  navies  ?  " 

*'  My  idea  about  a  navy,"  said  M.  Bloch,  ^*  is  that  unless 
you  have  a  supreme  navy,  it  is  not  worth  while  having 
one  at  all,  and  that  a  navy  that  is  not  supreme  is  only  a 
hostage  in  the  hands  of  the  Power  whose  fleet  is  supreme. 
Hence,  it  seems  to  me  that  for  Russia  to  spend  millions 
in  the  endeavour  to  create  a  deep-sea  fleet  of  sea-going 
battleships  is  a  great  mistake.  The  money  had  much 
better  be  used  for  other  purposes." 

**What!"  said  I,  ''then,  do  you  not  think  that  Russia 
needs  a  navy  ?  " 

"A  navy,  yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  ''a  navy  for  coast 
defence,  perhaps,  and  also  cruisers,  but  a  fighting  fleet  of 
battleships,  no.  It  is  a  folly  to  attempt  to  create  such  a 
navy,  and  the  sooner  that  is  recognised  the  better." 

'*  But,"  I  persisted,  "  do  you  not  agree  with  Captain 
Mahan  in  thinking  that  sea-power  is  the  dominant  factor 
in  the  destiny  of  nations  ?  " 

"  Do  not  let  us  theorise ;  let  us  look  at  facts,"  said  M. 
Bloch.  "  What  I  see  very  plainly  is  that  the  navy  may 
be  almost  ignored  as  a  vital  factor  in  a  war  to  the  death 
between  Russia  and  any  of  her  neighbours.  Suppose, 
for  instance,  ihat  we  had  a  war  with  Germany.  What 
would  be  the  good  of  our  fleet  ?  Suppose  that  it  is 
inferior  to  that  of  Germany,  it  will  be  either  captured,  or 


I    'Pt,, 


PREFACE  Ivii 

shut  up  in  harbour,  unable  to  go  out.  If  it  is  superior  to 
that  of  Germany,  what  better  are  we  ?  Here  we  have 
history  to  guide  us.  We  cannot  hope  to  have  such  an 
unquestioned  superiority  at  sea  over  the  Germans  as  the 
French  had  in  the  war  of  1870;  but  what  use  was  the 
naval  supremacy  of  France  to  the  French  in  their  death- 
grapple  with  the  Germans  ?  Why,  so  far  from  finding 
them  useful,  they  absolutely  laid  their  ironclads  up  in 
harbour  and  sent  their  crews  to  Paris  to  assist  in  the 
defence  of  the  capital — and  they  did  right.  German}^  was 
striking  at  the  heart  of  France  when  she  struck  at  Paris, 
and  no  amount  of  superiorit}^  over  the  German  fleet  on 
the  part  of  the  French  could  be  counted  for  a  moment  as 
a  set-off  against  the  loss  of  their  capital.  So  it  will 
always  be." 

"But,"  I  objected,  "could  the  German  fleet  not  be 
utilised  for  the  purpose  of  landing  an  expedition  on  the 
Russian  coast  ?" 

"  No  doubt,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  it  might.  But  here  again 
I  may  quote  Count  Moltke.  When,  in  1870,  we  were 
discussing  the  possibility  of  a  French  expedition  to  the 
shores  of  the  Baltic,  Moltke  declared  that,  so  far  from 
regarding  such  an  expedition  with  alarm,  he  would  rather 
w^elcome  it,  because  any  diversion  of  French  forces  from 
the  point  where  the  decisive  blow  must  be  delivered 
would  increase  the  German  chances  of  success.  Hence, 
if  the  Germans  w^ere  to  send  an  expeditionary  force  to 
Russian  v/aters,  it  would  only  represent  the  subtraction  of 
so  many  fighting  men  from  the  seat  of  war,  where  the 
real  issue  of  the  campaign  would  be  decided.  No ; 
Russia  would  have  no  reason  to  fear  any  serious  attack 
from  the  sea.  That  being  so,  what  is  the  use  of  wasting 
all  our  resources  upon  ironclads  which  we  could  not  use  ? 


Iviii  PREFACE 

It  would  have  been  much  better  to  have  gone  on  piling 
up  expenditure  on  our  army  much  more  rapidly  than  we 
have  upon  our  fleet.  In  1876  we  spent  twenty-seven 
million  roubles  on  the  navy,  and  twenty  years  later  we 
were  spending  sixty-seven  millions,  so  that  the  naval 
expenditure  had  more  than  doubled,  while  the  expenditure 
on  the  army  had  only  increased  fifty  per  cent." 

"  Do  you  not  think  that  a  German,  British,  or  Japanese 
fleet  might  seriously  injure  Russia  by  bombarding  the  coast 
towns  ?  " 

"  No,"  said  M.  Bloch.  *'  Such  coast  towns  as  we  have, 
and  they  are  not  many,  are  for  the  most  part  well 
defended,  too  well  defended  to  be  seriously  attacked  by 
an  enemy's  fleet.  The  experience  of  Crete  does  not 
increase  our  dread  of  the  bombarding  ironclad  as  a 
method  likely  to  affect  the  issues  of  a  campaign.  Why,  is 
H  not  true  that  the  international  fleet  on  one  occasion  fired 
70  shells  and  only  killed  three  men  and  wounded  15  ?  " 

"  And  what  about  the  protection  of  your  commerce, 
M.  Bloch  ?  " 

**  The  protection  of  our  commerce  would  have  to  be 
undertaken  (if  undertaken  at  all)  by  cruisers  and  not  by 
battleships.  Besides,  there  should  be  some  regard  paid 
to  the  value  of  the  thing  protected,  and  the  insurance 
which  you  pay  for  it.  At  this  moment  our  oversea 
mercantile  marine  is  small,  so  small  compared  with  that 
of  England  that,  although  you  are  spending  twice  as 
much  on  your  navy  as  we  do,  your  naval  insurance  rate 
(if  we  may  so  call  it)  only  amounts  to  16  francs  per  ton 
of  merchant  shipping,  whereas  with  us  the  rate  is  as  high 
as  1 30  francs  ;  or  if  it  is  reckoned  by  a  percentage  upon 
the  trade,  our  naval  expenditure  is  twice  as  high  as  yours. 
And  to  what  purpose  ?  " 


PREFACE  lix 

*'  But,  M.  Bloch,  supposing  that  our  fleet  is  inferior  in 
strength  to  the  German  fleet,  and  that  it  is  wiped  off  the 
face  of  the  sea.     What  then  ?  " 

''  What  then  ?  "  said  M.  Bloch.  "Why,  we  shall  just 
be  in  the  position  that  the  Italians  were  in  when  they  lost 
their  fleet  at  Lissa  to  the  Austrians.  But  what  effect  had 
that  decisive  naval  victory  upon  the  fortunes  of  the 
campaign  ?  The  fate  of  Austria  was  sealed  by  the 
battle  of  Sadowa,  and  all  naval  losses  which  we  might 
incur  would  naturally  be  charged  for  in  the  indemnit5 
which  we  should  impose  upon  our  defeated  enemy  if  we 
came  off  victorious,  and  if  we  were  beaten  on  land  our 
defeat  at  sea  would  not  be  a  material  aggravation  of  our 
position." 

"  But,  M.  Bloch,  do  not  you  think  that  you  need  a 
strong  fleet  in  order  to  keep  your  channels  of  trade 
open  ?  " 

''  I  do  not  believe,"  said  M.  Bloch,  ''  that  you  can  keep 
your  channels  of  trade  open,  even  with  the  strongest 
fleet.  I  grant  that  if  you  have  a  supreme  fleet,  you  may 
at  least  have  a  chance  of  keeping  the  trade  routes  open, 
but  if  you  have  not  a  supreme  fleet  (and  for  Russia  this 
is  out  of  the  question)  you  can  do  nothing,  and  Russia, 
fortunately  being  self-contained  and  self-supporting,  could 
manage  to  subsist  better,  if  her  oversea  trade  were  cut 
off,  than  any  other  country." 

"  Then  how  would  you  apply  your  reasoning  to 
England  ?  " 

"  England,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  is  in  a  different  category 
from  all  the  other  nations.  You  only  grow  enough  bread 
in  your  own  country  to  feed  your  people  for  three  months 
in  the  year.  If  3^ou  do  not  command  the  seas,  if  you 
cannot  bring  to  your  markets  the  food  of  the  world,  you 


Ix  PREFACE 

are  in  the  position  of  a  huge  beleaguered  fortress  with 
only  three  months'  rations  for  the  whole  people.  If  you 
ask  my  opinion,  I  tell  you  frankly  that  I  do  not  think 
your  position  is  very  enviable,  not  because  of  any  danger 
from  invasion,  for  I  recognise  the  superiority  of  your  fleet, 
but  because  it  seems  to  me  that  any  nation  is  in  a  very 
precarious  position  which  has  to  depend  for  so  much  of 
its  food  upon  countries  across  the  sea.  A  single  cruiser 
let  loose  upon  one  of  your  great  trade  routes  would  send 
up  the  price  of  provisions  enormously,  and  although  no 
one  could  hope  to  blockade  the  English  ports,  any  inter- 
ruption in  the  supply  of  raw  material,  any  interference 
with  the  stream  of  food  products  which  are  indispensable 
for  the  sustenance  of  your  people,  would  endanger  you 
far  more  than  the  loss  of  a  pitched  battle. 

"  It  is  true  that  you  are  prosperous  ;  but  there  are  many 
elements  in  your  population  the  material  condition  of 
which  leaves  much  to  be  desired,  and  with  the  stress  and 
strain  of  industrial  stagnation,  caused  by  the  closing  of 
markets  abroad  and  the  rise  in  the  price  of  food  which 
would  be  inevitable  under  any  circumstances,  you  might 
have  as  considerable  internal  difficulties  as  any  of  those 
which  threaten  your  neighbours.  But,  there  again,  if 
(which  God  forbid)  England  should  find  herself  at  war, 
the  factor  which  will  decide  the  issue  will  not  be  the 
decisive  battle ;  it  will  be  pressure  of  want,  the  lack  of 
food,  in  short,  the  economic  results  which  must  inevitably 
follow  any  great  war  in  the  present  complex  state  of 
human  civilisation. 

"  In  short,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "  I  regard  the  economic 
factor  as  the  dominant  and  decisive  element  in  the  matter. 
You  cannot  fight  unless  3'ou  can  eat,  and  at  the  present 
moment  you  cannot  feed  your  people  and  wage  a  great 


PREFACE  Ixi 

war.  To  a  certain  extent  this  is  already  recognised,  so 
much  so  that  there  are  a  few  general  principles  that  it  is 
worth  while  mentioning.  First,  you  may  take  it  for 
granted  that  the  great  war,  if  it  ever  breaks  out,  will  not 
take  place  until  after  the  harvest  has  been  gathered.  To 
mobilise  in  spring,  or  in  early  summer,  would  bring 
starvation  too  closely  home  to  the  population  for  any 
statesman  to  think  of  it.  Secondly,  whenever  there  is  a 
bad  harvest  you  may  be  sure  there  will  be  no  war.  Even 
with  a  full  granary  it  will  be  very  difficult  for  any  nation 
to  feed  its  troops,  to  say  nothing  of  its  home  population. 
With  a  bad  harvest  it  would  be  impossible.  Hence,  if 
ever  you  should  see  a  rapid  buying-up  of  bread-stuffs  on 
the  part  of  any  nation,  you  may  feel  sure  that  there  is 
danger  ahead  ;  but  so  long  as  there  is  no  attempt  made  to 
secure  reserve  supplies  of  grain,  you  may  regard  with 
comparative  equanimity  the  menaces  of  war." 

"Then,  on  the  whole,  you  are  hopeful  concerning  the 
future,  M.  Bloch  ?  " 

*'  Yes,"  said  he ;  "  hopeful  with  the  hope  that  is  born 
not  of  fantasy  or  of  Utopian  dreaming,  but  from  the 
painstaking  examination  of  hard,  disagreeable  facts.  The 
soldier  is  going  down  and  the  economist  is  going  up. 
There  is  no  doubt  of  it.  Humanity  has  progressed  beyond 
the  stage  in  which  war  can  any  longer  be  regarded  as  a 
possible  Court  of  Appeal.  Even  military  service  has  lost 
much  of  its  fascination.  At  one  time  war  appealed  to  the 
imagination  of  man,  and  the  poets  and  painters  found  no 
theme  so  tempting  as  depicting  the  heroism  of  the 
individual  warrior,  whose  courage  and  might  often  turned 
the  tide  of  battle  and  decided  the  destiny  of  nations.  All 
that  has  long  gone  by  the  board.  War  has  become  more 
and  more  a  matter  of  mechanical  arrangement.     Modern 


Ixii  PREFACE 

battles  will  be  decided,  so  far  as  they  can  be  decided  at 
all,  by  men  lying  in  improvised  ditches  which  they  have 
scooped  out  to  protect  themselves  from  the  fire  of  a 
distant  and  invisible  enemy.  All  the  pomp  and  circum- 
stance of  glorious  war  disappeared  when  smokeless 
powder  was  invented.  As  a  profession  militarism  is 
becoming  less  and  less  attractive.  There  is  neither  booty 
to  be  gained,  nor  promotion,  with  an  ever  increasing 
certainty  of  a  disagreeable  death,  should  war  ever  take 
place." 

*'The  old  toast  in  the  British  Army  used  to  be,"  I  said, 
** '  Bloody  war  and  quick  promotion.'  " 

^*Yes,"  said  M.  Bloch,  "as  long  as  bloody  war  only 
killed  out  a  certain  percentage  it  meant  more  rapid 
promotion  for  the  rest,  but  if  it  kills  out  too  many  the 
attraction  fails,  for  there  is  no  promotion  to  a  dead  man. 
Side  by  side  with  the  drying  up  of  the  attractiveness  of  a 
military  career  there  has  gone  on  an  increasing  agitation 
against  the  whole  system,  an  agitation  which  finds  its 
most  extreme  exponents  among  the  Socialists,  whose 
chief  stock-in-trade  is  to  dwell  upon  the  waste  of  industrial 
resources  caused  by  the  present  organisation  of  society 
on  a  competitive  basis,  which  the}^  maintain  naturally 
and  necessarily  results  in  the  excessive  burdens  of  our 
armed  peace.  What  the  Governments  will  all  come  to 
see  soon  more  or  less  clearly  is  that  if  they  persist  in 
squandering  the  resources  of  their  people  in  order  ^to 
prepare  for  a  war  which  has  already  become  impossible 
without  suicide,  they  will  only  be  preparing  the  triumph 
of  the  socialist  revolution." 


AUTHOR'S   PREFACE 

Natural  philosophers  declare  that  the  atmosphere 
reveals  at  times  the  presence  of  a  certain  so-called 
cosmic  dust.  It  influences  the  change  of  colours 
In  the  sky,  it  colours  the  sunlight  with  a  bloody- 
line,  it  penetrates  our  dwellings  and  our  lungs, 
acts  Injuriously  upon  living  organisms,  and,  falling 
even  upon  the  summits  of  hills,  leaves  Its  traces 
upon  their  mantles  of  virgin  snow. 

In  the  public  and  private  life  of  modern  Europe 
somethinor  of  the  same  kind  reveals  itself.  A 
presentiment  Is  felt  that  the  present  Incessant 
growth  of  armaments  must  either  call  forth  a  war, 
ruinous  both  for  conqueror  and  for  conquered, 
and  ending  perhaps  in  general  anarchy,  or  reduce 
the  people  to  the  most  lamentable  condition. 

Is  this  unquiet  state  of  mind  the  consequence 
of  a  mistaken  or  sickly  condition  of  the  nervous 
system  of  the  modern  man  ?  Or  is  it  justified  by 
possible  contingencies  ? 


Ixiv  AUTHOR'S   PREFACE 

Such  questions  cannot  be  answered  categori- 
cally. All  would  desire  that  the  dangers  caused 
by  armaments  were  but  a  symptom  which  time 
will  destroy.  But  even  an  unanimous  desire 
cannot  have  the  power  to  change  the  great  con- 
catenation of  circumstances  which  are  the  cause  of 
armaments,  until  the  time  shall  come  when,  in  the 
words  of  Von  Thiinen,  the  interests  of  nations  and 
the  interests  of  humanity  shall  cease  to  contend 
with  one  another,  and  culture  shall  have 
awakened  a  sense  of  the  solidarity  of  the  interests 
of  all. 

Such  a  state  of  affairs  is  unhappily  still  distant. 
It  is  true  that  the  ruinousness  of  war  under 
modern  conditions  is  apparent  to  all.  But  this 
gives  no  sufficient  guarantee  that  war  will  not 
break  forth  suddenly,  even  in  opposition  to  the 
wishes  of  those  who  take  part  in  it.  Involuntarily 
we  call  to  mind  the  words  of  the  great  Bacon, 
that  '*  in  the  vanity  of  the  world  a  greater  field  of 
action  is  open  for  folly  than  for  reason,  and 
frivolity  always  enjoys  more  influence  than  judg- 
ment." To-day  these  w^ords  are  even  moje 
apposite  than  in  the  past.  For  Reason  itself  it  is 
harder  than  before  to  find  a  path  in  the  field 
of  circumstances  which  change  for  ever.  The 
speed  with  which  relations  change  is  a  character- 
istic feature  of  our  time.     In  modern  times  a  few 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixv 

years  see  greater  changes  In  the  material  and 
moral  condition  of  masses  than  formerly  took 
place  In  the  course  of  centuries.  This  greater 
mobility  of  contemporary  life  Is  the  consequence 
of  better  education,  the  activity  of  parliaments,  of 
associations,  and  of  the  press,  and  the  Influence  of 
Improved  communications.  Under  such  Influences 
the  peoples  of  the  world  live  lives  not  only  their 
own,  but  the  lives  of  others  also  ;  Intellectual 
triumphs,  economic  progress,  materialised  among 
one  people,  react  at  once  on  the  condition  of 
others  ;  the  Intellectual  outlook  widens  as  we 
ascend,  as  the  seascape  widens  from  a  hill,  and, 
like  the  sea,  the  whole  world  of  culture  drifts  and 
fluctuates  eternally. 

Every  change  In  conditions  or  disposition  is 
affirmed  only  after  a  struggle  of  elements.  An 
analysis  of  the  history  of  mankind  shows  that 
from  the  year  1496  B.C.  to  the  year  1861  of  our 
era,  that  is,  in  a  cycle  of  3357  years,  were  but  227 
years  of  peace  and  3 1 30  years  of  war  :  in  other 
words,  were  thirteen  years  of  war  for  every  year 
of  peace.  Considered  thus,  the  history  of  the 
lives  of  peoples  presents  a  picture  of  uninterrupted 
struggle.  War,  it  would  appear,  is  a  normal 
attribute  to  human  life. 

The  position  now  has  changed  In  much,  but 
still    the    new    continues    to    coatejid   with    the 

e 


Ixvi  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

remnants  of  the  old.  The  old  order  has  changed 
and  given  place  to  the  new.  Sieyes  compared 
the  old  order  of  things  with  a  pyramid  standing 
upon  its  apex,  declaring  that  it  must  be  given  a 
more  natural  position  and  placed  upon  its  base. 
This  demand  has  been  fulfilled  in  this  sense,  that 
the  edifice  of  state  has  been  placed  upon  founda- 
tions incomparably  wider  than  before,  affirmed  on 
the  rights  and  wills  of  millions  of  men,  the  so- 
named  middle  order  of  society. 

It  is  natural  that  the  greater  the  number  of 
voices  influencing  the  course  of  affairs  the  more 
complex  is  the  sum  of  interests  to  be  considered. 
The  economic  revolution  caused  by  the  applica- 
tion of  steam  has  been  the  cause  of  entirely  new 
and  unexpected  conditions  between  the  different 
countries  of  the  world  anH  between  the  classes 
inhabltlnor  them,  enrichlnor  and  strengtheninor 
some,  impoverishing  and  weakening  others,  in 
measure  as  the  new  conditions  permitted  to  each 
participation  in  the  new  distribution  of  revenues, 
capital,  and  influence. 

With  the  innumerable  voices  which  are  now 
bound  up  in  our  public  opinion,  and  the  many 
different  representatives  of  its  interests,  naturally 
appear  very  different  views  on  militarism  and  its 
object,  war.  The  propertied  classes,  in  particular 
those    whose     importance     and     condition    was 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixvii 

established  during  the  former  distribution  of 
power  and  former  methods  of  acquisition,  precisely 
those  classes  whom  we  call  Conservatives,  are 
inclined  to  confuse  even  the  intellectual  move- 
ment against  militarism  with  aspirations  for  the 
subversion  of  social  order.  In  this  is  sometimes 
given,  they  attribute,  too  great  an  importance  to 
single  and  transitory  phenomena,  while  no 
sufficient  attention  is  turned  on  the  dano^erous 
fermentation  of  minds  awakened  by  the  present 
and  constantly  growing  burdens  of  militarisn. 

On  the  other  hand,  agitators,  seeking  influence 
on  the  minds  of  the  masses,  having  deduced  from 
the  new  conditions  with  recklessness  and  even 
intentional  misrepresentation  the  most  extreme 
conclusions,  deny  all  existing  rights,  and  promise 
to  the  masses  more  than  the  most  perfect  institu- 
tions could  give  them.  In  striving  to  arouse 
the  masses  against  militarism  such  agitators  un- 
ceremoniously ascribe  to  every  thinker  who  does 
not  share  their  views  selfish  Impulses,  although  in 
reality  he  may  be  following  sincere  convictions. 

And  although  the  masses  are  slow  to  surrender 
themselves  to  abstract  reasoning,  and  act  usually 
only  under  the  influence  of  passion  or  disaster, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  agitation,  cease- 
lessly carried  on  in  parliaments,  on  platforms,  and 
in  the  press,  penetrates  more  and  more   deeply 


Ixvili  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

the  people,  and  awakens  in  it  those  feelings  which 
in  the  midst  of  the  disasters  called  forth  by  war 
might  easily  lead  them  to  action.  The  evil  of 
militarism  serves  to-day  as  the  chief  instrument  of 
the  activity  of  agitators,  and  a  tangible  object  for 
attack,  while  in  reality  these  agitators  strive  not 
only  for  the  suppression  of  militarism,  but  for  the 
destruction  of  the  whole  social  order. 

With  such  a  position  of  affairs — that  is,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  ruinous  competition  in  constantly 
increasing  armaments,  and,  on  the  other,  the 
social  danger  for  all  which  grows  under  a  general 
burden  —  it  is  necessary  that  influential  and 
educated  men  should  seriously  attempt  to  give 
themselves  a  clear  account  of  the  effect  of  war 
under  modern  conditions ;  whether  it  will  be 
possible  to  realise  the  aims  of  war,  and  whether 
the  extermination  of  millions  of  men  will  not  be 
wholly  without  result. 

If,  after  consideration  of  all  circumstances,  we 
answer  ourselves,  '*  War  with  such  conditions  is 
impossible  ;  armies  could  not  sustain  those  cata- 
clysms which  a  future  war  would  call  forth  ;  the 
civil  population  could  not  bear  the  famine  and 
interruption  of  industry,"  then  we  might  ask  the 
general  question  :  "  Why  do  the  peoples  more 
and  more  exhaust  their  strength  in  accumulating 
means  of  destruction  which  are  valueless  even  to 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixix 

accomplish  the  ends  for  which  they  are  pre- 
pared ?  " 

It  is  very  natural,  that  even  a  long  time  ago,  in 
many  Western  European  countries,  in  all  ranks  of 
society,  many  attempts  have  been  made,  partly 
theoretical  and  partly  practical,  to  eliminate  war 
from  the  future  history  of  humanity.  Philoso- 
phers and  philanthropists,  statesmen  and  revolu- 
tionaries, poets  and  artists,  parliaments  and 
congresses,  more  strongly  and  strongly  every  day 
insist  upon  the  necessity  of  avoiding  the  blood- 
shed and  disasters  of  war. 

A  time  was  when  it  seemed  protests  against 
war  were  assuming  practical  importance.  But 
the  desire  for  revenge  awakened  by  the  events  of 
1870  turned  the  disposition  of  peoples  in  another 
direction.  Nevertheless  the  idea  remains  and 
continues  to  operate  on  minds.  The  voices  of 
scholars  and  the  efforts  of  philanthropists  directed 
against  war  naturally  found  an  echo  among  the 
lower  orders  of  populations.  In  the  twilight  of 
imperfect  knowledge  fantastic  visions  appeared, 
of  which  agitators  took  advantage.  This  agita- 
tion increased  every  year. 

In  recent  times  war  has  become  even  more 
terrible  than  before  in  consequence  of  perfected 
weapons  of  destruction  and  systems  of  equipment 
and  tr'aining  utterly  unknown  in  the  past.     What 


Ixx  AUTHOR^S  PREFACE 

is  graver  still,  the  immensity  of  armies  and  the 
training  of  soldiers  in  entrenchment  must  call 
forth  difficulties  in  provisioning  and  defence  from 
climatic  conditions. 

It  is  true  that  certain  military  authors  think 
that  the  bloodshed  of  the  battlefield  will  be 
decreased  in  consequence  of  the  greater  distance 
between  the  combatants,  that  attacks  by  cavalry 
and  with  the  bayonet  are  improbable  in  the 
present  conditions  of  firearms,  while  retreat  will 
be  facilitated  for  a  defeated  army.  But,  even 
admitting  this,  which  Is  by  no  means  proved, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  with  modern  firearms 
the  impression  which  battle  makes  on  armies  will 
be  incomparably  greater  than  before,  while 
smokeless  powder  will  change  even  the  nature  of 
these  impressions.  Infantry  and  artillery  fire 
will  have  unprecedented  force,  while  aid  to  the 
wounded  will  be  made  more  difficult  by  the  great 
range  both  of  small-arms  and  of  artillery.  Smoke 
will  no  longrer  conceal  from  the  survivors  the 
terrible  consequences  of  the  battle,  and  every 
advance  will  be  made  with  full  appreciation  of  the 
probabilities  of  extermination.  From  this,  and 
from  the  fact  that  the  mass  of  soldiers  will  have 
but  recently  been  called  from  the  field,  the  factory, 
and  the  workshop,  it  will  appear  that  even  the 
psychical  conditions  of  war  have  changed.  '  Thus 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixxi 

in  the  armies  of  Western  states  the  agitation 
against  war  may  extend  even  so  far  as  the 
materialisation  of  sociaHstic  theories  subverting 
the  bases  of  monarchies. 

The  thouofht  of  those  convulsions  which  will  be 
called  forth  by  a  war,  and  of  the  terrible  means 
prepared   for   it,    will    hinder  military   enterprise, 
notwithstanding   the   passionate   relations   of  the 
people  to  some  of  the  questions  in  dispute  among 
them.     But  on  the  other  hand,  the  present  con- 
ditions cannot  continue  to   exist   for  ever.     The 
peoples  groan  under   the  burdens  of  militarism. 
Europe  is  ever  confronted  with  the  necessity  of 
drawing  from  the  productive  forces  of  the  peoples 
new    and    new    millions    for    military    purposes. 
Hardly  was  the  small-calibre  rifle  adopted  when 
invention  made  a  new  advance,  and  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  soon  the  Great  Powers  will  be  com- 
pelled to  adopt  a  weapon  of  still  slnaller  calibre 
with  double  the  present  energy,  allowing  soldiers 
to  carry  a  greater  number  of  cartridges.     At  the 
same  time  we  see  in  France  and  Germany  pre- 
paration   of    new    artillery    to    turn    to    the    best 
advantage  the  new  smokeless  powder.      Millions 
are  expended  on  the  construction  of  new  battle- 
ships and  cruisers.      But  every  year  brings  such 
radical   improvements  in  guns,   in   speed,  and  in 
coal-carrying  capacity  that  vessels  hardly  launched 


Ixxii  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

are  obsolete,  and  others  must  be  built  to  replace 
them.  In  view  of  what  we  see  in  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Austria,  we  are  compelled  to  ask,  Can 
the  present  incessant  demands  for  money  from 
Parliament  for  armaments  continue  for  ever 
without  social  outbreaks  ?  And  will  not  the 
present  difficulty  of  carrying  on  war  at  last  be 
replaced  by  an  absolute  impossibility,  at  least  in 
those  countries  where  high  culture  has  increased 
the  value  of  the  life  of  every  citizen  ?  Thus,  in 
the  war  of  the  future  will  appear  not  only  quanti- 
tative differences  in  the  number  of  armies  but 
also  qualitative  differences  which  may  have  im- 
mense importance. 

But  what  is  still  graver  are  the  economic  and 
social  convulsions  which  war  will  call  forth  in 
consequence  of  the  summons  under  the  fiag  of 
almost  the  whole  male  population,  the  interrup- 
tion of  maritime  communications,  the  stagnation 
in  industry  and  trade,  the  increase  in  the  price  of 
the  necessaries  of  life,  and  the  destruction  of 
credit.  Will  these  convulsions  not  be  so  great 
that  governments  will  find  it  impossible  in  the 
course  of  time  indicated  by  military  specialists  as 
the  probable  duration  of  war  to  acquire  means  for 
maintaining  their  armies,  satisfy  the  requirements 
of  budgets,  and  at  the  same  time  feed  the  desti- 
tute remainder  of  the  civil  population  ? 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixxiii 

Within  the  last  twenty-five  years  such  changes 
have  taken  place  in  the  very  nature  of  military 
operations  that  the  future  war  will  in  no  way  be 
like  its  predecessors.  In  consequence  of  the 
adoption  of  improved  artillery,  explosive  shells, 
and  small-arms  which  allow  the  soldier  to  carry 
an  immense  number  of  cartridges,  in  consequence 
of  the  absence  of  concealing  smoke,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  immense  proportions  which  military 
operations  must  take  as  a  result  of  the  vastness  of 
armies,  such  unquestioned  authorities  on  military 
affairs  as  Moltke  and  Leer  and  many  other 
eminent  military  writers  declare  that  a  future  war 
will  last  many  years. 

But  with  modern  political,  social,  and  economic 
conditions  it  would  be  strange  if  there  did  not 
arise  in  England,  Italy,  Austria,  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France — in  one  country  from  one  reason,  in 
another  from  another — factors  which  will  dis- 
arrange the  apparatus  of  war  and  prevent  its 
continuance  before  the  ends  desired  shall  have 
been  attained.  This  is  a  question  of  the  first 
gravity,  yet  military  writers  entirely  ignore  it, 
attending  only  to  the  technical  side  of  war. 

In  consequence  of  alliances  concluded,  all  plans 
of  activity  are  founded  on  the  combined  opera- 
tions of  allied  armies.  What  will  happen  to 
combinations  founded  on  united  action  when  one 


Ixxlv  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

or  another  of  the  allies  is  compelled  to  cease 
operations  through  insufficient  means  for  resisting 
the  social  influences  of  war  ? 

Thus  we  find  that  military  questions  are  bound 
up  with  questions  of  economy.  But  military 
writers  look  on  the  future  war  only  from  the 
point  of  view  of  attaining  certain  objects  by 
destroying  the  armies  of  the  enemy ;  the  economic 
and  social  consequences  of  war,  if  they  are  con- 
sidered at  all,  are  considered  only  as  secondary 
objects.  Even  economists,  in  consequence  of  the 
difficulty  of  such  a  question,  have  made  no  single 
investigation  resulting  in  a  complete  picture  of 
the  consequences  of  war.  But  this  is  in  no  way 
surprising. 

Without  acquaintance  with  the  technicalities  of 
warfare  it  is  impossible  to  understand  what  will 
be  its  precise  conditions,  or  to  define  the  limits 
where  the  operation  of  defined  laws  will  cease 
and  accidental  phenomena  appear.  A  result  could 
only  be  obtained  by  careful  study  of  the  very 
nature  of  war  in  all  its  phenomena.  Twenty 
years  ago  such  a  task  would  have  been  compara- 
tively easy.  But  the  last  two  decades  have 
witnessed  immense  changes  equal  to  revolutions. 
First  of  all  a  fundamental  change  has  taken  place 
in  the  very  elements  which  take  part  in  war  and 
from  which  its  course  depends.     In  a  future  war 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixxv 

on  the  field  of  battle,  instead  of  professional 
soldiers,  will  appear  whole  peoples  with  all  their 
peculiar  virtues  and  failings. 

A  full  appreciation  of  the  conditions  of  a  future 
war  is  all  the  more  difficult  since  on  the  one  hand 
new  methods  of  attack  and  defence,  as  yet  in- 
sufficiently tested,  will  be  employed,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  because  former  wars  were  carried  on 
by  means  of  long-service  professional  soldiers. 
But  not  only  will  a  future  war  take  the  character 
of  a  struggle  of  whole  nations  living  a  wide  and 
complex  life,  with  military  problems  correspond- 
ing in  complexity,  but  the  arms  and  apparatus 
of  destruction  are  the  very  finest  result  of  the 
inventiveness  and  creative  activity  of  mankind. 

The  elements  contending  in  a  future  war  will 
be  all  the  moral  and  intellectual^  resources  of 
nations,  all  the  forces  of  modern  civilisation,  all 
technical  improvements,  feelings,  characters, 
minds  and  wills — the  combined  fruit  of  the 
culture  of  the  civilized  world.  It  is  thus  that  this 
question  demands  the  attention  of  all  society.  In 
Western  states,  especially  from  the  adoption  of 
conscription,  interest  in  military  affairs  has  spread 
through  all  ranks  of  society. 

Reasoning  on  the  basis  of  future  wars,  military 
writers  declare  that  the  chief  elements  of  warfare, 
although  only  in  their  general  character,  must  be 


Ixxvi  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

made  known  to  the  population,  which  in  the 
event  of  war  constitutes  the  army,  and  from 
whose  activity  depends  the  issue  of  campaigns. 
It  Is  not  enough  that  officers  and  soldiers  actually 
on  service  know  what  they  are  to  meet  in  a 
future  war.  In  the  ranks  of  armies  in  time  of 
war  will  appear  an  immense  proportion  of  officers 
and  men  from  the  reserves,  who  for  many  years 
have  taken  no  part  In  military  exercises.  As  a 
consequence  of  this,  in  ev^ery  state  appear  popular 
compositions  with  the  object  of  Informing  the 
public  of  the  technique  of  modern  war,  all,  almost 
without  exception,  neglecting  the  economic  side 
of  the  question.  Some  prejudge  a  future  war 
from  the  example  of  history.  Such  neglect,  as  a 
rule,  the  improvement  of  weapons  and  the  in- 
creased complexity  of  strategy  and  tactics. 
Others,  well  informed  as  to  the  improvement  of 
weapons,  but  neglecting  inevitable  conclusions, 
assume  that  war  will  last  but  a  short  time,  and 
therefore  pay  no  attention  to  the  financial  and 
economic  perturbation  which  it  will  cause  or  Its 
effects  on  the  moral  condition  of  the  people. 

The  late  General  Fadeleff  very  justly  pointed 
out  the  danger  arlslno"  from  such  a  state  of  affairs. 
"  The  opinion  of  the  people  of  their  strength  has 
immense  influence  on  the  course  of  politics  ;  this 
opinion  is  often  frivolous  and  unfounded,  though 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixxvii 

from  it  may  depend  the  destiny  of  nations.  Yet 
it  is  generally  agreed  that  even  the  elements  of 
military  affairs  constitute  a  speciality  which  must 
remain  unknown  by  the  public.  But  when  the 
moment  comes  to  express  its  opinion  on  war  and 
peace,  to  balance  the  chances  of  success,  it  may 
be  assumed  that  of  ten  military  specialists  whose 
authority  is  accepted  nine  will  adopt  the  opinions 
of  the  social  medium  in  which  they  live.  Thus  a 
public,  entirely  ignorant  of  military  questions, 
often  becomes  the  deciding  factor  In  decision. 
To  free  oneself  from  the  influence  of  public 
opinion  In  such  matters  is  impossible."  It  was 
with  the  object  of  making  accessible  in  some 
degree  information  accumulated  on  all  matters 
directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  war  that  the 
present  work  was  undertaken,  of  which  this 
volume  is  but  an  abridorment. 

It  is  but  a  sllcjht  service  to  diaornose  an  Illness 
and  pronounce  it  incurable.  The  position  of  the 
European  world,  the  organic  strength  of  which  is 
wasted,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the  sacrifice  of 
millions  on  preparations  for  war,  and,  on  the 
other,  in  a  destructive  aofltation  which  finds  In 
militarism  Its  apology  and  a  fit  Instrument  for 
acting  on  the  mJnds  of  the  people,  must  be  ad- 
mitted to  be  abnormal  and  even  sickly.  Is  it 
possible  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  from  this  ? 


Ixxvni  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

We  are  deeply  persuaded  that  a  means  of 
recovery  exists  if  the  European  states  would  but 
set  themselves  the  question — In  what  will  result 
these  armaments  and  this  exhaustion,  what  will 
be  the  nature  of  a  future  war,  can  resource  be 
had  to  war  even  now  for  the  decision  of  questions 
In  dispute,  and  Is  It  possible  to  conceive  the 
settlement  of  such  questions  by  means  of  the 
cataclysm  which,  with  modern  means  of  destruc- 
tion, a  war  between  five  Great  Powers  with  ten 
millions  of  soldiers  would  cause  ? 

Delay  In  the  practical  settlement  of  this  ques- 
tion Is  Impossible.  And  when  a  settlement  Is 
arrived  at  It  will  be  shown  that  for  twenty,  forty 
years  millions  have  been  wasted  yearly  on  fruit- 
less armaments  which  cannot  be  employed,  and 
by  means  of  which  the  decision  of  International 
disputes  Is  Inconceivable.  But  then  It  will  be  too 
late  ;  then  such  Immense  losses  will  have  been 
sustained  that  Europe  generally  will  be  In  a 
worse  position  than  Italy  to-day.  Then,  instead 
of  the  dano"ers  of  International  war,  other  threaten- 
ing  symptoms  will  have  appeared. 

That  war  will  become  Impossible  in  time — this 
is  indicated  by  all.  Its  apparatus  grows  more 
rapidly  than  the  productiveness  of  European 
states,  and  preparations  will  continue  to  swallow 
more  and  more  of  the  in  ome  of  peoples.     Mean- 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  Ixxix 

time  the  relations  of  the  nations  become  closer 
and  closer,  their  interdependence  more  plain,  and 
their  solidarity  in  any  great  convulsion  will  con- 
stantly o^row. 

That  war  will  finallv  become  impracticable  is 
apparent.  The  question  is  more  apposite — 
when  will  the  recognition  of  this  inevitable  truth 
be  spread  among  European  governments  and 
peoples  ?  When  the  impossibility  of  resorting  to 
war  for  the  decision  of  international  quarrels  is 
apparent  to  all,  other  means  will  be  devised. 


PART    I 
MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  DEVELOPMENTS 


CHAPTER    I 

HOW   WAR   WILL    BE   WAGED   ON    LAND 

In  former  times  bullets,  for  a  great  part  of  their  course, 
flew  over  the  heads  of  the  combatants,  and  were  effective 
only  for  an  insignificant  distance.  The  modern  bullet  will 
strike  all  it  meets  for  a  distance  of  660  yards,  and  after 
the  introduction  of  the  more  perfect  arms  now  in  course  of 
preparation  the  effective  distance  will  be  as  great  as 
1 2 10  yards.  And  as  it  is  most  improbable  that  on  the 
field  of  battle  it  will  not  meet  with  a  single  living  being  in 
such  a  distance,  we  may  conclude  that  every  bullet  will 
find  its  victim. 

The  old  powder  was  a  mechanical  mixture  of  nitre, 
sulphur,  and  charcoal,  upon  the  ignition  of  wiiich  were 
liberated  many  elements  which  did  not  enter  into  new 
combinations.  The  new  powder  is  a  chemical  combina- 
tion which  gives  scarcely  any  smoke  and  produces  no 
empyreuma  in  the  barrel  At  the  same  time  the  explosive 
force  of  the  new  powder  is  much  greater  than  that  of  the 
old,  and  its  quality  of  smokelessness  or  of  giving  little 
smoke,  in  the  first  place,  renders  it  impossible  to  judge  of 
the  position  and  forces  of  an  enemy  by  smoke,  and,  in  the 
second,  frees  the  marksmen  from  the  clouds  of  smoke 
which  formerly  were  an  obstacle  to  aiming.  And  as  in  the 
opinion  of  many  authorities  the  last  word  concerning 
explosives  has  not  yet  been  said,  in  the  war  of  the  future, 
especially  if  it  should  take  place  some  years  from  now, 
explosives  of  such  strength  will  be  employed  that  the 
concentration  of  armies  in  the  open  field,  or  even  under 
the  cover  of  fortifications,  will  be  almost  impossible,  so 


4  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

that  the  apparatus  of  war  prepared  at  the  present  time 
may  prove  itself  useless. 

The  improvement  of  small  arms  goes  forward  with 
incredible  speed.  By  the  almost  unanimous  testimony  of 
competent  persons,  the  changes  which  took  place  in  the 
course  of  five  centuries  cannot  be  compared  in  importance 
with  those  which  have  been  made  since  the  wars  of  1870 
and  1877-78.  The  well-known  specialist,  Professor  Gebler, 
made  a  comparison,  expressed  in  figures,  between  different 
modern  small  arms,  taking  as  his  standard  of  effectiveness 
at  100  degrees  the  Mauser  rifle,  ii  mil.,  of  1871.  On  this 
basis  he  worked  out  the  effectiveness  of  modern  weapons 
as  follows : 


The  modern  French  rifle      .... 
The  modern  German  rifle      .... 
The  new  rifles  in  use  in  Italy  and  Spain 
The  6-mil.  rifle  adopted  by  the  United  States 
The  5-mil.  rifle  now  undergoing  test     . 


433 

474 

580 

1000 

^337 


Therefore,  if  in  the  war  of  1870  the  German  and  French 
armies  had  been  armed  with  weapons  of  modern  type, 
speaking  theoretically,  the  losses  in  that  war  would  have 
been  4^  to  4f  times  greater  than  they  actually  were.  Had 
they  been  armed  with  the  6-mil.  rifle  used  in  the  United 
States  of  America  the  losses  would  have  been  ten  times 
greater. 

Nevertheless,  specialists  declare  that  the  new  weapons 
adopted  in  European  armies,  and  even  the  6  mil.  rifle,  are 
already  obsolete,  and  that  the  future  will  see  a  self-loading 
weapon  made  out  of  an  alloy  of  aluminium,  from  which  a 
series  of  shots  may  be  fired  without  taking  the  rifle  from 
the  shoulder  or  losing  time  and  energy  in  reloading. 

Experiments  made  in  Belgium  with  the  new  self- 
charging  rifles  and  pistols  of  the  Mauser  system  show 
that  (firing  only  such  a  number  of  cartridges  as  wiH  fit 
into  the  magazine)  a  trained  soldier  can  fire  from  six  to 
seven  times  a  second  ;  upon  shooting  a  greater  number  of 
cartridges  from  a  gun,  which  requires  reloading,  the 
maximum  number  of  shots  with  the  6-mil.  gun  is  : 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND    5 

Without  aiming        ...         78  per  minute. 
Aiming 60  „ 

But  the  efforts  to  improve  small  arms  do  not  stop  there, 
and  governments  will  continue  to  strive  to  lessen  calibres, 
as  is  maintained  by  Professor  Gebler,  General  Wille, 
Professor  Pototski,  and  other  authorities,  to  4  and,  it  may 
be,  even  to  3  millimetres.  It  is  true  that  there  are  great 
difficulties  in  the  utilisation  of  such  small  calibres,  but  the 
successes  already  achieved  by  technical  science  may  be 
taken  to  guarantee  that  these  also  will  be  surmounted. 

Such  a  weapon  will  excel  the  present  in  efficiency  even 
more  than  the  present  rifle  excels  the  past.  The  diminution 
of  the  calibre  of  rifles  to  5  mil.  makes  it  possible  for  a 
soldier  to  carry  270  cartridges,  instead  of  the  84  which  he 
carried  in  1877;  the  reduction  of  the  calibre  to  4  mil. 
would  enable  him  to  carry  380  cartridges ;  while  with  the 
reduction  of  the  calibre  to  3  mil.  the  number  of  cartridges 
borne  would  increase  to  575.  In  addition,  the  levelling  of 
the  trajectory  of  the  bullet  \^ould  give  to  shooting  such  dead- 
liness  that  it  would  be  practically  impossible  to  strengthen 
the  fighting  line  with  reserves. 

Professor  Gebler  declares  that  these  improved  weapons 
will  be  forty  times  more  effective  than  those  used  in  1870. 
From  this  must  result  the  complete  re-armament  of  all 
armies,  if  before  that  time  limits  be  not  placed  upon  the 
rivalry  of  the  nations  in  preparation  for  war.  For  the 
re-armament  of  their  infantry,  Germany,  France,  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Italy  would,  by  our  calculation,  be  com- 
pelled to  spend  the  immense  sum  of  ;{^ 1 50,800,000. 

But,  apart  from  future  improvements  in  arms,  it  is 
easy  to  see  with  existing  improvements  the  following 
consequences:  (i)  The  opening  of  battles  from  much 
greater  distances  than  formerly ;  (2)  the  necessity  of  loose 
formation  in  attack ;  (3)  the  strengthening  of  the  defence  ; 
(4)  the  increase  in  the  area  of  the  battlefield ;  and  (5)  the 
increase  in  casualties. 

It  is  enough  here  to  cite  some  statistics  as  to  the  action 
of  modern  arms  as  compared  with  the  arms  of  1870-71 
and    1877-78.     Thus,  the    bullet   of  the   Chassepot,  the 


Vs]r 


6  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Berdan,  or  the  Prussian  needle-gun  fired  from  a  distance 
of  1760  yards  could  not  penetrate  a  human  skull,  whereas 
the  bullet  of  modern  low-calibre  rifles  at  a  distance  of 
3850  yards  will  penetrate  the  hard  bones  of  an  ox. 

But  many  military  writers  declare  that  the  improvement 
in  small  arms  will  be  neutralised  by  the  fact  that  rapidity 
of  fire  will  deprive  the  soldier  of  coolness  and  capacity  to 
turn  to  account  the  superiority  of  the  modern  weapon. 

Let  us  admit  for  the  moment  that  modern  long-range 
rifles,  even  with  their  future  improvements,  will  not  prove 
more  deadly  in  battle  than  their  predecessors.  Such  an 
improbable  and  apparently  unfounded  proposition  is 
directly  refuted  by  the  experience  of  the  Chilian  war  of 
1894.  In  that  war  the  armies  of  the  Congress  were  armed, 
partly  with  old,  partly  with  modern  weapons,  and  it  was 
proven  that  each  company  of  soldiers  armed  with  rifles  of 
a  modern  type  put  out  of  action  S2  men  in  the  armies  of 
the  President-Dictator,  while  a  company  of  soldiers  armed 
with  obsolete  weapons,  put  out  of  action  only  34  men. 
The  absence  of  smoke  alone  must  increase  immensely  the 
deadliness  of  modern  arms.  The  history  of  past  battles 
relates  that  at  a  distance  of  sixty  paces  combatants  often 
could  not  see  one  another,  and  that  their  fire  proved  in- 
effective. And  even  if  long-range  rifles  do  not  prove 
more  deadly  than  their  predecessors,  it  will  still  be  absurd 
to  deny  that  a  certain  number  of  projectiles  will  disable  a 
certain  number  of  men.  And  as,  in  the  wars  of  the  present 
century,  the  number  of  shots  fired  for  every  disablement 
has  fluctuated  between  8 J  and  164,  it  is  plain  that  the 
supply  of  cartridges  now  carried  by  each  soldier  is  suffi- 
cient to  disable  at  least  one  opponent;  while  the  supply  of 
380  cartridges  with  the  4-mil.  rifle,  and  of  575  with  the 
3-mil.  rifle,  will  be  more  than  enough  to  disable  two  or 
three  of  the  enemy.  In  other  words,  even  supposing  the 
effectiveness  of  modern  arms  to  be  in  no  way  increased, 
the  fire  of  one  rifle  may  disable  two  or  three  of  the  enemy. 
From  this  it  is  plain  that,  even  with  the  weapons  now 
adopted,  the  effectiveness  of  fire  presents  the  possibility  of 
total  mutual  annihilation. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND    7 

Such  is  the  comparison  when  regard  is  had  alone  to 
the  increase  in  the  supply  of  cartridges  arising  from  the 
reduction  of  the  calibre  of  rifles. 

But  in  addition  we  must  take  into  account  the  rapidity 
with  which  modern  weapons  may  be  fired.  In  a  given  time 
twelve  times  as  many  shots  maybe  fired  as  in  1867,  while 
the  chances  of  missing  fire  and  of  injury  to  the  powder  by 
damp  have  been  removed.  In  addition  to  this  must  be 
borne  in  mind  the  long  range  of  modern  weapons,  the 
absence  of  the  accumulations  in  the  barrel  of  the  rifle,  the 
adoption  by  officers  of  instruments  for  precisely  ascertain- 
ing distances,  the  use  by  under-officers  of  field-glasses,  and 
finally,  the  substitution  of  the  old  powder  by  smokeless 
powder.  All  these  conditions  will  undoubtedly  increase 
the  number  of  losses,  and  if  the  operation  of  each  were 
considered  as  a  factor  in  multiplying  past  losses,  we 
should  attain  almost  incredible  but  technically  and  mathe- 
matically trustworthy  figures. 

To  this  must  be  added  the  improvement,  since  1870,  in 
the  instruction  of  soldiers  in  firing.  In  the  training  of 
soldiers  every  year  an  immense  quantity  of  ammunition  is 
expended.  In  addition,  mechanical  means  are  employed 
to  show  the  direction  of  the  barrel  on  aiming  and  firing. 
These  are  new  conditions  entirely,  or  in  a  great  degree, 
unknown  in  the  time  of  the  last  great  wars.  If  we  take 
into  account  the  fact  that  500  cartridges  are  prepared  for 
every  rifle,  the  expenditure  of  which,  of  course,  is  not 
stinted,  we  are  confronted  with  a  direct  denial  of  the  pos- 
sibility, even  for  armies  of  millions  of  men,  in  the  event  of 
equal  strength,  to  sustain  such  losses. 

In  addition   to   small   arms   the   power  of  artillery  has 
increased  in  a  measure  incomparable  with  the  past. 

A  glance  backward  at  the  development  of  field  artillery 
shows  that  from  the  date  of  the  invention  of  powder  im- 
provements in  arms  took  place  very  slowly.  In  imperfect 
weapons,  it  would  seem,  it  would  have  been  much  easier 
to  effect  improvements.  Nevertheless,  to  within  a  recent 
date,  the  effect  of  artillery  fire  remained  very  inconsiderable. 
In   1 89 1   Professor  Langlois  estimated  the  increase  of 


8  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  power  of  artillery  fire  since  the  war  of  1870  in  the 
following  manner  :  With  an  equal  number  of  discharges, 
modern  artillery  will  be  five  times  more  effective  than  the 
artillery  of  1870.  But  as  modern  field  guns  are  capable  of 
discharging  in  a  given  time  from  two  to  two  and  a  half 
more  projectiles  than  the  old  guns,  it  follows  that  the  power 
of  artillery  fire  has  multiplied  since  1870  no  less  than  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  times. 

The  calculations  made  by  Professor  Langlois  in  1891 
are  already  out  of  date.  In  France,  in  Germany,  and  in 
Russia  quick-firing  guns  are  being  made,  and  from  the 
testimony  of  such  authoritative  writers  as  General  Wille, 
Professor  Pototski,  and  Captain  Moch,  we  find  that  the 
fire  of  these  new  guns  is  at  least  twice  as  powerful  as  that 
of  the  gun  of  1891,  of  which  Langlois  speaks  in  the  fol- 
lowing terms  :  "  We  have  before  us  a  whole  series  of 
improvements  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  must  admit 
that  munitions  of  war  are  entirely  different  from  those  in 
use  in  the  past."  So  that  in  order  to  form  some  idea  as 
to  the  total  losses  in  a  future  war  it  is  necessary  to  com- 
pare the  action  of  the  latest  perfected  arms  with  the  action 
of  the  old  guns  employed  up  to  the  present  time.  Such  a 
comparison  only  shows  that,  as  in  the  case  of  quick-firing 
rifles,  the  past  can  give  no  precise  forecast  as  to  the  effect 
of  artillery  in  future  wars. 

With  the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder  and  the 
employment  of  nickel  steel  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
strengthening  by  wire  of  the  barrels  of  guns  on  the  other, 
arms  of  tremendous  power  are  being  made. 

A  comparison  of  the  result  of  the  firing  of  a  thousand 
rifle  bullets  by  soldiers  attacking  in  loose  formation  with 
the  action  of  shrapnel,  shows  that  one  round  of  shrapnel  is 
effective  over  a  space  double  the  length  of  that  covered  by 
a  thousand  rifle  bullets,  and  not  less  in  width.  Experi- 
ment has  also  shown  that  the  fragments  of  shrapnel  dis- 
perse themselves  over  a  space  880  yards  in  length  and 
440  yards  in  breadth.  Prince  Hohenlohe,  commander  of 
the  German  artillery  in  the  war  of  1870,  in  the  most 
emphatic  manner  declared  that  "  a  battery  placed  against 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND    9 

a  road  fifteen  paces  in  width  might  annihilate  a  whole 
mass  of  infantry  on  this  road  for  a  distance  of  7700  yards, 
so  that  no  one  would  even  think  of  standing  there." 

Not  less  are  the  successes  attained  in  the  improvement 
of  projectiles.  The  use  of  steel  in  their  manufacture 
permitted  their  being  charged  with  a  greater  number 
of  bullets.  The  use  of  explosives  four  times  more  power- 
ful than  were  formerly  employed  gave  to  each  splinter 
and  bullet  immense  force.  The  flight  of  bullets  and 
splinters  may  be  likened  to  the  action  of  a  sieve  from 
which  drops  of  water  are  driven.  Imagine  such  a  sieve 
revolving  at  great  speed,  and  some  idea  will  be  gained  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  fragments  of  shells  would  be 
dispersed. 

In  the  war  of  the  future,  shell,  which  is  much  less  effective 
than  shrapnel,  will  be  employed  less  than  formerly. 
Shrapnel  will  be  the  chief  ammunition  of  a.n\\\ery,  although 
if  we  believe  French  reports,  it  is  proved  that  all  in  the 
vicinity  of  a  bursting  Brisant  shell  will  be  knocked  down  by 
the  agitation  of  the  atmosphere  and  sustain  serious  internal 
injuries,  while  in  the  case  of  the  shell  bursting  in  a  covered 
space  every  one  there  will  be  killed  either  by  the  action  of 
mechanical  forces,  or  by  the  poisonous  gases  hberated  by 
the  explosion. 

By  a  comparison  of  the  effect  of  artillery  ammunition 
with  the  effect  of  that  employed  in  1870,  it  is  shown  that, 
on  the  average,  shells  burst  into  240  pieces  instead  01 
19-30  as  was  the  case  in  1870.  The  shrapnel  employed 
in  1870  burst  into  37  pieces,  now  it  gives  as  man\-  as  340. 
An  iron  bomb  weighing  82  pounds,  which,  with  the  old 
powder  gave  42  fragments,  filled  with  peroxylene  gives 
1204  pieces.  With  the  increase  in  the  number  of  bullets 
and  fragments,  and  in  the  forces  which  disperse  them, 
increases  also  the  area  which  they  affect.  Splinters  and 
bullets  bring  death  and  destruction  not  only,  as  in  1870,  to 
those  in  the  vicinity  of  the  explosion,  but  at  a  distance  of 
220  yards  away,  and  this  though  fired  from  a  distance  of 
3300  yards. 

With  such  improved  ammunition  the  destruction  pro- 


lo  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

duced  in  the  ranks  of  armies  will  be  immense.  From 
the  statistics  furnished  by  the  Prussian  General  Rohne, 
we  have  estimated  the  losses  which  would  be  sustained 
by  a  body  of  10,000  men  attacking  in  loose  formation 
a  fortified  position.  From  this  estimate  it  is  shown  that 
before  the  attacking  party  succeeded  in  covering  2200 
yards  in  the  direction  of  the  defenders'  trenches  every 
individual  composing  it  may  be  struck  by  bullets  and 
fragments  of  shells,  as  the  defenders'  artillery  in  that  time 
will  have  succeeded  in  firing  1450  rounds,  scattering 
275,000  bullets  and  fragments,  of  which  10,330  will 
take  effect  in  the  attacking  Irfies. 

But  artillery  fire  will  be  directed  not  only  against  the 
attacking  troops,  which,  when  within  range  of  the  trenches 
may  be  destroyed  by  rifle  fire,  but  also,  to  a  greater  extent, 
against  supporting  bodies  which  must  follow  in  closer 
order,  and  among  which,  therefore,  the  action  of  artillery 
fire  will  be  even  more  deadly. 

And  as  at  the  same  time  the  quantity  of  artillery  in  all 
armies  has  considerably  increased,  we  may  well  ask  the 
question  whether  the  nerves  of  short-service  soldiers  will 
stand  the  terrible  destructiveness  of  its  fire. 

The  improvement,  in  all  respects,  of  fire-arms,  and 
the  high  degree  of  perfection  achieved  in  artillery  and 
artillery  ammunition  are  by  no  means  all  that  the 
mind  of  man  has  contrived  as  weapons  of  destruc- 
tion. The  whole  series  of  auxiliary  instruments 
which  in  a  future  war  may  have  immense  importance 
has,  since  the  last  war,  been  improved.  Velocipedes, 
carrier  pigeons,  field  telegraphs  and  telephones,  appa- 
ratus for  signalling  by  day  and  by  night,  and  for  illu- 
minating the  field  of  battle,  photographic  apparatus 
for  the  survey  of  positions  from  great  distances,  means  of 
observing  the  movements  of  armies  by  the  use  of  observa- 
tion scaffolding,  ladders,  watch  towers  and  balloons — all 
in  a  great  degree  do  away  with  that  insufficiency  of  in- 
formation which  formerly  prevented  united  and  successful 
operations. 

As   a   necessary  consequence   of  the   increase  in  the 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  1 1 

power  of  fire,  we  find  the  more  frequent  and  more  ex- 
tended adoption  of  defences,  and  cover  for  protection  in 
attack  and  for  hampering  the  enemy.  Even  in  times  of 
peace,  positions  are  prepared  for  the  defence  of  certain 
points  of  the  railways  and  main  roads  and  of  water  com- 
munications. 

In  addition  to  this  in  the  future  war  every  body  of  men 
appointed  for  defence,  and  even  for  attack — if  it  is  not  to 
attack  at  once — must  immediately  entrench  itself.  It  must 
dig,  so  to  speak,  in  the  earth  its  line  of  battle,  and,  if  time 
permit,  must  raise  a  whole  series  of  defensive  points, 
taking  advantage  of  natural  obstacles,  and  perfecting  them 
with  defensive  works.  Sheltered  behind  such  works,  and 
in  a  position  to  devote  all  their  energy  to  fire  against  the 
enemy,  the  defenders  will  sustain  losses  comparatively 
slight,  only  their  heads  and  hands — that  is,  an  eighth  part 
of  their  height — being  exposed,  while  the  attacking  bodies 
will  be  exposed  to  the  uninterrupted  fire  of  the  defenders, 
and  deprived  almost  of  all  possibility  of  replying  to  their 
fire.  For  the  construction  of  such  trenches  and  earth- 
works, each  division  of  an  army  is  now  furnished  with 
the  requisite  tools. 

In  the  opinion  of  competent  military  writers  the  war  of 
the  future  will  consist  primarily  of  a  series  of  battles  for 
the  possession  of  fortified  positions.  In  addition  to  field 
fortifications  of  different  kinds,  the  attacking  army  will 
have  to  deal  with  auxiliary  obstacles  which  will  be  met 
with  in  the  neighbourhood  of  fortifications,  that  is,  in  the 
very  position  where  they  will  be  subjected  to  the  greatest 
danger  from  the  enemy's  fire — obstructions  formed  of 
beams,  networks  of  wire,  and  pit-falls.  To  overcome 
these  obstacles  great  sacrifices  must  be  made. 

The  part  of  cavalry  in  a  future  war  presents  this  primary 
difference  with  its  part  in  the  past.  At  the  very  beginning 
of  war,  and  even  before  the  attacking  army  has  passed  the 
frontier,  it  will  be  sent  to  make  irruptions  on  the  territory 
of  the  enemy,  penetrating  the  country  as  far  as  possible, 
destroying  communications,  depots,  and  telegraphs,  seizing 
government  resources,  and  preventing  the  concentration  of 


J 2  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

troops.  After  this  the  cavalry  which  follows  as  part  of 
the  constitution  of  the  regular  army  will  be  employed  in  the 
making  of  reconnaisances.  In  a  future  war  such  duties 
will  be  undoubtedly  more  difficult  than  before,  owing  to 
the  adoption  of  smokeless  powder.  Even  after  having 
determined  the  general  position  of  an  enemy,  cavalry  will 
hardly  be  in  a  condition  to  acquire  any  precise  information, 
to  determine  his  strength,  and  even  the  distance  of  his 
advanced  posts.  The  pickets  of  the  enemy  will  not  stand 
in  the  open  field,  but  under  cover,  behind  eminences, 
groups  of  trees,  and  hedges.  From  a  distance  of  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  the  fire  from  the  concealed  pickets  of  the  enemy 
will  be  very  effective,  yet  the  pickets  themselves  will  be 
invisible.  In  all  probability  pickets  will  open  fire  at  the 
distance  of  half  a  mile,  to  prevent  the  closer  approach  of  the 
reconnoitring  party,  and  as  with  modern  arms  horsemen 
may  be  picked  from  the  saddle  from  a  great  distance,  the 
patrol  will  be  unable  to  determine  the  distance  of  the 
enemy  by  the  effect  of  his  fire.  With  modern  arms  and 
smokeless  powder  a  single  marksman  in  a  sheltered  posi- 
tion may  cause  serious  loss  to  a  body  of  troops,  as  witness 
the  case  cited  in  the  **  Military  Album,"  when  in  an  attack 
by  Bavarians  on  a  PVench  battalion  sheltered  behind  a  low 
wall,  a  Bavarian  soldier  climbed  into  a  tree,  and  picked  off" 
the  French  at  will,  while  no  smoke  betrayed  him,  and 
several  volleys  failed  to  kill  the  daring  marksman. 

Thus  scouting  parties  will  be  forced  to  move  with  great 
caution,  and  will  not  always  be  able  to  collect  sufficient 
information,  all  the  more  so  because,  having  come  under 
the  fire  of  insignificant  posts,  and  having  been  obliged  to 
withdraw,  they  will  naturally  not  wish  to  admit  that  they 
were  engaged  with  small  numbers  of  the  enemy.  More 
precise  information  may  be  attained  only  by  means  of 
infantry  commands  which  are  more  easily  sheltered,  and 
which  can  approach  more  closely  the  positions  of  the 
enemy.  Such  a  definition  of  the  duties  in  reconnaissances 
of  cavalry  patrols  and  infantry  commands  is  laid  down  in 
the  Instructions  for  Infantry  elaborated  by  the  French 
technical  committee :  "  Cavalry  may  obtain  only  general, 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  13 

approximate  information  as  to  the  position  and  strength 
of  the  enemy;  for  the  acquiring  of  detailed  and  precise 
information  infantry  must  be  employed."  And  actually, 
in  the  French  military  manoeuvres,  cavalry  are  now  kept 
?.t  some  distance,  and  close  reconnaissances  are  made  by 
infantry.  Nevertheless,  the  reconnoitring  importance  of 
cavalry,  in  the  strategical  sense,  has  increased.  It  must 
be  taken  into  account  that  the  territory  of  the  enemy  will 
be  sown  with  a  multitude  of  permanent  and  improvised 
fortified  positions  and  points,  and  an  army  will  not  attack 
without  having  around  itself,  and  more  particularly  in 
advance,  a  network  of  cavalry  detachments  split  up  into 
small  parts  and  patrols.  To  a  large  extent  such  cavalry 
will  operate  independently,  as  when  crossing  the  frontier 
in  the  beginning  of  war.  It  must  alarm  the  enemy,  destroy 
or  seize  provisions,  guard  the  bridges,  seize  despatches, 
collect  information  as  to  the  enemy's  movements,  and  pro- 
tect the  communications  of  the  army  in  its  rear. 

The  greater  the  importance  played  in  modern  war  by 
railways,  telegraphs,  and  improvised  entrenchments,  the 
more  essential  has  become  this  strategical  employment  of 
cavalry.  Military  writers  generally  assume  that  the  chief 
strength  of  cavalry  must  be  sent  forward  for  investigation, 
and  for  the  protection  of  the  advanced  guards  of  armies, 
as  Germans  expressed  by  the  German  saying,  **Die  Reiterei 
allzeit  voran  I"  (H^semen  always  to  the  front).  In  view  of 
the  power  of  modern  arms,  and  the  resulting  practice  of  dis- 
posing troops  behind  natural  and  artificial  defences,  and  in 
view  of  the  great  network  of  defensive  points  prepared  in 
advance,  an  attacking  army  will  more  than  ever  find  it 
necessary  to  feel  its  way,  and  to  reconnoitre  the  country 
into  which  it  is  advancing.  Thus  the  capacity  of  cavalry  as 
the  "feelers"  of  an  army  has  become  especially  important. 

As  to  the  part  cavalry  should  play  in  actual  battle,  military 
writers  differ  in  a  remarkable  degree.  Some,  as  the  French 
Captain  Nigot,  believe  that  the  desperate  massed  attacks 
of  cavalry,  which  prove  so  effective  in  manoeuvres,  are 
impossible,  as  with  the  great  increase  in  the  power  of  fire, 
cavalry  will  not   be  able  to  strike  at  infantry  even  when 


14  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

weaKness  is  observed.  From  his  calculations  it  appears 
that  a  battalion  of  800  rifles,  with  one  volley  fired  at  a 
range  of  330  yards,  would  unhorse  424  troopers,  and  if  a 
battalion  were  to  open  fire  at  880  yards,  and  continue 
firing,  at  a  distance  of  1 10  yards  2656  men  would  have 
been  put  out  of  action,  that  is  several  battalions  of  cavalry, 
attacking  one  after  another. 

Such  is  not  the  view  of  all  military  writers.  Thus 
one  author,  relying  on  the  fact  that  cavalry  will  cover  a 
given  distance  at  twice  the  speed  of  infantry,  contends  that 
although  cavalry  is  subjected  to  treble  the  possibility  of 
disablement,  yet  one  factor  neutralises  the  other,  and 
therefore  the  loss  of  cavalry  will  be  no  greater  than  the 
loss  of  infantry  in  the  same  distance. 

Of  one  thing  there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt,  that  is,  that 
cavalry  is  threatened  with  treble  probability  of  being  struck. 
In  France  it  was  shown  that  under  equal  conditions  cavalry 
losses  under  fire  are  from  two  and  a  half  to  three  times 
as  great  as  infantry  losses,  and  that  cavalry  cannot, 
therefore,  remain  immovable  under  fire.  Therefore,  in 
France  it  is  considered  proven  that  in  time  of  battle 
cavalry  must  keep  at  a  distance  of  not  less  than  3850  yards 
from  the  enemy,  and  may  draw  nearer  only  towards  the 
close  of  the  battle.  Otherwise  it  would  be  swept  away  by 
rifle  and  artillery  fire. 

The  speed  at  which  cavalry  may  attack  is  taken  by 
some  at  550  yards  a  minute,  but  most  authorities  limit  it 
to  440,  even  to  374,  yards  a  minute.  But  even  if,  not- 
withstanding inequalities  of  the  battlefield  and  the  close 
formation  which  lowers  the  general  speed  to  the  speed  of 
the  slowest  horses,  the  speed  of  attack  is  taken  as 
half  a  mile  iii  two  minutes — almost  racing  speed — 
nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  these  two  minutes'  exposure 
to  effective  fire  before  it  can  get  to  close  quarters  with 
infantry,  cavalry  must  suffer  immense  losses  which  will 
force  it  to  disperse  or  make  its  attack  feeble. 

It  must  be  understood  that  for  the  consideration  of  this 
question  we  have  only  the  opinions  of  different  military 
specialists.      The    German    author   of  the    **  Militarische 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  15 

Essays  "  says  that  modern  conditions  in  no  way  involve 
the  fascination  which  surrounds  cavalry  in  the  traditions 
of  the  Seven  Years  War,  and  that  the  German  army 
would  enter  upon  war  with  from  30,000  to  40,000  super- 
fluous cavalry,  which  would  only  create  difficulties  in 
concentration  and  to  the  Commissariat.  But  other  authori- 
ties declare  that  the  smokelessness  of  the  battlefield  will 
be  favourable  for  cavalry  attack,  since  it  will  be  easier 
seen  at  what  points  the  enemy's  infantry  is  weak,  while  it 
will  be  more  difficult  for  infantry  to  await  from  afar, 
without  the  covering  of  smoke,  the  impetuous  shock  of 
masses  of  cavalry. 

This  moment  when  weakening  is  observed  in  the 
enemy's  infantry  is  relied  upon  by  the  advocates  of 
cavalry  attack  in  battle.  One  even  goes  so  far  as  to  say 
that  upon  the  clash  of  cavalry  upon  infantry  **  it  will 
matter  nothing  what  may  be  in  the  hands  of  the  trembling 
infantry — magazine  rifles,  flint-locks,  or  simply  pitch- 
forks." But,  as  Von  der  Goltz  observes,  weakness  may 
be  very  plain  in  the  ranks  of  an  army  and  yet  not  be  seen 
by  the  enemy.  Such  weakness  can  only  be  seen  from 
advanced  positions,  and  while  the  information  is  being 
conveyed  to  the  proper  quarter  and  cavalry  is  being  sent 
to  attack,  the  auspicious  moment  may  have  passed.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  movement  of  masses  of  cavalry  is 
always  visible  owing  to  the  dust  it  raises,  and  all  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  may  be  concentrated  on  these  masses, 
artillery  fire  against  cavalry  being  effective  from  a  long 
range,  as  the  mass  presents  an  immense  target. 

In  comparison  with  the  times  of  the  Seven  Years  War 
cavalry  has  itself  made  progress.  It  is  furnished  with 
stronger  and  swifter  horses.  But  this  improvement  can  in 
no  way  be  compared  with  the  increase  in  range  and 
rapidity  of  fire.  In  addition  to  this,  as  the  same  author 
observes,  in  former  times  it  was  sufficient  to  break  up 
thick  masses  of  infantry  and  their  opposition  was  at  an 
end ;  now  infantry  begins  the  battle  in  loose  formation, 
each  individual  command  constitutes  a  unit  fit  for  battle, 
and  even  the  solitary  soldier  will  not  lose  his  wits  while  a 


i6  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

cartridge  remains  upon  him.  Thus  the  relations  between 
cavalry  and  infantry  have  entirely  changed. 

It  is  questionable,  indeed,  whether  in  the  future  cavalry 
will  have  that  importance  which  formerly  belonged  to  it, 
as  a  force  deciding  battle  and  afterwards  completing 
the  overthrow  of  the  enemy  by  pursuit.  Even  in  the  wars 
of  1870  and  1877  this  importance  of  cavalry  seemed 
diminished,  although,  on  the  other  hand,  its  importance 
in  the  reconnoitring  of  occupied  territory,  the  protection 
of  armies,  and  its  value  in  independent  action  have 
increased. 

In  addition  to  this,  a  new  function  for  cavalry  has  been 
created — immediate  irruption  into  the  territory  of  an 
enemy,  and  the  destruction  of  his  arrangements  for 
mobilisation,  and  his  communications.  To  what  extent 
such  action  of  cavalry  in  the  moment  of  the  declaration  of 
war  will  prove  successful  is  still  to  be  proven  by  experi- 
ence. In  the  event  of  success  such  action  would  cause 
disorganisation  in  the  enemy's  arrangements,  and  force 
him  to  accelerate  them.  And  as  operations,  considering 
the  immensity  of  modern  armies,  may  be  successfully 
carried  on  only  by  the  precise  execution  of  strategical 
plans  elaborated  in  advance,  then  the  disorganisation 
caused  by  sudden  cavalry  irruptions  might  have  the 
most  important  results. 

As  concerns  the  role  of  cavalry  in  pursuit,  it  is  more 
important  to  consider  this  role  in  the  pursuit  of  retreating 
armies  to  their  farthest  movement  than  in  the  pursuit  of 
armies  in  their  actual  retreat  from  the  field  of  battle. 
Doubts  have  been  expressed  as  to  the  decisiveness  of 
future  battles.  It  is  very  probable  that  in  the  majority  pf 
cases  the  road  selected  for  retreat  will  be  guarded  by 
defences  constructed  in  advance,  the  retreating  army 
falling  back  upon  the  nearest  position  and  offering  fresh 
resistance  to  the  victors,  who,  on  their  side,  will  be 
weakened  by  the  storming  of  the  first  positions.  In  such 
case  the  most  important  role  of  cavalry  may  be  to  prevent 
the  retreating  army  drawing  reinforcement  from  other 
sections  of  the  army  which,  owing  to  the  vastness  of  the 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  17 

field  of  battle,  ma\^  find  themselves  at  considerable 
distance  from  the  main  army. 

In  any  case  it  will  be  seen  that  the  duties  of  cavalry  in 
war  remain  very  important,  although  the  fulfilment  or  non- 
fulfilment  of  some  of  the  tasks  appointed  for  il  has  still  to 
be  shown  by  experience. 

Quite  otherwise  is  the  case  of  artillery. 

It  is  an  accepted  axiom  that  without  the  aid  of  artillery 
it  is  impossible  to  drive  infantry,  even  infantry  considerably 
weaker  in  numbers,  out  of  a  fortified  position ;  and  as  all 
infantr}'  when  acting  on  the  defensive  will  be  entrenched, 
then  armies  in  future  will  find  themselves  mainly  dependent 
upon  artillery. 

The  successful  employment  of  artillery  will  depend  upon 
the  opposition  it  meets  from  the  artillery  fire  of  the  enemy. 
The  artillery  of  the  attacking  side  will  begin  by  attempt- 
ing to  silence,  or  at  least  to  weaken  the  artiller}'  fire  of  the 
defenders,  which  object  being  accomplished,  it  will  be  able 
to  turn  its  attention  to  the  enemy's  infantry.  The  artillery 
of  the  defending  army,  possessing  as  it  will  many  advan- 
tages, will  attempt  to  prevent  this.  The  result  of  such  a 
duel,  if  the  defenders  have  artiller}' of  nearl}' equal  strength 
and  quality,  in  all  probability  wmU  be  the  annihilation  of 
the  attacking  artillery ;  while  if  the  superiority  of  the 
attacking  artillery  be  substantial,  the  result  will  more  pro- 
bably- be  mutual  annihilation. 

The  increase  in  the  artillery  of  all  armies,  the  improve- 
ment of  ammunition,  the  adoption  of  smokeless  powder 
and  of  new  explosives,  the  improvement  in  tactics,  all 
these  must  lead  to  such  great  losses  in  the  artillery  service 
that  their  action  will  be  paral^'sed,  or  the  losses  in  the 
armies  will  become  so  tremendous  that  w^ar  itself  will  be 
impossible. 

Such  a  conclusion  may  seem  risky,  but  it  is  founded  on 
the  investigations  of  the  most  competent  artillerists,  and 
in  the  justice  of  their  conclusions  it  is  difficult  not  to 
concur,  when  we  consider  the  changes  which  have  taken 
place  since  the  time  of  the  last  great  war. 

As  relates  to  the  employment  of  artillery,  it  may  first  of 

B 


1 8  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

all  be  noted  that  the  adoption  of  new  powders  has  changed 
for  the  worse  the  position  of  artillerymen.  In  former 
times  a  thick  cloud  of  smoke  hampered  the  aim  of  the 
artilleryman.  But  on  the  other  hand  it  prevented  the 
enemy's  artillery  and  infantry  from  taking  accurate  aim. 

As  long  as  ordinary  powder  was  used  there  was  no 
especial  need  for  increase  in  accuracy  and  rapidity  of  fire, 
for  quick  firing  produced  so  much  smoke  that  after  a  short 
time  it  was  necessary  to  slacken  fire,  except  on  those 
occasions  when  there  was  a  favourable  wind  ;  and  accuracy 
also  was  not  as  important  as  it  is  at  the  present  day. 
With  smokeless  powder  it  is  possible  to  discharge  more 
shots  in  a  few  minutes  favourable  for  fire  than  were 
formerly  discharged  in  a  day's  battle.     In  this  connection 

.  the  accuracy  of  modern  fire  must  again  be  insisted  upon. 

j  Cannon  at  a  distance  of  2011  yards  has  placed   shot  in 

' '         the  same  hole  four  times  in  succession.* 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  against  the  enemy's 
artillery  the  defending  army  will  make  use  also  of  sharp- 
shooters. Using  the  new  powder,  sharpshooters  will  have 
full  possibility  to  approach  the  batteries  of  the  enemy,  and 
concealing  themselves  behind  inequalities  of  the  field  of 
battle,  with  no  smoke  to  betray  them,  may  pick  off  all  the 
enemy's  gunners  and  horses. 

Manoeuvres  in  which  smokeless  powder  has  been  used 
confirm  the  opinion  that  from  a  distance  of  440  yards  it 
is  impossible  to  discover  marksmen  hidden  behind  trees 
or  bushes.  But  from  this  distance  every  shot  of  a  skilful 
marksman  will  claim  its  victim.  In  addition  to  this,  all 
armies  now  possess  specially  organised  bodies  of  chas- 
seurs, trained  to  fire  from  great  distances,  and  accustomed 
stealthily  to  approach  their  mark.  It  is  plain  that  for  such 
commands  there  can  be  no  especial  difficulty  in  stealing  up 
to  a  battery  and  picking  ofi"  the  artillerymen.  The  French, 
German,  and  Austrian  armies  dispose  of  sufficient  numbers 
of  such  soldiers.  It  is  well  known  that  Germany,  France, 
Austria,  and  Switzerland  yearly  expend  considerable  sums 

*  Lbbell,  "  Militarische  Jahresberichte,"  1894. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  19 

on  the  encouragement  of  good  shooting,  and  that  among 
the  population  of  those  states  there  is  a  considerable 
number  of  first-rate  shots.  In  the  Russian  army  chasseur 
commands  are  also  found  with  the  different  arm}^  divisions. 
According  to  the  data  of  the  Prussian  General  Rohne 
100  sharpshooters  will  put  a  battery  out  of  action,  firing 
from  a  distance  of — 

880  yards  in  the  course  of-   2.4  minutes. 
1 100        „  „  „  4  ,, 

1320        „  „  „  7.5       „ 

1650        „  „  „         22  „ 

But  even  if  the  destruction  of  the  gunners  be  not  accom- 
plished by  sharpshooters,  it  is  very  probable  that  it  will 
soon  be  done  by  the  artillery  of  the  enemy. 

The  quantity  and  power  of  artillery  in  all  armies  has 
been  multiplied  many  times.  If  the  figures  which  repre- 
sent these  increased  quantity  and  increased  powder  be 
multiplied  it  will  be  shown  that  in  comparison  with  1870 
the  strength  of  the  French  artillery  has  been  multiplied 
1 16  times,  and  of  the  German  42  times.  But  after  the 
introduction  of  the  improved  artillery  now  being  accom- 
plished the  strength  of  artillery  will  be  again  redoubled. 

If,  to  form  some  idea  how  losses  in  a  future  war  from  the 
action  of  artillery  alone  will  exceed  the  corresponding 
losses  in  1 870-71,  we  multiply  the  figure  of  these  latter 
losses  by  the  figures  which  represent  the  increased  force 
of  modern  artiller}^,  the  result  would  be  incredible,  for  it 
would  show  that  there  could  not  be  an  army  large  enough 
to  sustain  such  losses.  But  for  the  purpose  of  giving  an 
idea  as  to  the  power  of  modern  artillery  these  figures  have 
a  theoretical  value,  resulting  as  they  do  from  simple  arith- 
metical calculation. 

In  one  sense  calculation  will  not  be  uninstructive. 
What  number  of  soldiers  will  be  disabled  by  the  use 
of  that  quantity  of  shots  w^hich  is  found  in  the  ammu- 
nition cases  of  the  batteries  of  different  countries,  taking 
into  account  the  conditions  for  marksmanship  less  favour- 
able in  war  than  in  peace  ?    When  we  make  this  calculation, 


20  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

on  the  figures  of  the  Prussian  general  and  well-known 
military  writer  Miiller,  we  find  that  the  ammunition  carried 
by  the  batteries  of  the  French  and  Russian  armies,  taken 
together,  would  put  out  of  action  six  millions  of  soldiers. 
Continuing  our  calculations  upon  the  data  of  the  same 
authority  we  find  that  the  Franco-Russian  artillery,  with 
its  ready  supply  of  ammunition,  would  be  capable  of  with- 
standing the  attack  of  double  that  number,  or  twelve 
millions  of  men.  The  ready  supply  of  ammunition  in  the 
united  German,  Austrian  and  Italian  armies  would  disable 
five  millions  of  men,  and  successfully  repulse  the  attack 
of  ten  millions  of  infantry. 

A  writer  no  less  authoritative,  a  professor  of  the  chief 
artillery  school  in  France,  Colonel  Langlois,  speaking  as  to 
the  character  of  future  battles,  expresses  the  opinion  that 
for  one  field-piece  up  to  500  rounds  will  be  required.  If 
we  estimate  the  quantity  of  artillery,  and  the  number  of 
fragments  produced  by  explosion,  it  is  shown  that  these 
are  sufficient  for  the  destruction  of  forces  eight  times 
stronger  than  the  armies  opposed  to  them.  It  is  necessary 
to  mention  here  that  modern  projectiles,  filled  with  powerful 
explosives,  will  be  dangerous  not  only  to  the  enemy,  but 
also  to  the  army  which  employs  them.  The  storing, 
transport,  and  employment  of  such  explosives  under  the 
well-directed  fire  of  an  enemy  may  lead  to  catastrophes 
which  will  still  further  increase  the  horrors  of  war.  In 
France  fougasse  shells,  containing  4  pounds  of  m.elinite, 
have  been  adopted.  The  majority  of  writers  are  agreed 
that  in  view  of  the  possible  premature  explosion  of  melinite 
shells,  fougasse  shells  are  very  dangerous,  as  in  such 
event,  the  bursting  of  the  gun  seems  inevitable.  But  the 
danger  is  not  limited  to  the  possible  bursting  of  guns. 
Against  entrenched  armies,  mortars  and  siege  artillery  of 
great  size  will  be  employed.  The  projectiles  of  these  will 
be  filled  with  strong  explosives,  such  as  peroxylene  and 
melinite.  Now  these  explosives  are  capable  of  exploding 
unexpectedly  on  certain  changes  of  temperature  and  from 
other  causes  not  yet  ascertained.  The  agitation  of  the  air 
cau.sed  by  the  enemy's  shells  may  also  cause  explosions. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  21 

It  is  enough  to  note  that  explosions  are  by  no  means 
uncommon  during  experiments,  although  these  experiments 
are  carried  on  by  trained  men  under  the  supervision  of 
picked  officers.  The  very  mystery  with  which  not  only 
the  experiments  but  the  accidents  which  arise  therefrom 
are  surrounded,  proves  recognition  of  the  difficulties  that 
arise  and  the  uncertainty  of  success.  England  is  the  only 
country  where  circumstantial  accounts  of  accidents  in 
dealing  with  explosives  are  published.  In  the  yearly 
memoranda  of  inspectors  we  usually  find  a  long  list  of 
accidents  in  the  making  or  transport  of  explosive  sub- 
stances, and  this,  among  other  things,  shows  that  notwith- 
standing all  measures  of  precaution,  armies  are  sometimes 
supplied  with  dangerously  defective  ammunition.  For  the 
sake  of  safety  in  many  armies  explosive  projectiles  are 
painted  various  colours,  and,  in  order  to  distinguish  them 
at  night,  are  given  a  different  form.  In  addition  to  that 
they  must  be  transported  separately,  and  the  very  fitting 
of  the  tube  into  the  projectile  is  done  at  the  time  of 
loading. 

It  is  very  natural  to  find  that  in  time  of  battle,  when 
armies  are  in  a  state  of  tension,  perfect  coolness  is  found 
only  among  exceptional  natures.  During  the  American  Civil 
War  thousands  of  rifles  were  found  upon  the  battle-fields 
doubly  and  trebly  loaded,  and  sometimes  charged  to  the 
very  muzzle.  If  in  such  a  simple  matter  as  the  loading  of 
a  rifle  such  mistakes  are  made,  what  is  to  be  expected  in 
the  use  of  highly  explosive  ammunition,  the  safe  handling 
of  which  demands  the  greatest  precision  and  caution  ? 

Even  if  we  were  able  to  assume  that  cartridges  will 
always  be  furnished  with  explosive  tubes  only  when 
operations  begin,  or  on  the  very  position  on  which  they 
are  to  be  employed,  and  that  guns  will  always  be  loaded 
with  due  caution  and  regularity,  even  in  that  case  we  find 
the  possibility  of  a  new  and  even  greater  danger. 

Foiigasse  cartridges  consist  of  a  long  steel  cylinder,  of 
which  the  smooth  interior  is  filled  with  melinite,  roburite, 
ecrasite,  or  some  other  explosive.  All  these  substances 
differ  from  one  another  by  admixtures  and  mode  of  pre- 


22  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

paration.  It  is  obvious  that  the  thinner  the  case  of  the 
cartridge  the  greater  the  quantity  .of  explosives  it  will 
contain. 

In  the  opinion  of  experts,  the  direct  action  of  gases  on 
explosion  is  limited  to  a  comparatively  small  space — 
i6h  yards — but  their  explosion  develops  such  force  that 
for  a  certain  distance  it  will  drag  gun,  gunners,  and  horses. 
It  cannot  but  be  observed  that  if  in  the  manufacture  of  the 
ammunition  any  faults  were  to  escape  detection,  the  very 
gravest  consequences  might  ensue.  In  one  of  the  latest 
English  compositions  on  artillery  the  following  sentences 
occur :  "  The  founding  of  ordinary  shells  demands  great 
care  in  order  to  prevent  premature  explosion  in  the  barrel 
of  the  gun.  Shells  must  not  have  on  their  internal  surface 
an3/  roughness  which  might  cause  explosion." 

On  the  explosion  of  such  a  shell  in  the  barrel  of  a 
gun  the  body  of  the  latter  was  shattered  into  more  than 
twenty  bits,  the  carriage  was  completely  destroyed, 
and  the  wheels  turned  into  a  heap  of  splinters.  Indi- 
vidual fragments  of  the  destroyed  weapon  weighed  363 
pounds,  and  were  flung  99  yards  forward  and  backward 
from  the  place  on  which  the  gun  had  stood,  and  nearly 
108  yards  on  either  side.  Notwithstanding  the  distance 
between  guns,  a  single  explosion  might  embrace  several 
guns  with  all  their  ammunition. 

Not  far  from  the  battery  ammunition  cases  will  be 
placed.  If  these  be  not  exploded  by  the  concussion  of 
the  atmosphere  they  may  very  easily  be  exploded  by 
some  of  the  heavy  fragments  which  fall  upon  them.  Is 
there  any  one  who  can  declare  that  all  such  accidents  will 
be  obviated  by  perfection  of  technical  construction  and, 
with  the  present  constitution  of  armies,  by  the  careful 
selection  of  those  who  are  to  deal  with  explosives  ? 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  even  if  we  do  not 
consider  the  dangers  proceeding  from  explosions,  the 
artillery  and  ammunition  already  prepared  is  sufficient  for 
the  destruction  of 'much  larger  armies  than  will  be  moved 
on  the  field  of  battle.  But  such  destruction  may  not  take 
place  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  the  artillery  of  each 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND   23 

combatant  may  in  a  very  short  time  silence  the  fire  of  its 
adversary.  And  as  the  quantity  of  artillery,  their  quality, 
and  the  training  of  their  crews  will,  in  the  opinion  of 
most  authorities,  be  almost  equal  on  both  sides,  then 
common  sense  tells  us  that  in  the  artillery  duel  with 
which  battles  will  commence  either  the  attacking  side, 
having  less  protection,  will  be  destroyed,  or  mutual  exter- 
mination will  result.  Thus  the  problem  might  arise  for 
infantry  to  attack  without  the  support  of  artillery,  and  as 
this,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  is  impossible  without 
terrible  losses,  tactics  would  probably  be  changed,  and  with 
the  remnants  of  its  artillery  the  side  having  the  advantage 
in  the  artillery  duel  must  await  the  attack  of  the  enemy  ; 
conditions  which  would  probably  result  in  a  repetition 
of  the  events'  of  1632  at  Nuremburg,  when  Gustavus 
Adolphus  and  Wallenstein  entrenched  themselves  and  laid 
all  their  hopes  of  victory  on  the  exhaustion  of  the  enemy. 

As  concerns  the  operations  of  infantry  in  the  future 
war  there  is  no  settled  opinion  even  on  the  chief  question, 
that  is,  the  deciding  influence  in  battle  of  an  infantry 
attack.  If  war  v/ere  to  break  out  to-morrow  all  armies 
in  this  respect  would  find  themselves  under  the  influence 
of  the  contradiction  between  instructions,  manoeuvres, 
and  the  views  of  the  more  noted  military  writers, 
General  Skugarevski,  Miiller,  Von  Rohne,  Janson,  and 
others.  There  is  no  reason  to  be  surprised  at  this,  as 
the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder,  improved  rifles  ten 
times  more  effective  than  the  rifles  of  the  old  type,  better 
instruction  of  soldiers,  and  their  equipment  with  instru- 
ments for  the  construction  of  earthworks  have  changed  in 
every  respect  the  conditions  of  war. 

Modern  tactics  are  primarily  the  result  of  our  experi- 
ence of  the  last  great  war.  As  long  as  the  progress  of 
military  technical  science  was  comparatively  slow  it  was 
not  difficult  to  rely  upon  the  experience  of  the  past.  At 
the  present  day  the  state  of  affairs  is  entirely  different  ; 
in  former  times  re-armament  took  place  after  hundreds  of 
years,  then  after  many  decades,  now  it  takes  place  in  a 
very  short  time. 


24  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

But  not  only  the  change  in  armament  will  influence  the 
action  of  infantry.  The  smokelessness  of  the  battlefield, 
the  perfection  of  rifles,  artillery,  and  explosives,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  employment  of  army  hordes  consisting 
largely  of  short-service  soldiers,  have  created  entirely 
new  conditions  for  the  war  of  the  future. 

In  battle  a  combatant  may  from  a  distance  three  to  four 
times  greater  than  before  inflict  serious  losses  on  attack- 
ing troops.  The  killing  off  of  the  officers  and  consequent 
weakening  in  leadership,  will  be  direct  consequences  of  a 
smokeless  battlefield,  and  of  the  precision  of  modern 
small  arms  which  makes  it  possible  for  marksmen  to 
select  their  victims  at  will. 

Meantime,  the  role  which  will  be  played  by  infantry 
has  become  more  complex.  In  prelimina'ry  operations 
infantry  must  take  a  far  larger  part  than  formerly.  The 
close  reconnoitring  of  an  enemy's  position  has  become 
the  duty  of  infantry  scouts,  who  will  be  obliged  to  advance 
stealthily  in  order  to  obtain  the  information  necessary  for 
any  successful  attack.  Without  such  service  by  infantry 
scouts  an  immense  superiority  would  remain  on  the  defen- 
sive side  which,  having  studied  the  locality  in  advance, 
and  occupying  a  commanding  position,  would  simply  with 
the  aid  of  field-glasses  direct  all  its  blows  successfully. 

For  the  carrying  out  of  such  reconnaissances  and  the 
collecting  of  information,  not  only  daring  but  skilful  and 
sagacious  soldiers  are  required,  and  with  the  modern 
composition  of  armies  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  find  such 
men.  The  determining  of  positions  by  smoke  is  no 
longer  possible  ;  while  to  determine  positions  by  sound 
is  extraordinarily  difficult.  Experiments  carried  out  on 
French  shooting  ranges  show  that  the  sound  caused  by 
the  explosion  of  smokeless  powder  does  not  penetrate 
as  far  as  that  of  sulphur  powder ;  a  single  rifle  shot  is 
heard  no  farther  than  880  yards,  and  volleys,  according 
to  the  number  of  rifles,  no  farther  than  from  1320  to  1540 
yards.  Yet  knowledge  of  the  strength  and  position  of 
an  enemy  is  much  more  essential  than  before,  as  the 
losses  from  an  unexpected  encounter  will  be  very  great. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  25 

From  modern  infantry  men  much  more  endurance  also 
will  be  required.  Marches  will  be  made  in  deep  columns 
in  consequence  of  the  growth  of  armies  ;  while  the  number 
of  these  marches,  as  a  consequence  of  the  massiveness 
of  modern  armies,  will  increase  in  comparison  with  former 
times,  since,  owing  to  considerations  of  space  and  commis- 
sariat, modern  armies  must  be  split  up  and  the  individual 
sections  must  reunite  with  the  main  body  on  drawing 
near  to  an  enemy  superior  in  numbers. 

Thus  the  conditions  surrounding  advance  to  battle  and 
battle  itself  have  become  extraordinarily  complicated. 
Yet  on  mobilisation  for  every  hundred  soldiers  serving 
with  the  colours  under  present  arrangements  from  26 
men  (Italy)  to  361  men  (Russia)  will  be  drawn  from  the 
reserve.  The  majority  of  these  men  will  have  long  for- 
gotten what  they  learnt  during  their  period  of  service, 
while  of  their  officers  only  a  fraction  will  be  in  a  high 
state  of  efficiency. 

With  such  conditions  it  would  seem  necessary  that  field 
instructions  and  regulations  must  be  elaborated  in  time  of 
peace,  giving  precise  directions  as  to  tactics  in  all  con- 
tingencies. But  in  this  very  respect  in  every  army  we 
find  deficiencies  of  different  kinds.  Theoretical  instructions 
do  not  correspond  to  practical  necessities  and  are  consti- 
tuted from  a  limited  standpoint.  Colonel  Mignol  says 
that  the  tactics  recommended  in  the  latest  French  official  in- 
structions in  essence  differ  very  little  from  those  introduced 
after  the  invention  of  firearms  and  the  adoption  of  bayonets, 
that  is,  when  firearms  were  about  forty  times  less  effective 
than  they  are  to-day.  At  that  time  in  the  first  line  of 
battle  marched  musketeers  who  opened  the  combat, 
followed  by  pikemen  who  carried  out  the  actual  assault. 
Now  battle  is  opened  by  moving  forward  lines  of  riflemen, 
after  which  storming  columns  will  advance.  But  are  these 
two  forms  of  tactics  in  essence  the  same  ?  Is  it  possible 
that  all  the  progress  in  ballistics  which  has  strengthened 
the  defensive  power  of  infantry  and  increased  the  mobility 
and  strength  of  artillery,  has  not  led  to  a  change  in  the 
very  nature  of  war  ?     Is  it  possible  that  war  remains  the 


26  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

same  as  in  the  time  of  matchlocks,  flintlocks,  and  ramrods 
with  the  mere  difference  that  musketeers  have  been  re- 
placed by  sharpshooters,  and  pikemen  by  reserves  and 
the  masse  ?  The  inadequacy  of  the  recommended  systems 
is  so  obvious  that  as  soon  as  new  instructions  appear  they 
are  submitted  to  criticism  and  changed.  In  truth,  the 
views  concerning  the  duties  of  infantry  present  a  labyrinth 
of  irreconcilable  contradictions,  one  incompatible  with 
another. 

The  reader  must  not  think  that  these  contradictions 
are  apparent  only  to  the  layman.  General  Luset,  a  very 
well-informed  specialist,  speaking  of  French  tactics,  asks  : 
**  Who  has  not  been  astonished  by  the  differences  of  view 
found  in  the  text-books  of  our  schools  on  questions 
touching  the  actual  condition  of  tactics  ?  Can  we  admit 
that  the  teaching  of  infantry  officers  in  the  lower  schools 
agrees  with  that  which  they  receive  in  the  highest  military 
training  institutions  ?  The  teaching  of  this  higher  school 
does  not  correspond  to  the  courses  of  the  Ecole  d^ Appli- 
cation. The  ideas  insisted  upon  in  the  teaching  of  the 
higher  military  school  change  continually.  There  is  a 
chaos  of  contending  ideas  and  principles,  and  out  of  the 
general  confusion  not  a  ray  of  light  appears.  Is  it 
surprising  that  officers  ask,  '  What  is  the  use  of  study  ? ' 
Let  teachers  first  agree  among  themselves  I " 

Attentive  study  of  German  writers  will  reveal  differences 
no  less  great.  But  for  many  obvious  reasons  they  are 
expressed  with  greater  caution.  Many  German  military 
writers  are  restrained  from  a  too  frank  admission  of  the 
dangers  and  difficulties  of  war  under  modern  conditions 
by  the  fear  of  giving  food  to  the  agitation  against  militarism. 

Rules  hasten  after  rules,  supplementary  explanations 
are  constantly  added,  and  in  the  result  of  results  we  find 
a  chaos  of  inconsistencies.  It  could  not  be  otherwise. 
When  all  units  of  infantry  are  furnished  with  trenching 
tools  in  such  quantities  that  in  the  course  of  a  very  short 
time  earthworks  may  be  thrown  up,  each  attacking  body  is 
subjected  to  eight  times  the  danger  of  their  sheltered 
opponents.     But  in  addition  to  rifle  fire,  attacking  forces 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  27 

will  be  subjected  to  fire  from  the  protected  artillery  of 
the  defenders. 

It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that,  concerning  the 
character  of  the  future  employment  of  infantry,  the 
views  of  different  authorities  present  numberless  and 
grave  contradictions. 

A  considerable  numbef  of  military  writers,  judging  from 
the  experience  of  past  wars,  conclude  that  the  main  points 
in  the  employment  of  infantry  in  battle  have  not  changed. 
Infantry  will  be  employed  in  battle  as  in  the  past,  but  in 
loose  formation,  and  the  command  of  infantry  will  not  be 
especially  difficult  not  only  for  experienced  officei's,  but 
even  for  those  who  have  been  taken  from  the  reserve. 
On  the  other  hand,  other  writers  declare  that  for  the  com- 
mand of  infantry  on  the  battlefield  even  more  ability  will 
be  required  than  for  the  command  of  artillery  and  cavalry. 
For  300  officers  who  are  capable  of  learning  to  command 
a  battery  or  a  squadron  not  100  will  be  found  in  any  army 
capable  of  leading  infantry  under  fire.  What,  then,  shall 
we  expect  from  the  officers  of  the  reserve  ?  In  one  thing, 
however,  all  are  agreed — that  whatever  be  the  tactics 
adopted,  their  successful  execution  will  require  great  skill 
in  taking  advantage  of  cover  and  in  overcoming  obstacles, 
knowledge  when  to  seek  shelter  on  the  ground  and  to 
advance  again  at  the  proper  moment.  Will  the  reservists 
only  just  summoned  to  the  colours  be  in  a  condition  to 
fulfil  these  duties  ?  But  even  suppose  that  a  considerable 
part  will  consist  of  perfectly  trained  and  enduring  officers 
and  soldiers,  what  in  such  event  will  be  their  losses  ? 

Some  say  that  there  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that  in 
a  future  war  armies  will  sustain  greater  losses  than  in  the 
past.  Others,  no  less  authoritative,  declare  that  attacks 
having  with  their  object  the  occupation  of  an  enemy's 
position  in  a  future  war  will  be  so  difficult  and  bloody 
that  neither  side  will  be  in  a  condition  to  celebrate  the 
victory.  Before  the  defended  position  will  be  formed  a  belt 
1 100  yards  wide,  for  both  sides  equally  inaccessible, 
limited  by  human  bodies  over  which  will  fly  thousands 
of  bullets  and   shells,  a  belt  over  which  no  living  being 


2  8  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

will  be  able  to  pass  to  decide  the  battle  with  the 
bayonet. 

But  another  view  is  expressed.  All  this,  some  writers 
say,  would  be  true  in  view  of  the  small-calibre  rifles  and 
improved  artillery  now  in  use  if  the  field  of  battle  were  a 
drill-ground  where  distances  were  known  and  marksmen 
guaranteed  that  they  would  not  -be  struck  by  the  enemy's 
fire,  and  if  the  field  of  battle  were  a  perfectly  level  space  ; 
but  in  nature  such  positions  are  rarely  met  with,  and  armies 
will  take  advantage  of  the  shelter  of  woods  and  under- 
growth, eminences  and  depressions.  Hidden  behind  the 
first  line  of  riflemen  who  will  constitute  the  Kugelfang  the 
succeeding  lines  will  advance  with  much  less  losses. 

To  this  is  replied  :  It»  will  be  easy  for  commanders  to 
follow  the  approach  of  the  enemy  by  means  of  balloons  from 
permanent  points  of  view  and  from  portable  obser- 
vation points,  which  will  be  set  up  by  every  detachment 
intending  to  occupy  a  position.  Therefore  with  the 
long  range,  precision  and  striking  power  of  modern  artil- 
lery, which  make  it  possible  to  scatter  fragments  and 
bullets  to  immense  distances,  it  will  be  possible  to  shell  an 
enemy  out  of  woods  and  from  behind  bushes  and  inequalities 
of  the  ground.  There  is  no  foundation  for  supposing  that 
the  enemy  will  select  precisely  those  positions  which  will 
not  give  him  the  possibility  of  taking  advantage  of  long- 
distance rifles  and  artillery.  In  addition  to  this,  and  to 
trenches  and  earthworks,  he  may  prepare  other  obstacles 
for  the  overcoming  of  which  the  attackers  from  a  short 
distance,  in  more  or  less  dense  masses,  and  under  a  con- 
stant fire  will  require  no  little  time. 

To  this  is  replied  that  at  short  range  the  losses,  not- 
withstanding the  unquestioned  improvement  of  the  ballistic 
qualities  of  modern  arms,  will  not  be  great.  When  the 
enemy  is  within  close  range  the  soldiers  will  be  nervous, 
they  will  aim  badly  or  not  at  all,  and  modern  perfected 
small-arms  will  be  little  better  than  bows  and  pitchforks  in 
the  hands  of  barbarians. 

But  the  soldier  under  cover  will  be  subjected  to  very 
little  danger.     Resting  his   rifle  upon  the  trench,  he  will 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  29 

fire  without  aiming,  holding  his  rifle  horizontally,  and  the 
bullet  will  bring  death  to  whatever  lies  in  its  path  for  a 
space  of  660  yards,  while  even  if  fired  at  too  great  an 
elevation  it  will  fall  among  the  reserves.  The  experience 
of  the  Chilian  war  demonstrates  that  at  a  range  of  from 
1 100  to  1320  yards  the  losses  from  random  shots  may  be 
very  considerable. 

AH  this  is  well  known  to  the  advocates  of  war,  yet  they 
continue  to  maintain  that  soldiers  will  shoot  badly,  and 
that  the  perfected  rifles  now  in  their  hands  will  be  no  more 
effective  than  the  weapons  they  bore  in  the  past.  But  is 
there  any  reason  to  suppose  that  with  the  favourable  con- 
ditions for  defence  above  indicated,  soldiers  acting  on  the 
defensive  will  aim  badly  ?  Why,  then,  assume  that  the 
attackers  will  have  sufficient  courage  to  advance  openly, 
exposing  their  whole  bodies,  when  the  defenders  will  be 
subjected  to  a  danger  eight  times  less  ?  In  reality  even  this 
danger  will  not  exist.  At  very  short  distances  the  fire  of  an 
enemy  approaching  at  a  running  pace  will  be  quite  ineffec- 
tive, while  his  fear  ranks  will  be  forced  to  cease  fire. 

Even  if  we  were  to  admit  that  the  defending  army  will 
always  be  of  inferior  quality,  in  such  case  his  fire  will  be 
so  heavy  that  it  must  work  immense  destruction  among 
the  attackers.  To  this  also  a  reply  is  found.  We  are 
told  that  the  stronger  the  fire  the  farther  the  contending 
armies  will  remain  from  one  another  ;  they  will  rarely  see 
one  another  ;  rivers,  woods,  and  hills  will  sometimes  sepa- 
rate them  ;  there  will  no  longer  be  direct  clashes  of  troops, 
making  of  man  a  bloodthirsty  beast,  and  ending  in  the  ruin 
of  one  of  the  combatants.  And  since  battles  will  take 
place  at  immense  distances  it  will  not  be  difficult  in  case  of 
need  to  retreat  from  the  field.  But  in  such  event  more  or 
less  mutual  extermination  will  have  taken  place  without 
definite  result. 

Other  writers  admit  the  probability  of  terrible  blood- 
shed and  immense  losses,  but  maintain  that  not  this  but 
the  gaining  of  victory  is  the  important  point,  whatever 
the  losses  may  be.  The  war  of  1870  showed  that 
infantry  is   capable  of  enduring  immense  losses.       Other 


30  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

specialists  regard  this  opinion  with  suspicion  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  modern  infantry  is  very  different  from  that 
which  fought  in  1870.  For  many  causes  they  admit  that 
the  losses  will  be  incomparably  greater. 

Modern  arms  not  only  increase  the  direct  danger  but 
paralyse  the  medical  service,  since  it  will  be  impossible  to 
organise  ambulance  stations  in  positions  exposed  even  to 
the  random  shots  of  the  enemy,  and  equally  difficult  to 
carry  off  the  wounded.  Modern  rifles  kill  at  two  miles, 
artillery  is  effective  at  more  than  three  and  a  half  miles. 
And  armies  no  longer  consist  of  professional  soldiers,  but  of 
peace-loving  citizens  who  have  no  desire  to  expose  them- 
selves to  danger.  The  propaganda  against  war  may  turn 
their  minds  in  another  direction.  It  is  impossible  to  rely 
upon  modern  armies  submitting  to  sacrifice  and  depriva- 
tion to  such  an  extent  as  is  desired  by  military  theorists 
who  lose  sight  of  the  tendencies  which  obtain  in  western 
European  society. 

Such  contradictions  of  opinions  are  met  not  only  by  ques- 
tions' of  a  general  nature,  but  even  by  matters  of  detail. 
Some  declare  that  the  improvement  in  firearms,  and  the 
adoption  and  application  to  military  purposes  of  all  the 
latest  inventions,  have  cast  into  the  background  mere 
muscular  strength,  replacing  it  by  military  technique. 
With  immense  armies  and  high  mental  training  of  leaders, 
it  will  be  possible  by  means  of  the  strategical  concentra- 
tion of  marching  columns  at  a  certain  point  to  outflank  and 
surround  the  enemy — all  the  more  possible  because  the 
defence  will  be  weakened  in  consequence  of  the  greater 
distance  of  reserves. 

To  this  the  reply  is  :  In  order  to  carry  out  such  an 
operation  it  will  be  necessary  to  know  all  the  movements 
of  the  enemy,  while  against  smokeless  powder,  long- 
range  firearms,  and  against  the  precautions  taken  for 
guarding  the  centre  of  an  army,  the  obtaining  of  informa- 
tion and  the  examination  of  the  inhabitants  will  be  more 
difficult ;  the  quick  construction  of  light  trenches  will 
render  vain  attempts  at  turning  flanks  and  surrounding 
an  enemy ;  while  the  constant  arrival  on  the  field  of  battle 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  31 

of  fresh  forces,  which  will  be  frequent  owing  to  the  dis- 
tribution of  armies  over  great  areas,  will  endanger  the 
position  of  an  army  which  attempts  a  flanking  movement. 

Thus  we  find  before  us  a  whole  series  of  hopeless  con- 
tradictions. This  it  seems  is  inevitable  and  springs  from 
the  very  nature  of  things.  A  war  alone  is  capable  of 
solving  these  questions. 

In  the  future  war,  whatever  the  combinations  may  be, 
one  side  will  stand  primarily  on  the  defensive;  and  if 
after  the  repulse  of  the  enemy's  attacks  it  in  its  turn 
resorts  to  attack  for  the  purpose  of  finally  overthrowing 
him,  such  operations  can  only  be  carried  on  for  a  short 
distance,  as  the  newly  attacking  army  will  meet  with 
similar  insuperable  obstacles.  The  contending  armies  in 
all  probability  will  often  exchange  their  parts. 

French  statisticians  estimate  that  every  attacking  body, 
in  order  that  it  shall  not  be  inferior  to  the  defenders,  when 
it  has  got  within  35^  yards  (the  distance  at  which  it  will  be 
possible  to  rush  upon  the  enemy),  for  each  hundred  men  of 
the  defenders  it  must  have  637  men ;  while  if  it  wishes  to 
reach  the  actual  positions  of  the  defenders  not  numerically 
inferior,  it  must  have  eight  times  as  many  men. 

By  the  statistics  of  General  Skugarevski,  a  body  of 
troops,  double  the  strength  of  the  defenders,  beginning  an 
attack  from  800  paces,  by  the  time  they  have  advanced 
300  paces  will  have  less  than  half  their  strength  available 
against  the  defence.  With  equal  forces  the  defenders  may 
allow  the  enemy  to  approach  to  within  a  distance  of  220 
yards,  when  they  will  only  need  to  discharge  the  six  cart- 
lidges  in  their  magazines  in  order  to  annihilate  the 
attacking  force. 

The  celebrated  Prussian  authority.  General  Muller, 
declares  that  in  order  to  avoid  total  extermination 
"  soldiers  will  be  compelled,  in  scattered  formation,  and 
as  much  as  possible  unobserved  by  the  enemy,  to  creep 
forward,  hiding  behind  irregularities  in  the  field,  and 
burying  themselves  in  the  earth  as  moles." 

If  this  is  so,  is  it  possible  to  dream  of  taking  an  en- 
trenched position?     Let  us  suppose  that,  following  the 


32  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

advice  of  General  Miiller,  attacking  troops  will  begin  to 
form  at  225  paces  from  the  enemy,  up  to  that  time  having 
suffered  no  loss.  Let  us  also  suppose  that  at  that  distance 
of  225  paces  the  attacking  body  numbers  400  men  and 
the  defenders  in  the  trenches  only  100  men.  Now  from 
the  statistics  of  General  Skugarevski,  after  the  distance 
between  the  combatants  has  been  traversed,  only  74  men 
will  be  left  to  the  offensive  side  for  the  actual  attack  with 
the  bayonet.  To  suppose  that  the  defending  troops  will 
have  a  clear  field  for  aiming  of  less  than  225  paces,  or  that 
74  men  will  be  able  to  wrest  an  entrenched  position  from 
100  would  be  absurd. 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  concerning  methods 
of  attack  there  can  be  no  certain  knowledge.  To  rely 
upon  the  assistance  of  artillery  at  the  present  day,  when 
the  quantity  and  quality  of  artillery  will  be  on  both  sides 
the  same,  is  impossible.  To  obtain  a  superiority  of  rifle 
fire  over  that  of  the  defenders  will  be  equally  difficult, 
even  with  a  considerable  preponderance  of  strength  ;  so 
that  the  defending  army  in  the  very  moment  of  attack  may 
find  itself  in  a  position  of  complete  security. 

The  Prussian  General  Janson  expressed  the  view,  to 
this  time  uncontroverted,  that  for  attack  it  will  first  be 
necessary  to  employ  artillery  upon  the  enemy's  position, 
and  this  of  course  can  only  be  done  by  the  concentration 
of  a  more  powerful  artillery  than  is  at  the  disposal  of  the 
defence.  If  the  rifle-pits  and  trenches  of  the  defender's 
position  are  furnished  with  internal  covering  the  assistance 
of  siege  artillery  may  be  necessary  for  their  destruction. 

Only  after  such  preliminary  action  may  the  actual  attack 
by  infantry  begin.  But  to  approach  an  adversary  in  a 
strongly  fortified  position,  in  the  face  of  a  fire  over  ground 
the  distances  of  which  have  been  ascertained  beforehand, 
is  a  laborious  task,  and  may  even  require  two  days  to 
accomplish.  In  the  first  day  the  attacking  body  will 
advance  to  the  limit  of  the  line  of  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery,  and  upon  the  approach  of  darkness  must  send 
into  the  belt  of  rifle  fire  small  bodies,  that  is,  companies 
taken  from  the  assaulting  army,  always  according  to  their 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  33 

order  in  the  ranks.  The  advanced  troops  will  proceed  to 
the  points  selected,  and  immediately  entrench  themselves. 
These  selected  points  of  defence  will  form  a  line  from 
which  on  the  following  day  the  storm  of  the  position  will 
be  begun,  after  the  opening  of  a  strong  rifle  fire  against 
the  defence,  and  the  advance  of  the  rear  echelons  into  the 
foremost  line. 

Now  here  comes  in  the  chief  difficulty  in  the  execution 
of  General  Janson's  plans.  First  of  all  the  enemy  will 
take  such  precautionary  measures  that  it  will  seldom 
happen  that  the  echelons  advanced  into  the  firing  line 
before  dawn  will  be  able  to  find  natural  cover ;  on  the 
contrary,  the  greater  part  of  these  echelons  will  remain 
without  protection,  and  will  stand  exposed  for  a  long  time, 
while  the  attacking  army,  by  means  of  fire,  is  preparing 
the  position  for  attack. 

General  Janson  himself  is  far  from  persuaded  that  the 
system  of  attack  recommended  by  him  will  prove  suc- 
cessful, even  in  the  majority  of  cases.  Indeed,  as  a 
condition  precedent  for  the  success  of  the  attack,  he 
assumes  that  the  defenders  will  be  disorganised  and 
panic-stricken ;  at  the  same  time  adding  that  **  we  have 
no  right  to  assume  concerning  the  enemy  what  we 
would  never  admit  about  ourselves."  Of  course  the 
system  of  attack  he  advocates  could  only  prove  suc- 
cessful after  immense  losses,  and  not  always  even  after 
such  losses. 

To  rely  simply  on  the  strength  of  the  bayonet  in  face 
of  modern  intensity  of  fire  would  be  to  judge  only  by 
the  tradition  of  those  times  when  the  bayonet  was  the 
last  argument  in  battle.  In  the  Russian  army,  faith 
in  the  bayonet  is  still  sometimes  expressed.  Among 
foreign  authorities  it  is  no  longer  met  with.  The  con- 
ditions have  wholly  changed.  In  former  times  the  result 
of  an  infantry  battle  was  thus  decided  :  the  combatants 
advanced  upon  one  another  without  flinching,  exchanged 
a  volley  or  two,  and  then  rushed  upon  one  another. 
By  such  an  assault  the  fate  of  the  battle  was  quickly 
decided,  the  weaker  side  gave  way,  and  escaped  without 

c 


34  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

difficulty  if  the  enemy  employed  no  cavalry.  The  victors 
sent  two  or  three  volleys  after  the  vanquished,  and  the 
battle  was  over. 

The  conditions  are  very  different  now.  Before  an 
attack  with  the  bayonet  can  be  made  a  zone  of  murderous 
fire  has  first  to  be  passed.  Retreat  after  a  repulsed  attack 
upon  a  fortified  position,  will  be  accomplished  only  after 
the  loss  of  more  than  half  the  attacking  force.  At  such 
short  ranges  as  will  be  found  in  bayonet  attacks,  almost 
every  rifle  bullet  will  disable  one  soldier,  and  often  more 
than  one.  On  a  smokeless  battlefield  the  results  of  such 
an  overthrow  will  be  visible  to  all.  At  such  close  ranges  the 
present  covered  bullet  will  penetrate  the  cranium ;  but  in 
other  parts  of  the  body  will  have  a  shattering  and  tearing 
effect. 

If  we  accept  the  opinions  of  the  specialists  cited  that 
the  defending  troops  by  the  force  of  their  fire  can  stop  the 
attack  at  some  hundred  yards  distance,  making  further 
progress  impossible,  we  are  bound  to  admit  that  the 
defenders  in  their  turn  will  not  be  able  to  undertake  an 
assault,  which  would  merely  result  in  changing  their 
positions  with  the  enemy. 

The  attainment  of  success,  as  happened  in  the  past,  and 
especially  in  the  war  of  1870,  by  means  of  manoeuvres  and 
enveloping,  will,  in  the  war  of  the  future,  also  be  unlikely. 
In  the  first  place  such  operations  demand  great  superiority 
of  force,  whereas  armies  will  be  almost  equal.  Further,  for 
the  enveloping  of  an  enemy's  position  reconnaissance 
under  fire  is  necessary,  and  this  is  a  very  arduous 
task.  A  defending  army  driven  from  its  positions,  will 
begin  to  retreat  by  convenient  roads,  either  finding  new 
points  of  resistance  prepared  in  advance,  or  again 
entrenching  itself  in  suitable  positions,  continuing  its 
opposition  to  the  attacking  army,  and  inflicting  upon  it 
new  losses  until  reinforcements  arrive. 

In  view  of  the  conditions  of  modern  war  the  question 
inevitably  arises  :  Will  leaders  be  found  gifted  with  suffi- 
cient talent  to  decide  the  problems  of  war,  and  overcome 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  35 

difficulties  which  seem  almost  insuperable  ?  Year  by 
year  the  mechanism  of  war  undergoes  improvement,  and 
it  must  continue  to  become  more  complex.  The  fortifica- 
tion of  frontiers  continues,  the  strength  of  armies  grows. 
Would  it  not  be  madness  to  begin  a  war  when  the  very 
methods  of  attack  are  the  subject  of  dispute,  and  the  only 
indisputable  fact  remains  that  every  mistake,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  immense  power  of  firearms,  will  be  followed 
by  ruinous  results  ? 

In  enunciating  the  more  important  questions  which 
arise  from  the  new  mechanism  of  war,  we  naturally  meet 
the  question  :  Is  there  not  a  strange  contradiction  in  the 
preparation  of  powerful  weapons  of  extermination,  and 
the  subjection  to  military  service  of  almost  the  whole  of 
the  grown  population  in  those  states  where  the  spirit  of  the 
time  is  so  decidedly  opposed  to  militarism?  In  order,  how- 
ever, to  prepare  a  basis  for  a  reply  to  this  question  we  should 
be  compelled  to  describe  the  entire  action  of  that  mechanism 
denominated  an  army  of  which  the  constituent  parts  are 
here  marshalled. 

General  Count  Caprivi  declared  in  Parliament  that  the 
people  was  possessed  by  a  madness  for  figures.  And 
indeed  all  European  states  from  the  time  of  the  introduc- 
tion of  universal  military  service  have  been  in  a  position 
to  call  under  the  colours  almost  the  whole  of  their  able- 
bodied  male  population. 

But  these  men  are  not  soldiers.  They  are  worthless 
save  when  they  are  properly  armed  and  instructed.  In 
addition  they  must  be  commanded,  and  without  leader- 
ship the  best  army  in  the  world  would  be  an  inert  mob. 
Only  men  with  commanders  can  be  named  soldiers. 

Different  authorities  variously  estimate  the  strength  of 
armies  which  might  be  placed  in  the  field  on  the  outbreak 
of  a  war.  To  preserve  impartiality  we  must  introduce  all 
such  estimates. 

But  the  following  figures,  which  relate  to  the  year  1 896, 
appear  to  us  the  most  probable. 

The  military  strengths  of  the  Powers  are  as  follows  : 


36  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Germany 2,550,000 

Austria- Hungary     ....         1,304,000 
Italy 1,281,000 


Total        .        .        5»i35»ooo 

France 2,554,000 

Russia     ..,..,        2,800,000 


Total         .         .         5,354,000 

To  arrive  at  this  result  the  governments  of  these  coun- 
tries have  lavished  milliards.  Yet  it  is  a  remarkable  fact 
that  the  relative  strength  of  armies  has  not  changed,  not- 
withstanding the  efforts  of  every  State  to  outdo  its  neigh- 
bours. 

Conscription,  as  at  present  systematised,  has  one  good 
side — it  bears  in  itself  the  embryo  of  the  abolition  of  war. 
On  the  mobilisation  of  the  whole  working  population  in 
the  different  countries  difficulties  may  easily  arise  the  con- 
sequences of  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  foresee. 

Within  recent  times  immense  sums  have  been  laid  out 
to  ensure  the  rapid  concentration  of  all  possible  forces  as 
quickly  as  may  be  after  the  declaration  of  war,  in  positions 
near  to  the  enemy,  in  order  at  once  to  begin  a  determined 
attack.  Such  arrangements  in  1870  gave  the  Germans 
the  most  splendid  results,  and  their  necessity  is  now 
generally  acknowledged.  But  since  then  the  conditions 
have  changed.  The  superiority  which  rapid  concentration 
and  mobilisation  will  give  may  be  counterbalanced  by  the 
greater  order  which  will  result  from  less  haste,  and  the  less 
grave  economic  disorganisation  which  slower  mobilisation 
will  cause. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  immensity  of  modern 
armies  and  the  weight  of  their  equipment  enormously  in- 
crease the  need  for  endurance  among  the  rank  and  file. 
Infantry  soldiers  are  compelled  to  carry  a  weight  of  from 
25  to  35  kilogrammes,  or  from  70  to  87  pounds.  To  become 
inured  gradually  to  this  there  will  not  be  time  ;  long 
marches  must  be  undertaken  at  once,  and  not  a  small  pro- 
portion of  the  soldiers  will  break  down  from  exhaustion. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  37 

The  French  medical  authorities  declare  that  after  the  first 
two  weeks  of  marching  the  hospitals  will  contain  100,000 
men,  excluding  those  disabled  by  wounds. 

To  obtain  quarters  for  an  immense  number  of  men  will 
be  impossible,  and  armies  in  the  very  beginning  will  be 
deprived  of  the  most  necessary  conveniences.  It  will  be 
difficult  to  guarantee  large  masses  of  men  with  pro- 
visions, with  the  same  speed  with  which  those  men  are 
mobilised.  The  local  stores  at  the  chief  points  of  move- 
ment will  be  exhausted,  and  the  transport  of  provisions 
from  the  central  organisation  will  require  time.  Of  the 
consequences  of  mobilisation  we  may  judge,  although 
imperfectly,  by  the  experience  of  manoeuvres.  In  France 
the  manoeuvres  have  already  revealed  imperfect  training  of 
officers,  and  unsatisfactor}^  fulfilment  by  the  reservists  of 
their  military  duties.  At  every  obstacle  these  men  broke 
up  into  formless  mobs  ;  they  fired  badly,  so  badly,  indeed, 
that  it  was  admitted  that  in  the  event  of  war  three  or  four 
weeks'  training  would  be  required  before  they  could  be 
sent  to  the  front,  especially  upon  offensive  operations. 

It  is  improbable  that  in  other  countries  similar  in- 
efficiency has  not  been  observed  ;  and  that  this  inefficiency 
is  not  spoken  of  so  openly  may  be  due  to  greater  restraint 
or  to  insufficient  means  of  publicity. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  said  that  universal  military  service 
foi*  short  periods  presents  conditions  in  which  lie  con- 
cealed the  germs  of  the  impossibility  of  war  itself.  This 
impossibility  lies  mainly  in  the  difficulty  of  providing  for 
immense  masses,  as  a  consequence  of  the  diminution  in 
productiveness,  the  possibility  of  economic  crises,  and 
popular  commotions,  and,  finally,  in  the  extreme  difficulty 
of  directing  armies  consisting  of  millions  of  men. 

With  the  growth  of  populations  armies  will  continue  to 
grow,  and  since  even  now  the  immensity  of  armies  and 
the  condition  of  armaments  and  tactics  make  the  appara- 
tus of  war  so  complex  that  the  directing,  feeding,  and 
forcing  of  armies  into  battle  has  become  very  difficult,  in  a 
not  very  distant  future  it  will  be  more  than  questionable. 

The  more  complex  the  apparatus  the  greater   intelli- 


38  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

gence  will  be  required  for  its  management,  both  in  those 
who  command  and  those  who  obey.  As  the  methods  of 
extermination  grow  more  powerful  the  more  essential  will 
it  be  to  act  at  the  psychical  moment.  In  the  network  of 
opinions,  conditions,  needs,  and  dangers  which  will  arise 
at  almost  every  point  of  a  struggle,  in  the  opinion  of 
General  Dragomiroff  only  a  powerfully  developed  intelli- 
gence will  be  in  a  position  to  act.  The  immensity  of 
armies  will  cause  great  complexity  in  the  whole  apparatus 
of  war ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  side  by  side  with  the  in- 
crease in  the  size  of  armies,  grows  the  power  of  weapons 
of  destruction.  The  power  of  the  rifle  has  been  increased 
fourteen  times  and  that  of  artillery  forty  times. 

In  the  past,  success  in  war  depended  upon  the  ability 
of  the  commander  and  the  courage  of  his  army.  In  the 
future,  success  will  depend  more  on  the  ability  of  the 
commanders  of  individual  bodies  of  troops,  on  the 
initiative  and  energy  of  all  officers,  on  the  personal 
example  which  they  set  to  their  men,  and  finally  even  on 
the  condition  of  the  soldiers  themselves. 

For  the  just  direction  of  all  this  gigantic  mechanism 
much  experience  will  be  required.  But  where  will  experi- 
enced commanders  be  found  in  the  future,  when  experience 
even  of  the  present  conditions  is  lacking  ? 

The  conditions  of  modern  war  are  such  that  of  necessity 
the  directing  power  must  pass  from  the  hands  of  the  older 
commanders,  not  to  speak  of  generals — from  the  hands  of 
colonels  and  even  commanders  of  battalions — into  the 
hands  of  captains.  Yet  the  French  Professor  Coumes, 
in  his  work,  **  La  Tactique  de  Demain,"  declares  that  for 
the  command  of  infantry  on  the  field  of  battle  such  skill 
will  be  required  that  in  no  army  will  there  be  found  lOO 
officers  out  of  every  500  fit  to  lead  a  company  under  fire. 

If  this  can  be  said  in  time  of  peace  concerning  the 
officers  of  standing  armies,  what  will  be  the  state  of  affairs 
in  war  ?  What  will  the  chaos  be  when  two-thirds  of  the 
men  in  the  ranks  shall  have  been  taken  from  the  reserves, 
who  have  forgotten  their  duties,  who  do  not  know  their 
officers,  and  to  whom  their  men  in  turn  are  equally  strangers? 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  39 

The  army  will  pass  under  the  baton  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  as  it  has  been  made  by  mobilisation.  Consequently 
the  dispositions  for  mobilisation  have  greater  importance 
than  before,  and  defects  in  mobilisation  cannot  be 
remedied  in  time  of  war.  In  view  of  the  colossal  size  of 
modern  armies  their  direction  in  time  of  war  will  be 
extremely  difficult  even  for  the  most  gifted  leaders. 

In  addition  to  military  skill,  it  will  be  necessary  that  a 
commander-in-chief  shall  be  a  good  administrator.  Every- 
where it  is  recognised  that  the  supply  of  an  army  will  be 
a  labour  of  Hercules,  and  attempts  will  continually  be 
made  by  the  enemy  to  destroy  communications.  To  lead 
an  immense  modern  army,  to  concentrate  and  deconcen- 
trate  it  as  necessity  requires,  is  a  labour  in  no  w^ay  easy  ; 
but  to  keep  it  in  supplies  will  be  an  especially  burdensome 
task. 

Before  the  introduction  of  long-range  firearms,  battle- 
fields were  no  larger  than  the  exercise  grounds  of  a  modern 
brigade.  The  battlefields  of  the  future  will  prove  to  be  much 
greater  in  area  than  those  of  the  past.  The  most  powerful 
mind  will  not  be  able  to  embrace  and  combine  all  the 
details,  requirements,  and  circumstances  of  an  immense 
field.  The  receiving  of  information  and  the  despatch  of 
orders  will  be  very  difficult  in  the  general  uproar.  The 
position  will  be  all  the  more  difficult  since  it  will  be  seldom 
possible  fully  to  concentrate  the  army  for  battle ;  often 
many  divisions  will  approach  at  their  own  time.  Hence  it 
will  happen  that  the  independence  of  commanders  of 
divisions  will  play  a  considerable  part.  The  wars  of  the 
eighteenth  century  required  one  commander.  The  present 
more  mobile  tactics  necessitate  as  many  commanders  as 
there  are  independent  sections  of  an  army. 

And  yet  Europe  has  no  generals  experienced  in  leading- 
such  masses,  and  none  experienced  in  the  keeping  of 
armies  supplied  with  provisions  and  ammunitions  on  a 
scale  even  approaching  that  which  will  be  needed  in  the 
future.  If  dealing  with  such  complex  problems  the 
commander-in-chief  prove  incapable,  tremendous  losses 
are  bound  to  be  sustained  before  he  can  be  superseded. 


40  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Not  only  the  question  of  supreme  command,  but  the 
action  of  subordinate  commanders,  and  of  the  officers 
generally,  in  view  of  the  way  in  which  troops  will  be 
scattered  and  of  their  loose  relations  to  one  another,  and 
in  view  of  the  difficulty  of  taking  advantage  of  cover  as  a 
consequence  of  smokeless  or  nearly  smokeless  powder, 
has  become  considerably  more  complex,  and  in  future 
much  more  independent  action  will  be  required  from 
officers.  But  in  this  necessary  independence  of  action 
lies  concealed  another  great  danger. 

Every  meeting  with  an  enemy  will  prove  more  threaten- 
ing, and  every  mistake,  every  hesitation  will  have  much 
more  serious  consequences  than  in  the  past,  both  in  its 
material  and  its  moral  relations.  A  cloud  of  smoke  will 
not  cover  the  battlefield,  concealing  the  horrors  of  the 
conflict.  The  soldier  will  not  see  the  enemy,  or  hear  the 
shot  which  may  deprive  him  of  life,  but  he  will  see 
around  him  his  dead  companions.  As  a  consequence  of 
such  conditions,  the  nerves  of  all,  in  the  battles  of  the 
future,  will  be  subjected  to  a  terrible  and  hitherto  unexpe- 
rienced strain. 

The  lack  of  officers  trained  in  warfare  is  another 
notable  fact.  Since  the  Franco-German  war  twenty-nine 
years  have  passed,  and  since  the  last  Russo-Turkish  war 
twenty-two  years.  But  even  if  these  wars  were  less  remote, 
conclusions  drawn  from  them  would  be  inapplicable  to 
modern  conditions,  all  the  more  so  because  each  of  these 
wars  was  characterised  by  exceptional  circumstances.  In 
the  war  of  1870-71  the  strength  and  qualities  of  the  two 
armies  were  too  unequal,  while  the  war  of  1877-78,  in 
European  Turkey,  presented  itself  chiefly  in  the  form  of 
the  siege  of  a  single  fortress.  Since  then  the  introduction 
of  smokeless  powder,  the  general  improvement  of  arms, 
and  the  growth  of  the  importance  of  field  fortifications, 
have  completely  changed  the  system  of  tactics. 

Of  officers  who  have  studied  military  science,  not  on 
exercise  grounds  but  on  the  field  of  battle,  there  are  fewer 
than  there  were  in  former  wars,  and  in  a  few  years  there 
will  be  none  at  all      The  absence  of  experience  must  be 


HOW  AVAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  41 

replaced  by  scientific  instruction.  But  military  science  in 
one  important  respect  differs  from  other  branches  of  know- 
ledge, inasmuch  as  its  theoretical  teaching  is  not  accom- 
panied by  the  constant  test  of  experiments,  such  as  are 
made  for  instance  in  chemistry,  mechanics,  and  medicine. 
Manoeuvres  give  neither  complete  nor  trustworthy  infor- 
mation, as  much  that  is  allowed  would  prove  impos- 
sible in  war,  and  moreover  they  lack  what  Bismarck,  at 
the  siege  of  Paris,  called  the  "  psychological  moment." 
It  was  not  without  reason  that  General  Dragomiroff 
observed  that  manoeuvres  would  be  much  more  instructive 
if  even  one  out  of  a  thousand  cartridges  contained  a 
bullet. 

Meantime  a  fundamental  change  has  taken  place  in  the 
very  elements  of  war  from  which  depend,  on  the  one  hand, 
its  course,  and  on  the  other,  its  influence  on  all  the  depart- 
ments of  social  order.  On  the  field  of  battle,  instead 
of  moderate,  easily  supervised  armies  and  their  reserves, 
marching  in  deep  and  thick  formation,  elbow  to  elbow,  there 
will  advance  whole  peoples  up  to  fifty  years  of  age,  com- 
manded for  the  most  part  (three-fourths)  by  officers  from 
the  reserve,  who  will  have  almost  forgotten  the  military 
art. 

These  immense  mobs  will  have  at  their  disposal  new 
explosives  of  tremendous  power,  and  arms  with  incompar- 
ably greater  range  and  deadliness  than  before,  but  never 
tested  in  a  great  war. 

The  immense  extent  of  the  theatre  of  war ;  the  vastness 
of  the  field  of  battle ;  the  difficulties  presented  by  attack 
on  entrenched  positions  and  fortifications,  and  those 
natural  defences  on  the  battlefield  which  soldiers  are  now 
taught  to  utilise,  and  which  inevitably  will  be  utilised  in 
view  of  the  deadliness  of  modern  fire  ;  the  impossibility  of 
massed  attacks  ;  finally,  the  duration  of  battles,  which  may 
be  prolonged  for  several  days,  and  which  owing  to  the  im- 
possibility of  pursuit  may  yield  no  decisive  results — ^all 
these  are  new  circumstances. 

In  view  of  the  increased  importance  of  officers  under 
these  conditions,  systematic  attempts  will  be  made  in  all 


42  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

European  armies  to  kill  off  the  officers  of  the  enemy.  Expe- 
rience even  of  the  last  wars,  when  it  had  not  been  adopted 
as  a  principle  to  disable  the  officers  of  the  enemy,  showed 
how  possible  was  the  rapid  diminution  of  the  number  of 
officers  on  the  field  of  battle.  At  the  end  of  the  Franco- 
German  war  at  the  head  of  battalions  and  half  battalions 
stood  reserve  officers  of  lower  rank,  and  even  sergeant- 
majors.  In  December  1870  in  a  Bavarian  division  there 
remained  but  one  line  captain. 

As  an  illustration  of  what  may  happen  in  the  future  we 
may  take  the  Chilian  war,  although  only  a  part  of  the  army 
of  one  of  the  combatants  was  armed  with  small-calibre 
rifles. 

The  losses  in  two  battles  were  as  follows  : 

Officers  killed     ....  23  per  cent. 

,,        wounded        •         •         •  75        >> 

Men  killed  .....  13        „ 

,,     wounded     ....  60        ,, 

The  high  percentage  of  officers  killed  vividly  illustrates 
the  heavy  cost  of  leading  masses  in  war. 

But  the  war  of  1870  showed  that  if  officers  are  lacking 
to  give  example  the  men  will  not  attack.  If  this  were  so 
in  1870,  what  will  be  the  case  in  the  future,  when  for  every 
hundred  soldiers  in  the  standing  army  it  is  proposed  to 
draw  from  the  reserves  : 


By  Italy 


Austria 
Germany 
France 
Russia 


260  men. 

566    „ 

573    » 
361    „ 


The  majority  of  these  reservists  will  have  forgotten 
what  they  learnt  during  their  period  of  service  with  the 
colours.  Of  the  officers  only  a  small  proportion  will  be 
trained  up  to  date.  But  it  is  in  their  hands  that  all  leader- 
ship will  rest.  Yet  the  percentage  of  officers  who  possess 
a  good  preparatory  training  is  : 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  43 

In  Russia  ....        41  per  cent. 

,,  Germany  ....  100         „ 

,,  France  ....         38         „ 

,,  Austria  ....  20        ,, 

Thus  although  experience  has  superseded  science,  we 
find  that  the  officers  who  have  been  serving  continuously 
will  constitute  less  than  half  the  staff,  the  other  half  will 
consist  of  officers  of  the  reserve  of  all  denominations,  the 
majority  of  whom  will  have  long  forgotten  the  military  art. 
Of  this  first  half  almost  all  will  be  taken  for  the  formation 
of  new  staffs,  &c.,  and  the  supply  of  line  officers  will  be 
so  exhausted  that  at  the  front  there  will  remain  in  each 
battalion  no  more  than  eight  of  such  officers — that  is,  no 
more  than  a  fifth  part,  or  20  per  cent.,  a  deficiency  of 
four-fifths  remaining  which  must  be  supplied  partly  by 
retired  officers,  and  partly  by  sergeant-majors  and  non- 
commissioned officers,  for  the  greater  part  taken  from  those 
serving  with  the  colours,  but  to  some  extent  even  from  the 
reserve. 

Thus  every  military  undertaking  owing  to  lack  of 
leaders  will  present  a  terrible  risk,  and  only  daring 
advocates  of  a  policy  of  adventure  would  now  determine 
to  solve  international  questions  by  war. 

The  frontiers  of  all  states  are  sown  with  fortresses  and 
fortified  camps,  and  every  road  by  which  invasion  might 
be  made  is  prepared  for  defence  beforehand.  Even  in 
times  of  peace  immense  forces  stand  at  short  distances 
from  one  another,  and  for  the  purpose  of  reinforcing  them 
quickly  strategical  railroads  have  been  built,  so  disposed 
that  there  can  be  no  talk  of  the  occupation  of  any  country 
at  once.  A  few  days  after  mobilisation  the  opposing 
armies  will  almost  directly  confront  one  another. 

In  former  times  to  hold  great  masses  in  hand,  even  in 
the  case  of  failure,  was  comparatively  easy.  Long  service 
and  tactical  exercises  had  turned  soldiers  into  automata ; 
in  manoeuvres  as  in  war,  great  masses  of  men  advanced, 
mighty  by  their  own  inert  obedience. 

In  the  present  day  armies  almost  always  advance  and 
act  in  loose  formation,  and  with  this  the  influence  of  the 


44  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

mass  on  the  individual  unit  disappears.  It  is  obvious 
that  for  the  attainment  of  success  the  employment  of  a 
thin  line  of  riflemen  will  not  be  sufficient.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  prepare  for  an  assault  by  artillery  fire,  and 
then  by  gradually  strengthening  the  firing  line  with 
reserves,  after  which  the  position  of  the  enemy  will  be 
finally  attacked.  Napoleon  said  that  no  decision  in  favour 
of  battle  should  be  taken  where  the  chances  of  success 
were  less  than  JO  out  of  lOO;  for  when  battle  is  once 
begun  either  victory  or  destruction  must  result.  This  rule 
of  course  remains  applicable  at  the  present  day,  but  it 
must  be  noted  that,  with  the  immensity  of  modern 
armies  and  the  vast  spaces  covered  by  the  field  of  battle, 
if  it  be  not  impossible  it  will  at  least  be  much  more  difficult 
to  estimate  chances  of  success  and  to  foretell  the  course 
of  events. 

Whatever  technical  improvements  may  exist,  the  first 
rule  in  battle  is — obtain  a  superiority  in  numbers.  The 
strategical  problem  (in  the  theatre  of  military  operations) 
which  lies  in  the  union  of  forces  exceeding  the  enemy's, 
corresponds  in  battle  to  the  tactical  problem,  the  acquire- 
ment of  a  preponderance  at  important  points.  Due  de- 
fence, however,  of  the  other  points  of  one's  position  must 
be  provided  for,  and  the  troops  defending  these  latter  points 
must  sufficiently  occupy  the  enemy's  attention  to  prevent 
his  forces  from  concentrating  on  the  important  point.  A 
commander  undertaking  an  assault  must  calculate  the 
general  consequences  which  will  result  from  his  initiative, 
and  justly  calculate  as  to  his  decisive  blow,  while  provid- 
ing in  the  execution  of  his  plan  for  those  contingencies 
which  arise  in  the  moment  of  battle. 

Thanks  to  the  system  of  furnishing  troops  with  trenching 
instruments  there  will  always  be  sufficient  time  for  the 
construction  of  light  earthworks,  except  of  course  on  those 
occasions  when  the  soil  will  prove  frozen,  marshy,  or 
stony.  A  company  by  means  of  its  own  trenching  tools 
may  in  the  course  of  two  and  a  quarter  hours  construct 
protection  sufficient  for  a  line  of  riflemen  250  paces  in 
length.     Small  trenches,  100  paces  long,  for  the  protection 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  45 

of  a  whole  company  also  require  no  more  than  two  and  a 
quarter  hours,  but  larger  earthworks  and  cover  for  artillery 
need  from  two  and  a  half  to  eight  hours'  time.  A  battery 
is  also  provided  with  trenching  tools,  so  that  in  the  course 
of  from  two  and  a  half  to  eight  hours,  according  to  the 
magnitude  of  the  work,  it  may  construct  protection  for  its 
guns. 

The  chief  difference  between  the  tactics  of  modern  and 
those  of  ancient  times  consists  undoubtedly  in  the  rare 
employment  nowadays  of  direct  attack.  With  modern 
arms  and  modern  systems  of  defence  generally,  direct 
attack  is  accompanied  by  such  immense  losses  that  com- 
manders, in  all  probability,  will  prefer  flank  attacks,  espe- 
cially if  the  enemy  occupy  a  strongly  fortified  position. 

But  for  this  a  considerable  superiority  of  force  will  be 
required.  In  the  words  of  Von  der  Goltz,  the  growing 
power  of  resistance  of  every  military  unit  will  enable  a 
single  division  to  accept  battle  with  an  army  corps  if  it  be 
confident  of  reinforcement  within  a  brief  time  by  another 
division.  Even  if  the  first  division  were  exhausted  by 
battle,  yet  so  much  time  would  be  required  for  its  decisive 
defeat  that  it  might  await  the  arrival  of  strong  reinforce- 
ments, when  the  course  of  the  battle  might  be  entirely 
changed. 

As  an  example  we  may  cite  the  case  of  the  army 
manoeuvres  in  Eastern  Prussia  in  the  presence  of  the 
Emperor  in  1894.  Two  divisions  of  the  First  Army 
Corps  found  themselves  at  the  distance  of  a  day's  march 
from  one  another,  yet  the  first  of  them  succeeded  in  holding 
out  against  the  assaults  of  the  17th  Army  Corps  till  the 
arrival  of  the  second  division,  after  which  the  defending 
divisions  succeeded  even  in  gaining  some  advantage  over 
the  enemy.  In  addition  to  this  the  flanking  army  cannot 
be  certain  that  it  will  not  meet  with  a  fortified  position  on 
its  road,  and  to  count  upon  the  negligence  of  the  enemy 
would  be  foolhardy. 

Formerly  the  conditions  were  much  more  favourable 
for  attack.  Napoleon,  who,  as  the  history  of  his 
campaign    shows,    always   had    a   plan   of  battle    ready. 


46  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

nevertheless  allowed  a  considerable  margin  to  accidents, 
to  meet  which  he  changed  his  plan  in  the  very  moment 
of  action.  **  It  is  necessary,"  he  said,  "  to  strike  at  the 
enemy  and  then  to  think  what  further  to  do."  This  policy 
answered  well  at  a  time  when,  although  armies  were  very 
large,  the  commander  nevertheless  held  in  his  hand  all  the 
threads  of  the  battle,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  with  clouds  of 
smoke,  short  range  weapons  and  the  closer  order  of  the 
armies,  he  could  himself  follow  the  course  of  the  battle, 
learn  precisely  all  its  events,  and  have  ready  close  at  hand 
considerable  reserves.  In  the  future  such  direct  command 
will  be  incomparably  more  difficult,  and,  in  consequence,  in 
order  to  preserve  unity  of  action  it  will  be  necessary  to 
observe  more  rigorously  the  original  plan. 

Not  only  the  question  of  supreme  command,  but  also 
the  action  of  the  subordinate  commanders  and  of  officers 
generally,  in  consequence  of  the  loose  formation  of  armies 
and  of  the  difficulty  of  taking  advantage  of  the  ground 
owing  to  smokeless  powder,  has  become  much  more  com- 
plex. In  the  war  of  1870  one  of  the  circumstances  which 
helped  the  Germans  to  victory  was  that  the  German  officers 
were  much  more  independent  and  self-reliant  than  the 
French. 

But  what  would  the  result  have  been  if  the  French 
army  had  not  been  from  the  very  beginning  several  times 
weaker  than  the  German,  and  had  been  even  in  part  well 
trained  ? 

The  following  is  the  judgment  of  the  Prussian  General 
Janson  :  "  The  characteristic  features  of  the  campaign  of 
1870-71  were,  on  the  German  side,  a  general  advance  and 
extraordinary  liberty  of  the  subordinate  commanders — 
even  down  to  captains.  But  this  was  accompanied>  by 
such  dismemberment  in  the  leadership  that  if  the  first 
attack  had  not  succeeded  there  might  have  been  the 
greatest  danger  for  the  attacking  armies." 

Let  us  examine  a  modern  battle.  As  examples  we  will 
quote  two  sketches,  the  one  borrowed  from  the  celebrated 
work  of  Von  der  Goltz,  the  other  from  the  French  Captain 
Nigote.     Both  these  sketches  represent  the  course  of  a 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  47 

battle  in  its  general  features,  and  the  second  shows  great 
skill  also  in  depicting  the  battle  of  the  future — that  is,  a 
probable  picture  of  a  battle  under  modern  conditions. 

Goltz  describes  an  accidental  battle,  and  then  considers 
the  diflferences  between  such  a  conflict  and  a  battle  which 
has  formed  part  of  the  plans  of  the  commanders-in-chief. 
It  is  obvious  that  in  the  accidental  battle  the  chief  part 
will  be  played  by  the  eye  of  the  commander-in-chief,  his 
readiness  in  the  appreciation  of  complex  circumstances, 
and  his  resolution.  *'  In  such  a  state  of  affairs,"  he  says, 
"  the  fortune  of  battle  will  lie  with  the  commander  who 
first  comes  to  a  clear  decision,  and  who  judges  better  the 
most  distant  events  of  the  battle."  On  the  Qther  hand,  in 
the  *'  planned  battle  "  all  is  arranged  in  advance,  although 
plans  may  demand  alteration  owing  to  changed  cir- 
cumstances, contingencies  requiring  from  the  commander 
ability  to  take  advantage  rapidly  ot  his  position. 

This  picture  gives  no  image  of  that  which  will  happen. 

The  French  Colonel  B.  in  his  composition  *'  La  Poudre 
sans  Fumee,"  which  awakened  much  interest,  says  : 
"  Having  no  means  of  precisely  judging  our  position,  the 
enemy  will  be  constrained  to  advance  towards  us  in 
marching  columns  in  order  to  deploy  immediately  on  the 
discovery  of  our  lines.  But  where  shall  he  gain  informa- 
tion ?  He  will  be  struck  by  artillery  fire  from  a  great 
distance,  and  the  position  of  this  artillery  will  be  extremely 
difficult  to  determine  precisely.  .  .  .  He  will  neither  hear 
nor  see  enough  for  his  purposes,  and  thus  in  a  particular 
sense  the  words  of  Scripture  may  be  applied  :  '  Eyes  have 
they  and  they  see  not,  ears  have  they  and  they  hear  not.' 
Reconnaissances  and  other  means  may  be  employed  to 
determine  the  position  of  an  enemy,  but  after  these  are 
made,  changes  in  disposition  may  have  taken  place,  and 
basing  his  operations  on  information  thus  obtained,  an 
enemy  may  open  fire  on  unoccupied  points,  and  waste  his 
ammunition,  firing,  as  is  said,  'at  the  sparrows.'" 

Thus  smokeless  powder  ensures  long  ignorance  of 
positions  and  much  search,  and  in  consequence  serious 
losses  until  the  true  position  of  things  is  ascertained.     If 


48  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  attacking  troops  be  opposed  by  a  capable  and  active 
foe,  the  period  of  uncertainty  may  cost  them  immense 
losses. 

But  the  battle  is  now  in  full  play.  We  will  quote  here 
the  picture  of  a  modern  battle  drawn  by  Captain  Nigote. 
This  picture  is,  of  course,  only  the  fruit  of  imagination,  as 
all  the  new  instruments  of  extermination  have  not  yet 
been  employed  in  practice.  But  imagination  has  worked 
upon  a  knowledge  of  the  subject,  and  Captain  Nigote's 
picture  has  as  much  claim  on  our  attention  as  other 
theoretical  sketches. 

"  The  distance  is  6600  yards  from  the  enemy.  The 
artillery  is  in  position,  and  the  command  has  been  passed 
along  the  batteries  to  *  give  fire.'  The  enemy's  artillery 
replies.  Shells  tear  up  the  soil  and  burst ;  in  a  short  time 
the  crew  of  every  gun  has  ascertained  the  distance  of  the 
enemy.  Then  every  projectile  discharged  bursts  in  the 
air  over  the  heads  of  the  enemy,  raining  down  hundreds  of 
fragments  and  bullets  on  his  position.  Men  and  horses 
are  overwhelmed  by  this  rain  of  lead  and  iron.  Guns 
destroy  one  another,  batteries  are  mutually  annihilated, 
ammunition  cases  are  emptied.  Success  will  be  with 
those  whose  fire  does  not  slacken.  In  the  midst  of  this 
fire  the  battalions  will  advance. 

*'  Now  they  are  but  2200  yards  away.  Alread}^  the 
rifle  bullets  whistle  around  and  kill,  each  not  only  find- 
ing a  victim,  but  penetrating  files,  ricochetting,  and  strik- 
ing again.  Volley  succeeds  volley,  bullets  in  great  hand- 
fuls,  constant  as  hail  and  swift  as  lightning  deluge  the  field 
of  battle. 

*'The  artillery  having  silenced  the  enemy,  is  now  free 
to  deal  with  the  enemy's  battalions.  On  his  infantry, 
however  loosely  it  may  be  formed,  the  guns  direct  thick 
iron  rain,  and  soon  in  the  positions  of  the  enemy  the  earth 
is  reddened  with  blood. 

**The  firing  lines  will  advance  one  after  the  other, 
battalions  will  march  after  battalions  ;  finally,  the  reserves 
will  follow.  Yet  with  all  this  movement  in  the  two  armies 
there  will   be  a  belt  a  thousand  paces  wide,   separating 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  49 

them  as  if  neutral  territory,  swept  by  the  fire  of  both 
sides,  a  belt  in  which  no  living  being  can  stand  for  a 
moment. 

"  The  ammunition  will  be  almost  exhausted,  millions  of 
cartridges,  thousands  of  shells  will  cover  the  soil.  But 
the  fire  will  continue  until  the  empty  ammunition  cases 
are  replaced  with  full. 

"  Melinite  bombs  will  turn  farmhouses,  villages  and 
hamlets  to  dust,  destroying  everything  that  might  be  used 
as  cover,  obstacle,  or  refuge. 

'*  The  moment  will  approach  when  half  the  combatants 
^'ill  be  mowed  down,  dead  and  wounded  will  lie  in  parallel 
rows,  separated  one  from  the  other  by  that  belt  of  a 
thousand  paces  swept  by  a  cross  fire  of  shells  which  no 
living  being  can  pass. 

**  The  battle  will  continue  with  ferocity.  But  still  those 
thousand  paces  unchangingly  separate  the  foes. 

'*  Which  will  have  gained  the  victory  ?     Neither." 

This  picture  serves  to  illustrate  a  thought  which,  since 
the  perfection  of  weapons,  has  occupied  the  minds  of  all 
thinking  people.  What  will  take  place  in  a  future  war  ? 
Such  are  constrained  to  admit  that  between  the  com- 
batants will  always  be  an  impassable  zone  of  fire  deadly 
in  an  equal  degree  to  both  the  foes. 

With  such  conditions,  in  its  application  to  the  battles  of 
the  future,  the  saying  of  Napoleon  seems  very  question- 
able :  "  The  fate  of  battle  is  the  result  of  one  minute,  of 
one  thought,  the  enemies  approach  with  different  plans, 
the  battle  becomes  furious  ;  the  decisive  moment  arrives, 
and  a  happy  thought  sudden  as  lightning  decides  the  con- 
test, the  most  insignificant  reserve  sometimes  being  the 
instrument  of  a  splendid  victory." 

It  is  much  more  probable  that  in  the  future  both  sides 
will  claim  the  victory.  Examples  of  indecisive  battles  are 
found  even  in  the  war  of  1870.  Thus  near  Metz  three 
battles  took  place  which  really  constituted  parts  of  one 
great  battle.  But  which  was  decisively  victorious  at  Metz? 
In  reality  neither.  The  German  artillery  proved  its 
superiority  ;  the  French  infantry,  armed  with  the  Chasse- 

D 


^o  is  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

pot,  proved  its.  Notwithstanding  heroic  efforts  on  both 
sides,  neither  one  army  nor  the  other  gained  a  victory  in 
the  older  and  decisive  sense  of  the  word. 

The  shutting  up  of  the  French  army  in  the  fortress  and 
its  subsequent  surrender  were  the  consequence  of  the 
cutting  off  of  supplies,  the  result  of  the  numerical  supe- 
riority of  the  Germans.  Theirs  was  not  a  victory  of  genius 
or  military  initiative — it  was  a  victory  of  figures. 

In  a  luture  war  these  conditions  will  be  all  the  more 
important  since  the  seal  and  sign  of  victory — the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy — will  be  almost  impossible.  The  celebrated 
Liebert  puts  the  matter  in  a  few  words  :  "  In  the  pa^ 
battles  were  ended  thus  :  the  field  was  ours,  the  enemy 
turned  in  flight ;  the  command  to  pursue  was  passed  from 
flank  to  flank,  and  this  crisis  put  strength  into  weary 
limbs ;  instinctively  horses  were  spurred,  all  thought  only 
of  drawing  the  greatest  possible  profit  from  victory,  of 
causing  the  enemy  even  greater  loss.  Now  matters  are 
very  different."  Infantry  having  sustained  modern  destruc- 
tive fire  for  a  whole  day,  will  be  in  a  state  of  prostration,  and 
so  vast  will  be  the  space  occupied  by  the  army  that  even 
the  reserves  who  are  on  the  spot  at  the  end  of  the  battle 
will  not  be  fresh.  As  for  cavalry,  while  rifle  and  artillery 
fire  are  powerful  it  must  keep  at  a  distance.  Napoleon's 
cavalry  constantly  went  into  attack  at  a  trot,  but  Seidlitz 
at  Zorndorf  led  his  cavalry  at  a  trot  to  within  one  hundred 
paces  from  the  enemy,  and  at  this  distance  raised  it  to  a 
gallop.  In  the  face  of  modern  fire,  cavalry  must  exert  all 
its  strength  to  gallop  across  the  zone  of  extermination. 

In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  direct  attack  in  the  face  of 
modern  fire,  the  idea  naturally  occurs  of  attacking  under 
cover  of  night.  Some  military  writers  attribute  immense 
importance  to  night  attacks ;  others,  for  a  variety  of 
reasons,  find  them  inconvenient.  Concerning  this  ques- 
tion, it  is  useful  to  cite  the  opinion  of  Lieutenant-General 
Puzuirevski  as  the  most  impartial.  General  Puzuirevski 
emphasises  the  laboriousness  of  movement  by  night  after 
the  work  of  the  day,  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  dis- 
cipline, and  the  difficulty  of  looking  after  the  soldiers. 
**  Notwithstanding  all  this,"   says  this  authority,  '*  move- 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  5 1 

ments  by  night  are  sometimes  necessary  in  war,  and 
therefore  must  be  reckoned  with." 

Modern  miHtary  history  presents  a  remarkable  example 
of  a  night  attack — at  Gorni  Dubnak  on  October  12,  1877. 
After  great  losses  the  army  was  unable  to  continue  the 
assault,  but  remained  on  the  captured  positions  close  to 
the  enemy's  trenches,  and  on  the  approach  of  night  rushed 
upon  the  redoubts  and  captured  them  with  trifling  loss. 

General  Dragomiroff  emphasises  the  following  advan- 
tages of  night  attack  :  The  attacking  body  may  escape 
observation  for  some  time ;  it  may  find  an  unexpectant 
enemy,  whose  fire  under  such  circumstances  will  be  insig- 
nificant, and  the  bayonet  may  also  be  employed.  General 
Dragomiroflf  finds  that  such  operations  as  the  storming  of 
Kars  and  the  battle  of  Kagaretch,  where  the  Turks  px)s- 
sessed  an  immense  preponderance  of  forces,  are  possible 
only  by  night,  and  that  generally  in  view  of  the  destruc- 
tiveness  of  modern  fire,  it  will  be  necessarv  to  accustom 
soldiers  to  operations  by  night.  General  Kuropatkin  also 
declares  himself  in  favour  of  night  attacks,  although  he 
thinks  they  will  succeed  easier  with  small  bodies  of  troops, 
and  that  picked  men  will  be  required. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  majority  of  foreign  writers 
expect  little  profit  out  of  night  attacks.  It  is  true  that  the 
French  authority.  Colonel  B.,*  thinks  that  having  the  advan- 
tage of  smokeless  powder  the  attacking  body  may  approach 
very  near  to  the  enemy  and  create  a  panic  in  his  ranks, 
but  the  author  of  an  article  in  the  Neiie  Militdrische  Bldtte?',^ 
as  an  illustration  of  the  danger  of  mistakes  by  night,  quotes 
a  case  in  the  war  of  1870  when  the  lOist  Regiment  of  the 
French  army,  having  come  into  conflict  by  night  with  a 
superior  force  of  Germans,  was  defeated,  and  immediately 
fell  under  the  fire  of  their  comrades,  who  mistook  them  for 
the  enemy.  Hoenigt  cites  as  example  the  battle  at  Le 
Mans  in  1 87 1 ,  in  which  the  Germans  gained  possession  of  all 
positions,  but  in  another  place  he  expresses  himself  de- 
cidedly against  night  attacks,  on  the  ground  that  panics  may 
easily  occur  in  the  attacking  force. 

*  "  La  Poudre  sans  Fum^e."  t  Jahr^ang  1890,  p.  286. 

X  "  Die  Taktik  der  Zukunft,"  pp.  170  and  2S6. 


52  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

However  it  may  be,  preparations  are  made  in  all  armies 
for  such  contingencies.  An  illuminating  bomb  has  been 
invented  which  burns  from  one  to  three  minutes,  according 
to  calibre,  and  electrical  projectors  also  which  are  capable 
of  illuminating  houses  at  a  distance  of  55CX)  yards,  and 
by  the  aid  of  which  the  smallest  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy  may  be  observed. 

It  is  unquestionable  that  the  possibility  of  anight  attack 
will  cause  great  anxiety  in  every  army.  In  former  wars 
there  were  many  cases  of  false  alarms  and  panics.  As- 
suredly they  will  be  more  common  in  future,  as  the  dangers 
of  war  have  increased,  the  nerves  of  modern  soldiers  are 
weaker,  and  owing  to  the  system  of  short  service,  soldiers 
cannot  be  inured  as  were  the  veterans  of  the  past.  As 
far  as  nerves  are  concerned  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
superiority  will  lie  with  the  Russian  soldier.  The  endur- 
ance shown  by  the  Russian  soldiers  in  the  passage  of  the 
Balkans  in  the  winter  of  1877-78  awakened  the  astonish- 
ment of  strangers.  The  Prussian  General  Von  Kahler 
declared  that  the  work  which  they  accomplished  surpassed 
the  strength  of  men. 

The  following  well-known  saying  of  Napoleon  is  no 
longer  applicable,  "  When  the  battle  is  over  the  vanquished 
in  reality  are  little  weaker  than  the  victors,  but  the  moral 
result  constitutes  such  a  great  difference  that  the  appear- 
ance of  two  or  three  squadrons  is  enough  to  cause  great 
results."  We  have  seen  that  such  authoritative  writers  as 
the  Prussian  General  Janson  and  the  French  Professor 
Langlois  prophesy  that  battles  will  last  several  days,  but 
a  French  Captain  (formerly  Professor)  Nigote  says 
plainly  that  battles  may  last  for  three  or  four  days  or 
even  for  a  fortnight.*  Other  military  specialists,  and 
among  them  the  well-known  writer  Fritz  Hoenig,t  think  it 
not  improbable  that  we  are  returning  to  the  epoch  of 
sieges.  Belgrade,  Mantua,  and  Plevna  may  be  repeated. 
It  is  very  possible  that  the  attacking  armies,  finding 
decisive  victory  unattainable,  will  attempt  to  enclose  the 
enemy  in  the    position  where    they  find  him,  and,  after 

*  "  La  Bataille  de  Vesles,"  Capt.  Nigote. 
t  op.  cit.  ante. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  53 

entrenching  themselves,  begin  to  make  raids  in  order  to 
prevent  the  provisioning  of  the  besieged.  Such  operations 
would  be  continued  until  the  enemy  are  starved  out. 

It  is  hard  to  imagine  it  otherwise,  when  we  remember 
that,  with  much  inferior  weapons,  even  the  badly  trained 
French  mobiles  of  1870  were  rarely  beaten  at  once,  a 
second  day  having  usually  been  necessary  to  drive  them 
from  newly  occupied  positions. 

But  the  nature  of  the  future  war  will  be  influenced  by 
fortresses  to  an  extent  hitherto  unknown.  In  the  past, 
fortresses  were  situated  in  the  more  important  strategical 
positions,  but  were  only  individual  points  equipped  for 
passive  defence.  Nowadays,  at  all  the  most  important 
thoroughfares  are  situated  fortresses  and  fortified  camps 
which  contain  such  immense  masses  of  troops  that  their 
turning  is  inconceivable.  In  addition  to  these,  railways 
and  roads  are  specially  built  to  ensure  the  rapid  con- 
centration of  troops  immediately  after  war  is  declared  ; 
and,  if  the  concentration  of  the  enemy's  troops  should 
make  it  necessary,  to  provide  for  the  quick  transportation  of 
troops  from  one  spot  to  another. 

Having  constructed  such  works  on  their  frontiers,  States 
consider  it  more  than  probable  that  they  will  be  able  with 
inferior  forces  to  oppose  an  enemy,  thus  counterbalancing 
all  the  advantages  which  he  may  draw  from  the  more 
rapid  accomplishment  of  mobilisation.  But,  however 
powerful  modern  systems  of  defence  may  be,  science  has 
yet  contrived  such  destructive  weapons  that  the  question 
has  already  arisen  :  How  many  fortresses  in  a  future  war 
will  accomplish  that  purpose  for  which  they  are  destined  ? 
This  question  has  been  the  object  of  especial  attention  in 
military  literature. 

For  us,  the  question  whether  modern  fortresses  will 
justify  the  hopes  placed  in  them  has  an  importance  of  the 
first  degree.  If  an  attacking  army  be  held  upon  the 
frontier  for  a  long  time  in  conflict  with  an  enemy  defending 
himself  in  fortified  positions  prepared  beforehand,  the 
economic  consequences  of  war  will  be  very  different  from 
those  which  would  follow  if  the  invaders  were  to  break  at 
once  through  the  lines  of  defences^  and,  having  defeated  the 


54  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

defenders  in  the  interior  of  their  own  country,  were  within 
a  short  time  to  occupy  the  greater  part  of  their  territory. 

All  examples  from  the  past,  and  even  the  history  of  the 
two  last  campaigns,  throw  little  light  on  this  question. 
Although  fortress  warfare  in  1870-71  had  an  importance 
hardly  dreamt  of  before,  as  the  Germans  captured  fifteen 
French  fortresses,  still  the  methods  taken  from  this 
campaign  can  hardly  be  applicable  to  the  future.  The 
objects  of  attack,  with,  to  some  extent,  the  exception  of 
Paris,  Metz,  and  Belfort,  were  fortresses  of  an  obsolete 
type,  and  their  defence  was  badly  conducted. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  battles  at  Plevna,  in  the  war  of 
1877-78,  mainly  proved  the  close  bonds  which  exist 
between  field  and  fortress  warfare.  But  it  has  become 
clear  to  all  that  in  a  future  war  the  example  of  the  Turks 
will  be  followed  as  much  as  possible  by  an  army  acting  on 
the  defensive.  At  Plevna  the  besieged  had  but  an  insig- 
nificant quantity  of  artillery,  yet  the  thought  of  taking 
Plevna  by  storm  had  to  be  abandoned  ;  it  was  hunger 
alone  which  compelled  Osman  to  attempt  to  break  out, 
and  Plevna  fell  only  after  all  the  methods  of  siege  warfare 
had  been  put  in  operation. 

Since  those  days  the  science  of  fortress  construction  has 
made  great  advances,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  means 
of  attack  have  increased  proportionately.  The  subject  of 
fortress  construction  is  very  complicated,  and  its  full 
elucidation  would  require  detailed  technical  exposition, 
which  would  have  too  special  a  character. 

Here  we  can  quote  only  the  general  conclusions  to 
which  a  study  of  the  best  authorities  leads.  The  more 
important  the  fortress  the  more  difficult  will  it  be  for  the 
attacking  army  to  pass  it,  since,  if  the  fortress  contained 
troops  in  a  condition  to  attack,  they  would  threaten  the 
communications  of  the  invaders.  To  seek  a  guarantee 
against  such  operations  merely  by  placing  against  it  posts 
of  observation  is  impossible,  since  if  the  fortress  contains  a 
capable  commander  he  will  attack  and  defeat  these  detach- 
ments. The  investment  of  great  fortresses,  from  which 
vigorous  sallies  might  be  made,  requires  large  armies  and 
considerable  time. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  55 

For  the  investment  of  a  modern  fortress,  say,  with 
thirteen  forts,  with  intervening  distances  of  2|  miles, 
and  with  fortified  batteries  between  the  forts,  would  require, 
according  to  a  calculation  made  by  Brialmont,  an  army 
of  122,000  men  and  a  special  siege  corps  of  50,000  men, 
in  all  172,000  men.  It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  the 
line  of  investment  of  Paris  required  28  men  for  every 
3  J  feet  of  fighting  line.  For  the  investment  of  the  fortress 
postulated  by  Brialmont,  according  to  this  precedent,  the 
investing  army  must  be  246,400  strong,  or  together  with 
a  special  siege  corps,  296,400  men  and  not  merely  172,000. 

In  order  to  give  some  idea  of  the  time  required  for  the 
siege  of  a  modern  fortress  we  will  cite  the  approximate 
estimate,  taken  from  a  French  publication  on  the  attack 
and  defence  of  fortresses  :  * 


Period  of  investment, 
and  arrival  of  sieg-  ^ 
ing  weapons,  &c. 


Attack    on    forts    of 
the  first  line. 


Defeat  of  the  enemy's 
advanced  lines 

Occupation  of  posi- 
tions for  close  in- 
vestment of  the 
fortress  . 

Setting  in  position 
and  construction 
of  parks 

/  Construction    and 
equipment   of  bat- 
teries  of   the   first 
position  . 
Artillery    duels    and 

bombardment 
Occupation   of    posi- 
tions for   batteries 
of  second  position, 
&c. 


8  days 


10 


12 


12 


y  30  days. 


25 


45 


Successive  capture  of  contiguous  forts  and  attack  on 
interlying  defensive  lines 

Attack  and  capture  of  the  fortress  itself 

Total 


20 


25 


120  days 


*  "  Attaque  et  defense  des  places  fortes  ou  Guerre  de  siege," 
Publiee  avec  le  concours  d'officiers  de  toutes  armes  et  tout  le 
patronage  de  la  Reunion  des  officiers,  Bruxelles  1886. 


S6  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

At  the  present  day  there  is  a  conviction  widely  spread 
among  miHtary  engineers  and  artillerists  that,  in  view  of 
the  perfection  of  modern  artillery,  fortresses  will  not  be 
subjected  to  siege,  but  will  be  attacked  with  open  force. 
The  downward  firing  of  shrapnel  out  of  short  guns  and 
mortars  will  deprive  the  fortification  of  defence  ;  direct 
fire  from  heavy  artillery  will  batter  the  walls  and  open 
a  free  path  for  the  storm  of  the  fortress  ;  the  introduc- 
tion of  shells  containing  five  and  a  half  hundred-weight 
of  powerful  explosives,  will  so  increase  the  destructive 
power  even  of  individual  shots  that  all  the  older  construc- 
tions will  prove  worthless,  and  even  the  new  fortifications 
defended  with  armour  will  prove  little  better.  Even  a 
comparatively  short  bombardment  with  such  projectiles 
will  be  sufficient  to  make  the  fortifications  useless  to  the 
defence. 

The  chief  upholder  of  such  opinions  is  General  Von 
Sauer,  who  proposes  a  system  of  shortened  attack.  The 
difference  between  systematic  and  accelerated  attack  in 
the  exposition  of  General  Sauer  consists  in  the  following  : 
"  Systematic  or  regular  attack  is  directed  mainly  on  one 
side  of  the  fortress,  while  accelerated  attack  threatens  all 
accessible  sides.  And  since  on  the  employment  of  the  first 
method  the  besieged  may  devote  all  their  strength  to  the 
defence  of  one  side  and  even  of  one  threatened  point, 
accelerated  attack  is  calculated  to  prevent  such  concentra- 
tion, thus  making  it  easier  to  overcome  the  scattered 
strength  of  the  defence." 

Against  systematic  attack  the  measures  of  defence  con- 
sist firstly  in  this.  The  front  or  fronts  which,  according 
to  the  position  of  the  roads  are  the  nearest  to  materials 
which  might  serve  for  the  construction  of  batteries  and 
which  by  the  configuration  of  the  country  will  be  most 
threatened,  will  be  strongly  fortified  in  advance.  Against 
accelerated  attack,  which  will  be  founded  on  considerations 
rather  tactical  than  technical,  it  will  be  necessary  to  fortify 
strongly  all  fronts,  for  which  resources  will  not  always  be 
found.  But  it  is  relying  precisely  on  this  circumstance, 
on  the  mobility  of  modern  artillery,  and  on  the  difficulty  of 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  OX  LAND  57 

complete  protection  from  projectiles,  that  the  "  tactical  " 
attack  is  founded — the  attack,  as  will  easily  be  conceived, 
being  directed  not  on  the  strong  but  on  the  wl&k  parts  of 
the  defence. 

But  the  defenders  of  a  fortress  will  oppose  the  enemy 
with  four  consecutive  lines  of  obstacles,  that  is,  a  first  line 
of  opposition,  a  chief  defensive  line,  an  intermediate  line 
or  line  of  reserves,  and  finally,  a  fortified  unbroken  rampart 
or  central  citadel.  The  capture  of  even  the  first  line  will 
require  considerable  effort,  since  this  will  consist  of  a  series 
of  field  defences.  The  field  will  be  strewn  with  numerous 
but  small  earthworks  in  the  form  of  pits  which  the  enemy 
cannot  see  from  afar,  and  upon  which  artillery  will  have 
little  eff'ect,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  skilful  marksmen 
concealed  in  these  pits  may  cause  considerable  loss. 

In  the  attack  on  the  chief  defensive  line  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  improvements  made  in  small  arms 
and  in  artillery  will  prove  as  much  in  favour  of  the  defence 
as  of  the  attack. 

The  North  American  war  of  1861-64,  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  of  1 870-7 1 ,  and  the  Russo-Turkish  w^ar  of 
1877-78  off'er  sufficient  examples  of  the  immense  efforts 
and  sacrifices  which  will  be  required  in  order  finally  to 
overcome  an  antagonist  who  has  turned  his  circumstances 
to  advantage  in  advance.  What  will  happen  in  the  war  of 
the  future  when  the  defenders  will  have  the  support  of  a 
whole  system  of  defensive  works  ready  at  hand  ? 

Milliards  have  been  expended  in  Germany  and  France 
since  1870,  in  Russia  since  1882,  and  in  Italy,  Austria, 
Belgium,  and  Switzerland  in  more  recent  times,  in  attempts 
to  render  frontiers  impregnable,  and,  to  provide  for  the 
contingency  of  the  frontier  defences  failing  to  stop  the 
enemy,  on  other  defensive  points  at  a  greater  distance 
from  the  frontiers. 

Not  only  are  the  frontiers  of  all  states  studded  with 
fortresses,  but  even  in  time  of  peace  great  forces  stand  at 
short  distances  from  one  another,  and  for  the  conveyance 
to  them  of  reinforcements  a  system  of  railways  exists  so 
complete,  that  from  the  very  outbreak  of  war  armies  will 


58  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

almost  immediately  confront  one  another,  and  the  space 
free  for  movement  will  be  very  small.  With  these  condi- 
tions, in  thdKvar  of  the  future  an  operation  hitherto  un- 
known must  be  undertaken — namely,  to  break  through 
frontier  defences.  In  view  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  soldiers  who  will  immediately  be  concentrated,  the 
breaking  of  a  frontier  line  without  a  whole  series  of  battles 
is  inconceivable. 

The  defenders,  says  General  Leval,  will  know  in  ad- 
vance the  approximate  position  of  the  field  of  battle.  They 
know  the  chief  points  of  the  enemy's  concentration,  indi- 
cated by  the  position  of  his  roads  and  military  stores. 
Mass  attracts  mass,  such  is  the  law  of  gravitation  in  war. 
The  enemy  will  advance  upon  our  main  forces,  and  even 
the  points  of  conflict  may  be  approximately  prophesied. 
And  so  those  ''great  uncertainties,"  of  which  we  hear  so 
much,  from  the  very  beginning  of  war  will  not  exist,  and 
both  sides  will  have  full  possibility  to  fortify  themselves 
in  corresponding  positions. 

The  present  armaments  of  all  European  armies  may  be 
taken  as  equal  in  effectiveness,  and  the  preparation  of  the 
soldiers,  both  as  concerns  training  and  courage  is  the 
same.  Therefore,  if  we  set  aside  the  capacity  of  the 
commander-in-chief,  as  something  which  cannot  be  fore- 
seen, we  shall  be  obliged  to  conclude  that  the  only  element 
of  inequality  is  the  number  of  soldiers  in  the  ranks. 
Supposing  equality  in  the  numerical  relation,  there  would 
be  complete  balance  between  the  opposing  forces,  and  equal 
probability  of  success  on  both  sides.  From  this  the 
question  naturally  springs — With  the  equality  of  strength 
which  France  and  Russia  have  as  against  the  Triple 
Alliance,  will  it  be  possible  for  the  armies  of  the  attacking 
powers  in  the  present  state  of  fortified  frontiers  to  attain 
any  immediate  and  decisive  success  ? 

Comparison  with  the  past  gives  us  little  information 
in  this  respect.  We  find  ourselves  confronted  with 
an  awful  phenomenon.  In  all  armies  a  theory  is  pro- 
claimed as  to  the  superiority  of  offensive  action.  But 
meantime  such   strong  positions  have  been  created    for 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  59 

defence  that  their  existence  cannot  be  without  influence 
on  the  course  of  events.  The  war  of  the  future,  whatever 
may  be  said,  will  be  a  struggle  for  fortified  positions,  and 
for  that  reason  it  must  be  prolonged.         ■■ 

If,  in  addition  to  the  advance  towards  perfected 
mechanism,  another  fundamental  change  had  not  taken 
place,  then  it  might  have  been  possible  out  of  the  past  to 
draw  conclusions  as  to  the  future.  But  to-day  whole 
nations  will  be  under  arms,  the  flower  of  every  race 
— millions  of  men,  just  taken  from  the  ranks  of  the 
workers,  the  producers  of  the  substance  of  the  people. 
The  places  they  forsake  will  remain  unoccupied,  and  their 
absence  will  be  felt  every  day.  The  news  of  their  fate 
will  be  waited  with  anxiety  by  the  remaining  millions  ; 
the  destruction  of  whole  divisions  will  call  forth  the  groans 
and  it  may  be  the  protests  of  hundreds  of  millions  of 
people. 

But  the  majority  of  those  military  writers  who  pay 
attention  to  the  technical  conditions  of  the  matter,  look  on 
the  question  of  the  future  war  so  objectively  that  they  fail 
to  see  its  relations  with  psychological  and  sociological 
questions — to  express  it  in  a  word,  they  disregard  the 
human  side  of  the  question.  For  this  reason  investigation 
of  the  conditions  of  a  future  war  cannot  be  limited  to  the 
comparative  military  efficiency  of  the  different  States. 
Armies  at  present  are  the  products  of  nations  them- 
selves. But  the  people,  as  Taine  observed,  judge  not 
with  the  head  but  with  the  heart.  It  is  therefore  in  the 
sentiments  of  the  people  that  we  must  seek  an  indication 
of  the  frame  of  mind  with  which  armies  will  enter  upon 
war,  and  some  guide  as  to  the  consequences  among  them 
of  the  first  successes  or  failures.  The  temper  of  armies 
is  a  product  of  enlightenment,  national  character,  culture, 
preponderance  of  civil  or  agricultural  population,  and  those 
political  and  social  ideals  which  in  certain  times  influence 
the  various  countries. 

Such  were  the  considerations  which  impelled  us  to 
examine  the  data  bearing  on  the  condition  and  spirit  of 
armies;  to  consider,  for  instance,  those  impressions  which 


6o  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

will  be  caused  on  the  field  of  battle  by  the  absence  of  a 
thick  cloud  of  smoke  obscuring  the  riflemen.  Speaking 
generally,  we  attempted  to  determine  the  military  spirit  of 
the  various  European  peoples  according  to  the  character 
peculiar  to  each.  We  attempted  to  bring  under  considera- 
tion all  that  might  be  drawn  from  the  study  of  former 
wars,  in  order  to  form  an  idea  as  to  the  qualities  of  the 
chief  European  armies.  But  conclusions  drawn  from 
former  wars  have  but  very  conditional  significance.  The 
spirit  of  armies  in  different  countries  does  not  always  remain 
at  the  same  level ;  after  great  height  sometimes  follow 
sudden  fall  and  changes.  And  such  changes  take  place 
in  periods  no  greater  than  that  which  separates  us  from 
the  last  great  European  war. 

A  remarkable  feature  of  our  time  is  the  rapidity  with 
which  changes  occur  both  in  the  material  and  intellectual 
spheres.  In  the  course  of  a  few  years  greater  changes 
take  place  in  social  life  than  formerly  took  place  in 
decades.  In  this  there  is  no  ground  for  surprise.  This 
great  movement  in  life  is  ensured  by  the  spread  of 
education,  the  activity  of  parliaments,  associations,  the 
press,  and  means  of  communication.  Under  the  influence 
of  these  conditions  the  intellect  of  the  West  finds  itself 
under  constant  movement. 

Another  characteristic  feature  of  our  time  is  thus  empha- 
sised by  Gervinus  :  "  Movements  in  our  century  proceed 
from  the  instinct  of  the  masses,  and  it  is  a  very  remark- 
able fact  that  in  modern  history  are  rarely  found  examples 
of  the  strong  influence  of  individual  personalities,  rulers, 
or  private  workers.  In  our  time  as  in  the  sixteenth 
century  peoples  move  in  masses." 

The  list  of  great  gifts  decreases,  while  the  number  of 
moderate  talents  have  grown  to  an  extraordinary  extent. 
Few  great  and  exalted  personalities  are  produced,  but 
in  the  whole  a  great  revolution  in  social  life  has  taken 
place. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  the  study  of  the  spirit  of 
armies  in  the  future  has  such  immense  bearing  upon  the 
present  work. 


HOW  WAR  WILL  BE  WAGED  ON  LAND  6i 

It  was  necessary  to  ask  ourselves  the  questions  :  What 
will  be  the  temper  of  modern  armies  in  the  event  of 
defeat,  or  even  of  victory,  if  war  should  be  prolonged  ? 
What  will  be  the  effect  of  the  news  from  the  field  of  battle 
on  the  civil  population  ?  What  convulsions  must  we  expect 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace  when  millions  of  excited 
soldiers  return  to  their  destroyed  and  desolated  homes  ? 

We  attempted  to  collect  data  for  the  consideration  of 
these  questions,  and  with  this  object  classified  them  in 
their  constituent  elements,  resting  upon  precedent  modi- 
fied by  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  consti- 
tution of  armies,  in  armaments,  and  in  tactics.  But  in 
order  to  draw  from  these  data  conclusions  on  all  the 
different  points,  it  would  be  necessary  to  make  a  tiresome 
repetition  of  the  degrees  of  different  qualities  in  armies, 
and,  in  addition,  it  would  be  difficult  to  represent  in  words 
with  any  precision  the  total  of  military  qualities  in  the 
different  armies  in  their  twofold  relationship — that  is,  their 
applicability  to  attack  and  defence.  It  would  be  necessary 
to  cite  the  statistics  of  morals,  culture,  and  sanitary  con- 
dition of  the  various  European  armies.  Only  after  such  a 
laborious  process  could  the  system  upon  which  we  have 
estimated  the  respective  values  in  attack  and  defence  of 
the  various  European  armies  be  followed.  It  is  enough 
to  give  here  the  categories  under  which  we  have  classified 
the  elements  which  together  constitute  the  general  effi- 
ciency of  armies  : 

(i)  Susceptibility  of  application  to  the  new  conditions  of 
war. 

(2)  Composition  and  completeness  of  the  corps  of  officers. 

(3)  Capacity  for  initiative. 

(4)  Endurance  under  difficulty  and  privation. 

(5)  Discipline. 

(6)  Absence  of  egoism,  dangerous  for  the  general  welfare. 

(7)  Faith  in  leaders  and  in  companions-in-arms. 

(8)  Supplies  and  sanitary  conditions. 

(9)  Age,  disposition,  and  method  for  supplementing  the 

lower  ranks. 


62 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


(lo)  Conviction  in  the  merit  of  armaments, 
(ii)  Courage. 

As  the  final  result  we  have  obtained  the  following  figures, 
showing  the  comparative  military  efficiency  of  the  chief 
European  armies  in  attack  and  in  defence : 


In  Attack. 

In  Defence. 

I  St 

Summons. 

2nd 

Summons. 

ISt 

Summons. 

2nd 

Summons. 

Germany 

Austria  .... 
Italy       .... 
France  .... 
Russia    .... 

95 

80 

65 

72 
88 

80 

68 
51 
59 
80 

98 

86 
74 
85 
94 

86 
76 

59 
72 
86 

Of  all  the  details  in  the  above  chapter  we  find  most 
clearly  in  relief  the  threatening  features  which  a  future 
war  must  present,  both  as  regards  the  sacrifices  of  the 
population,  and  as  regards  the  risks  which  must  be  run 
by  the  states  participating.  But  both  these  factors  are 
explained  more  fully  in  the  chapter  devoted  to  "  Plans  of 
Military  Operations." 


CHAPTER    II 

PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  :    POSSIBLE   AND    IMPOSSIBLE 

The  first  consideration  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
estimating  the  chances  of  the  next  great  war  is  the  change 
which  has  been  brought  about  by  the  improvement  in  fire- 
arms and  in  the  constitution  of  modern  armies.  These 
changes  have  all  tended  to  the  advantage  of  the  de- 
fensive and  against  the  attacking  force.  Previous  wars 
under  the  old  conditions  had  led  to  a  conviction  of  the 
superiority  of  attack.  The  new  conditions  which  will 
prevail  in  the  future  have  reversed  this  opinion.  Alike  in 
the  equipment  of  troops  and  in  the  system  of  fortifications, 
the  changes  have  operated  in  favour  of  the  defence. 

The  total  numbers  of  fighting  men  eflfective  for  war  in 
1896  with  their  artillery  were  as  follows : 

Thousands  of  men.  Artillery. 

In  Germany       .         .         2550  ...  4552 


»> 


Austria- Hungary  .         1304  ...  2696 

Italy       .         .         .         128 1  ...  1764 


Together        5135  ...  9012 

„  France  .        .        .        2554  ...  7320 

„  Russia   .         .         .         2800  ...  4952 


Together        5354  ...        12,272 

Detailed  calculations  lead  to  the  following  estimate  of 
the  probable  distribution  of  the  armies  v/liich  might  be 
placed  in  both  theatres  of  war,  after  deducting  those  forces 
which  would  be  employed  on  garrison  duty  in  the  interior 


64 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


of  each  country,  and  for  the  defence  of  the  frontier  against 
sudden  intervention  by  any  neutral  State. 


— 

In  Thousands. 

Ger- 
many. 

Austria. 

Italy. 

Total. 

Russia. 

France. 

Total. 

In  the  Russo- 

Austro-Ger- 

man  theatre 

of  war     .     . 
In  the  Franco- 

690 

979 

— 

1669 

2539 

— 

2539 

German  the- 

atre of  war  . 
In  the  Franco- 

2035 

— 



2035 

— 

2126 

2126 

Italian    the- 

atre of  war  . 
Total   .     . 

— 

— 

700 

700 

• — • 

500 

500 

2725 

979 

700 

i 

1 

4404        2539 

.i 

2626 

5165 

It  is  obvious  that  all  these  troops  could  not  at  once  be 
employed.  The  campaigns  of  the  past  w^ere  often  begun 
with  from  one  quarter  to  one-eighth  part  of  the  armies 
appointed  for  war.  In  the  future  the  conditions  in  this 
relation  will  have  entirely  changed.  Speed  in  mobilisation, 
as  a  consequence  of  the  railways  constructed  specially  for 
strategical  purposes,  will  ensure  the  rapid  concentration 
of  armies  at  the  very  frontiers  of  States,  reinforcing  the 
large  armed  forces  maintained  there  even  in  times  of 
peace.  All  this  makes  it  possible  for  immense  armies  to 
meet  face  to  face.  And  as  in  every  case  the  attacking  side 
must  exceed  the  defending  in  numbers,  the  question  as  to 
the  disposition  of  armies  near  the  frontier,  and  the  means 
of  transport  of  frontier  forces  to  the  positions  which  they 
must  occupy  in  war,  is  one  of  the  first  importance.  But 
it  does  not  enter  into  the  subject  at  present  under  dis- 
cussion. It  will  be  sufficient  here  to  quote  the  opinion  of 
one  of  the  first  of  modern  military  authorities,  the  Belgian 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  65 

General  Brialmont.  Brialmont  estimates  that  France 
is  in  a  position  to  mobilise  immediately  nineteen  army 
corps,  and  Germany  twenty,  each  army  corps  counting 
forty-five  to  fifty  thousand  men.  These  will  constitute 
the  first  line  of  the  operating  armies.  The  armies  of 
the  second  line,  according  to  General  Brialmont,  will 
on  both  sides  be  formed  of  more  than  half  a  million 
men. 

Estimating  thus,  General  Brialmont  concludes  that  on 
the  theatre  of  the  future  Franco-German  war  the  forces  of 
both  sides  will  be  almost  equal,  consisting,  roughly  speak- 
ing, of  about  1,500,000  men  on  each  side.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  four  years  have  passed  since  the  time  of  General 
Brialmont's  estimate  and  that  two-years'  service  has  been 
introduced  into  Germany,  we  may  take  the  strength  of  the 
army  of  the  second  line  at  a  million  men.  And  since 
owing  to  the  numerical  equality  of  the  opposing  armies, 
and  to  the  existence  of  the  present  fortifications,  the 
advantage  lies  with  the  defending  side,  serious  offensive 
action  by  Germany  against  France  could  be  begun  only 
after  sending  to  the  French  frontier  a  great  part  of  the 
German  army.  Under  such  conditions,  Germany,  of 
course,  could  not  even  think  of  contemporaneous  assault 
upon  Russia.  She  would  be  constrained,  after  allotting 
portion  of  her  forces  for  strengthening  Austria,  to  limit  her 
remaining  free  forces  to  defensive  operations.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  we  accept  the  strength  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  army  against  Russia  as  1,669,000  as  against 
2,539,000  on  the  side  of  Russia. 

An  examination  of  the  views  of  all  authorities  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  Germany,  having  possibilities  for 
more  rapid  mobilisation  and  concentration,  will  aim  at 
successes  in  the  first  operations,  while  France  will 
organise  all  her  obtainable  resources  with  the  aim  of 
retrieving  the  first  failures.  In  order  to  consider  the 
possibilities  arising  from  this  position  we  found  it  neces- 
sary to  consider  the  conditions  under  which  a  new  attack 
by  Germany  on  France  or  b}^  France  on  Germany  must  be 
begun,   and  first  of  all  to  study  the  fortifications  of  the 

E 


66  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Franco-German  frontier,  and  the  probable  paths  of  attack 
in  Germany  and  France. 

From  a  consideration  of  these  conditions  it  clearly 
appears  that  to  pass  the  newly  constructed  frontier  lines 
of  fortresses  is  impossible  ;  and  there  exists  no  means  of 
direct  invasion  of  France  by  Germany  except  by  the 
attack  of  fortified  positions  or  the  forcing  of  a  path  through 
narrow  passages  purposely  left.  These  will  be  defended 
by  forces  which,  within  a  short  time  after  mobihsation,  if 
they  do  not  exceed  the  German  armies,  will  at  least  equal 
them. 

It  is  true  that  the  German  army  will  be  better  than  the 
French,  but  the  estimate  we  have  made  shows  the  differ- 
ence to  be  insignificant.  The  effectiveness  of  the  German 
army  in  attack  and  the  French  in  defence  may  be  thus 
expressed  : 


ist  Summons. 

2nd  Summons. 

German 

95 

80 

French 

.        .        85 

72 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  German  army  will  succeed  in 
breaking  through  the  frontier  zone  of  operations  and 
advancing  on  Paris  by  the  routes  indicated  by  General 
Brialmont.  Having  calculated  the  result  of  such  operations, 
we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  at  that  time  the  French 
will  have  available  1,160,000  men,  while  for  the  siege  of 
Paris  the  Germans  wi.   have  but  520,000  men. 

The  former  German  Chancellor,  Count  Caprivi,  a  man 
unquestionably  competent  in  military  affairs,  on  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  new  military  law  in  Parliament,  said  : 

Supposing  the  French  army  were  beaten,  and  retreated  behind 
the  walls  of  fortresses,  then  in  order  to  enclose  the  present  forti- 
fications of  Paris  we  must  have  at  our  disposal  eighteen  army 
corps,  in  addition  to  corresponding  reserves.  It  is  very  probable 
that  the  seige  of  Paris  could  now  be  carried  on  from  one  point 
only,  but  the  example  of  Sevastopol  shows  that  for  this  a  whole 
year  might  be  required. 

Meanwhile  our  examination  of  the  conditions  in  which 
the  besieging  army  would  find  itself  led  us  to  the  conclusion 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  67 

that  if  the  mihtary  strength  of  Germany  proved  sufficient 
for  the  investment  of  Paris  and  the  protection  of  its  own 
rear,  even  then  social  and  economic  conditions  would  not 
permit  of  such  operations  being  carried  to  an  end. 

Considering  the  possibility  of  an  invasion  of  Germany 
by  the  French,  it  may  be  concluded  that,  with  the  present 
conditions  of  mobilisation  and  concentration  of  armies, 
such  an  invasion  is  probable  only  on  the  supposition  that 
Germany  in  the  beginning  of  the  war  limited  herself  in  the 
west  to  defensive  action,  relying  on  the  strength  of  Metz, 
Strasbourg,  Thionville,  and  the  Rhine  fortresses,  and 
sending  her  offensive  resources  to  the  east,  calculating  on 
the  less  rapid  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  army. 

In  the  opinion  of  specialists  the  only  possible  path  by 
which  France  can  attack  Germany  lies  between  Blamont 
and  Longwy,  with  a  movement  thence  on  Mayence.  But 
what  tremendous  obstacles  would  have  to  be  overcome  at 
the  very  first !  The  French  would  be  obliged  to  cross,  in 
the  face  of  the  German  army  relying  upon  the  fortresses 
of  Metz  and  Thionville,  the  Moselle  and  the  Seille,  and, 
defeating  this  army,  blockade  Metz  and  Strasbourg,  take 
by  assault  the  fortified  positions  on  the  Saar  and  the  still 
stronger  positions  in  the  Ilartz  Mountains,  and  finally 
force  a  passage  across  the  Rhine,  about  Mayence,  Worms, 
Mannheim,  or  Speyers.  And  all  this  would  have  to  be 
undertaken  by  armies  which  for  attack  are  less  efficient 
than  the  German. 

After  considering,  from  all  points  of  view,  the  possible 
invasion  of  Germany  by  a  French  army  a  million  and  a 
half  strong,  against  which  Germany  would  place  in  the 
field  600,000  field  troops  and  600,000  Landsturm,  it 
appears  that  the  investment  of  Mayence  and  the  forcing  of 
a  passage  across  the  Rhine  would  be  impossible.  After 
deducting  the  losses  in  battle  and  on  the  march,  the  troops 
allotted  for  the  investment  of  fortresses  and  the  guarding 
of  communications,  France  would  have  available  350,000 
of  the  field  army,  whose  quality  may  be  expressed  by  the 
figure  72,  and  Germany  350,000  of  the  field  army,  whose 
effectiveness  in  defence  may  be  expressed  by  the  figure  98, 


68  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

and   in   addition    a    Landsturm    whose   effectiveness    for 
defence  is  expressed  by  the  figure  86. 

But  we  assumed  that  Germany  for  defence  would  call 
up  600,000  Landsturm  ;  the  same  supposition  applies  to 
France.  To  complete  her  forces  she  would  call  up  600,000 
men  of  the  territorial  army,  which  would  be  employed  in 
secondary  operations.  Even  with  such  conditions,  which 
may  be  taken  as  very  favourable  to  the  French,  it  is  hard 
to  believe  that  the  Rhine  could  be  crossed.  But  even  if 
the  French  army  succeeded  in  forcing  a  passage  across 
that  river,  after  the  losses  sustained  in  the  passage,  and 
after  the  investment  of  Mayence,  the  French  army  would 
contain  no  more  than  590,000  men,  who  would  be  opposed 
by  595,000  Germans,  so  that  the  numerical  superiority 
would  already  be  on  the  side  of  the  Germans. 

In  addition,  Germany  would  have  the  Landsturm 
reserves,  in  number  not  less  than  1,200  000  men.  A  part 
of  this  force  might  also  be  moved  to  ilie  Rhine,  and  in 
such  an  event  the  French  armies  would  find  themselves  in 
a  hopeless  position. 

In  any  case,  we  may  safely  prophesy  a  difficult  and 
slow  course  of  military  operations,  involving  great  losses, 
in  consequence  of  the  delay  of  immense  forces  by  the 
defensive  lines  and  fortifications  of  the  enemy.  And  with 
the  immensity  of  armies,  and  their  prolonged  stoppages 
on  one  spot,  the  difficulty  of  provisioning  appears  in- 
superable. 

The  losses  from  wounds,  hunger,  ordinary  ailments, 
epidemics,  and,  it  may  be,  even  desertion,  will  cause  all 
the  more  disorganisation  in  armies,  because  the  war  will 
disturb  the  internal  life  both  of  Germany  and  France. 
To  decide  whether  Germany  or  France  would  prove  itself 
stronger  and  more  stable  in  its  economic  and  social 
relations  is  difficult.  The  statistics  of  France  and  Germany 
show  that  both  these  states  possess  in  an  almost  equal 
degree  elements  of  endurability  against  the  destructive 
influences  of  war.  With  such  conditions,  it  is  difficult  to 
conceive  that  the  statesmen  of  France  or  Germany  would 
undertake  a  war. 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  69 

Let  us  turn  to  the  other  possible  theatre  of  a  great 
European  war  and  consider  the  operations  of  Germany, 
Austria  and  Russia.  In  this  theatre  also  the  most  notable 
fact  is  the  great  chain  of  fortresses  and  defensive  lines. 
As  in  Russia,  so  in  Germany  the  attacking  army  will  meet 
on  its  path  great  groups  of  fortresses  and  fortified  positions, 
in  mutual  inter-relationship,  and  serving  as  a  support  for 
the  operations  of  defensive  armies.  To  invest  such  for- 
tresses without  sanguinary  battles  would  be  impossible, 
to  force  a  passage  in  spite  of  them  is  difficult,  while  to 
evade  them  could  only  be  done  after  leaving  considerable 
forces  behind  for  the  protection  of  communications. 

The  alliances  concluded  between  Germany,  Austria  and 
Italy  on  the  one  hand,  and  Russia  and  France  on  the 
other,  in  view  of  the  great  differences  which  exist  between 
the  strength  and  endurance  of  these  states,  render  possible 
a  great  variety  of  combinations  in  actual  war.  In  con- 
sidering a  struggle  between  France,  Germany  and  Italy, 
plans  of  military  operations  are  comparatively  easy  to 
define.  In  the  case  of  an  Austro-German-Russian  war  the 
conditions  are  much  more  complex.  Here  present  them- 
selves a  greater  number  of  combinations  resulting  from 
the  vast  extent  of  the  theatre  of  war,  and  a  greater  room 
for  initiative,  owing  to  great  differences  in  the  period  of 
mobilisation  and  concentration,  but  chiefly  owing  to  the 
totally  different  social,  political,  and  economic  conditions. 

The  majority  of  writers  assume  that  Germany  would 
decide  at  the  beginning  to  strike  with  all  her  force  at  one 
of  her  enemies,  and  having  broken  down  his  opposition, 
would  attempt  by  means  of  railroads  to  move  her  main 
forces  to  the  other  theatre  of  war. 

From  this  the  question  arises,  to  which  frontier  would 
she  first  direct  her  forces  ?  In  order  to  form  a  clear  idea 
on  this  subject  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  consideration 
certain  circumstances. 

We  have  given  reasons  for  assuming  that  the  mobili- 
sation and  concentration  of  the  German  army  would  be 
carried  through  more  speedily  than  that  of  the  French  or 
Russian  armies.     From  this  it  follows  that  so  far  as  Russia 


70  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

is  concerned  the  initiative  of  action  will  belong  to  Germany. 
The  German  government,  when  demanding  from  the 
Reichstag  credit  for  the  increase  of  the  army — and  the 
Emperor  William  himself,  on  every  convenient  occasion — 
declared  that  the  reason  for  demanding  from  the  people 
such  great  sacrifices  lay  in  the  fact  that  Germany  would 
be  compelled  to  carry  on  offensive  operations  on  two 
frontiers,  and  that  if  any  other  course  were  adopted 
German  territory  might  be  subjected  to  an  invasion 
inevitably  accompanied  by  the  most  terrible  disasters 
for  the  people.  But  as  it  turned  out,  all  the  European 
powers  immediately  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Germany, 
and  the  relationship  of  strength  remained  unchanged,  so 
that  the  German-Austro-Italian  alliance  has  not  now 
sufficient  preponderance  of  strength  for  Germany  to  carry 
on  serious  offensive  operations  on  both  frontiers ;  and, 
considering  the  defensive  strength  of  the  French  and 
Russian  frontiers  and  also  the  defensive  strength  of  the 
German  frontier  itself,  such  an  attempt  would  hardly  seem 
rational. 

With  a  division  of  forces  the  war  would  be  still  more 
prolonged,  yet  the  immediate  interest  of  Germany  is  to 
overthrow  as  quickly  as  possible  one  of  its  opponents,  since 
Austria  and  Italy  are  less  capable  than  she  is  of  enduring 
the  financial  and  social  influences  which  would  be  aroused 
by  a  prolonged  war.  In  the  event  of  a  lengthened  campaign 
one  or  both  of  the  allies  of  Germany  might  be  compelled 
to  cease  military  operations  before  the  objects  of  the 
allies  were  attained.  In  addition  to  this,  Germany  must 
count  upon  the  fact  that  her  adversaries  occupy  a  strong 
position  for  defence,  so  that  the  occupation  of  their 
defensive  lines  would  demand  immense  sacrifices. 

For  such  reasons  it  appears  most  probable  that  Germany 
would  direct  the  greatest  number  and  the  best  of  her  troops 
against  one  of  her  adversaries,  placing  on  the  other  frontiers 
only  such  forces  as  would  be  required  to  support  Austria 
against  Russia  or  Italy  against  France.  Other  forms  of 
operations  on  the  part  of  Germany  are  hard  to  conceive. 
Some  suppose  that  the  chief  strength  of  Germany  will  first 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  71 

be  turned  against  France  as  more  sensitive  and  less  powerful 
than  Russia,  and  not  until  she  has  broken  down  the 
opposition  of  France  will  she  turn  on  her  more  dangerous 
enemy,  Russia.  Others  assume  that  Germany  will  take 
the  opposite  course,  striking  first  at  Russia,  the  frontiers 
of  which  may  not  be  so  stubbornly  defended  as  the  frontiers 
of  France,  in  consequence  of  the  greater  spaces,  the  absence 
of  mountains,  deep  rivers  and  other  obstacles,  and  also 
because  of  the  slower  mobilisation  and  concentration  of  the 
Russian  forces.  But  what  is  more  important,  out  of  fear 
that  Austria  might  be  crushed  at  once,  Germany  may  be 
forced  to  begin  operations  first  of  all  against  Russia,  for  the 
defence  of  her  Western  frontier  relying  upon  Metz  and  the 
Rhine  fortifications  and  on  the  diversion  created  by  the 
Italians.  The  probability  of  such  initiative  is  indicated 
also  by  the  concentration  of  Germany's  greatest  forces  on 
the  Russian  frontier.  For  Germany  would  have  no  need 
of  such  a  concentration  of  troops  on  a  frontier  in  time  of 
peace  if  she  did  not  intend  to  act  offensively. 

In  a  work  published  some  years  ago  by  Colonel  Zolotaref, 
of  the  General  Staff,  devoted  to  an  investigation  of  the 
Russian  theatre  of  military  operations,  the  following  view 
is  expressed  : 

Our  adversaries  will  not  fail  to  take  advantage  of  the  only 
superiority  which  they  have  over  us,  that  is  to  say,  their  more 
rapid  mobilisation  and  concentration,  in  order  at  once  to  cut  off 
from  Russia  the  western  part  of  the  theatre  of  war,  to  prevent 
reinforcement,  and  in  a  short  time  to  make  themselves  masters 
of  that  territory.  But  this  object  could  not  be  attained  until  they 
had  succeeded  in  taking  Brest- Litovsk,  that  important  meeting- 
place  of  internal  communications  situated  at  the  entrance  to  a 
difficult  country.  Thus,  on  the  roads  leading  to  Brest-Litovsk 
we  must  pay  attention,  as  the  most  probable  lines  of  operation 
of  an  enemy. 

We  have  seen  that  the  armed  forces  of  the  Triple  and 
the  Dual  Alliances  may  be  taken  as  almost  equal,  although 
as  far  as  numbers  are  concerned  some  preponderance 
remains  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France.  Adopting 
the  supposition  that  Germany  decides  in  the  beginning  of 


72  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  war  to  stand  on  the  defensive  against  Russia,  we 
must  ask  ourselves  on  which  of  its  defensive  hnes  the 
German  army  will  stand,  on  its  eastern  frontier  or  on  the 
territory  of  Russia  ?  Major  Scheibert,*  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  supposes  that  the  war  will  be  begun  against 
Russia  as  against  France  by  strategical  attack,  but  that 
after  this,  offensive  operations  must  be  discontinued  on 
one  theatre  of  war,  in  order,  with  concentrated  forces,  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow  at  the  other  enemy.  But  when 
attack  is  discontinued  it  will  be  necessary  to  guarantee 
the  successes  gained  by  extensive  fortifications.  If  this 
stoppage  is  made  in  the  Western  Provinces  of  Russia, 
Major  Scheibert  thinks  that  without  great  trouble  the 
junction-points  of  roads  and  railways  may  be  fortified  by 
means  of  armoured  gun  carriages  which  can  be  speedily 
furnished  from  the  German  depots.  He  further  proposes 
to  fortify  the  occupied  Russian  territory  by  crowding  the 
rivers  with  steamers  of  small  size  (die  Flussnetze  mit  kleinen 
Dampfern  zu  bevdlkern)^  thus  protecting  the  territory 
occupied  by  the  Germans,  helping  the  study  of  the 
locality,  and  facilitating  the  manoeuvres  of  troops.  He 
advises  the  organisation  of  communications  between  the 
different  fortified  points  by  lines  of  railways  and  steamers. 
In  other  words.  Major  Scheibert  advocates  the  occupation 
of  the  kingdom  of  Poland. 

Let  us  criticise  these  proposals  more  closely. 

The  kingdom  of  Poland  forms  a  wedge  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  to  such  a  distance  that  the  Russian  armies  on 
the  frontier  may  threaten  Berlin,  and  what  is  more  may 
take  in  flank  Prussian  forces  sent  into  Eastern  Prussia. 
But  for  precisely  the  same  reason.  Eastern  Prussia  forms 
a  wedge  between  the  Baltic  Sea  and  Russian  territory, 
bending  round  Poland  and  piercing  to  the  Niemen,  which 
makes  it  possible  for  the  Germans  to  threaten  the  Russian 
forces  in  Poland  by  an  advance  on  Brest  and  farther  in 
the  direction  of  Moscow,  and  also  to  operate  directly 
against    the    second    Russian    defensive    line   of  Kovno- 

*  "  Aus  der  militarischen  gesellschaft,"  Berlin,  1893. 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  73 

Vilna,  evading  the  first  Russian  position.  In  the  opinion 
of  the  great  majority  of  writers  the  defensive  system  of 
Russian  Poland  has  been  brought  to  perfection.  (See 
map  on  next  page  of  Russian  Defensive  System.) 

In  view  of  the  strength  which  the  Russian  armies  would 
present  for  the  defence  of  the  territories  between  the 
rivers  Vistula,  Bug,  and  Narev,  supported  by  fortified 
positions  on  the  Narev  at  Pultusk,  Rozhan,  Ostrolenka,  and 
Lomza,  and  the  fortresses  of  Warsaw,  Novogeorgievski, 
and  Zegrze,  the  military  writers,  Generals  Brialmont, 
Pierron,  and  other  foreign  students,  and  Colonel  Zolotaref 
assume  that  Germany,  if  she  were  to  decide  at  first  to 
turn  her  chief  forces  against  Russia,  would  undertake  an 
energetic  offensive  movement  into  the  depths  of  Russia 
through  Byelostok,  to  Brest  from  the  direction  of  Warsaw, 
occupying  the  enemy  with  fictitious  operations  in  order 
to  cut  off"  the  main  Russian  forces  from  the  other  parts 
of  the  empire. 

In  other  words,  this  means  to  pass  the  fortifications  of 
the  defensive  line  of  the  Vistula- Bug- Narev  district. 
Such  an  undertaking  might,  of  course,  be  very  advan- 
tageous for  the  attacking  Austro-German  armies,  but  its 
execution  would  be  attended  with  extraordinary  dangers. 
If  Germany  and  Austria  could  be  assured  that  the  Russian 
armies  in  this  theatre  of  war  were  not  in  a  fit  state  in  their 
turn  to  make  an  attack  upon  vital  points  in  the  interior 
of  Germany  and  Austria,  or  to  cut  the  lines  of  communi- 
cation of  the  invading  armies,  then  such  an  attempt  might 
have  equal  chances  of  success,  and  the  Russian  armies 
would  be  compelled  to  attack  the  invaders  or  to  retire  into 
the  interior  of  the  country.  But  the  threat  alone  that  the 
Russian  armies  might  invade  Silesia  and  the  rich  terri- 
tories lying  near  the  frontier  would  cause  great  alarm, 
acting  all  the  more  powerfully  on  public  opinion  in  Ger- 
many since  it  would  be  in  direct  opposition  to  the  declara- 
tions of  the  government  and  of  the  Emperor. 

The  opinion  expressed  by  German  writers  that  their 
aumies  would  occupy  the  undefended  territory  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Vistula,  which  is  at  considerable  distance  from 


74 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Map  of  Russian  Defensive  System. 


From  Schroeter's  "  Die 

Festungen  in  der  heutigeu 

Kriegfiihrung." 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  75- 

the  fortresses,  is  therefore  much  more  probable.  In  such 
event  the  losses  which  are  demanded  by  attack  would  fall 
upon  Russia.  Further,  in  the  case  of  the  breaking  of  this 
line  the  Russian  armies  on  the  German  frontier  would  be 
met  by  another  defensive  line. 

Between  the  German  and  Austrian  armies  a  junction 
might  be  effected  by  means  of  the  railway  leading  from 
the  Vistula  on  the  Austrian  frontier  through  Ostrobetz  to 
the  Vistula  on  Prussian  territory.  On  this  railway  are 
situated  many  important  towns — among  them  Lodz  with 
more  than  300,000  inhabitants — which  might  furnish  large 
resources. 

In  view  of  convenience  for  the  disposition  of  their  armies, 
the  Germans  might  usefully  employ  for  the  occupation  of 
this  line  part  of  their  older  reserves,  consisting  of  men 
who  would  be  entirely  unfit  for  field  warfare  and  bivouac 
life.  Nevertheless,  in  view  of  the  risk  of  such  an  under- 
taking, it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  Austro-Ger- 
man  armies  would  attempt  primarily  to  direct  their  re- 
sources on  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  district,  taking  only 
defensive  action  against  France. 

After  investigating  the  resources  which  Germany  and 
Austria  would  have  at  their  disposal  for  attack  on  Russia, 
the  result  appears  that  these  powers,  after  allotting  the 
forces  needed  for  garrisons  and  for  guarantee  against 
France,  would  dispose  of  2,100,000  men.  Russia  would 
have  available  not  less  than  2,380,000  men. 

But  of  course  neither  Austria,  nor  German}^,  nor  Russia 
will  be  in  a  position  to  employ  such  forces  at  once.  From 
the  statistics  of  foreign  authorities  it  appears  that  Germany 
and  Austria  for  immediate  attack  would  have  available 
900,000  men,  Russia  at  first  having  available  no  more 
than  500,000  men. 

But  these  figures  seem  to  us  untrustworthy.  Before 
the  Austro-German  armies  could  penetrate  to  the  Peters- 
burg-Warsaw, the  Moscow- Brest,  and  other  railways  by 
which  Russian  troops  might  be  brought  to  the  front, 
almost  all  will  have  been  done  to  bring  the  Russian  army 
of  the  first  line  up  to  its  full  strength. 


76  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

The  German  army  cannot  attack  before  the  Austrians,. 
and  therefore  as  a  basis  we  must  take  the  greatest  distance 
and  the  longest  period  needed  for  mobihsation.  In 
Austria  mobilisation  and  concentration  will  take  place 
much  more  slowly  than  in  Germany,  and  the  distances  to 
be  traversed  will  be  longer  by  at  least  ten  days'  march. 
Meantime  the  Warsaw  district  includes  reserv^es  of  200,000 
men,  the  Vilna  district  270,000,  and  the  Kief  district 
427,000  men.  Thus  it  will  be  impossible  to  prevent  the 
strengthening  of  the  Russian  armies  situated  on  the  Vistula- 
Niemen  theatre  of  war  to  a  million  of  men. 

Plans  of  attack  by  the  allies  on  the  territory  watered  by 
the  rivers  Niemen,  Vistula,  and  Narev  have  been  analysed 
by  the  French  writer  General  Pierron,  who  mentions  that 
in  June  1888  he,  together  with  French  officers  of  the 
General  Staff,  by  order  of  his  government  made  a  tour 
through  the  theatre  of  war  above  mentioned.  From  the 
data  collected  by  General  Pierron  the  probable  routes  of 
attack  by  the  Austro-German  armies  from  their  points  of 
concentration  would  appear  to  be  those  indicated  by  the 
plan  opposite.  The  probable  paths  of  attack  by  Germany 
and  Austria  have  also  been  considered  by  the  Belgian 
engineer,  General  Brialmont.  By  combining  the  data  of 
Generals  Pierron  and  Brialmont  the  disposition  of  the 
allied  armies  in  their  concentric  movement  on  Warsaw 
and  Novogeorgievsk  may  be  presented  in  the  plan  on  page 
y^,  in  which  we  take  as  points  of  departure,  not  those 
positions  which  serve  as  bases,  but  those  railway  stations 
near  which,  in  all  probability,  the  concentration  of  the 
armies  will  take  place.  For  convenience  the  routes  of 
the  attacking  armies  are  indicated  by  straight  lines,  each 
straight  line  also  representing  an  army  corps  of  50,000 
men. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  Russian  territories  the 
attacking  Germans  and  their  allies  will  meet  with  strong 
defensive  lines,  which,  if  they  are  inferior  in  anything  to 
the  iron  ring  of  defences  constructed  in  France,  neverthe- 
less may  be  defended  even  against  an  enemy  twice  as 
strong.     These    Russian    lines    of    defence    include    ten 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN 


77 


Paths  of  Advance  of  the  Aiistro-German  Armies  from  Points  of 
Concentration  to  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  Theatre  of  War. 


German  Army  .     . 

Austrian  Army 
Russian  Defensive 
Armies      .     .     . 
Russian      Operat- 
ing Armies    .     . 

9      (dl^lA    W    w    fM   If 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Paths  of  Advance  of  the  German  and  Austrian  Armies  on  the  Vistula- 
Bug-Narev  Theatre  of  War,  from  Pierron  and  Brialmont. 


German    and    Aus- 
trian Armies  . 

Russian   Defensive 
Armies  .     .     .     . 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  79 

fortresses  with  fortified  camps,  situated  on  rivers,  and 
making  the  passage  of  rivers  and  marshes  extremely 
difficult. 

With  such  conditions  the  Russian  armies  supported  by 
internal  lines  of  defence  will,  with  energetic  leadership 
and  the  known  endurance  of  the  Russian  soldier,  have 
full  possibility  of  moving  to  every  threatened  point  pre- 
ponderating forces,  before  the  junction  in  superior  force  of 
the  Austrian  and  German  armies  can  take  place. 

The  greatest  numerical  superiority  which  can  be 
admitted  as  possible  on  the  Austrian  and  German  side 
would  be  at  Kovno,  400,000  men,  and  at  Brest,  also 
400,000  men,  against  100,000  defending  the  first  fortress, 
and  250,000  the  second.  But  Kovno  and  Brest  are  both 
first-class  fortresses,  and  the  troops  defending  them  will 
be  in  strong  positions,  of  the  speedy  capture  of  which  the 
enemy  cannot  even  dream.  To  their  aid  will  hasten  the 
fresh  forces  which  will  be  mobilised  within  Russia,  and 
the  besiegers  may  easily  find  themselves  in  a  dangerous 
position. 

If  Plevna  with  its  improvised  fortifications  was  held  for 
months  against  an  enemy  four  times  stronger,  by  a  garri- 
son deprived  of  hope  of  relief,  how  much  longer  may  such 
regularly  fortified  camps  as  Kovno  and  Brest  hold  out 
when  help  must  come  within  the  fortnight  which  will  be 
required  for  the  mobilisation  of  415,000  men,  or,  at  the 
worst,  of  a  considerable  proportion  of  that  number  ? 
When  these  41 5,000  men  shall  have  marched  to  the  relief 
c^  Brest  and  Kovno,  the  forces  of  Russia  will  not  only 
equal  those  of  the  allies,  but  will  even  find  themselves  to  a 
certain  extent  superior. 

In  addition  to  this  must  be  borne  in  mind  the  difficulty 
of  provisioning  an  invading  army,  a  million  strong,  far 
from  its  base,  while  the  Russian  armies  defending  their  own 
territory  would  fight  under  much  better  conditions.  Even 
from  the  point  of  view  most  favourable  to  the  Germans — 
even  if  they  succeeded  in  taking  Ivangorod,  Warsaw,  and 
Novogeorgievsk,  with  all  auxiliary  fortifications  —  they 
would  find  a  tremendous  obstacle  in  Brest-Litov.sk  alone. 


8o  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Situated  in  the  midst  of  a  marsh  it  would  be  almost 
impossible  to  invest  it  closely,  and  in  no  case  could  it  be 
invested  speedily.  It  is  obvious  that  before  Brest  could 
be  taken  the  Russian  army  garrisoned  there  would  be  re- 
inforced by  more  than  250,000  men.  Even  supposing, 
what  is  still  more  improbable,  that  the  allies  in  opera- 
tions against  fortresses  and  first  lines  of  defence  were 
always  victorious,  yet  such  victories  would  cost  them  so 
dear  that  the  stoppage  of  further  operations  would  seem 
inevitable. 

Estimates  as  to  the  probable  loss  of  attacking  and 
defending  troops  in  battle  and  from  disease  show  that 
by  the  time  the  allies  were  in  a  position  to  undertake 
operations  against  the  second  defensive  line — that  is, 
Brest-Litovsk  and  Kovno  —  the  Russian  forces  would 
amount  to  440,000  in  fortresses,  and  375,000  auxiliary 
forces  acting  in  combination  with  these  garrisons,  a  total 
of  815,000  men,  to  which  must  be  added  an  army  of 
1,264,000,  newly  formed,  approaching  the  scene  of  opera- 
tions. The  allied  powers  would  dispose  of  1,588,000 
men.  In  such  event  the  numerical  superiority  of  the 
allies  over  the  operating  Russian  armies  would  amount  to 
only  773,000  men. 

In  the  face  of  the  Russian  armies  operating  on  internal 
lines  and  able  to  change  front  at  discretion,  and  in  face  of 
the  reinforcements  daily  increasing  until  on  the  arrival  on 
the  scene  of  action  of  the  whole  1,264,000  of  their  reserved 
armies,  the  Russians  would  have  a  numerical  superiority 
of  491,000  men,  an  advance  into  fhe  interior  of  Russia 
would  be  an  undertaking  attended  with  too  great  risk.  It  is, 
therefore,  more  probable  that  the  enemy  would  first  invest 
the  fortresses,  and  only  afterwards  attempt  to  defeat  the 
armies  of  reserves. 

In  assuming  this,  we  again  allow  the  most  favourable 
supposition  for  the  allies,  for  this  reason,  that  the  losses 
in  battle  and  in  the  investment  of  the  fortresses  of  the 
second  line  of  defence  will  be  as  follows  :  The  375,000 
men  of  the  Russian  operating  army,  acting  in  combination 
with  the  garrisons  of  the  fortresses,  will  lose  a  third  of 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  8i 

their  strength,  or  125,000  men  ;  the  losses  of  the  attack- 
ing armies  will  be  twice  as  great,  that  is,  250,000  men. 
Further,  we  assume  that  only  10  percent.,  or,  25,000 men 
of  the  Russian  army  would  be  able  to  take  refuge  in  the 
fortress  of  Brest- Litovsk,  the  other  90  per  cent.,  that 
is,  225,000,  being  taken  prisoners.  But  even  under  such 
circumstances  the  German-Austrian  armies  would  not 
have  freedom  for  activity. 

From  the  estimate  of  General  Brialmont  we  find  that  for 
the  investment  of  armies  shut  up  in  fortresses,  an  army  of 
double  the  strength  of  the  besieged  is  necessary — that  is 
to  say,  the  position  of  the  Russian  and  Austro-German 
armies  after  the  defeat  of  the  operating  Russian  army, 
and  the  investment  of  the  fortresses,  would  be  as  follows  : 

Russian  Armies. 


Approaching  Reserves   . 

In  fortresses 

1,264,000 
465,000 

Austro-German. 

Besieging  armies    .... 
Free  for  attack        .... 

926,000 
412,000 

These  figures  show  that  before  the  fall  of  the  fortresses 
there  could  be  no  thought  of  any  extensive  advance  of  the 
allied  armies  into  the  interior  of  Russia.  Let  us  admit, 
however,  the  extreme  hypothesis  that  immediate  attacks 
on  the  fortresses  will  prove  completely  successful,  and 
that  the  Russian  armies  besieged  will  be  compelled  to 
surrender.  Such  a  success  apparently  would  in  no  way 
resemble  the  surrenders  of  the  French  in  .1870-71.  The 
capture  of  the  Russian  fortresses  by  assault  could  only  be 
accomplished  after  terrible  conflicts  attended  with  tre- 
mendous losses  in  the  ranks  of  the  attacking  armies. 

We  will  suppose — a  supposition  again  the  most  favour- 
able to  the  invaders — that  the  losses  of  the  allies  under 
these  circumstances  were  only  half  as  great  as  the  losses 
of  the  Russian  armies  in  battle,  that  is  232,000  men,  with  a 
loss  of  no  more  than  10  per  cent,  from  disease.     In  such 

F 


82  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

event  there  would  remain  only  1,013,000  men  in  the  ranks 
of  the  allies  against  1,264,000  in  the  armies  of  the 
Russian  reserve. 

Having  gone  so  far,  there  are  two  questions  which  may 
well  be  asked.  Having  maintained  her  main  forces  for 
such  a  prolonged  time  on  the  Russian  theatre  of  war, 
would  Germany  be  in  a  position  to  defend  herself  against 
attack  from  France,  and  would  the  70,000  men  left  by  the 
allies  for  the  guarding  of  Ivangorod,  and  the  200,000 
Austrians  left  in  Galicia  be  able  to  withstand  the  attack  of 
the  Russian  reserves  ? 

From  the  foregoing  figures  and  arguments  we  must 
conclude  that  the  plans  of  attack  by  Austria  and  Germany 
in  Russia  proposed  by  foreign  military  authorities,  taking 
into  consideration  the  immense  strength  of  the  fortresses 
of  the  Vistula- Bug-Narev  theatre  of  war,  and  afterwards 
of  the  second  Russian  line  of  defence,  would  be  impossible 
to  carry  into  effect. 

It  is  true  that  another  opinion  has  been  expressed  as  to 
the  possibility  of  outflanking  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  posi- 
tions and  even  also  that  of  Brest.  But  such  an  undertaking 
would  be  attended  with  such  extraordinary  and  obvious 
dangers  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider  it  here. 

Generally,  the  consequences  which  would  ensue  if  the 
German-Austrian  armies  were  to  adopt  the  daring  plan  of 
direct  movement  on  Brest-Litovsk  in  order  to  cut  off  the 
Russian  forces  in  Poland,,  belong  to  the  category  of  vexed 
questions.  Plans,  of  course,  are  kept  scrupulously  secret, 
but  some  indications  nevertheless  may  be  drawn  from  the 
opinions  current  in  military  circles.  First  of  all  it  is  note- 
worthy that  German  officers  no  longer  speak  of  the  project 
of  immediately  occupying  Warsaw  and  the  whole  of  Poland, 
and  of  fortifying  themselves  there.  But  ten  years  ago, 
when  war  with  Russia  seemed  near,  this  view  was  so 
widespread  in  Prussian  military  circles  that  certain  officers 
invited  Polish  ladies  to  a  dance  in  Warsaw  at  the  next 
carnival.  The  well-known  military  writer,  Scheibert,* 
expressing  the  opinion  that  the  Germans  must  limit  them- 

*  op.  cit.  ante. 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  83 

selves  to  the  occupation  of  Poland,  and  fortifying  themselves 
there,  added  that  in  the  West  Germany  should  afterwards 
confine  herself  to  defensive  operations,  while  her  "  Eastern 
neighbour,  incited  by  the  independent,  premature  initiative 
peculiar  to  its  leaders,  would  try  to  gain  successes  by  means 
of  reckless  enterprises." 

Nowadays,  of  talk  of  the  occupation  of  Warsaw  there 
remains  not  a  trace.  But  it  is  known  that  in  Konigsberg 
are  collected  immense  stores  of  sections  of  bridges  and 
materials  for  the  construction  and  repair  of  railways. 
Apparently,  the  Germans  have  realised  the  delusiveness 
of  an  undertaking  having  as  its  aim  to  cut  off  the  Russian 
armies  in  Poland,  and  place  them  between  two  fires.  Such 
thoughts  correspond  to  the  spirit  of  self-confidence  fostered 
in  German  military  circles  since  the  great  successes  of 
1870-71,  successes  which  awakened  profound  faith  in  the 
excellence  of  the  German  army,  and  a  disposition  to  depre- 
ciate the  value  of  other  armies. 

Thus  the  opinion  of  Scheibert  that  the  Russian  com- 
manders will  attempt  to  attain  successes  by  means  of 
daring,  ill-considered  enterprises,  is  repeated  in  Germany 
to  the  present  day.  And,  indeed,  if  the  German  head- 
quarters staff  is  convinced  that  it  is  capable  always,  at  the 
right  moment,  to  concentrate  its  forces,  and  that  the  Rus- 
sian armies  will  not  find  themselves  in  such  favourable 
conditions,  it  may  easily  set  itself  the  task  of  defeating  the 
Russian  armies  one  after  another,  calculating  by  such 
operations  to  hasten  the  course  of  the  war,  and  diminish 
the  economic  difficulties  from  which  Germany  would  suffer. 
But  such  an  undertaking  would  be  so  risky  that  its 
initiation  would  be  desired  by  the  most  competent  autho- 
rities in  Russia.  In  war  nothing  can  be  calculated  upon 
absolutely,  and  the  strategical  development  of  operations 
may  result  in  no  way  so  favourably  as  is  relied  upon  in 
Berlin  and  Vienna.  In  such  event  the  allies  would  be 
subjected  to  defeat. 

Without  analysing  closely  the  opinions  we  have  quoted, 
we  must  ask  the  question  whether  with  such  plans  of 
operations  the  final  objects  of  war  could  be  accomplished. 


84  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

All  authorities  on  the  war  of  the  future  are  agreed  that  in 
order  to  force  Russia  to  conclude  peace  on  terms  unfavour- 
able to  herself,  the  occupation  of  Petersburg  and  Moscow 
would  be  required.  It  is  plain  that  in  face  of  the  immense, 
almost  insuperable  obstacles  which  separate  both  these 
capitals  from  the  Austro-German  base,  the  alHes  would  not 
have  the  resources  to  advance  at  once  upon  Petersburg 
and  Moscow  as  long  as  the  chief  fortified  points  remained 
uncaptured  and  the  Russian  armies  unbeaten,  since  until 
these  objects  were  accomplished,  too  great  forces  would  be 
needed  for  the  protection  of  communications. 

Thus  the  allies  would  be  compelled  to  choose  between 
plans  of  attack  either  on  Petersburg  or  on  Moscow.  To 
wait  for  an  opportunity,  in  view  of  the  intact  Russian 
armies,  would  be  impossible  for  the  allies,  because  the  Rus- 
sian armies  in  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  district  would  pre- 
serve open  communications  with  the  southern  governments, 
and  the  Russian  army  might  undertake  a  movement  against 
Austria  which  would  destroy  the  plans  of  the  enemy. 
The  opinions  expressed  on  this  subject  in  military  litera- 
ture lead  to  the  conclusion  that  if  the  German  government 
decided  on  a  march  into  the  interior  of  Russia  the  aim  of 
the  allies  would,  in  all  probability,  be  Moscow  and  not 
Petersburg,  while  the  consequences  of  any  such  attempt 
would  recall  the  fate  of  Napoleon's  army,  that  is  to  say, 
it  would  result  in  absolute  starvation. 

For  the  Germans  to  limit  themselves  to  the  conquest  of 
Poland,  as  certain  authorities  advise,  and  confine  them- 
selves to  defensive  operations  is  impossible,  as  such  action 
would  give  no  speedy  and  final  result,  and  a  prolonged 
war  could  not  be  sustained  by  Germany's  allies.  In  addi- 
tion, such  a  decision  would  expose  Germany  to  great  risk. 
The  armies  on  the  Vistula-Bug-Narev  theatre  of  war  would 
be  directed  against  Prussia.  It  is  true  that  the  German 
frojitier  is  very  strongly  fortified,  and  presents  topo- 
graphical conditions  very  favourable  for  defence.  But  the 
very  attempt  of  the  Russian  armies  to  enter  upon  German 
territory  would  undoubtedly  cause  intense  alarm  among 
the  German  population. 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  85 

The  strength  in  that  district  of  the  Russian  army  which 
would  be  in  a  position  to  undertake  operations  against 
Germany  we  have  already  estimated  at  650,000  men. 
The  operations  of  this  army  would  be  directed  against 
Eastern  Prussia,  in  order  to  cut  the  communications 
between  Berlin  and  the  bases  of  attack  of  the  German  army 
in  Russia — that  is,  Konigsberg.  The  invasion  of  Prussian 
territory  would  be  facilitated  by  the  nearness  of  the  lines 
of  the  Narev  and  Bug  to  the  Prussian  frontier.  But  it  is 
evident  that  the  Russian  armies  situated  in  that  district 
would  not  be  strong  enough  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at 
Prussia  by  operations  against  Berlin  itself 

The  occupation  by  the  Germans  of  the  left  undefended 
bank  of  the  Vistula  in  Poland  would  require  separate  armies 
at  least  as  strong  as  the  acting  Russian  forces.  There- 
fore, at  the  disposal  of  the  German  headquarters  staff  would 
be  1,175,000  men  ready  for  further  advance  into  the  in- 
terior of  Russia. 

If  the  fortresses  of  the  Bug  did  not  require  investment, 
then  Kovno,  Ossovetz,  Olita,  and  Grodno  must  un- 
doubtedly be  invested,  for  which  purpose  at  least  375,000 
men  would  be  required.  Thus  for  advance  into  the 
interior  of  Russia  the  Germans  would  only  dispose  of 
800,000  men,  a  number  obviously  insufficient  for  such  an 
undertaking.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  Germans  will 
be  compelled  to  await  the  approach  of  the  Austrians,  and 
to  continue  their  operations  in  combination  with  them. 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  defences  of  Austria  in 
Galicia  are  very  weak.  It  is  probable  that  this  considera- 
tion will  not  exercise  a  commanding  influence  in  the 
choice  of  plans  of  operations,  for  the  decisive  word  will 
undoubtedly  belong  to  Germany.  But  for  that  reason  it 
will  be  difficult  to  compel  Austria  to  advance  her  forces 
rapidly,  she  finding  herself  threatened  by  an  invasion 
from  Russia  of  her  Slavonic  provinces.  Thus  the  German 
staff  in  all  probability  will  not  decide  upon  invasion  of  the 
interior  of  Russia,  but  will  first  of  all  occupy  itself  with 
operations  against  Olita,  Ossovetz,  Grodna,  and  Kovno. 
Detailed  calculations  show  that  after  deducting  the  forces 


86  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

necessary  to  restrain  Russia  from  active  operations 
against  Austria,  the  latter  power  would  only  have  600,000 
men  free  for  offensive  action  against  Russia ;  thus  the 
attacking  forces  of  the  allies  may  be  estimated  at  1,400,000 
men. 

Russia  would  dispose  of  armies  2,380,000  strong,  which 
would  be  distributed  as  follows  : 

In  the  Vistula- Bug- Narev  positions  .  650,000 
,,  Kovno,  Grodno,  Ossobitz,  Olita  .  .  250,000 
,,  Dubno,  Kovno,  Dutzke         .         .         .        200,000 


Total         .         .      1,100,000 

Thus  for  active  operations  Russia  would  possess 
1,280,000  men.  Of  course  when  the  Austro- German 
armies  began  operations  this  force  of  1,280,000  might 
not  be  concentrated.  But  as  we  already  explained,  long 
before  the  enemy  could  reach  Moscow  not  only  this  army, 
but  millions  more,  although  with  little  training,  would  be 
ready  to  oppose  the  invaders,  whose  armies,  every  fifty 
miles  they  marched  into  the  interior,  would  thaw  as  snow 
in  spring. 

In  this  connection  the  history  of  18 12  may  perhaps  be 
instructive.  In  the  beginning  of  action  the  operating 
armies  consisted  of 

400,000  French     ...     180,000  Russians 

At  Smolensk  .         .    183,000        ,,  ...     120,000        „ 

,,   Moscow      .         .    134,000        ,,  ...     130,000         „ 

As  the  final  result  of  investigation  we  must  conclude 
that  an  advance  on  Moscow  would  require  at  least  a  two 
years'  campaign,  while  the  more  prolonged  the  war,  the 
better  it  would  prove  for  Russia.  Her  immense  resources 
gradually  organised  would  every  day  be  better  prepared, 
and  the  numerical  preponderance  would  finally  pass  to 
Russia,  while  the  allies,  weakened  by  immense  losses  in 
battle,  and  from  illness  caused  by  insufficient  food,  would 
be  forced  to  close  the  war  without  attaining  their  objects, 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  87 

in  consequence  of  the  absence  in  the  markets  of  Trans- 
oceanic and  Russian  grain,  and  probably  also  as  a  result 
of  internal  difficulties  caused  by  the  stoppage  of  work,  and 
by  famine. 

Some  military  writers  advise  that  operations  against 
Russia  should  begin  in  winter,  as  the  frozen  ground  would 
increase  the  difficulty  of  constructing  earthworks,  while 
the  invaders  would  find  greater  facilities  for  transport, 
both  in  the  sledge  paths  which  replace  in  winter  the  bad 
marshy  roads,  and  in  the  freezing  of  the  rivers.  This  last 
circumstance,  in  their  opinion,  almost  totally  deprives 
rivers  of  their  immense  defensive  value. 

But  the  danger  of  advance  into  Russia  by  winter  would 
be  still  greater  for  the  German  army  (consisting,  as  it  will, 
of  four-fifths  of  reserves)  than  it  was  for  the  army  of  Napo- 
leon, which  was,  for  the  most  part,  composed  of  veterans. 

Such  a  decision  on  the  part  of  the  German  Government 
is  all  the  less  probable  because  the  roads  in  the  frontier 
districts  of  Russia  are  often  spoiled  by  thaws,  as  was 
experienced  in  the  wars  of  1806-7,  ^^^  ^^  the  Polish 
campaign  of  183 1. 

Thus  after  considering  all  possible  combinations  it  is 
more  than  probable  that  an  invasion  of  Russia  would  not 
lead  to  such  results  as  would  accomplish  the  ends  of  war. 
And  modern  conditions  are  such  that  even  Russia,  in  the 
event  of  victory,  could  not  attain  the  best  results. 

The  carrying  on  by  Russia  of  an  offensive  war  against 
Germany  and  Austria  after  driving  the  armies  of  those 
powers  out  of  her  territories,  or  in  the  event  of  those  states 
from  the  beginnmg  restricting  themselves  to  defence,  or 
limiting  their  offensive  operations  to  the  occupation  of 
certain  Russian  territories,  would  be  accompanied  by 
great,  it  may  be  insuperable  difficulties. 

Following  on  the  heels  of  the  armies  which  she  had 
defeated,  the  Russian  armies  would  be  compelled  to 
traverse  vast  territories  entirely  exhausted,  and  to  draw 
all  their  provisions  from  an  immense  distance.  The 
victories  already  gained  would,  of  course,  have  cost 
them  dear,  and  reserves  of  necessity  would  predominate 


88  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE 

both  in  the  ranks  and  among  the  officers.  With  armies 
thus  constituted  success  in  an  offensive  war  would  be 
much  less  probable  than  with  armies  only  completed  from 
the  reserve. 

In  addition  to  this,  in  advancing  on  German  territory 
the  Russian  armies  would  meet  with  still  numerous  forces 
formed,  it  is  true,  mainly  from  the  remnants  of  the  attack- 
ing armies  and  from  the  Landsturm  with  its  reserves, 
worthless  for  attack,  but  fully  reliable  for  defence.  As 
relates  to  commissariat,  transport  from  the  interior  of 
Russia  to  Prussian  territory — not  to  speak  of  possible 
failure  of  the  administration — would  require  much  time 
and  immense  outlay.  In  the  war  of  1870  the  Germans 
lived  at  the  expense  of  the  enemy.  But  such  favourable 
circumstances  will  not  be  repeated.  Rapid  advances  and 
the  possibility  of  making  requisitions  demanding  contribu- 
tions in  the  face  of  the  present  fortified  frontiers,  smoke- 
less powder,  and  improved  armaments,  are  inconceivable. 

For  the  invasion,  by  Russia,  of  Prussian  territory 
military  literature  offers  several  projects.  The  plan  oppo- 
site illustrates  the  scheme  of  operations  which  military 
writers  consider  most  probable 

But  whatever  the  direction  selected  for  attack  on  Prussia, 
it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  invaders  will  be  met  by 
a  scientific  and  long-prepared  system  of  defence.  Great 
rivers  and  fortresses  constitute  for  the  Germans  a  strong 
defence,  while  behind  them  a  network  of  railways,  satisfy- 
ing all  the  requirements  of  modern  strategy,  guarantees 
the  communications  of  the  defending  armies  with  the 
interior  of  the  country.  There  will  be  no  difficulty  in  com- 
pleting the  ranks  of  the  Prussian  army,  for  in  addition  to 
the  remnants  of  the  invading  army  the  Landsturm  with 
its  reserves  will  be  ready. 

Thus,  to  conquer  Prussia  on  her  own  territory  will  be 
no  easy  task,  and  the  danger  she  will  be  subjected  to  by 
the  occupation  by  an  enemy's  forces  will  be  far  less  serious 
than  the  danger  which  will  threaten  her  from  famine.  As 
relates  to  internal  revolutionary  movements  it  can  hardly 
be  supposed  that  the  irruption  of  an  enemy  on  Prussian 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN 


89 


Plan  of  invasion t  by  Russia,  vj  Prussian  territory. 


90  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

territory  would  strengthen  such  a  movement.  Invasion 
from  Russia  would  in  all  probability  have  entirely  different 
results. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  one  more  combination — 
namely,  that  Russia,  in  view  of  the  weakness  of  the 
Austrian  defence  in  Galicia,  as  compared  with  the  defences 
which  exist  in  the  Eastern  provinces  of  Prussia,  would 
restrict  herself  to  defence  against  Germany,  employing  her 
remaining  forces  for  the  invasion  of  Eastern  Galicia.  But 
such  a  combination  is  improbable.  The  chief  political 
question  lies  in  the  crushing  of  Germany.  Having  wasted 
her  strength  in  a  struggle  with  Austria,  Russia  would 
be  still  less  able  to  force  Germany  to  lay  down  her 
arms. 

According  to  General  Brialmont  two  Russian  armies 
might  at  the  same  time  operate  against  Austria,  one  having 
as  its  goal  Vienna,  and  the  other  Buda-Pesth.  The  con- 
sideration of  plans  of  operation  in  these  directions  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  Russian  army  would  have  to 
overcome  immense  obstacles,  and  to  march  through  a 
country  already  more  or  less  exhausted. 

But  even  in  the  event  of  Russian  victory  the  results 
obtained  would  hardly  compensate  for  the  war. 

For  in  assuming  that  Russia  were  to  carry  the  war  into 
the  territory  of  one  of  the  allies,  we  must  consider  the 
possibility  that  Germany  would  return  Alsace-Lorraine  to 
France,  and  that  the  Government  of  France  might  not  be 
in  a  state  to  oppose  the  popular  movement  in  favour  of  the 
conclusion  of  peace.  If  this  were  to  happen  the  whole 
plan  of  attack,  based  upon  the  diversion  by  France  of  half 
the  forces  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  would  have  to  be  aban- 
doned. 

n  all  possible  combinations  a  European  war  in 
ssia  took  part  would  result  in  complete  exhaus- 
th  combatants.  Nevertheless,  estimates  of  the 
and  distribution  of  armies,  the  resources  for 
em  up  to  strength,  and  economic  endurance, 
Russia  will  be  in  a  condition  to  sustain  a  war 
/.     Even  the  occupation  of  one  of  the  Russian 


«0,. 


PLANS  OF  CAMPAIGN  91 

capitals,  perhaps  of  both,  would  not  force  her  to  uncondi- 
tional surrender.  On  the  other  hand,  the  advance  of  the 
Russian  armies  into  Prussia  or  Austria  would  not  result 
in  any  certain  success. 

Generally,  it  is  difficult  to  foresee  what  actual  strategical 
results  would  issue  from  this  immense  struggle,  or  how  it 
would  end.  Russia,  even  with  the  failure  of  her  arms  in 
some  directions,  relying  upon  the  immensity  of  her  terri- 
tories and  the  approach  of  an  inclement  winter,  would  not 
be  inclined  to  the  conclusion  of  peace.  As  for  western 
countries,  with  the  complexity  of  their  economic  and  social 
polity,  with  the  mutual  interdependence  of  all  the  wheels 
of  the  internal  m.echanism,  it  is  difficult  to  form  any  idea 
how  a  great  and  prolonged  war  would  react  on  the 
economic  and  social  order.  It  is  unquestionable  that  the 
fear  of  those  internal  agitations  which  would  be  awakened 
by  a  crisis  will  have  great  influence  in  dissuading  govern- 
ments against  undertaking  a  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  once  war  has  broken  out  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  will  present  great  difficulties  to  any 
government,  either  after  failure  or  success.  At  first  it 
will  seem  that  the  results  obtained  in  no  way  compensate 
for  the  sacrifices  made,  and  grave  difficulties  may  present 
themselves  even  in  the  disarmament  of  masses  of  men. 
In  the  second  case — that  is,  of  failure — the  stoppage  of 
military  operations  without  attaining  the  results  expected 
might  easily  give  rise  to  revolutionary  movements.  Even 
in  Russia,  with  all  its  political  fortresses,  the  war  of 
1877-78  resulted  in  a  temporary  strengthening  of  the 
revolutionary  propaganda^  although  that  propaganda 
was  carried  on  by  an  insignificant  proportion  of  the 
people. 

General  plans  of  operation  against  possible  enemies 
are  elaborated  by  the  General  Staffs  of  all  armies.  In 
these  plans  are  unquestionably  indicated  the  resources 
and  time  that  will  be  required  for  the  attainment  of  certain 
objects.  But  we  may  doubt  whether  in  any  of  such  plans 
the  economic  conditions  have  been  considered.  On  more 
than  one  occasiop  we  have  spoken  to   M.   Burdeau,  the 


^^o©.> 


^t>\ 


92  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

French  Minister  of  Marine,  a  man  of  the  highest  capacity, 
who  frankly  admitted  that  when  M.  Freycinet  was  Minister 
of  War  it  was  proposed  to  undertake  an  inquiry  into  the 
economic  conditions  which  would  accompany  war,  but  this 
project  had  to  be  abandoned  in  consequence  of  the  oppo- 
sition met  with  in  military  circles. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   FUTURE   OF   NAVAL   WARFARE 

Since  the  time  of  the  Franco-German  war  certain  principles 
have  been  advocated  in  relation  to  maritime  warfare  which, 
if  practised,  involve  a  return  to  the  conditions  of  barbarism. 
The  advance  which  has  taken  place  in  that  period  in  naval 
affairs  is  interesting  not  only  in  itself,  but  also  because  of 
the  influence  which  it  must  exert  on  the  character  of  war 
on  land.  The  possibility  of  the  destruction  of  maritime 
towns,  the  interruption  of  oversea  supplies,  and  the  severing 
of  certain  states  from  communication  with  the  rest  of  the 
world  may  awaken  dangerous  movements  and  cause  the 
stoppage  of  a  war  on  land  earlier  than  the  results  expected 
have  been  attained.  But  a  naval  war  between  two  European 
powers  with  equal  fleets  is  improbable,  since  it  would  result 
in  mutual  destruction. 

With  the  wars  of  the  past,  again,  no  comparison  could 
be  drawn.  In  view  of  the  immense  influence  which  a 
naval  war  may  exert  on  the  economic  and  social  conditions 
of  peoples,  it  might  be  expected  that  all  questions  connected 
with  the  building  of  warships  and  their  operations  had 
already  been  submitted  to  careful  study  and  consideration. 
But  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  has  been  done.  In  France, 
still  dreaming  of  vengeance,  every  investigation  which 
would  emphasise  the  ruinous  consequences  of  maritime 
war  in  its  new  conditions  is  unpopular,  since  such  investi- 
gation would  unquestionably  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
will  be  almost  impossible  to  carry  on  a  war  on  dry  land  so 
as  to  realise  the  first  hopes.  In  Germany,  maritime  war  is 
treated  of  only  by  specialists,  who  restrain  themselves  in 


94  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

the  expression  of  views  as  to  the  ruinous  results  which 
war  might  involve.  Exceptions  to  this  rule  are  few. 
Among  their  number  may  be  found  the  economist  Rudolf 
Meyer  and  Admiral  Werner.  In  Italy,  the  Government  is 
generally  condemned  for  the  intolerable  burdens  to  which 
the  people  are  subjected  for  the  maintenance  of  armed 
forces  generally,  and  in  particular  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  fleet ;  and  it  is  the  interest  of  the  Government  to 
prevent  the  circulation  of  pessimistic  views.  Russia  and 
Austria  concern  themselves  little  with  maritime  warfare, 
since  for  them  these  questions  are  of  secondary  importance. 
England  is  an  exception,  and  much  interest  is  taken  there  ; 
and  this  is  natural,  both  on  account  of  her  geographical 
position  and  because  her  population  depends  directly  upon 
oversea  supplies. 

But  even  in  England  no  clear  idea  of  the  recent  revolu- 
tion in  methods,  and  of  the  consequences  of  a  naval  war, 
has  yet  penetrated  to  the  masses,  and  the  assurance  of 
specialists  is  accepted  that  between  the  naval  warfare  of  the 
present  and  the  past  no  fundamental  difference  which 
would  exclude  comparison  exists. 

In  order  to  establish  a  contrary  proposition,  a  searching 
study  of  the  methods  which  have  been  prepared  for  naval 
warfare  would  be  necessary.  Without  this  it  is  impossible 
to  estimate  the  significance  of  the  change.  But  a  popular 
description  of  systems  of  attack  and  defence  at  sea  presents 
even  greater  difficulties  than  the  description  of  war  on 
land. 

To  give  an  idea  to  laymen  of  the  mechanism  prepared 
for  maritime  war  to-day,  and  to  facilitate  comparison  with 
the  mechanism  employed  in  the  past,  it  is  necessary  to 
compare  the  growth  and  perfection  of  fleets,  and  the 
methods  adopted  for  their  utilisation  by  different  states. 
In  such  a  comparison  we  find  a  peculiar  circumstance 
which  greatly  increases  the  complexity  of  the  subject.  In 
the  comparison  of  armies  we  deal  with  a  quantity  of 
similar  units — soldiers,  artillery,  and  horses.  But  for  the 
comparison  of  the  fleets  of  the  different  powers  at  different 
times,  we  have  to  deal  with  varying  units,  since  not  only 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE    95 

the  armaments  of  ships  have  changed,  but  the  very  type. 
Many  suppose  that  a  single  modern  ironclad,  a  single 
swift  cruiser  with  long-range  weapons,  supplied  with 
explosive  shells,  will  be  able  to  accomplish  work  for  which 
a  squadron  would  formerly  have  been  needed. 

With  the  adoption  of  steamers  for  naval  warfare,  sailing 
ships  gradually  disappeared  from  the  composition  of  navies. 
Yet  as  late  as  the  beginning  of  the  Crimean  war  the  Black 
Sea  fleet  counted  only  7  steam-frigates,  of  i960  steam- 
power,  armed  with  49  guns,  the  remainder  of  the  fleet 
being  composed  of  sailing  ships.  The  allied  fleets  con- 
tained the  following  number  of  steamers  :  England  24,  of 
5859  steam-power;  the  French  12,  of  4960  steam-power. 
The  number  of  guns  on  the  Russian  fleet  was  about  2000, 
and  on  the  allies  2449.  The  impossibility  of  sailing  ships 
accepting  battle  with  freely  manoeuvring  steamers  was 
•then  fully  demonstrated,  for  the  greater  part  of  the  Black 
Sea  fleet  was  destroyed.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 
the  Baltic  fleet,  composed  of  weakly  constructed  vessels, 
made  even  a  less  successful  show  against  the  allies. 

After  the  close  of  the  Crimean  war  the  Ministry  of 
Marine  actively  undertook  the  construction  of  a  steam 
fleet  for  the  Baltic,  as  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  the  destroyed  Black  Sea  fleet  was  not  to  be  rebuilt. 
This  work  was  carried  on  in  the  spirit  which  generally 
characterises  an  epoch  of  reform.  But,  owing  to  want  of 
experience,  the  new  vessels  did  not  answer  requirements, 
especially  in  respect  to  long  distance  steaming.  The  pro- 
gramme of  construction  had  not  been  fully  executed  when 
armour  began  to  play  such  an  important  part  in  the 
building  of  warships  that  the  wooden  ships  then  building 
lost  their  value  as  fighting  units. 

At  the  end  of  1870,  when  Paris  was  besieged  by  the 
Germans,  the  Russian  Government,  in  view  of  the  political 
changes  taking  place  in  Europe,  declared  that  it  no  longer 
regarded  as  binding  the  articles  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
relating  to  the  keeping  of  warships  in  the  Black  Sea. 
But  the  new  Black  Sea  fleet  had  hardly  been  built  before 
the  war  of  1877  broke  out,  and  the  fleet  had  no  influence 


96  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

on  the  course  of  operations,  although  the  Russian  sailors 
distinguished  themselves  by  exploits,  and  destroyed  several 
Turkish  vessels. 

The  first  appearance  of  armoured  ships  dates  back  to 
the  time  of  the  Crimean  war.  The  bombardment  of 
Sevastopol  by  the  combined  Anglo-French  fleets  showed 
the  allies  that  their  wooden  vessels  might  easily  be  set  on 
fire  and  destroyed,  in  a  battle  with  fortresses.  The  conse- 
quence of  this  discovery  was  an  attempt  to  protect  vessels 
with  iron  plates,  and  in  1854  France  began  the  construc- 
tion of  three  armoured  floating  batteries  destined  for 
attack  upon  the  Russian  coast  fortifications  in  the  Black 
Sea.  The  English,  with  the  intention  of  attacking  Cron- 
stadt  in  1856,  constructed  seven  floating  batteries.  The 
Russian  shells  directed  against  these  batteries  only  occa- 
sioned damage  when  they  accidentally  fell  into  the  em- 
brasures. From  this  the  conclusion  was  drawn  that  if' 
vessels  were  built  well  protected  with  armour,  and  able  to 
manoeuvre  freely  in  the  open  sea,  they  would  be  inde- 
structible. 

In  1858,  by  order  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.,  the 
building  of  the  first  armoured  frigate  Gloire  was  begun 
on  the  plan  of  the  celebrated  engineer  Dupuy  de  Lome. 
This  frigate,  in  the  words  of  its  builder,  was  to  be  **  a  lion 
in  a  flock  of  sheep."  The  cost  of  construction  reached 
i^28o,ooo — that  is,  almost  three  times  the  cost  of  the 
greatest  line-of-battle  ships,  but  in  view  of  the  immense 
results  that  were  expected,  this  outlay  was  not  considered 
extravagant. 

The  initiative  of  France  was  quickly  imitated  both  by 
England  and  America.  The  deciding  circumstance,  how- 
ever, which  led  to  the  final  supersession  of  wooden  ships 
was  the  American  Civil  War,  when  the  exploit  of  the 
Merrimac,  and  the  subsequent  battle  between  the  Monitor 
and  Mcrj'imac  showed  the  ineffectiveness  of  wooden  ships, 
and  the  immense  power  of  resistance  of  armour. 

This  change  acted  most  disadvantageously  for  Russia; 
the  new  steam  fleet  had  only  just  been  completed,  and  the 
need  for  re-building  came  when,  as  a  consequence  of  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE    97 

Crimean  war,  the  finances  of  the  country  were  in  a 
desperate  state.  But  to  delay  was  impossible,  and  fresh 
events  emphasised  the  necessity  for  proceeding  with  the 
new  construction  without  delay. 

As  is  well  known,  Russia  in  the  sixties  was  threatened 
with  a  rupture  with  the  Western  powers  over  the  Polish 
question.  In  1863  a  committee  was  formed  under  the 
presidency  of  General-Adjutant  Kruizhanovski  to  consider 
the  measures  necessary  for  placing  Cronstadt  in  a  position 
of  defence.  The  general  opinion  of  that  committee  was, 
that  with  the  resources  possessed  by  the  enemies  of  Russia 
in  1863,  Cronstadt  could  not  be  defended,  and  considering 
the  skill  and  persistence  of  the  enemy  even  the  capital 
could  not  be  considered  safe.  The  committee  found  that 
by  means  of  coast  fortifications  alone,  without  mobile 
defences  consisting  of  forty  floating  batteries,  monitors, 
and  gunboats,  the  defence  of  Cronstadt  would  be  im- 
possible. 

While  vessels  of  war  were  constructed  of  wood,  the 
materials  and  the  capacity  to  work  them  were  found  in 
Russia.  The  case  was  otherwise  when  iron  vessels  had 
to  be  built  and  equipped  with  costly  machinery  and 
weapons.  Nevertheless,  considering  the  financial  diffi- 
culties, energetic  measures  were  taken  to  construct  an 
armoured  fleet. 

Meantime  the  other  maritime  powers,  recognising  that 
they  were  almost  defenceless  without  increase  of  their 
fleets  of  armoured  vessels,  began  with  feverish  activity 
to  attempt  to  attain  what  is  apparently  unattainable — that 
is,  to  build  armoured  vessels  which  would  resist  the 
action  of  the  strongest  artillery. 

Not  one  of  the  details  of  naval  affairs,  not  even  the  con- 
struction of  ships,  presents  such  amazing  results  in  the 
way  of  novelty  and  improvement  as  have  been  attained 
since  i860  in  naval  ordnance.  The  best  idea  of  this  may 
be  given  by  a  contrast  of  the  armaments  of  the  Russian 
fleet  of  to-day  with  its  predecessors.  We  will  take  the 
old  84  Prokhor  and  the  modern  Piotr  Veliki  which  carries 
only  four  12-inch  rifled  guns.     With  one  discharge  of  its 

G 


98  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

guns  the  Piotr  Veliki  develops  three  times  the  power  of  a 
similar  discharge  from  the  guns  of  the  ProkJior.  The 
whole  84  guns  of  the  ProkJior  if  they  could  be  directed  at 
once  in  one  direction  would  not  cause  the  slightest  damage 
to  the  armour  of  the  weakest  of  modern  armoured  vessels, 
while  every  shot  tired  from  a  distance  of  7000  feet  from 
the  modern  12-inch  rifles  against  the  strongest  of  modern 
ironclads,  will  penetrate  the  side  3  feet  thick  and  protected 
by  a  13-inch  plate.  In  addition  to  this,  all  four  weapons 
of  the  Piotr  Veliki  might  be  directed  against  a  compara- 
tively small  space  of  the  ship's  side.  But  even  these  guns 
will  be  powerless  against  some  of  the  ironclads  now  under 
construction,  which  are  protected  by  20-inch  and  even 
24-inch  steel  armour,  and,  in  consequence,  by  the  side  of 
these  armour-clads  will  be  invented  even  more  powerful 
guns.  The  more  perfect  the  guns  the  stronger  the  armour 
which  has  been  produced  for  protection  against  them.  This 
struggle  continues  even  at  the  present  day. 

For  employment  against  armour,  steel  projectiles  w^ere 
made,  and  the  force  of  the  impact  increased  ;  thus  in  turn 
calling  for  stronger  armour,  against  which  still  more 
powerful  projectiles  are  employed.  A  rivalry  in  invention 
began.  Sometimes  armour  was  uppermost,  sometimes 
projectiles.  But  no  one  listened  to  the  voice  of  the  eco- 
nomists who  foretold  the  consequence  of  this  rivalry.  To 
illustrate  this  we  may  cite  some  figures  as  to  the  cost  of 
modern  vessels  of  war.  The  cost  of  a  first-class  line-of- 
battle  ship,  impelled  by  sails,  did  not  exceed  ;^  11 5,000. 
The  building  of  the  first  English  ironclad  Warrior  in 
i860  entailed  an  outlay  of  ;^3 50,000.  But  this  was  but 
the  beginning  in  the  growth  in  the  cost  of  warships.  The 
German  ironclad  Koenig  Wilhelm^  built  in  1868,  cost 
^500,000,  the  Italian  Diiilio,  in  1876,  ;^700,ooo,  the  Italia, 
1886,  ;^  1,000,000.  Thus  in  twenty  years  the  cost  of  iron- 
clads increased  three  times.  A  great  part  of  this  outlay 
is  swallowed  up  by  armour.  Of  ;^840,ooo  spent  on  one 
of  the  latest  ironclads.  Magenta,  ;^6oo,COO,  that  is,  71  per 
cent.,  was  spent  upon  armour. 

Let  us  examine  the  instruments  of  destruction  of  these 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  99 

maritime  giants.  A  battleship  of  the  old  type  of  the  first 
rank  was  armed  with  120  guns,  weighing  480  tons.  The 
first  ironclad  carried  only  32  guns,  but  these  weighed 
690  tons.  On  the  ironclad  Italia^  built  in  1886,  were 
carried  only  4  large  and  8  small  guns,  yet  they  weighed 
nearly  double  as  much  as  the  32  guns  of  the  first  ironclad, 
namely,  11 50  tons.  Thus  since  the  days  of  sailing  ships 
the  weight  of  guns  has  increased  more  than  150  times. 
The  size  and  weight  of  ammunition  has,  of  course,  corre- 
spondingly increased,  and  also  the  destructive  force  of 
explosive  shells.  The  diameter  of  the  shells  of  the 
ironclad  Warrior  was  approximately  6\  inches,  its  weight 
70  pounds  ;  on  the  armour-clad  Italia  the  diameter  is  in- 
creased to  17  inches,  and  the  weight  to  2000  pounds. 
In  the  course  of  twenty  years  the  power  of  a  shell,  taking 
only  its  weight  into  account,  has  increased   30  times. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  is  the  limit.  England 
continues  to  stand  at  the  head  of  the  states  who  seek  for 
improvements  in  weapons  of  destruction  at  sea.  Some 
years  ago  English  ships  were  armed  with  guns  of  a  calibre 
of  12  inches,  and  armour  nearly  12  inches  thick.  At 
a  later  time  they  carried  guns  with  a  calibre  of  16  inches, 
weighing  80  tons,  and  throwing  a  shell  weighing  1760 
pounds.  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Italy  had  armed 
her  ironclads  Duilio  and  Dandolo  with  guns  weighing 
100  tons,  the  English  consider  a  project  of  building 
200-ton  guns  which  will  throw  a  shell  of  nearly  three  tons 
weight,  and  pierce  armour  35  J  inches  thick. 
^  What  is  the  outlay  on  the  use  of  such  weapons  ? 
Le  Progres  Militairc,  on  the  basis  of  statistics  taken  from 
the  French  naval  budget,  makes  the  following  estimate. 
The  firing  of  a  shell  from  a  no-ton  gun  costs  £^66, 
which  corresponds  to  a  capital  of  ;^4i6o.  This  sum  is 
thus  apportioned  :  ^^36  for  990  pounds  of  powder,  ;^I30 
for  the  projectile,  total,  £166.  But  this  is  not  all.  A 
no-gun  will  stand  only  93  shots,  after  which  it  becomes 
useless  for  further  employment.  As  the  cost  of  such  a 
weapon  amounts  to  ;^  16,480  it  appears  that  with  every  shot 
fired  the  value  of  the  arm  diminishes  by  ^174,  from  which 


loo  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

we  find  that  every  shot  fired  will  cost  ;£340.  Thus  with 
every  shot  is  thrown  away  the  yearly  interest  on  a  capital 
of  -^8500.  A  thousand  of  such  shots  would  represent  a 
capital  of  ^^8, 500,000. 

Passing  to  arms  of  smaller  calibre  it  is  shown  that  a  shot 
fired  from  a  77-ton  gun  (the  cost  of  which  is  ^10,000, 
and  which  will  stand  127  shots)  costs  ;^i84,  a  shot  from  a 
45-ton  gun  (which  costs  ;^6300,  and  is  useless  after  150 
shots  have  been  fired)  amounts  to  ;^98.  Only  the  lives 
of  the  sailors  on  fleets  are  considered  as  valueless. 

General  Pestitch  draws  a  very  interesting  contrast. 
He  says  :  "  Six  Russian  ships  taking  part  in  the  battle 
of  Sinope  were  armed  with  about  600  guns,  out  of  which 
the  300  guns  employed  destroyed  all  that  was  in  Sinope, 
yet  the  cost  of  these  300  guns,  in  the  values  of  that  time, 
did  not  exceed  the  cost  of  a  single  modern  1 00-ton 
gun.  What  results  are  to  be  expected  from  one  weapon 
which  in  an  hour  may  be  fired  no  more  than  five  times  ?  " 
An  answer  to  this  question  it  seems  can  be  given  only  by 
a  future  war.  The  guns  on  modern  battleships  will  be* 
able  to  bombard  ports,  fortresses  and  towns,  as  many 
specialists  declare,  from  a  distance  of  nearly  seven  miles. 

But  this  increase  of  power  has  not  been  restricted  to 
battleships  alone.  Many  specialists  consider  it  more 
advisable  to  build  light  and  swift  cruisers  with  powerful 
armaments,  and  torpedo  boats  which  move  almost  unnoticed 
through  the  water  with  the  speed  of  a  mail  train.  As 
soon  as  the  construction  of  ships  was  perfected  to  such  an 
extent  that  England  was  able  to  place  on  the  sea  a  con- 
siderable number  of  ironclads,  armed  with  powerful  guns, 
and  protected  by  thick  steel  armour,  the  question  naturally 
arose  :  Would  it  not  be  possible  to  direct  mines  underneath 
these  immense  ships,  and  destroy  them  by  means  of 
powerful  explosions  in  the  vicinity  of  weakly  defended 
parts  ?  For  a  long  time  the  application  of  this  idea  was 
unsuccessful,  many  obstacles  had  to  be  overcome,  and 
only  in  recent  times  has  the  question  been  successfully 
resolved.  Then  began  the  construction  of  vessels  specially 
designed  for  the  purpose  of  discharging  torpedoes.     Ex- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  loi 

perience  showed  that  vessels  discharging  the  torpedo  ran 
no  risk  in  employing  a  mine  of  55  to  66  pounds  of  powder, 
13  to  15  pounds  of  dynamite,  or  22  to  27  pounds  of  per- 
oxylene,  if  it  be  not  less  than  19 J  feet  distant  from  the 
place  of  explosion,  the  mine  being  at  a  depth  of  7  feet.  Since 
from  igh  feet  distance  there  is  little  difficulty  in  directing  a 
torpedo  against  an  enemy's  ship  by  the  use  of  a  pole,  the 
problem  became  simply  how  best  to  build  vessels  which 
would  be  unnoticed  on  approach.  In  the  Russo-Turkish 
war  of  1877,  out  of  nine  cases  of  attack  by  Russian  torpedo 
boats  the  Turks  lost  one  ironclad  and  two  steamers,  while 
three  ironclads  were  injured.  The  loss  in  men  is  unknown. 
On  the  Russian  side  three  torpedo  boats  were  injured,  also 
three  steam  sloops,  while  one  torpedo  boat  was  sunken. 
Two  sailors  were  killed  and  ten  wounded. 

Similar  results  were  obtained  in  the  time  of  the  French- 
Tonkin  war  of  1885.  Two  ordinary  steam  cutters,  not  more 
than  46  feet  in  length,  armed  with  torpedoes,  on  the 
night  of  the  14-15  February,  1885,  attacked  a  Chinese 
frigate  of  3500  tons  and  sank  it.  This  frigate  was  hidden 
in  the  harbour  of  Shein  under  the  cover  of  fortifications, 
but  the  French  Admiral  Courbet  was  at  a  distance  of 
several  knots  from  this  harbour.  Hidden  in  the  darkness 
the  French  cutters  covered  the  distance  unnoticed,  and 
after  destroying  the  Chinese  ship  returned  uninjured  to 
the  admiral's  flagship. 

The  history  of  the  Chilian  war  presents  a  similar  case, 
when,  after  an  attack  lasting  no  more  than  seven  minutes, 
the  Congressionalist  ironclad  Blanco  Encalada  was  sent  to 
the  bottom. 

From  this  is  evident  the  immense  danger  with  which 
armour-clads  are  threatened  by  torpedo-boats  armed  with 
Whitehead  and  other  torpedoes  of  recent  design.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  not  only  torpedo-boats,  but  almost  all 
ships  of  war  are  armed  with  such  weapons  of  destruction 
to-day. 

It  is  natural  that  the  complement  of  these  inventions 
was  a  new  system  of  defence  against  the  action  of  torpedo- 
boats.     A  new  type  of  war  vessel,  the  torpedo-catcher,  was 


I02  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

evolved,  specially  adapted  for  dealing  with  torpedo-boats, 
powerfully  armed,  and  steaming  at  a  speed  of  32  knots  an 
hour. 

Admiral  Werner  declares  that  as  soon  as  the  price  of 
aluminium  falls  so  low  that  it  may  be  employed  for  the 
construction  of  ships,  the  sides  of  ships  will  be  so  power- 
fully protected,  in  consequence  of  the  lightness  of  the 
material,  that  the  strongest  explosive  shell  will  not 
penetrate  them,  and  a  battle  against  torpedo-boats  will 
become  mere  child's  play.  Now  the  price  of  aluminium 
has  lately  fallen  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is  already  being 
employed  for  many  articles  of  domestic  use,  such  as  keys. 
If  this  prophecy  be  fulfilled  the  European  powers  will  be 
compelled  to  disburse  fresh  millions  on  aluminium  ships. 
This  could  have  but  one  consequence.  Invention,  even 
now  stimulated  in  most  countries  by  manufacturers  and 
their  patrons,  would  seek  to  discover  even  more  powerful 
explosive  combinations.  The  last  act  in  this  rivalry  it  is 
impossible  to  foresee. 

For  the  purpose  of  protection  against  mines,  the  more 
important  parts  of  warships,  the  boilers  and  engines,  are 
now  being  protected  even  under  water  by  especial 
armour,  and  surrounded  with  layers  of  coal.  In  addition 
water-tight  compartments  have  been  adopted  to  ensure 
the  unsinkability  of  the  ships,  and  torpedo-nets  are 
carried.  The  value  of  such  defences  will  be  proved  in 
the  future.  But  experiments  carried  on  in  England  have 
tended  to  show  that  the  protection  of  torpedo-nets  is 
ineffective.  On  experiment  being  made  to  ascertain 
whether  a  torpedo-boat  might  pass  through  an  obstacle 
constructed  of  strong  beams,  it  was  shown  that  the 
torpedo-boat,  striking  the  obstacle  when  at  a  speed  of  20 
knots,  broke  it  and  returned  to  harbour  undamaged. 

A  commission  appointed  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  question  of  attack 
by  and  defence  against  torpedo-boats,  came  to  the  alm.ost 
unanimous  conclusion  that  torpedo-boats  will  certainly 
destroy  an  armour-clad  if  they  escape  destruction  during 
the  two  minutes  in  the  course  of  which  the  vessel  attacked 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE    103 

will  be  able  to  employ  its  quick-firing  guns.  But  the 
effectiveness  of  defence  is  weakened  by  the  fact  that  in 
all  navies  the  number  of  torpedo-boats  is  from  three  to 
seven  times  greater  than  the  number  of  armour-clads,  and 
the  loss  of  several  torpedo-boats  cannot  be  compared  in 
gravity  with  the  loss  of  a  single  armour-clad  carrying  an 
incomparably  larger  crew,  and  costing  an  incomparably 
greater  sum. 

It  is  true  that  the  smallness  of  torpedo-boats  and  the 
insignificant  quantity  of  stores  they  carry  prevent  them 
from  seeking  an  enemy  in  the  open  sea.  But  these 
obstacles  are  overcome  by  the  building  of  special  vessels 
for  the  transport  of  torpedo-boats.  In  addition,  all  tor- 
pedo-boats built  to-day  are  seagoing,  develop  great  speed, 
and  steam  a  considerable  distance  with  their  own  supply 
of  coal,  while  their  size  is  being  increased  on  all  sides. 

In  any  event,  it  is  not  reckless  to  predict  in  the  near 
future  the  invention  of  subterranean  torpedo-boats,  w^hich 
will  carry  torpedoes  of  such  power  that  even  aluminium 
armour  will  not  avail  to  save  the  vessel  attacked. 

A  future  war  on  sea  might  be  considered  under  the 
following  heads  :  Operations  on  the  littoral,  operations 
against  ports  and  merchant  ships,  and  battles  between 
separate  ships,  squadrons,  and  fleets.  With  long-range 
modern  guns  and  powerful  projectiles,  maritime  towns 
may  be  threatened  with  a  destruction  from  which  they  will 
not  recover  for  a  long  time.  Of  the  smooth-bore  12-inch 
mortar  of  the  old  type,  the  greatest  range  was  2500  yards  ; 
the  modern  I2i-inch  guns  of  the  Canet  system  throw  a 
shell  weighing  986  pounds,  and  filled  with  275  pounds 
of  explosives,  to  a  distance  of  11,^  miles,  so  that  towns 
may  now  be  bombarded  from  a  considerable  distance.  It 
must  be  remembered  that,  as  is  shown  by  the  practice  at 
manoeuvres,  the  principle  that  undefended  towns  are  not 
to  be  subjected  to  bombardment  is  not  acknowledged,  and 
in  a  future  war  no  town  will  be  spared.  As  evidence  of 
this  the  following  case  may  be  cited.  On  August  24,  1889, 
the  following  letter  was  addressed  by  the  commander  of 
the  Collingwood  to  the  Mayor  of  Peterhead  : 


I04  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

By  order  of  the  Vice- Admiral  commanding  the  nth  division  of 
the  fleet :  I  have  to  demand  from  your  town  a  contribution  of 
;^i  50,000  sterling.  I  require  you  to  deliver  to  the  bearer  of  this 
letter  a  guarantee  of  the  immediate  fulfilment  of  this  condition. 
I  regret  the  necessity  of  demanding  such  a  large  sum  from  the 
peace-loving  and  industrious  population  of  the  town,  but  I  cannot 
act  otherwise  in  view  of  the  immense  contributions  exacted  by 
your  warships  from  the  prosperous  city  of  Belfast.  I  must  add 
that  in  case  the  officers  who  deliver  this  letter  do  not  return 
within  the  course  of  two  hours  the  town  will  be  burnt,  the  ship- 
ping destroyed,  and  factories  ruined. 

This  letter  was  printed  in  all  the  newspapers,  and 
called  forth  no  protest.  On  a  question  being  raised  on 
the  subject  in  the  House  of  Commons,  the  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty  answered  evasively.  It  is  evident  then  that 
England  will  not  refrain  from  such  action  when  convenient, 
and  as  her  voice  is  the  most  important  in  naval  matters, 
the  other  powers  will  certainly  follow  her  example. 

To  avoid  such  dangers,  all  powers  have  occupied  them- 
selves with  the  defence  of  their  coasts  by  means  of  fortifi- 
cations, and  the  building  of  railways  for  the  transport  of 
artillery  from  one  point  to  another  as  the  exigencies  of 
defence  demand.  But  the  firing  from  coast  batteries, 
notwithstanding  ingenious  methods  of  measuring  the 
distance  of  moving  and  hardly  visible  objects,  would  be 
only  waste  of  powder  and  shell.  A  steamer  moving  with 
a  speed  of  13  miles  an  hour  will  in  30  seconds  traverse 
175  yards  while  a  shot  from  coast  artillery  requires  about 
five  minutes.  By  skilful  artillerymen  this  time  might  be 
shortened  to  from  two  to  three  minutes.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  bombardment  of  the  immense  spaces  covered 
by  coast  towns  almost  every  shell  will  find  its  sacrifice, 
and  each  upon  explosion  will  cause  ruin  over  an  immense 
space. 

The  blockade  of  ports  in  a  future  war  is  also  likely  to 
have  immense  importance,  since  each  of  the  combatants  will 
consider  as  a  main  object  the  interruption  of  the  maritime 
communications  of  the  other,  and  the  causing  of  all  possible 
damage  to  trade  b}^  blockading  his  ships  in  ports  and 
harbours. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE    105 

But  history  teaches  that  even  in  a  time  when  sails  were 
the  only  method  of  sailing,  single  vessels  and  even  whole 
squadrons  succeeded  in  escaping  into  the  open  sea.  It 
would  seem  that  nowadays,  what  with  the  speed  of 
vessels,  and  the  strength  of  coast  defences  which  compel 
blockading  ships  to  remain  at  a  considerable  distance, 
no  state  can  rely  absolutely  upon  closing  the  ports  of  even 
a  weaker  enemy,  whose  cruisers  may  therefore  keep  the 
sea,  and  injure  and  interrupt  the  trade  of  the  stronger 
power. 

In  contrast  with  that  which  is  the  case  on  land,  the  field 
of  battle  at  sea  is  in  no  way  limited,  and  both  sides 
have  a  free  choice  of  movement.  Here  we  find  not  a 
certain  number  of  human  beings,  but  a  limited  number  of 
floating  fortresses  equipped  with  complex  machinery,  and 
armed  with  guns  and  torpedoes  of  almost  miraculous 
power,  cruisers  which  for  rapidity  of  movement  may  be 
likened  to  the  fabled  giant  with  the  seven-league  boots, 
and  finally  torpedo-boats  equipped  with  forces  capable  of 
sending  the  greatest  battleship  to  the  bottom.  In  open 
sea  battle  will  take  place  only  at  the  will  of  the  swifter 
fleet.  The  commander  will  also  find  himself  in  a  position 
different  from  that  of  a  general  on  land.  At  sea  the  com- 
mander is  first  in  the  battle,  he  stands  in  the  midst  of  all, 
he  is  the  first  object  of  the  enemy's  fire,  his  decision  must 
be  immediate.  In  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  specialists, 
vessels  which  take  part  in  great  battles  will  issue  from 
them  damaged  to  such  an  extent,  that  for  the  rest  of  the 
period  for  which  the  war  will  last  they  need  not  be  taken 
into  account. 

In  the  first  half  of  the  present  century  the  effect  of 
shore  batteries  on  ships,  and  the  results  of  battles  be- 
tween ships  themselves,  were  not  very  terrible.  The 
heavy  shot  discharged  by  smooth-bore  guns  carried  for  a 
very  short  distance,  often  missed  its  target,  and  the  greater 
part  of  the  damage  it  caused  could  be  repaired  by  means 
at  hand. 

The  adaptation  of  rifled  guns,  and  of  shells  charged  with 
high  explosives,  have  entirely  changed  the  conditions  of 


io6  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

war.  The  destruction  now  caused  by  a  single  well-aimed 
shell  is  so  great  that  in  comparison  the  effect  of  red-hot 
shot  is  but  a  trifle.  Modern  shells  will  not  merely  penetrate 
vessels,  causing  a  puncture  their  own  diameter  in  size,  but 
will  destroy  whole  sections  of  the  ship,  annihilating  every- 
thing around  them.  Yet  on  modern  vessels  are  found 
machinery  of  every  kind,  marine  engines,  dynamo-electric 
engines,  pumping,  steering,  hauling,  and  ventilating  appa- 
ratus. Every  gun,  every  steam  pinnace  has  its  own  com- 
plex machinery.  Add  to  this  miles  of  electric  wire,  and  a 
wilderness  of  constructions  of  every  kind  concentrated  in 
the  machinery  departments,  in  which  men  by  artificial 
light,  and  in  artificially  induced  atmosphere,  in  isolated 
groups,  and  cut  off  from  their  commanders,  must  with  full 
control  of  their  business,  execute  immediately  and  coolly 
orders  proceeding  from  an  unseen  leader  by  telegraph. 
Such,  in  brief,  is  the  modern  man-of-war. 

To  give  some  idea  of  the  role  played  by  machinery  in 
modern  ships  we  may  cite  a  comparison  made  by  Admiral 
Makarof  between  a  wooden  frigate  of  the  old  type  and 
the  modern  cruiser  Rurik :  **  The  engines  and  boilers  of 
the  cruiser  Rurik  occupy  192  feet  length  in  the  widest 
part  of  the  ship.  In  order  to  understand  what  this  means 
we  may  say  that  if  we  were  to  take  out  of  the  ship  the 
engines  and  boilers,  also  the  coal  bunkers,  and  fill  the 
vacant  space  with  water,  a  frigate  of  the  old  type  might 
easily  be  moored  inside,  with  all  its  equipment  and  all  its 
guns.  Around  the  frigate  there  would  be  sufficient  space  to 
steer  a  pinnace.  Within  this  space  of  192  feet  all  is  com- 
pressed to  a  seemingly  impossible  extent.  .  .  .  The  engi- 
neer must  be  an  acrobat,  and  the  stoker,  who  with  forced 
draught  must  make  the  boiler  give  twice  the  steam 
pressure  that  corresponds  to  its  dimensions,  must  in 
endurance  and  energy  give  way  in  little  to  Satan  him- 
self" 

With  growing  complexity  of  the  mechanism  the  need 
for  intelligence  has  also  grown.  In  former  times  when 
wind  was  the  only  motive  power  of  vessels  the  result  of 
battles  depended  much   from  skilful  seamanship,  and  in 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  107 

the  end  of  ends  was  decided  by  boarding.  Steam  power 
has  entirely  changed  these  conditions.  The  course  of  the 
battle  will  be  determined  by  steam  alone,  whatever  may  be 
the  direction  of  the  wind,  and  it  will  be  decided  by  tor- 
pedoes, by  artillery,  or  by  the  ram.  In  the  time  of  sail- 
ing ships  a  movement  once  determined  upon  could  not  be 
concealed;  with  steam  it  need  not  be  revealed  until  the 
last  movement.  Thus  the  need  for  leadership  and  decision 
has  grown  to  a  remarkable  degree.  The  German  authority 
Henning  justly  remarks  :  *'  As  far  as  technique  is  con- 
cerned, it  may  be  said  that  everywhere,  in  England, 
France,  Germany,  Russia,  and  Italy,  it  will  give  similar 
results.  Here  the  whole  question  lies  in  the  training  and 
firmness  of  the  commander  and  of  the  crew,  and  afterwards 
in  the  successful  employment  of  technical  factors.  Of 
course  he  will  have  an  advantage  who  commands  a  crew 
formed  of  born  sailors,  but  in  battle  this  advantage  may 
be  counterbalanced  by  individual  qualities  of  command." 

After  making  a  study  of  the  conclusions  which  are 
drawn  from  the  battle  of  Lissa,  the  wars  of  1870  and 
1877,  the  Chilian  war  of  1879,  the  Tonkin  Expedition 
of  1885,  the  naval  operations  in  the  Chilian  war  of  1891, 
and,  finally,  the  war  between  China  and  Japan,  and  having 
in  view  the  opinions  of  the  best  authorities,  such  as  White, 
Brassey,  and  Werner,  it  is  impossible  not  to  conclude 
that  a  battle  between  fleets  equal  in  speed  and  arma- 
ment will  lead  very  quickly  to  the  destruction  by  shell- 
fire  and  conflagration  of  the  upper  decks  in  which  are 
concentrated  the  chief  directing  elements,  while  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  crew  will  be  killed,  and  in  the  number 
every  officer  who  successively  occupies  the  post  of  com- 
mander. In  one  word,  in  the  first  battle  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  ships  will  be  destroyed,  and  the  remainder 
will  be  forced  to  go  into  port  to  refit.  There  tore  in  war 
the  strongest  will  prove  to  be  the  nation  which  possesses 
the  greatest  number  of  arsenals  and  ready  stores  of 
ammunition  and  coal  at  points  selected  in  times  of  peace  ; 
and  in  addition  to  that  a  fleet  in  reserve,  even  a  fleet  of 
old  type,  but  equipped  with  modern  artillery ;  with  such  a 


loS  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

fleet  it  will  be  possible  to  strike  deadly  blows  at  the  enemy 
when  the  fleets  of  the  first  line  shall  have  been  forced  to 
leave  the  seas  in  consequence  of  damage  sustained  in  battle. 

In  all  probability  future  naval  battles  will  present  this 
difference  from  those  of  the  past — even  from  recent  battles 
— that  solitary  vessels  will  not  take  part,  but  whole 
squadrons  consisting,  as  armies,  of  their  own  sort  of 
cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  that  is,  their  swift  cruisers, 
their  battleships,  and,  finally,  of  their  torpedo-boats  and 
torpedo-catchers.  With  this  the  element  of  accident  will 
play  such  an  important  I'ole  that  naval  battles  will  almost 
resemble  a  game  of  dice  in  which  the  stakes  will  be  millions 
of  money  and  thousands  of  lives. 

It  is  certain  that  all  that  is  not  defended  by  armour  will 
be  swept  from  the  decks  by  the  shell-fire  of  quick-firing 
guns,  and  it  remains  an  open  question  if  even  that  portion 
of  the  crew  which  is  in  protected  positions  will  be  able  to 
stand  the  concussion  produced  by  the  explosion  of  shells. 
Attention  must  be  called  to  the  ease  with  which  shells  pro- 
duce conflagrations  of  decks,  masts,  bridges  and  everything 
inflammable.  All  that  is  near  the  region  of  explosion  of  a 
shell  will  be  totally  destroyed,  a  thousand  steel  fragments 
will  fly  about  with  inconceivable  rapidity,  penetrating 
decks  and  corridors.  Some  of  the  shells  which  fall  in  an 
ironclad  will  immediately  make  a  part  of  its  guns  useless, 
and  the  employment  of  the  larger  guns  will  be  impeded, 
since  the  turning  of  the  turrets  will  be  impeded  by  torn 
plates.  Shells  containing  heavy  charges  will  cause 
immense  destruction.  If  a  shell  loaded  with  22  pounds 
of  melinite  were  to  fall  between  the  two  decks  of  an  iron- 
clad its  explosion  would  destroy  the  balks  supporting 
the  deck,  rend  the  iron  sheets,  pierce  the  deck,  stretch, the 
electric  wires  until  they  broke,  damage  the  steam  pipes 
and  boilers — in  one  word,  disable  all  the  vital  organs  of  the 
ship  for  a  space  of  several  yards  around  the  region  of 
explosion,  and  in  addition  produce  suftbcating  fumes  which 
would  prevent  approach  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  however 
perfect  might  be  the  ventilation. 

It    needs    no   evidence    to   prove   that   it   is   extremely 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  109 

doubtful  that  any  one  state  can  obtain  a  decided  prepon- 
derance above  the  others  in  the  quaHty  of  its  ships  or  their 
armament.  In  the  present  state  of  technical  science  every 
improvement  adopted  by  one  power  is  immediately  adopted 
by  all  the  others.  The  number  of  vessels  of  an  obsolete 
type  is  great,  but  these  less  effective  ships  are  divided 
among  the  different  powers  in  proportion.  The  fate  of 
future  battles  will  therefore  depend  primarily  on  acci- 
dents which  cannot  be  foreseen,  and  secondly  on  the 
possession  at  a  given  moment  of  preponderating  strength. 
But  in  this  respect  we  find  that  in  spite  of  all  efforts  the 
relative  strength  of  fleets  has  changed  but  little,  and  the 
comparison  made  by  Admiral  Werner  therefore  seems 
entirely  true.  "  A  naval  battle,"  he  says,  **  if  both  adver- 
saries are  determined  and  energetic,  will  resemble  a  conflict 
between  two  stags  which  in  a  moment  of  fury  rush  upon 
one  another,  entangling  their  antlers,  and  in  the  end  of 
ends  destroying  one  another.  Or  if  the  enemies  are  less 
determined  a  naval  battle  will  resemble  a  contest  of 
athletes,  the  combatants  moving  backwards  and  forwards 
in  serpentine  lines  ;  both  will  keep  up  fire  from  a  great 
distance  until  neither  has  enough  ammunition  left  to  strike 
a  decisive  blow." 

To  cruisers  and  torpedo-boats  will  be  allotted  a  duty 
not  less  ferocious — a  duty  which,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  was 
fulfilled  by  pirates  and  privateers — to  pursue  merchant 
ships,  fall  on  them  by  night  and  sink  them,  with  passengers, 
crews  and  cargoes,  with  the  object  of  cutting  the  communi- 
cations and  paralysing  the  trade  of  the  enemy.  The 
following  passage,  which  we  find  in  "  Les  Guerres  Navales 
de  Demain,"  is  an  interesting  illustration  of  this  :  "  A  war 
on  commerce  will  have  its  regulations,  precise,  constant, 
and  unconditional ;  the  weak  will  be  attacked  without 
mercy,  the  strong  will  be  evaded  by  flight  without  any  false 
shame.  Our  torpedo-boats  and  cruisers  as  soon  as  they 
discover  an  English  squadron  from  afar,  or  even  a  single 
battleship,  it  may  be  not  exceeding  them  in  fighting  strength, 
but  capable  of  offering  even  slight  opposition,  will  be  bound 
to  disappear." 


no         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

From  such  passages,  and  from  the  declarations  of 
unquestioned  authorities,  it  is  impossible  not  to  con- 
elude  that  the  effect  of  future  naval  wars  on  future  trade 
will  be  incomparably  more  disastrous  than  before.  A 
future  war  on  sea  will  also  draw  after  itself  economic  and 
political  consequences  quite  different  from  those  of  the  past, 
when  every  state  found  its  needs  supplied  within  the  limits 
of  its  own  dominions.  The  general  use  of  shells  loaded 
with  explosives  which  may  be  thrown  a  distance  of  some 
miles,  shells,  one  of  which  falling  into  a  town  or 
settled  locality  may  cause  the  most  terrible  destruction ; 
and  the  speed  with  which  vessels  may  be  moved  from  one 
point  of  a  coast  to  another,  independently  of  weather  and 
wind,  must  affect  the  minds  of  peoples,  and  even  give  rise 
to  agitations.  And  such  agitations,  in  view  of  the  present 
general  socialistic  tendencies,  may  not  be  limited  to  tem- 
porary disorder.  On  preparations  for  naval  war  immense 
sums  are  yearly  expended  by  the  powers,  but  shipbuilding 
so  constantly  and  so  rapidly  advances  towards  perfection, 
that  a  large  proportion  of  modern  fleets  is  obsolete,  and 
incapable  of  meeting  in  battle  vessels  of  the  newer  types, 
some  being  unfit  for  employment  even  after  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  latter. 

All  this  was  more  or  less  clearly  foreseen  ten  years  ago 
on  the  appearance  of  smokeless  powder.  And  in  the 
present  time,  in  view  of  the  speed  attained  by  cruisers 
armed  with  strong  artillery,  and  also  by  torpedo-boats  of 
the  latest  type  ;  in  view  of  the  improvements  in  the  propul- 
sion of  torpedoes,  and  in  view  of  the  progress  made  in  the 
building  of  submarine  boats,  it  may  be  affirmed  that  even 
vessels  of  the  latest  types,  however  they  may  be  divided 
among  the  different  nations,  cannot  guarantee  the  attain- 
ment of  the  ends  of  war. 

Meantime,  for  the  improvement  and  increase  of  fleets 
new  credits  are  required  every  day.  We  may  well  inquire 
what  degree  the  discontent  of  peoples  may  attain  when 
they  learn  that  even  the  newest  types  of  ships  and  the 
last  inventions  in  artillery  have  been  adopted  everywhere, 
while  requirements  still   continue  to  grow.     In  view  of 


THE  FUTURE  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  in 

those  elements  which  in  Western  Europe  to-day  contend 
with  all  political  and  social  order,  even  more  absurd  appears 
the  rivalry  of  states  in  the  increase  of  their  fleets,  while 
the  relation  of  fighting  force  remains  the  same,  and 
immense  sums  are  yearly  squandered  which  might  have 
been  devoted  to  the  satisfaction  of  social  needs. 

A  comparison  of  the  growth  of  expenditure  on  armies 
and  fleets  is  presented  by  the  following  table  (counting  the 
rouble  as  equal  to  three  shillings)  : 


E: 

<PENDITURE. 

0^ 

Armies. 

On 

Fleets^ 

Millions  of 

Millions  of 

Roubles. 

£ 

Roubles. 

£ 

1874  . 

.      615.4 

92,325 

000 

158.2 

23,730 

000 

1884    . 

.     688.1 

103,215 

000 

218.6 

32,790, 

000 

I89I    . 

.     885.1 

132,765 

000 

... 

247.2 

37,080, 

000 

1896    . 

.     893.6 

134.040, 

000 

299.6 

44,940, 

000 

Armies. 

Fleets 

100 

100 

112 

138 

144 

156 

145 

189 

To  express  more  clearly  the  comparative  growth  of 
outlay  on  armed  forces,  we  take  the  outlay  of  1874  at  KX), 
and  find  the  following  percentage  increase  : 

1874 
1884 
1891 
1896 

•  The  comparison  which  we  have  made  as  to  the  naval 
resources  of  the  different  states  shows  that  these  millions 
can  have  no  practical  result,  even  if  we  admit  that  war  is 
as  unavoidable  in  the  future  as  it  has  been  in  the  past. 

Calculations  made  by  us  show  that  England  alone  in  a 
prolonged  war  could  obtain  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  forcing 
the  other  naval  powers  to  give  way  everywhere.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  the  interruption  of  communications  at  sea 
would  cause  the  English  such  great  losses  as  to  eliminate 
the  possibility  of  a  prolonged  war,  even  although  they  were 
absolutely  certain  of  victory.  The  cessation  of  the  import 
of  provisions  would  not  allow  of  England  continuing  a 
prolonged  war.  Of  wheat,  barley,  and  rye  England  lacks 
supplies  for  274  days  and  of  oats  for  y6  days  in  the  year. 


112  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

Even  if  we  agree  with  the  baseless  opinion  of  optimists 
and  assume  that  the  transport  of  suppHes  to  England 
might  be  carried  on  under  convoy,  still  we  must  bear  in 
mind  the  terrible  rise  in  prices  in  consequence  of  the  risk. 
And  side  by  side  with  this  rise  in  prices  would  proceed 
the  interruption  of  industry. 

Thus,  in  continuing  to  increase  their  fleets  and  to  per- 
fect their  armaments  at  immense  cost  the  European  powers 
are  striving  at  aims  undefined  and  unattainable.  But  the 
financial  and  social  difficulties  which  yearly  increase  may 
result  in  such  dangers  that  governments  must  be  compelled 
after  immense  sacrifices  to  do  what  it  would  be  wiser  to  do 
to-day,  namely,  to  abandon  a  fruitless  competition. 

Such  is  a  brief  picture  of  what  Europe  may  expect  from 
a  future  war.  But  over  and  above  the  direct  sacrifices  and 
material  losses,  by  slaughter,  fire,  hunger,  and  disease,  a 
war  will  cause  to  humanity  a  great  moral  evil  in  conse- 
quence of  the  peculiar  forms  which  a  struggle  on  sea  will 
assume  and  of  the  examples  of  savagery  which  it  will  pre- 
sent at  a  moment  when  the  civil  order  will  be  threatened  by 
new  theories  of  social  revolution. 

What  wearisome  and  ungrateful  labour  will  be  needed 
to  repair  the  losses,  to  cure  the  wounds  which  a  war  of  a 
single  year  will  cause  !  How  many  flourishing  countries 
will  be  turned  into  wildernesses  and  rich  cities  into  ruins  ! 
How  many  tears  will  be  shed,  how  many  will  be  left  in 
beggary !  How  long  will  it  be  before  the  voices  of  the 
best  men,  after  such  a  terrible  example,  will  preach  to 
humanity  a  higher  principle  than  ''  might  is  right "  ? 


CHAPTER    IV 

DOES   RUSSIA   NEED   A   NAVY? 

A  CHARACTERISTIC  feature  of  our  time  is  the  technical 
improvement  of  all  military  apparatus.  Hardly  has  a  new 
rifle  or  a  new  gun  been  adopted  before  it  is  necessary  to 
replace  it  by  fresh  weapons.  Within  a  short  time  we  may 
expect  new  improvements  in  powder,  and  this  in  its  turn 
will  require  changes  in  all  war  material.  In  recent  times 
these  changes,  consequent  on  new  inventions,  have  taken 
place  more  and  more  swiftly.  Of  this,  perhaps  the 
building  of  fortresses  is  the  best  example.  After  fabulous 
sums  had  been  lavished  on  the  building  of  fortresses  on  a 
new  system  with  all  the  latest  technical  improvements,  the 
opinion  has  gained  ground  that  modern  strategy  requires 
fortresses  only  to  a  limited  extent,  a  view,  the  probability 
of  which  is  increased  by  the  fact  that  every  army  will  be 
equipped  with  instruments  for  the  construction  of  its  own 
defensive  works. 

A  similar  process  of  change  may  be  observed  in  the 
building  of  fleets.  In  the  past  one  and  the  same  type 
was  employed  in  the  course  of  three  hundred  years 
without  essential  change.  After  this  began  the  building 
of  ironclads,  and  in  the  course  of  thirty  years  the  various 
types  of  ships  may  be  counted  by  tens.  In  the  present 
time  opinions  change  so  rapidly  that  no  sooner  is  a  vessel 
launched  than  it  is  found  not  to  come  up  to  the  newest 
requirements.  Meantime,  every  new  ship  costs  more 
than  the  last.  Even  the  richest  nations  have  begun  to 
groan  under  the  burden. 

In  this   relation  Russia   especially  finds    herself  in  a 

H 


114  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

difficult  position.  At  a  time  when  in  Western  countries 
a  powerful  social  initiative  heaped  up  wealth,  when  towns 
sprang  up,  not  as  centres  of  local  authority,  but  as  trading 
and  industrial  centres,  and  when  in  the  country  free  labour, 
full  ownership  of  land,  and  the  accumulation  of  savings 
ensured  the  erection  of  good  and  durable  buildings  for 
man  and  beast,  the  construction  of  good  roads,  the  regu- 
lation of  water  communications,  and  the  building  of  fac- 
tories, in  that  time  in  Russia  the  economic  life  of  the 
people,  their  social  initiative,  and  even  the  satisfaction 
of  their  necessities  were  paralysed  by  the  existence  of 
serfage. 

The  Crimean  war  resulted  in  disorder  in  the  finances 
and  in  the  money  system  which  had  only  just  been  brought 
into  order,  and  in  addition  to  this,  shook  the  faith  of  men 
in  the  old  system  of  government.  The  reform  of  the 
administrative  apparatus  was  all  the  more  essential  owing 
to  the  subsequent  emancipation  of  the  serfs.  The  necessity 
for  building  roads  was  recognised.  The  peasants  received 
their  freedom  and  occupied  themselves  with  the  working 
of  their  fields.  Savings  they  could  not  have.  They 
lived  in  poverty  and  the  conditions  of  their  lives  were 
most  primitive.  Landowners  had  not  the  capital  to  carry 
on  agriculture,  and  were  forced  to  let  their  land  to  the 
peasantry  for  labour  or  on  lease.  The  work  of  the 
peasantry,  both  on  their  own  lands  and  on  that  of  the 
landowners,  continued  to  be  most  primitive.  Meeting  no 
support  from  industry  in  the  utilisation  of  their  products, 
agriculturists  were  compelled  to  export  them  in  a  raw 
form.  Russia  exported  grain,  cattle,  and  phosphates  to 
improve  the  soil  of  foreigners,  while  Russian  soil  itself 
constantly  deteriorated.  Such,  briefly,  was  the  condition 
of  the  chief  part  of  the  Russian  population  at  a  time 
when  Western  Europe  was  advancing  in  industry  and 
prosperity  by  bounds. 

Meantime,  the  population  rapidly  grew.  In  a  time 
when  the  population  of  the  Empire  was  estimated  at  some 
hundred  and  ten  and  odd  millions,  the  census  of  last 
year   gave    the    figure    at    more    than  one    hundred    and 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        115 

twenty-nine  million  souls.  This  yearly  growth  of  the 
population,  estimated  approximately  at  two  millions,  un- 
doubtedly constitutes  an  increase  of  wealth,  but  only  in 
the  event  of  there  being  sufficient  resources  for  the  feeding 
and  training  of  the  growing  population.  Otherwise  it 
must  only  result  in  an  increase  of  the  proletariat. 

In  comparison  with  its  revenue  the  Empire  has  an 
immense  debt.  Interest  on  the  Imperial  Debt  occupies  the 
second  place  in  the  Budget,  and  is  only  a  little  less  than 
the  expenditure  of  the  Ministry  of  War  (;^40, 800,000  and 
;£^43, 200,000  in  1898).  The  finances  showed  a  deficit 
even  before  the  Crimean  war.  After  the  Crimean  war  the 
position  was  worse,  and  every  attempt  to  diminish  the 
extraordinary  expenditure  proved  fruitless  in  consequence 
of  the  war  of  i^tyy-yd).  Meantime,  fresh  expenditure 
was  entailed  by  re-armament,  the  construction  of  fortresses 
and  strategical  railways.  Independently  of  these  it  was 
necessary  for  the  development  of  industry  to  return  to  the 
construction  of  railways  which  had  been  suspended 
in  1875,  although  a  great  part  of  the  railways  promised 
only  to  pay,  or  even  cover  their  expenses,  in  the  future. 
It  is  natural  that  this  increase  in  indebtedness  had  as 
inevitable  consequence  an  increase  in  the  burden  of 
taxation. 

To  contend  with  such  a  position  was  very  difficult,  but 
thanks  to  twenty  years  of  peace  and  the  energetic  efforts 
of  the  Ministry  of  Finances,  the  deficits  vanished  from  the 
ordinary  Budget,  and  it  seemed  that  money  could  even  be 
found  for  productive  purposes.  But  in  all  circumstances 
the  finances  of  a  country  depend  on  the  economic  con- 
dition of  the  people.  We  have  already  briefly  pointed 
out,  and  shall  hereafter  show  in  greater  detail,  how  badly 
Russia  compares  in  this  respect  with  the  countries  of 
Western  Europe.  The  severity  of  the  climate  prevents 
agricultural  work  during  a  considerable  part  of  the  year, 
and  involves  greater  demand  for  clothing,  dwelling,  food, 
heat,  and  light.  The  great  number  of  holidays  still 
further  shortens  production,  even  in  the  working  season. 
With  such  conditions  it  is  inevitable  that  savings  for  a 


ii6  TS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

rainy  day  among  the  Russian  people  should  be  insignifi- 
cant, and  such  they  are  shown  to  be  in  reality.  Every 
famine,  even  a  local  failure  of  harvest,  is  the  cause  of  a 
veritable  disaster. 

With  such  a  state  of  affairs  it  is  needless  to  point  out 
the  absolute  necessity  for  great  caution  in  the  expenditure 
of  money  on  military  purposes.  It  is  quite  true  that  in 
this  respect  Russia  cannot  fall  behind  the  othei"  powers, 
but  she  must  not  follow  blindly  after  them,  and,  above  all, 
she  must  not  attempt  to  outstrip  them,  for  such  a  course 
might  lead  to  the  most  disastrous  consequences.  In  the 
struggle  for  money  the  rivalry  is  unequal.  Russia  is 
weaker  for  two  reasons — first,  she  has  less  reserves ; 
secondly,  she  gives  orders  abroad,  pays  more  than  other 
powers,  and  sends  her  money  out  of  the  country.  While 
England,  Germany,  and  France  themselves  construct  and 
prepare  all  that  they  need  at  the  lowest  possible  cost, 
keeping  their  money  at  home,  Russia  is  compelled  to  take 
a  less  advantageous  course.  Thus,  for  instance,  in  ordering 
ships  of  war  in  England,  or  building  them  at  home  to  a 
large  extent  with  imported  materials  and  machinery, 
Russia  pays  at  least  25  per  cent,  more  than  the  building 
of  warships  costs  the  English  Government,  and  sends  into 
that  country  money  which  England  afterwards  uses  for 
the  strengthening  of  her  own  fleet.  By  her  orders  Russia 
helps  to  keep  up  English  shipbuilding  yards,  which  in 
time  of  war  would  make  it  easy  for  England  to  repair 
quickly  the  losses  she  sustained. 

Every  effort  put  forth  by  Russia  in  the  strengthening  of 
her  fleet  calls  forth  corresponding  activity  in  foreign 
countries.  The  recent  assignation  of  ^13,500,000 
(ninety  millions  of  roubles)  to  strengthen  the  fleet  m^y 
serve  as  an  example.  As  the  direct  consequence  of  this 
the  project  of  the  German  Government  to  allot  several 
millions  of  marks  to  increasing  the  fleet  during  a  period 
of  seven  years,  a  project  which  had  met  with  strong 
opposition  in  the  Reichsrath,  was  agreed  to  without  any 
further  difficulty.  As  a  natural  consequence  the  French 
and  Austrian   Governments  already  demand    from    their 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        117 

parliaments  extraordinary  credits  for  the  same  purpose. 
Thus,  as  the  final  result  of  this  rivalry,  the  relationship 
of  the  naval  powers  will  remain  what  it  was  before. 

All  this  only  confirms  the  necessity  for  greater  caution 
and  concentration  of  resources  in  the  satisfying  of  those 
requirements  which  in  a  given  time  are  most  insistent. 
Precisely  as  climatic  conditions  in  every  country  demand 
a  suitable  distribution  of  agricultural  labour,  in  military 
affairs  a  definitive  plan  also  is  essential  corresponding 
with  needs  and  re^.ources.  The  first  question  which  would 
be  asked  after  the  adoption  of  such  a  system  is  :  Must 
Russia  be  equally  ready  to  carry  on  war  on  land  and 
on  sea  ? 

In  order  to  define  the  importance  of  naval  power  in  a 
naval  war  two  propositions  must  be  made — first,  that  a 
war  impends  with  the  Triple  Alliance,  in  the  event  of 
which  Russia  has  the  support  of  France  ;  and  secondly, 
that  a  war  is  probable  with  England.  It  is  necessary, 
first  of  all,  to  observe  the  immense  preponderance  of 
armies  and  of  operations  on  land  over  naval  forces  and 
possible  operations  at  sea.  The  armies  which  would 
enter  upon  war  on  the  Continent  are  numbered  by 
millions  of  men.  The  armies  of  the  first  line  of  both 
alliances  number  more  than  six  and  a  half  millions. 
The  armies  of  the  second  line  would  number  almost  six 
millions. 

What  role  will  be  played  by  the  fleet  during  the  conflict 
of  such  masses  ?  To  this  question  we  get  the  best  answer 
by  reverting  to  the  war  of  1870.  Germany  then  possessed 
a  fleet  in  no  way  fit  to  oppose  the  fleet  of  France.  Yet 
the  French  fleet  was  compelled  to  abandon  all  plans  of  a 
landing  upon  the  German  coast,  and  did  not  even  make  an 
attempt  to  accomplish  them.  From  the  first,  Moltke  was 
so  convinced  of  the  impossibility  of  such  a  diversion  that 
in  his  plan  of  military  operations  in  1870,  relying  upon 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  German  army,  he  declared  : 
"The  superiority  of  our  forces  at  the  point  where  the 
decisive  blow  will  be  struck  will  be  all  the  greater  if  the 
French  undertake  an  expedition  against  the  northern  coast 


ii8  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

of  Germany."  This  is  the  best  evidence  of  the  disregard 
he  paid  to  all  projects  of  invasion. 

From  that  time  the  organisation  of  the  armies  of  the 
great  powers  has  gone  still  further,  so  that,  even  if  the 
whole  of  an  army  and  its  reserves  were  engaged  in 
operations  on  the  frontier  or  in  the  territory  of  the  enemy, 
it  would  nevertheless  not  be  difficult  to  oppose  a  superior 
force  to  any  that  could  be  landed  on  the  coast. 

From  estimates  made  in  Italy,  the  transport  of  an  army 
corps  fully  equipped  with  provisions  for  a  month,  and 
corresponding  train,  would  require  a  fleet  with  a  dis- 
placement of  116,000  tons.  Professor  Deguis  says  that, 
in  the  first  15-20  days  from  the  beginning  of  operations, 
France  could  despatch  an  expedition  of  not  more  than 
30,000  men.  But  in  the  face  of  modern  artillery,  small 
arms,  and  coast  defences,  a  landing  could  only  be  accom- 
plished with  great  difliculty. 

Only  a  change  of  wind,  a  sudden  storm  or  a  thick  fog  is 
needed  to  interrupt  the  operation  of  landing,  and  to  place 
the  forces  already  on  shore  in  a  critical  position. 

It  is  true  that  we  hear  talk  of  the  possibility  of  war- 
ships holding  the  coast-line  under  their  guns  and  keeping 
it  entirely  clear  of  the  defenders'  troops.  In  reality,  it 
happens  that  warships  of  deep  draught,  in  order  to  keep 
clear  of  rocks  and  shoals,  are  compelled  to  stand  at  a  dis- 
tance of  1 100  to  1600  yards  from  the  shore,  and,  incom- 
moded in  movement  by  their  transports,  they  regulate 
their  fire  with  difficulty.  But  the  enemy,  relying  upon 
long-range  artillery,  does  not  show  himself  at  all  upon  the 
open  shore,  but  shelters  himself  behind  dunes  and 
eminences  or  keeps  even  farther  in  the  interior.  The  fire 
from  warships  may  be  powerful,  but  it  is  scattered  and  for 
this  reason  cannot  be  effective.  During  the  bombard- 
ment of  the  insurgents'  camp  in  Crete  the  allied  squadron 
fired  seventy  shells,  with  a  resulting  loss  to  the  insurgents 
of  three  killed  and  fifteen  wounded. 

We  will  not  speak  of  the  possibility  of  a  Russian 
descent  upon  the  coast  of  Germany.  But  let  us  suppose 
that  the  Germans  were  to  land  troops,  of  course  without 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        119 

cavalry,  on  the  Baltic  coast,  what  could  they  effect  ?  We 
have  heard  of  course  of  the  possibility  of  the  Germans 
landing  near  Riga  in  order  to  cut  the  communications  of 
the  Russian  army  situated  in  Lithuania,  or  descending 
near  Narva  in  order  to  operate  against  St.  Petersburg. 
But  this  is  almost  a  phantasy.  Wherever  they  might  be 
landed,  an  enemy's  forces  moving  into  the  interior  would 
be  gradually  weakened  by  the  allotment  of  a  consider- 
able proportion  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  communi- 
cations. Meantime  the  strength  of  the  defence  would 
continuously  grow.  With  the  aid  of  the  telegraph  and 
the  railway,  troops  might  be  brought  to  the  threatened 
locality  in  a  very  short  time.  Nor  could  their  arrival  at 
the  scene  of  operations  be  interfered  with  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  railways,  for  the  invading  army  will  be  without 
cavalry. 

The  success  of  the  allied  armies  in  the  Crimea  may  be 
adduced  against  this  argument.  Such  an  objection  has 
been  answered  by  Von  der  Goltz  in  his  work  "  Das  Volk  in 
Waffen."  He  says  :  *'  If  the  armies  landed  in  the  Crimea 
were  victorious  over  the  local  forces  the  cause  of  this  was 
that,  however  difficult  communication  by  sea  was  for  the 
allies,  these  conditions  were  more  favourable  than  the  land 
communications  used  by  the  defenders  in  their  own 
country.  If  in  1854  Russia  had  had  her  present  network 
of  railways,  the  French,  the  English  and  the  Turks, 
at  first  landing  in  the  Crimea  to  the  number  of  120,000 
men,  would  not  have  remained  there  long." 

The  undertaking  of  a  descent  in  considerable  force 
is  improbable,  if  only  for  the  reason  that  it  weakens  the 
strength  of  the  army  which  must  defend  the  frontier  where 
superiority  of  forces  is  aimed  at  by  both  sides.  In  certain 
events  Germany  would  be  compelled  to  carry  on  war  on 
two  frontiers.  Her  enemies  would  only  desire  that  she 
should  make  the  mistake  which  Moltke  expected  from 
France. 

Thus  for  the  protection  of  her  coasts,  Russia  has  no 
need  whatever  to  increase  her  fleet,  for  the  descent  of  an 
enemy  would    place    her    in    no    danger  whatever,   even 


I20  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

if  she  did  not  dispose  of  her  present  fleet.      This  opinion 
is  held  even  in  Germany. 

The  bombardment  of  a  coast  town,  however  important  it 
may  be  as  a  political,  industrial,  or  trading  centre,  can 
only  cause  material  losses  to  private  individuals  and  to  the 
state.  But  such  operations  can  have  no  effect  on  the 
resources  which  a  country  possesses  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  on  war.  The  destruction  caused  can  have  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  course  of  the  war  on  land,  and 
even  if  all  the  seaports  of  a  country  were  bombarded 
it  could  in  no  way  change  the  course  of  events.  The 
essential  fact  is  this,  that  a  continental  war  will  not  be 
carried  on  merely  with  the  object  of  causing  losses  to  the 
enemy  and  beginning  negotiations  for  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  losses  caused.  A  future  war  will  be  a  struggle 
between  whole  peoples,  and  each  side  will  have  as  its 
object  the  total  overthrow  of  the  enemy.  Therefore  such 
bombardments  of  coast  towns,  however  wealthy  and 
important  these  latter  may  be,  would  only  represent 
so  much  destruction  with  little  influence  on  the  issue 
of  the  struggle. 

Even  in  this  respect  Russia  is  in  a  better  position  than 
Germany ;  the  Russian  coast  being  less  thickly  populated, 
the  losses  from  bombardment  would  be  less,  and  conse- 
quently a  numerous  fleet  is  less  necessary  for  Russia  than 
for  Germany.  With  the  exception  of  Riga,  Revel,  and 
Helsingfors,  strongly  fortified,  there  are  no  important 
towns  on  the  Russian  coast.  And  the  Russian  fleet, 
even  as  constituted  now,  represents  a  very  considerable 
force. 

Even  the  complete  destruction  of  a  fleet  could  have 
little  influence  upon  a  continental  war.  In  commenting 
upon  the  experience  gained  from  the  last  wars  in  Europe, 
we  may  point  first  to  the  destruction  of  the  Italian  fleet 
by  the  Austrians  at  Lissa  in  1866.  What  benefit  did  this 
naval  victory  bring  to  Austria,  beaten  at  Sadova?  In 
1870  a  German  fleet  scarcely  existed,  while  the  French 
fleet  had  full  freedom  to  act,  yet  Germany  sustained  no 
damage  and  her  naval  inferiority  in  no  way  influenced  the 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        121 

course  of  the  war.  The  French  sailors  were  far  more 
needed  for  the  defence  of  Paris.  It  is  true  that  the 
maritime  trade  of  Germany  was  arrested.  But  whatever 
the  number  of  warships  may  be,  communications  by  sea 
will  be  cut.  Nowadays  every  power  has  sufficient  cruisers, 
and  merchant  ships  which  might  be  turned  into  cruisers, 
in  order  to  stop  all  trade  by  sea. 

Battleships  against  this  will  be  of  little  use.  In  speed 
they  must  give  way  to  cruisers  which  will  evade  them  and 
simply  laugh  at  their  unwieldy  adversaries.  Battleships 
will  be  valuable  only  for  battle  between  themselves  and 
for  attack  upon  coasts. 

But  let  us  postulate  that  the  Russian  navy  had  a  decided 
preponderance  over  that  of  the  enemy,  sending  to  the 
bottom  many  more  of  his  ships  than  she  lost  herself. 
Even  in  such  case  the  Russian  fleet  would  at  best  be  in 
the  position  of  the  French  fleet  in  1870,  which  not  only 
gained  no  victories,  but  found  no  foe.  The  victorious 
fleet  would  steam  along  the  coast  and  threaten  certain 
localities.  Suppose  that  the  Russian  fleet  were  to  act 
more  energetically  than  the  French  fleet  in  1870  and 
bombard  mercilessly  a  great  number  of  the  smaller  coast 
towns  of  Germany.  The  great  German  cities,  Bremen, 
Hamburg,  Stettin,  Kiel,  Dantzig,  and  Konigsberg  would 
remain  inaccessible,  standing  too  far  from  the  coast. 

But  to  attain  results,  even  in  the  case  of  the  less 
important  towns,  would  be  no  easy  task  for  a  fleet  of 
ironclads.  On  approaching  the  coast  they  must  meet 
with  the  torpedo-boats,  submarine  mines,  and  submarine 
boats  of  the  enemy,  and  run  very  great  risks.  Modern 
science  has  contrived  a  very  different  system  of  coast 
defence  from  that  which  obtained  in  1870.  But  we  will 
suppose  that  the  Russian  fleet  were  uninjured.  Yet  if 
the  fleet  does  not  dispose  of  swift  cruisers,  hundreds  of 
merchant  vessels  will  escape  from  harbour  and  the  blockade 
will  be  ineffective.  In  this  respect  one  cruiser  may  do 
more  than  a  whole  fleet  of  unwieldy  battleships,  which 
consume  immense  quantities  of  coal,  a  material  which  the 
Russian  fleet  could  obtain  only  with  difficulty.     Thus,  if 


122  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

the  battleships  cannot  be  devoted  to  the  interruption  of 
trade,  their  operations  must  be  confined  to  the  destruction 
of  peaceful  settlements,  the  slaughter  of  unarmed  men, 
women  and  children,  leading  to  an  increase  of  savagery  in 
the  relations  of  the  contending  peoples. 

Suppose  that  victory  should  remain  on  the  side  of 
Germany,  acting,  it  might  be,  in  co-operation  with  Eng- 
land, the  results  would  be  even  less  considerable,  for  the 
Russian  coast  is  much  more  thinly  peopled.  We  will 
even  go  farther  and  suppose  that  the  German  fleet  proved 
victorious  over  the  PVench.  What  influence  could  such  a 
result  have  on  the  events  of  the  war  on  land  between  the 
two  states  ?  In  all  probability  no  more  than  the  superiority 
of  the  French  fleet  in  1870,  for  Germany  would  certainly 
not  make  the  mistake  of  attempting  a  descent  upon  the 
French  coast. 

Prince  Bismarck,  in  one  of  his  speeches,  drew  the 
following  comparison  of  the  importance  of  successes  on 
sea  and  land  in  a  war  between  continental  powers  :  **  It 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  capture  of  every  village 
represents  a  real  success,  the  importance  of  which  is 
immediately  felt,  while  the  capture  of  an  enemy's  vessel 
only  goes  into  the  general  account,  which  must  be  settled 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  The  capture  of  a  fortress 
ensures  the  possession  of  territory,  while  the  capture  even 
of  a  whole  fleet  at  best  represents  only  means  for  under- 
taking fresh  conquests."  But  Russia,  even  if  she  aimed 
at  conquests  in  Germany  and  Austria,  would  not  need  a 
fleet,  for  the  land  frontiers  of  both  these  countries  are 
conterminous  with  hers  for  an  immense  distance. 

Let  us  consider  two  hypotheses  :  (i)  That  the  armies  of 
Russia  were  defeated,  while  her  fleet  gained  a  complete 
victory :  in  the  fiinal  result  of  course  Russia  would  be 
beaten.  (2)  That  the  Russian  army  gained  complete 
victory  while  her  fleet  was  annihilated  ;  the  result  would 
be  that  Russia  would  gain  all  the  fruits  of  her  victory  on 
land.  The  conquered  on  land  would  be  forced  to  pay 
Contributions,  and  even  their  fleets  might  pass  into  the 
hands  of  Russia, 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        123 

To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  since  France,  Germany, 
and  England  increase  their  fleets  we  must  do  the  same. 
Whether  France  is  acting  wisely  in  increasing  her  fleet 
we  will  not  stop  to  consider,  since  F^rance  must  bear  in 
mind  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  with  Italy,  protect  her 
interests  in  the  Mediterranean  and  her  colonial  possessions, 
and,  we  may  observe,  the  greater  her  naval  forces  increase 
the  greater  will  be  the  security  of  Russia,  although  it  must 
be  noted  that  in  France  every  expedition  to  distant  countries 
gives  cause  for  complaints  as  to  unreadiness,  disorder  and 
defects  in  the  personnel.  It  is  enough  to  read  the  work  of 
M.  Lockroy,  former  Minister  of  Marine,  to  be  convinced 
that  the  French  fleet  is  far  from  being  on  a  level  with  the 
English,  and  that  the  incessant  attempts  made  to  overtake 
England  have  only  resulted  in  hindering  the  French  fleet 
in  its  efforts  to  be  fully  ready  for  war.  Even  if  we  allow 
that  there  is  much  exaggeration  in  the  complaints  which 
have  been  made,  it  is  impossible  not  to  conclude  that  as 
France  cannot  rival  England  in  the  number  of  her  ships,  the 
French  Government  would  do  better  to  devote  all  its  atten- 
tion to  preparing  the  fleet  in  its  present  composition  for  war. 

For  Germany  an  increase  in  the  navy  is  not  demanded  by 
any  interests  in  Europe,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
example  of  Japan,  in  all  probability,  the  Emperor  William 
would  not  have  set  himself  so  passionately  to  the  increase 
of  his  fleet. 

In  a  very  different  position  is  England.  Her  funda- 
mental interests  demand  that  she  shall  remain  mistress  of 
the  seas,  everywhere  and  against  every  possible  enemy, 
preserving  from  all  danger  not  only  the  British  Islands, 
but  her  maritime  trade,  her  immense  colonies  in  all 
quarters  of  the  globe,  and  those  communications  by  which 
the  riches  of  the  Old  and  New  Worlds  are  exchanged  to 
her  advantage,  and  from  which  depend  the  ebb  and  flow 
of  her  social  life.  Mistress  of  the  seas,  England  can  be  at 
rest,  both  as  concerns  herself  and  as  concerns  her  colonies. 
For  her  the  mastery  of  the  seas  is  no  empty  word,  and 
she  has  every  good  reason  to  devote  all  her  resources  to 
the  strengthening  of  her  fleet. 


124  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

In  its  turn  this  example  of  England  may  be  instructive 
for  other  countries.  England  does  not  rely  on  the  strength 
of  her  armies.  A  country  composed  of  islands,  having  a 
commanding  fleet  is  secure,  and  consequently  it  may 
wisely  sacrifice  all  to  the  increase  of  its  fleet.  Russia  is 
in  a  very  different  position,  and  her  fleet  can  in  no  way 
guarantee  her  safety.  A  decisive  blow  can  be  struck 
only  on  land,  and  for  Russia  a  navy  has  only  an  auxiliary 
importance,  in  proportion  as  it  influences  operations  on 
land.  If  a  naval  war  be  carried  on  independently  of  these 
operations,  and  without  influence  upon  them,  it  represents 
a  mere  waste  of  strength  and  money.  Even  in  relation  to 
England  it  is  more  important  for  Russia  to  be  strong  on 
land  than  to  increase  her  fleet,  which  never  can  be  made 
to  rival  the  navy  of  Great  Britain. 

Not  only  is  an  increased  fleet  not  essential  for  the  safety 
of  Russia,  but  an  increase  would  produce  very  little  moral 
effect  on  her  possible  enemies.  Germany,  as  we  have 
already  pointed  out,  has  no  fear  of  a  landing  on  her  coast, 
and  her  fleet  will  always  have  the  Northern  Canal  avail- 
able as  a  means  of  refuge.  In  England  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  Russian  battleships  would  produce  no  impres- 
sion. There  remains  only  Japan.  But  there  is  not  one 
of  Russia's  vital  interests  which  Japan  could  damage.  The 
Siberian  railway  is  important  only  as  a  means  of  trans- 
port, and  neither  Japan  nor  China  has  any  interest  in 
opposing  transit  across  Siberia. 

For  England  the  competition  of  the  Siberian  railway  is 
insignificant.  The  freight  rate  from  Hankow  to  Odessa 
or  to  London  is  only  about  twopence  per  pound,  and  the 
great  proportion  of  Asiatic  trade  will  continue  to  prefer 
this  cheaper  route.  It  is  true  that  transport  by  railway 
will  be  shorter  in  time,  but  this  has  little  importance.  The 
use  of  the  Siberian  railway  for  purposes  of  trade  cannot 
assume  large  measures  for  many  years.  For  this  an 
immense  development  in  China  would  be  required,  and 
China  is  above  all  things  a  country  of  stagnation. 

In  recent  times  Russia  has  made  no  small  efforts  to 
strengthen  her  fleet.     In  the  course  of  the  twenty  years 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        125 

period,  1876-96,  the  expenditure  of  the  Russian  Ministry 
of  Marine  grew  at  a  much  greater  rate  than  other  branches 
of  expenditure — that  is,  from  ;{^4,050,ooo  to  ;^9,ooo,ooo 
(in  1896,  ;^ 1 0,050,000),  or  122  per  cent.  In  the  same 
period  the  expenditure  on  the  army  increased  only  50 
per  cent.  Now  the  maritime  trade  of  Russia  for  one 
inhabitant  only  amounts  to  fourteen  shillings  and  three- 
pence— that  is,  the  trading  interests  of  the  Russian  popu- 
lation are  twenty-two  times  less  than  those  of  the  popula- 
tion of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  seven  times  less  than 
those  of  France,  Germany,  and  the  United  States.  Thus 
maritime  trade  has  for  Russia  less  importance  than  for 
other  countries,  not  only  from  its  smaller  value  but  owing 
to  her  geographical  position  ;  the  land  frontiers  of  Russia 
being  immense,  while  her  limited  coast  is  icebound  for  a 
great  part  of  the  year. 

A  more  important  consideration  lies  in  the  fact  that 
those  very  powers  which  could  place  obstacles  in  the  way 
of  Russian  maritime  trade  are  those  which  are  most 
dependent  upon  it,  for  neither  Germany  nor  England  could 
manage  without  Russian  products.  The  stoppage  of 
Russian  trade  would  cause  great  injury  to  both  these 
countries.  From  this  it  results  that  the  maritime  trade  of 
Russia  will  be  defended  by  the  very  nature  of  things,  and 
not  by  the  number  of  her  warships.  Yet  Russia  spends 
for  every  ton  displacement  of  her  own  ships  more  than 
any  other  European  state  :  that  is  to  say,  £^  4s.,  while 
France  spends  £4.  is.  8</.,  Italy  £2  13s.,  Austria  £1  85., 
Germany  £1,  and  England  only  125.  gd. 

Naval  expenditure  amounts  to  7  per  cent,  of  the  total 
value  of  her  maritime  trade,  while  that  of  France  is 
6  per  cent.,  that  of  England  3J  per  cent.,  and  that  of 
Germany  less  than  2  per  cent.  From  this  we  see  how 
insignihcant  are  the  trading  interests  of  Russia.  In  the 
East  they  are  quite  inconsiderable. 

First  of  all  it  is  necessary  to  consider  what  is  the  extent 
of  that  trade  in  China  and  Japan  which  so  captivates  the 
imaginations  of  Europeans.  China  imports  goods  of 
average    value    of    ;£"4i,050,ooo,    and   exports    her   own 


126  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

products  to  the  average  value  of  ;^23, 850,000.  The 
imports  of  Japan  are  valued  at  ;^6,7 50,000,  and  her 
exports  at  ;^8, 700,000.  These  figures  refer  to  a  time  before 
the  war  between  China  and  Japan,  since  which  those 
countries  have  permitted  themselves  such  expenditure  that 
they  have  undoubtedly  impoverished  themselves,  and  will 
not  quickly  recover  from  the  consequences. 

In  this  trade  the  share  of  Russia  is  quite  inconsider- 
able. Of  five  hundred  mercantile  firms  trading  in  China 
ten  only  are  Russian.  In  the  general  export  and  import 
trade  of  China  the  share  of  Russia  is  as  small  as  4  per 
cent.  The  number  of  vessels  entering  Chinese  ports  in 
the  year  1889  was  19,100,  with  a  displacement  of 
1 5,800,000  tons.  Of  these  vessels  but  44,  with  a  displace- 
ment of  55,000  tons,  were  Russian,  or  less  than  |  percent, 
of  the  total. 

True,  we  may  expect  that  the  construction  of  the  Siberian 
railway  will  lead  to  the  increase  of  Russian  trade  with 
China.  But  it  will  be  safer  not  to  have  any  illusions  in  this 
respect.  A  comparison  of  the  present  freight  from  Hankow 
to  Odessa  with  the  railway  freight  from  Odessa  to  Moscow, 
will  show  what  transport  by  the  Siberian  railway  even 
with  the  lowest  possible  freights  will  cost. 

The  political  influence  of  a  great  fleet  in  the  Far  East 
may  be  of  course  adduced.  We  hear  talk,  for  instance,  of 
the  acquisition  of  Corea.  The  possession  of  Corea  could 
be  of  no  possible  advantage  to  Russia.  Corea  has  a  popu- 
lation of  twelve  millions,  and  the  whole  value  of  her  trade, 
import  and  export,  amounts  to  no  more  than  ^780,000. 
With  the  conquest  of  Corea,  Russia  would  have  another 
distant  point  for  the  defence  of  which  she  would  have 
to  provide,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  such  weak 
places  in  the  state  the  more  its  power  is  weakened. 
The  immense  defensive  strength  of  Russia  lies  in  the  fact 
that  she  is  a  compact  continent  with  a  short  coast  line  on 
which  attack  could  be  made. 

While  Russia  could  draw  no  possible  profit  from  the 
acquisition  of  Corea,  she  would  suffer  from  the  fact  that 
the  Coreans,  becoming  Russian  subjects,  would  begin  to 


DOES  RUSSIA  NEED  A  NAVY?        127 

immigrate  into  Siberia,  leading  the  Chinese  after  them. 
When  we  recall  the  case  of  the  United  States,  compelled 
to  prohibit  the  immigration  of  Chinese  coolies,  it  will 
appear  plain  that  Russia  would  be  compelled  to  take  limi- 
tary measures  against  her  Corean  subjects,  measures  which 
would  not  exactly  tend  towards  the  reconciliation  of  the 
Coreans  with  their  new  position.  It  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  Russia  is  spending  half  a  milliard  roubles  on  the 
Siberian  railway  in  order  to  facilitate  the  competition  of 
Coreans  and  Chinese  with  the  Russian  settlers  in  Siberia. 
The  settlement  of  Eastern  Siberia  with  Coreans  would  also 
give  rise  to  difficulties  from  the  political  point  of  view. 
For  all  such  reasons  the  acquisition  by  Russia  of  Corea  is 
not  to  be  desired. 

In  addition  to  this,  from  the  direction  of  Japan  there  can 
be  no  serious  danger.  In  her  excessive  armaments  Japan 
is  making  efforts  to  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  Europe,  like 
the  frog  in  the  fable  which,  seeking  to  rival  the  size  of  the 
ox,  blew  himself  out  until  he  burst.  Something  of  this 
nature  must  happen  with  Japan.  The  Amur  territory  of 
Russia  is  a  wilderness  which  Japan  cannot  threaten.  It  is 
inconceivable  that  she  would  enter  upon  a  war  with  Russia 
even  though  she  were  possessed  of  a  preponderance  in 
battleships. 


CHAPTER  V 

WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST  IN  THE  NINETEENTH 

CENTURY 

In  considering  the  expenditure  on  past  wars  it  would  be 
necessary  to  add  to  the  direct  expenditure  of  Treasuries 
the  losses  sustained  by  populations  through  destruction  of 
property,  shortening  of  production,  loss  of  trade,  and 
generally  from  economic  perturbations.  The  total  of  such 
losses  would  unquestionably  exceed  the  total  of  the  sums 
directly  devoted  by  governments  to  the  carrying  on  of 
war.  But  this  total,  of  course,  can  only  be  estimated 
approximately.  According  to  M.  Leroy  Beaulieu  the 
expenditure  by  England  in  consequence  of  the  French 
wars  of  the  Revolution  and  of  the  First  Empire,  amounted 
to  ;f  840,000,000 ;  and  the  losses  of  men  in  Europe 
amounted  to  2,100,000.  Some  authorities  estimate  this 
loss  of  men  at  a  much  higher  figure  ;  Sir  Francis  Duver- 
nois  finds  that  France  alone,  up  to  the  year  1799,  had  lost 
i^  millions  of  men. 

The  cost  of  the  war  with  France  from  1812  to  18 15, 
according  to  the  accounts  presented  by  Prince  Barclay  de 
Tolly  to  the  Emperor,  amounted  to  ^23,325,000.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  some  of  the  larger  items  in  this  account. 
Thus  we  find  that  ;^  10,650,000  were  devoted  to  pay, 
;^ 1, 800, 000  to  provisions,  ;^ 1, 050, 000  to  the  purchase  of 
horses,  and  ^1,200,000  to  rations. 

In  reality  the  expenditure  caused  by  this  war  was  very 
much  greater.  The  issue  of  assignats  amounted  to 
;^43, 850,000,  and  debts  in  consequence  of  loans,  &c.,  to 
^22,950,000.     In  addition  to  this,  Russia  expended  the 


WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST 


129 


subsidies  received  from  England,  and  large  sums,  both 
in  money  and  in  kind,  contributed  by  private  indi- 
viduals. 

The  Crimean  is  the  first  of  great  wars  the  expenditure 
of  which  can  be  defined  with  accuracy.  The  extraordinary 
expenditure  caused  by  this  war  amounted  to : 


England             .         .  ;^74,200,ooo  or     1.855,000,000  francs. 

France       .         .         .  66,400,000             1,660,000,000       ,, 

Russia       .         .         .  160,000,000            4,000,000,000       ,, 

Austria      .         .         .  13,720,000               343,000,000       ,, 

Turkey  and  Sardinia  25,680,000               642,000,000       ,, 


Total 


.  ;^34o,ooo,ooo     or     8,500,000,000  francs. 


Let  us  present  these  totals  graphically 


Expenditure  on  the  Crimean  War  in  Millions  of  Francs. 


Russia                :: 

llillil  1 

:: 

.:::::::::;:::::::;::::;;:::i 

England           ;; 

IlllHrlllillllrl 

9  1855 

!! 

1660 

France              :; 

i  URKEi     AN  U        :: 

RA.9 

OTt 

oAKUl  N  lA             ; ; 

AusiRiA               :: 

1343 

4000 


Thus  the  Crimean  war  laid  on  Europe  an  additional 
burden  of  ;^ 340,000,000.  The  total  of  the  indirect 
losses  caused  by  this  war  it  is  quite  impossible  to 
estimate. 

The  expenditure  on  the  war  of  1859  is  thus  estimated 
by  Leroy  Beaulieu  : 


130 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


France 
Austria 
Sardinia 


;^i 5,000,000     or     375,000,000  francs. 
25,400,000  635,000,000       „ 

10,200,000  255,000,000       „ 


Total        .         ;^5o,6oo,ooo    or  1,265,000,000  francs. 
Expenditure  on  the   War  of  1859  in  Millions  of  Francs. 


France     :i:i":i::';:ii:":  — :: —    o/j 

Austria     III;;II;IIII.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIZIIIIIIIZIZIIII"I: 

0                                                                                                                               ^«  »  as 

Sardinia    — 7SK 

635 


After  this  we  come  to  the  North  American  Civil  War. 
In  the  course  of  four  years  the  Northern  States  put  in 
the  field  2,656,000  volunteers,  and  the  Southern  States 
1,100,000.  The  North  expended  in  this  struggle 
;^ 5 60, 000, 000,  and  the  Southern  States  about  the  same 
sum.  In  a  word,  this  conflict  cost  the  United  States 
;£" 1, 000, 000, 000  direct  outlay,  and  probably  double  that 
sum  from  destruction  of  property  and  decline  in  pro- 
duction. Estimating  the  average  value  of  a  slave  at 
£^0,  we  find  that  an  expenditure  of  ;^  160,000,000  would 
have  been  sufficient  for  the  peaceful  decision  of  this 
question. 

In  the  Danish  war  of  1864  the  expenditure  was  much 
less.  It  amounted  to  about  ^7,200,000  for  Denmark, 
and  about  the  same  for  Prussia  and  Austria  together. 
The  Prussian-Austrian  war  of  1866  involved  an  expen- 
diture of  about  ;^66, 000, 000.  In  the  war  of  1870  the 
expenditure  of  Germany  was  covered  by  the  French 
indemnity.  As  relates  to  France,  the  following  are 
the  statistics  of  her  losses  in  the  war  of  1870:  From 
August  I,  1870,  to  April  i,  1871,  France  lost  3864  men 
through   desertion,    310,449    taken    prisoners,   4756   dis- 


WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST 


131 


charged  from  the  service  for  inefficiency,  &c.,  21,430 
falHng  on  the  battlefield,  14,398  dying  from  wounds,  and 
223,410  discharged  for  different  reasons,  including  sick- 
ness. The  money  expenditure  and  losses  of  France 
amounted  to  :  Military  indemnity  and  payment  for  outlay 
on  occupation,  ^225,118,554  2s.  6d.  ;  contributions  from 
Paris  and  other  towns,  ^10,040,000.  The  total  expen- 
diture, indemnity  and  contributions  caused  by  the  war 
with  Germany  amounted  to  ;^5o6,68o,ooo.  To  this  must 
be  added  losses  from  interruption  of  communications 
and  work,  so  that  the  general  total  of  losses  caused  by 
a  war  over  the  candidature  of  a  Hohenzollern  prince 
amounted  to  about  one  thousand  millions  of  pounds 
sterling. 

The  extraordinary  expenditure  of  Russia  caused  by  the 
war  of  1877-78  was  as  follows  : 


1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 

1880 

Total 

£ 
7,649.717  2 
64,399,213  7 
61,221,445  10 

19,816,397  8 
8,222,724  9 

- 

161,309,497  16 

1876 

5t 

1877 

[1     !J 

429 

408 

1878 

1  tilt  t 

1879  i 

132 

1880 

55 

Total 

= :..! :..., 

^ 

T 

j 1 J 

1075 


The  figures  in  the  diagram  stand  for  millions  of  roubles  (a 
rouble  being  taken  as  equivalent  to  3s.) 


132 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Of  the  losses  and  expenditure  of  Turkey  statistics  are 
not  available.  But  taking  the  losses  of  Turkey  at  half  of 
those  sustained  by  Russia — that  is,  at  no  more  than 
;^8o, 700,000,  we  get  an  expenditure  on  both  sides  of 
^241,950,000. 

Ihus  we  find  that  from  1853  ^^  1878,  a  period  of 
twenty-five  years,  the  expenditure  on  the  great  wars  of 
Europe,  that  is,  the  Crimean  war,  the  war  of  1859,  the 
Austro- Prussian  war  of  1866,  the  Franco-Prussian  war  of 
1870,  and  the  war  with  Turkey  of  1877-78,  reaches  the 
immense  sum  of  ^1,221,360,000. 

Expenditure  of  Europe  on  War  in  the  second  half  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century. 


Wars. 


Crimean 


1859 


1866 


1870 


1877 


850a 


1265 


1650 


12667 


6452 


The  figures  in  heavy  t5'pe  stand  for  millions  of  francs,  the  total 
of  which  amount  to  ;^i, 22 1,360, 000. 

But  heavy  as  is  the  cost  of  actual  warfare,  the  burdens 
entailed  by  militarism  in  time  of  peace  are  no  less  crush- 
ing, and  no  easier  to  estimate  precisely.  The  need  of 
preparation  for  unforeseen  events  entails  a  growth  of 
expenditure  not  only  in  the  military  and  naval  depart- 
ments, but  in  other  departments  of  government.  In 
1883  the   military  expenditure   of  Russia  is  defined  as 


WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST 


133 


;^30,234,693  3s.,  but  this  in  no  way  formed  the  limit  to 
the  mihtary  outlays  of  Russia ;  for  pensions,  and  out- 
lays by  the  Ministries  of  Internal  Affairs  and  Ministry  of 
Finances  arising  directly  out  of  military  necessities, 
increased  this  outlay  by  ;^3, 000,000.  The  building  and 
exploitation  of  railways  further  complicates  such  estimates. 
In  1893  the  Ministry  of  War  expended  £33,S2g,68i  ys. 
But  to  these  figures  it  would  strictly  be  necessary  to  add 
the  following  expenditure.  Ministry  of  Finances,  pen- 
sions over  ;^900,ooo  ;  assistance  to  lower  ranks,  ;^67 5, 000; 
recruiting,  ;^93,750,  and  extraordinary  expenditure  by  the 
Ministry  of  War  in  re-armament  over  ;^4,050,ooo.  This 
extra  expenditure,  with  other  smaller  items  which  we 
omit,  show  that  the  military  budget  of  1893  must  be 
increased  by  nearly  ;^6,ooo,ooo. 

But  it  is  by  no  means  sufficient  to  take  into  account 
direct  expenses  alone ;  the  diminution  of  the  revenue  in 
consequence  of  a  strained  economic  condition  is  no  less 
grave.  In  addition  to  this  the  interest  paid  by  states  on 
loans  concluded  to  satisfy  military  needs  must  be  taken 
into  account  as  one  of  the  consequences  of  the  permanent 
armaments  of  Europe.  An  attempt  to  present  in  figures 
these  losses  and  expenditures  would  lead  too  far.  We  must 
confine  ourselves  to  a  short  comparison  of  military  expen- 
diture as  expressed  in  the  budgets  of  different  countries. 

First  of  all  it  is  interesting  to  see  the  amounts 
which  the  Great  Powers,  that  is,  Prussia,  Austria,  Italy, 
Russia,  France,  and  England,  spent  and  spend  yearly  for 
the  maintenance  of  their  land  and  sea  forces,  the  outlay  of 
every  thousand  inhabitants,  and  the  percentage  of  increase 
in  twenty-two  years. 


Year. 

Maintenance  of 
Armies  nnd  Navies. 

Burden  on  looo 
Inhabitants. 

Increase  per  cent. 

taking;  1874  as 

100  per  cent. 

1874         . 

1884        . 

i8gi       . 
1896      . 

£ 
116  040,000 
136,005,000 
169,845,000 
178,995^000 

£      s. 
432     3 
458  II 

530  II 
586     4 

100 
117 
146 

134 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


The  above  table  shows  that  military  and  naval  expendi- 
ture develops  ceaselessly,  and  since  1884  more  rapidly 
than  in  preceding  3^ears.  Thus  war  budgets  grow  not 
only  proportionately  with  the  increase  of  the  population, 
but  in  a  degree  much  greater.  In  1874  every  inhabitant 
of  these  countries  paid  eight  shillings  and  eightpence ;  in 
1 89 1  this  figure  had  grown  to  ten  shillings  and  sixpence, 
in  1896  almost  to  tw^elve  shillings. 

The  table  opposite  shows  the  increase  in  the  expendi- 
ture on  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  armaments  of  each 
state  separately. 


Increase  per  Cent,  of  Military  Expenditure  between  1874  and  1896. 


Germany 


Italy 


Austria     t 


England   c 


France 


Russia 


27Vo 


21Vc 


47% 
43V. 


79  7« 


7574 


From  the  above  diagram  we  see  that  the  greatest 
increase  in  the  war  budget  in  this  period  took  place  in 
Germany,  after  which  Russia  follows,  then  England, 
France,  Italy  and  Austria.  If  we  take  the  period  1874-91 
we  will  see  that  Germany  most  of  all  increased  her  arma- 
ments in  the  latter  year,  expending  twice  as  much  as 
seventeen  3'ears  before.  After  her  follows  Ital}',  and  then 
Russia.  If  we  take  the  period  1874-84  we  find  Italy  at 
the  head,  after  her  follow  France,  Germany,  England  and 
Austria.  Russia  in  this  period  not  onl}'  did  not  increase 
her  war  budget,  but  even  diminished  it  by  4  percent.     It  is 


WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST 


135 


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Germany 
Italy 

Austria    . 
England  . 
Russia     . 
France    . 

13 
-4-1 

136 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


interesting  and  characteristic  that  in  the  very  time  when 
Russia's  armaments  were  being  decreased,  Prince  Bis- 
marck and  his  supporters  attempted  to  spread  throughout 
Germany  and  all  Europe  the  idea  that  Russia  was  arming 
against  Germany.  It  was  this  policy  which  induced  the 
Reichsrath  to  consent  to  increased  outlays  on  armaments, 
thus  dragging  all  Europe  deeper  into  the  gulf  of  militarism. 
If  we  compare  the  two  rival  states  of  Central  Europe, 
Germany  and  France,  we  will  see  that  in  1874  France 
expended  ;£'6,450,ooo  more  than  Germany,  in  1884, 
^8,850,000  more,  in  189 1,  ;£"2,400,000  less,  and  in  1896, 
;f2, 700,000  more  than  Germany.  But  general  figures 
such  as  these  give  no  clear  idea  of  the  increase  of  the 
burden  on  the  population. 

It  is  necessary  here  to  call  attention  to  one  circumstance. 
The  expenditure  cost  of  maintenance  of  soldiers  constantly 
increases,  in  consequence  of  perfected  technique,  the 
greater  knowledge  required,  and,  at  the  same  time,  im- 
provement in  food  and  quarters.  From  statistics  showing 
the  strength  and  cost  of  armies  we  have  drawn  up  the 
following  table  showing  the  yearly  cost  of  the  main- 
tenance of  a  single  soldier. 


1874 

1884 

1891 

1896 

Russia 
France     . 
Germany 
Austria    . 
Italy 
England  . 

£,    s. 

33  15 
37  10 
39     0 

34  I 
36     0 
60     0 

£    s. 
26     5 

43  19 

44  8 
39  15 

33     0 

88  19 

£    s. 
36   12 

43   19 
67   19 

45   18 
41   II 

81     3 

£    s. 
56     8 

44  II 
51     9 
39     0 
35   17 
77  5 

Average 

40     I 

49     I 

52   17 

50  15 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  estimate  the  comparative 
cost  of  maintenance  of  a  cavalry  soldier,  an  infantryman, 
and  an  artilleryman.     From  these  calculations  it  appears 


WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST  137 

that  the  cost  of  armament  constitutes  only  a  small  per- 
centage of  the  general  expenditure  of  maintenance.  As 
the  military  value  of  every  soldier  depends  largely  upon 
the  greater  or  less  degree  of  perfection  of  his  firearms,  a 
natural  consequence  appears  in  the  ceaseless  endeavours 
of  every  state  to  improve  upon  the  weapons  of  its  rivals. 
From  this  rivalry  springs  one  of  the  most  important  items 
of  expenditure  on  armies.  Naval  forces  demand  even 
greater  changes  in  armament.  Old  vessels  have  scarcely 
any  fighting  value,  and  can  only  be  employed  when  the  con- 
fiiict  of  newer  types  has  resulted  in  mutual  extermination. 

In  order  to  give  some  idea  of  the  vastness  of  the  sums 
expended  on  fleets  we  quote  some  statistics  as  to  the  cost  of 
the  creation  of  the  French  fleet.  The  cost  of  the  modern 
fleet  of  France,  according  to  figures  given  in  Engineering 
amounted  to  ;£"29, 172,000 ;  its  actual  modern  value  is 
^^18,538,000,  to  which  must  be  added  expenditure  on 
artillery  to  a  sum  of  ;^2, 11 3,666  135.  ^d.  Consequently 
we  see  that  two-sevenths  of  the  value  of  the  French  fleet 
is  irrecoverably  lost. 

The  following  table  (p.  138)  from  the  Rasvedtchik  gives  a 
detailed  analysis  of  the  expenditure  of  the  Great  Powers 
on  armies  and  fleets  in  1893. 

From  this  table  may  be  seen  the  immense  sums 
swallowed  up  in  military  preparations.  But  in  addition 
to  the  ordinary  expenditure  on  armies  and  fleets,  the  sum 
of  which  rises  from  ^12,000,000  in  Austria- Hungary  to 
;^45, 000,000  in  Russia,  every  state  makes  extraordinary 
expenditure  on  the  increase  of  its  army  and  fleet.  In  1893 
such  outlay  in  Russia  and  France  reached  the  sum  of 
;^6, 840,000  for  the  army,  and  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
;^ 1 0,066,000.  As  concerns  extraordinary  outlay  on  fleets 
we  have  statistics  only  for  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany; 
in  1893  these  states  expended  ;^2, 2 54,000.  These  sums 
increase  year  by  year.  And  they  are  by  no  means  con- 
fined to  the  Great  Powers. 

At  the  same  time,  and  as  an  inevitable  consequence,  the 
essential  requirements  of  the  people  remain  unsatisfied. 
In  Austria  in  1896,  ^13,500,000  were  devoted  to  the  army 


138 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


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WHAT  WARS  HAVE  COST  139 

and  fleet,  while  only  ;^2, 8 50,000,  or  4^  times  less  was 
devoted  to  popular  education.  Jn  Italy  in  the  same  year 
the  expenditure  on  armaments  was  ^12,650,000,  while 
;^i, 500,000,  or  eight  times  less,  was  spent  upon  education. 
In  France  ;^3 2,400,000  are  spent  upon  the  army,  and 
;^6,6oo,O0O,  or  a  fifth  part,  on  education  generally.  In 
Russia  the  army  devours  ;^4 1,5 20,000,  while  education 
receives  but  i^3, 540,000,  that  is,  a  little  more  than  a 
twelfth. 

These  figures  speak  for  themselves ;  and  give  a  plain 
indication  of  the  degree  of  intellectual  and  moral  culture 
we  may  expect  from  mankind  when  all  its  labour  and 
strength  are  swallowed  up  in  the  creation  and  maintenance 
of  armed  forces.  The  United  States  in  this  respect  have 
an  infinitely  better  record.  There  all,  from  the  children 
of  the  millionaire  Vanderbilt  down  to  the  poorest  peasant, 
attend  the  public  schools,  and  receive  elementary  educa- 
tion. There  knowledge  for  all  is  free  and  obligatory. 
The  state  makes  it  a  duty  to  guard  and  maintain  the 
popular  schools. 

But  expenditure  on  past  wars,  and  on  armaments  in 
peace  have  but  a  secondary  importance  in  determining 
the  significance  of  modern  armaments.  It  is  more  im- 
portant to  estimate  the  expenditure  which  may  be  expected 
in  a  future  war. 


CHAPTER   VI 

WHAT   THEY   WILL   COST   IN    THE   FUTURE 

The  expenditure  which  the  actual  carrying  on  of  war 
will  demand  can  only  be  estimated  approximately.  But 
some  consideration  of  this  question  is  indispensable  for 
the  purposes  of  this  work. 

It  is  useful  to  indicate  some  of  those  new  conditions  of 
modern  warfare  which  will  be  the  cause  of  immense 
expenditure.  First  of  all,  militar}^  stores  must  be  drawn 
by  every  country  from  its  own  resources.  This  in 
itself  is  a  circumstance  which  will  tend  greatly  to  increase 
the  cost  of  war  for  individual  states.  The  quick-firing 
rifle  is  a  costly  weapon,  and  the  quantity  of  ammunition 
it  will  require  cannot  even  be  estimated.  The  same  may 
be  said  concerning  modern  artillery  and  artillery  ammuni- 
tion. The  vastness  of  armies,  and  the  deadliness  of 
modern  weapons,  will  immensely  increase  the  require- 
ments of  the  sick  and  wounded.  The  preparations  for 
sudden  irruption  upon  an  enemy's  territory  and  destruc- 
tion of  his  conmiunications,  having  in  view  the  fact  that 
local  resources  must  quickly  be  exhausted,  constitutes 
another  factor  which  mus-t  be  borne  in  mind.  The 
demand  for  provisions  must  grow  to  an  immense  extent, 
corresponding,  as  it  will,  to  the  increase  of  armies  ;  and 
this  will  be  followed  by  a  great  rise  in  prices.  In  the 
supply  of  these  provisions  each  country  must  provide  for 
itself.  That  an  immense  army  cannot  exist  on  the 
resources  of  an  enemy's  territory  is  plain,  especially  when 
the  slowness  of  advance,  in  a  struggle  for  fortified 
positions,  is  taken  into  account.     A   future  war  will  not 


WHAT  WARS  WILL  COST  141 

only  involve  the  question  of  victory  in  the  field,  but  also 
the  problem  of  forcing  the  enemy  into  such  a  position  as 
to  render  military  operations  on  his  part  impossible,  in 
consequence  of  the  failure  of  supplies.  As  we  have 
already  explained,  communications  by  sea  will  be 
interrupted  at  the  very  outbreak  of  war.  In  consequence 
of  this  those  countries  which  do  not  grow  sufficient  corn 
for  the  support  of  their  populations  will  be  compelled  to 
expend  immense  sums  in  obtaining  food.  In  this  respect, 
as  we  shall  hereafter  point  out  in  detail,  England  is  in 
incomparably  the  worst  position. 

The  increased  demand  for  corn  in  time  of  war  will,  of 
course,  cause  an  immense  rise  in  prices.  At  a  time  when 
armies  had  but  one-fifth  of  their  present  strength,  and 
when  there  was  no  thought  of  the  interruption  of  sea 
communications,  the  authority  Stein  estimated  that  the 
expenditure  on  provisioning  an  army  would  be  three 
times  greater  in  time  of  war  than  in  time  of  peace. 
Another  authority,  S.  N.  Kotie,  considers  that  even  in 
Austria,  which  grows  a  superfluity  of  corn,  the  rise  in 
prices  consequent  on  war  w^ould  amount  to  from  60 
per  cent,  to  100  per  cent.  But  if  war  were  to  prove  as 
prolonged  as  military  authorities  declare — that  is,  if  it  were 
to  last  for  two  years — the  disorganisation  of  agriculture 
caused  by  the  withdrawal  from  work  of  the  majority  of 
agriculturists,  would  raise  the  price  of  bread  to  an  incon- 
ceivable height. 

There  are  serious  reasons  for  doubting  the  proposition 
that  a  future  war  would  be  short.  Thanks  to  railways, 
the  period  of  preparatory  operations  would  be  consider- 
ably shortened,  but  in  marches,  manoeuvres,  and  battles, 
railways  can  be  employed  only  in  very  rare  cases,  and 
as  lines  of  operation  the}/  cannot  serve. 

General  Jung  estimates  that  the  mobilisation  of  the 
French  army  would  require  ;^i 2,000,000,  and  that  the 
daily  expenditure  would  grow  from  ^60,000  in  time  of 
peace  to  £;^6o,ooo  in  time  of  war. 

The  L!Avenir  Militaire  estimates  the  daily  expenditure 
in  time  of  war  at  the  following  totals  : 


142  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


France 
Germany 
Italy    . 


;^396,88o 

388,920 
248,040 


From  detailed  calculations,  made  on  the  basis  of  past 
wars,  it  appears  that  a  war  breaking  out  in  1896  would 
have  cost  daily : 


Germany  (for  an  army  of  2,550,000) 
Austria      (     „  „  1,304,000) 

Italy  (     ,,  „  1,281,000) 

Total  for  Triple  Alliance     . 

France  (for  an  army  of  2,554,000) 
Russia  (     ,,  „  2,800,000)  . 


.  ;^I, 020,000 
521,600 
512,400 

;^2,o54,ooo 

.  ;^  I, 02  I, 600 

1,120,000 

2,141,600 


The  following  diagram  represents  this  more  clearly : 


Probable  Daily  Expenditure  on  a  Future  War  in  Millions  of 

Francs. 


1 


WHAT  WARS  WILL  COST  143 

Thus  it  may  be  said  that  for  five  of  the  chief  European 
states  the  daily  expenditure  in  a  future  war  would  amount 
approximately  to  ;^4, 200,000.  In  reality,  however,  this 
sum  would  probably  be  much  higher.  The  provision- 
ing of  armies  would  be  carried  out  not  only  with  stores 
obtained  from  the  central  commissariat,  but  also  from 
local  products.  The  extent  to  which  such  a  circumstance 
raises  local  prices  may  be  shown  by  the  history  of  the 
Crimean  war.  In  the  Crimean  peninsula  the  price  of 
victuals  during  war  rose  10,  15,  16,  and  even  25  times, 
hay  i6f  times,  and  grain,  milk,  and  wood  from  5  to  9 
times  ;  the  price  of  manufactured  articles  increased  2  and  3 
times,  and  transport  from  5  to  7^  times.  In  the  neigh- 
bouring southern  governments  prices  were  two  and  three 
times  greater  than  in  time  of  peace,  and  even  in  govern- 
ments distant  from  the  seat  of  war  they  doubled  themselves. 
To-day  the  employment  of  railways  would  somewhat 
relieve  this  condition,  but  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume 
that  the  whole  provisioning  of  an  arm}',  and  especially 
the  supply  of  forage,  could  be  carried  on  by  means  of 
railways. 

The  extraordinary  expenditure  caused  by  war  will  by 
no  means  be  limited  by  these  items.  The  following  table, 
which  is  based  on  detailed  calculations,  shows  the  extent 
to  which  governments  would  be  compelled  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  families  left  without  resources  on  the  out- 
break of  war : 

Daily. 

Germany  (783,000  families)     .         .       ;^78,30o 
Austria     (351,000        ,,       )     .         .  21,060 

Italy         (341,000       ,,      )    .        .  20,460 


Total  for  Triple  Alliance       .     ;^i  19,820 

France  (659,000  families)        .        .       ;^52,720 
Russia  (531,000        5)      )        .        .         25,488 


Total  for  Dual  Alliance       .       ;C78,2o8 
The  following  diagram  illustrates  this  more  plainly : 


144  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Probable  Daily  Expenditure  of  Governments  on  the  Assistance  of 
the  Families  of  SoUiiers  in  Thousands  of  Francs. 


1.957 


Probable  Yearly  Expenditure  on  War  in  Millions  of  Francs. 


Germany 



10 

: 

Austria 

5,327 
5,187 

-— — — 

Italy 





France 

1  1( 

Russia 

~  .,-■  ■ 

^ , — 

10,727 
1i;756 


WHAT  WAR  WirJ.  COST 


145 


For  these  five  states  the  daily  expenditure  in  assisting 
the  resourceless  part  of  the  population  would  amount  to 


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;£■  1 98,028.  This  sum  cannot  be  considered  exaggerated, 
considering  the  immense  increase  in  the  price  of  the  neces- 
saries of  life.     Tliis  rise  in  prices,  independently  of  the 


146  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

general  economic  crisis  caused  by  war  and  interruption  of 
communications,  will  tend  towards  the  depreciation  of 
paper  money,  to  the  increased  issue  of  which  governments 
will  be  compelled  to  resort  in  order  to  meet  growing 
expenditure. 

The  amount  which  will  be  required  by  the  Great  Powers 
of  the  continent  to  carry  on  war  for  a  year  may  be  seen 
from  the  diagram  at  the  bottom  of  page  144. 

We  may  well  ask  the  question — where  will  such  re- 
sources be  found  ?  Already  militarism  and  public  debts 
swallow  up  the  greater  part  of  the  revenue  of  most  Euro- 
pean states,  as  the  diagram  on  page  145  shows. 

An  examination  of  the  foregoing  statistics  naturally 
raises  the  question,  Will  it  be  possible  to  raise  resources 
so  vastly  exceeding  the  normal  revenues  of  states  ?  And 
what  results  must  we  expect  from  such  extraordinary 
tension  ? 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE   CARE    OF    THE    WOUNDED 

I. — Effect  of  the  Improvement  in  Firearms  upon  the 
Character  of  Wounds. 

The  adoption  of  long-range  artillery  and  quick-firing, 
small-calibre  rifles  with  four  times  the  energy  of  those 
employed  in  former  wars,  gives  reason  for  fearing  that 
not  only  the  losses  in  battle  will  be  incomparably  greater 
than  in  the  past,  but  also  that  the  assistance  of  the 
wounded  will  be  much  more  difficult.  It  is  true  that  many 
authorities  do  not  share  these  pessimistic  views  ;  in  their 
opinion  the  difference  in  the  wounds  caused  by  the  old 
and  the  new  weapons  being  in  favour  of  the  latter.  The 
wounds  inflicted  by  modern  weapons,  they  say,  will  be  more 
easily  cured ;  even  when  the  wounded  are  left  a  long  time 
without  assistance  the  loss  of  blood  will  be  small.  The 
number  of  wounded  will  not  be  so  great.  According  to 
this  view  the  losses  in  future  battles  will  be  determined 
not  alone  by  the  power  of  arms,  but  also  by  those  tactical 
methods  which  have  been  adopted  as  a  consequence  of 
the  improvements  in  arms.  As  the  result  of  perfected 
weapons,  armies  will  seek  or  construct  cover,  and  will 
attack  in  loose  formation,  while  battles  will  be  carried  on 
at  greater  distances,  all  of  which  factors  must  tend  to  the 
decrease  in  the  number  of  wounded.  In  addition  to  this, 
every  soldier  will  be  supplied  with  materials  for  dressing 
wounds,  while  blood-poisoning  will  be  almost  wholly 
eliminated,  and  the  medical  staffs  of  armies  will  be  much 
stronger  than  before.     Such  are  the  opinions  of  optimists. 


148  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

It  is  interesting  to  consider  the  proportions  and  nature 
of  wounds  in  past  wars  in  comparison  with  those  inflicted 
by  the  weapons  now  in  use. 

Injuries  from  Cold  Steel. — Fisher  estimates  the  pro- 
portion of  wounds  inflicted  by  cold  steel  in  the  war  of 
1866  in  the  Austrian  army  at  4  per  cent.,  and  in  the 
Prussian  army  at  5  per  cent.,  of  all  wounds.  In  the  war 
of  1870-71  the  proportion  of  wounds  caused  by  cold  steel 
in  the  German  army  was  i  per  cent.  In  the  Russo- 
Turkish  war  the  percentage  of  wounds  inflicted  by  cold 
steel  was  2.5  per  cent,  in  the  Russian  army  of  the  Danube. 
The  percentage  of  deaths  caused  by  cold  steel  is  also  very 
inconsiderable.  In  the  last  Russo-Turkish  war,  of  the 
number  killed  in  the  army  of  the  Danube  only  5.3  per 
cent,  of  deaths  were  caused  by  cold  steel,  and  in  the  army 
of  the  Caucasus  barely  i  per  cent. 

Injuries  from  Bullets  and  Shells. — The  mutual  relations 
of  injuries  by  rifle  and  artillery  fire,  both  as  to  quantity 
and  nature,  present  different  results  in  previous  wars.  In 
a  future  war  the  differences  will  be  still  greater.  In  the 
past  the  wounds  from  shell-fire  were  many  times  more 
dangerous  than  those  caused  by  rifle  bullets  ;  in  the  present 
day  this  would  appear  to  have  changed.  The  bullet  of  a 
modern  rifle,  weighing  several  grammes,  has  such  force 
that  it  may  strike  five  or  six  men,  and  cause  even  greater 
destruction  than  is  caused  by  fragments  of  shells.  The 
mutual  relations  of  injuries  from  bullets  and  shells  in  a 
future  war  will  depend  from  the  manner  in  which  the  war 
is  conducted — that  is,  whether  it  be  determined  chiefly  by 
open  battles  or  take  the  character  of  sieges. 

Since  the  adoption  of  rifled  weapons  we  find  that 
casualties  have  been  caused  mainly  by  bullets.  Thus  at 
the  battle  of  Inkermann  91  per  cent,  of  all  wounds  were 
inflicted  by  rifle  fire.  At  the  battle  of  the  Tchernaya  the 
proportion  of  wounds  from  rifle  fire  reached  75  per  cent. 
Similar  rusults  took  place  in  the  Italian  war,  at  Dlippel 
and  at  Koniggratz.  In  the  war  of  1859,  80  per  cent,  of  all 
wounds  were  caused  by  rifle  fire,  while  at  the  storm  of 
Dlippel   the    proportion    of    bullet   wounds    among    the 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED     149 

Prussians  was  80.6  per  cent.  The  statistics  given  by 
Weygand  concerning  the  Franco-Prussian  war  are  as 
follows  :  Artillery  fire  was  the  cause  of  25  per  cent,  of  the 
losses  of  the  French  and  5  per  cent,  of  the  losses  of  the 
Germans,  while  rifle  fire  caused  70  per  cent,  of  French  and 
94  per  cent,  of  German  losses. 

Thanks  to  the  introduction  of  smokeless  powder,  dimi- 
nution of  calibres,  and  the  covering  of  bullets  with 
steel,  the  infantry  rifle,  of  all  arms  the  most  important,  has 
been  so  perfected  that  grave  questioning  has  arisen 
concerning  the  losses  in  future  war.  Especial  alarm  has 
been  caused  by  the  increased  penetrative  power  of  the  new 
composite  bullet  over  that  of  the  old. 

The  following  diagram  illustrates  the  result  of  firing 
experiments  from  an  ii-mil.  rifle.  The  shots  were  fired 
against  fifteen  folds  of  cowhide,  3.6  inches  of  hard  beech- 
wood,  and  finally  pine  planks  I  inch  thick,  at  a  distance 
of  32 1  feet  from  one  another. 


l! 


3.  Compound.  4,  5,  6.  Hard  leaden  bullets. 

7,  8,  9.  Soft  bullets. 


From  this  we  see  that  the  penetrative  force  of  the 
compound  bullet  is  many  times  greater.  It  is  generally 
accepted  that  a  bullet  which  will  penetrate  an  inch  of  pine 
has  sufficient  force  to  kill  or  wound  a  man  or  horse. 

But  even  here  invention  has  not  stopped.  The  sketch  on 
page  150  shows  the  action  of  a  5.5-mil.  bullet  fired  with  an 
initial  velocity  of  about  2600  feet  against  a  14-mil.  steel 
plate.  The  force  of  this  bullet  was  sufficient,  from  a 
distance  of  81^  feet,  to  penetrate  the  plate,  the  bullet,  on 
issuing  from  the  plate   taking  the  form  of  a  mushroom. 


I50 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


In  view  of  the  small  diameter  of  bullets  and  the  force 
with  which  they  penetrate  the  body,  the  German  surgeons 
Reger  and  Beck,  and,  to  some  extent,  Bruns,  consider  that 
wounds  from  the  new  bullets  will  be  less  terrible  than  those 
caused  by  the  old,  in  consequence  of  which  they  have  given 
to  these  bullets  the  title  **  humane."  In  an  address  read 
in  1885  by  Reger  to  the  Berlin  Military  Medical  Society, 


a 


§ 


at 


^  :^ 


we  find  the  following  expression  of  opinion  :  "  I  welcome 
the  new  bullet  with  great  joy  and  believe  that  if  it  were 
generally  adopted  by  international  consent,  all  humanity 
would  have  cause  to  rejoice."  Similar  views  have  been 
expressed  by  Bruns,  who  considers  that  the  new  bullet  is 
not  only  the  most  effective,  but  also  the  most  humane,  tend- 
ing to  decrease  the  horrors  of  war. 

But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  these  views  were 
unanimously  held.  As  far  back  as  the  Franco-German  war 
we  find  that  both  combatants  reproached  one  another  with 
the  employment  of  explosive  bullets.     The  foundation  for 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED     151 

these  accusations  was  the  fact  that  ordinary  bullet  wounds 
often  took  the  character  of  wounds  caused  by  explosive 
bullets.  A  closer  acquaintan',je  with  facts  would  have 
prevented  these  accusations.  Numerous  experiments 
which  have  been  made  show  that  bullets  fired  at  great 
initial  velocity  (not  less  than  812J-975  feet)  cause 
injuries  similar  to  those  caused  by  explosive  bullets. 
Various  attempts  have  been  made  to  explain  this  cir- 
cumstance. The  opinion  most  widely  accepted  is  that 
an  explosive  effect  is  produced  when  the  bullet  falls  in 
some  organ  rich  in  liquids,  the  liquids  being  cast  on  all 
sides  with  destructive  action  on  the  neighbouring  tissues 
similar  to  that  of  an  explosion.  This  theory  is  elaborated 
by  Reger  in  particular. 

As  modern  rifles  are  immensely  superior  to  those  of 
former  times,  both  in  range,  accuracy  and  power,  it  would 
seem  natural  to  expect  a  greater  proportion  of  mortal 
wounds  than  before.  If  this  be  so,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  they  deserve  the  title  "humane."  It  must  first  of  all 
be  stated  that  against  the  immense  force  with  which  modern 
bullets  move,  the  opposition  of  the  human  body  has  little 
power  to  arrest  their  movement.  The  experiments  of 
Bruns,  in  which  a  bullet  fired  from  a  distance  of  2600-3900 
feet  penetrated  2-3  human  corpses  one  behind  the  other, 
and  fired  from  a  distance  of  400  metres  penetrated  4-5 
bodies,  even  the  strongest  bones  of  the  human  body  being 
shattered,  have  not  only  been  confirmed  but  strengthened 
by  later  investigations,  which  showed  that  at  any  distance 
up  to  6500  feet  the  penetrating  force  of  a  composite 
bullet  was  sufficient  to  pierce  several  bones. 

The  absolute  number  of  wounded  in  war,  even  with  an 
equal  number  of  combatants,  must  be  incomparably  greater 
than  before.  The  causes  of  this  are  obvious  :  the  increased 
quantity  of  ammunition  expended  per  man,  rapidity  of  fire, 
increased  range,  greater  accuracy,  smokeless  powder,  and 
greater  penetrative  force,  thanks  to  which  many  forms  of 
cover,  formerly  effectually  protecting  the  soldier  will  be  of 
no  value. 

Professor  Bardeleben  draws  a  melancholy  picture  of  the 


152  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

action  of  the  new  weapons.  He  agrees  that  the  number 
of  wounded  in  the  course  of  a  given  time  will  increase, 
not  only  because  the  magazine  rifle  allows  the  discharge 
of  many  more  bullets  than  formerly,  but  because  one  bullet 
will  strike  three  or  four  men,  one  behind  the  other,  it  may 
be  even  more.  On  the  other  hand,  he  finds  that  the  pro- 
portion of  killed  on  the  field  of  battle  will  increase  in  con- 
sequence of  the  increased  force  of  the  blow.  Fired  from  a 
distance  at  which  the  old  bullet  was  stopped  by  the  skull 
or  the  ribs,  the  modern  bullet  will  penetrate  to  the  brain 
and  heart. 

The  sketches  of  Bircher  (opposite  page)  give  some  idea 
of  the  effect  of  fire  at  long  range.  These  experiments  were 
carried  on  in  Switzerland  with  the  7. 5-mil.  bullet  at  a 
distance  of  9750  feet  and  11, 375  feet. 

Such  shattering  of  the  bones  at  a  distance  of  9750  feet 
and  1 1,375  feet  will  be  comparatively  rare.  In  the  zone  of 
actual  fire  cases  of  shattered  bones  will  be  more  frequent 
and  more  serious  ;  and  the  mortality  will  be  greater  in 
consequence  of  greater  loss  of  blood  resulting  from  direct 
injury  to  the  blood-vessels. 

As  relates  to  the  wounds  caused  by  artillery  fire,  as  a 
great  part  of  these  wounds  will  be  caused  by  the  frag- 
ments and  bullets  of  shrapnel,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
injuries  they  inflict  will  differ  little  from  those  inflicted  in 
past  wars. 

II. — Help  to  the  Wounded. 

Not  only  may  we  expect  that  the  quantity  of  wounds 
and  sickness  will  increase  in  future  wars,  but  the  assist- 
ance of  the  wounded  and  sick  will  be  much  more  difficult 
than  in  the  past.  It  must  be  noted  that  this  side  of  the 
question  has  received  little  attention.  The  whole  atten- 
tion of  specialists  has  been  bent  upon  the  increase  of  the 
deadliness  of  weapons  of  extermination,  and  upon  the 
strengthening  of  armies.  The  chief  physician  of  the 
Bavarian  army.  Forth,  calls  attention  to  this  fact,  and 
declares  that  the  German    strategists  in   the  race  after 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED         153 


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154  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

perfection  of  weapons  of  extermination,  have  left  behind 
them  all  plans  for  the  amelioration  of  the  lot  of  the 
wounded  in  war.  Indeed,  they  go  even  further,  and 
refuse  to  grant  resources  for  the  perfection  of  the  medical 
organisation,  thinking  that  such  a  course  would  hinder 
military  operations.  Meantime,  the  modern  weapons  will 
cause  wounds  requiring,  if  anything,  more  rapid  aid  to  the 
wounded  than  those  inflicted  by  the  old  type. 

In  recent  wars  provision  for  the  wounded  generally 
proved  inadequate.  Even  in  the  war  of  1870  it  was 
impossible  to  make  arrangements  for  ambulances  as 
easily  as  formerly.  ''  Bullets  and  shells,"  says  Pigorof, 
*'  carried  much  farther  than  before  ;  it  was  difficult  to  find 
a  safe  spot  in  the  vicinity  of  the  field  of  battle,  and  such  a 
position  once  found  was  quickly  rendered  untenable  by 
the  rapid  movements  of  the  armies.  Another  element  of 
difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  all  stations  for  dressing 
wounds  in  modern  wars  are  quickly  overcrowded  owing 
to  the  rapidity  of  fire,  whole  files  being  stricken  down  at 
the  same  time  ;  in  consequence  there  is  no  possibility  of 
avoiding  terrible  overcrowding  in  the  ambulances  if  the 
wounded  are  not  sent  off*  the  field  at  once. 

"  After  the  battle  of  Weissenburg  the  wounded  French 
lay  two  days  upon  the  field.  In  the  village  of  Remilie  lay 
some  thousands  of  men  wounded  at  Gravelotte,  brought 
thither  in  two  days  and  two  nights  in  peasants'  carts,  and, 
to  attend  to  these  thousands  of  wounded  (nearly  10,000) 
during  the  first  few  days  only  four  doctors  were  avail- 
able." Similar  was  the  experience  after  other  battles  of 
this  war.  Pigorof  continues  :  "  The  wounded  remaining 
after  battle  were  named  by  our  old  servant  '  garbage  and 
bits,'  and  there  they  all  lay,  garbage  and  bits,  scattered 
over  the  battlefield  till  some  one  lifted  them  up  and  bore 
them  away.  The  rapidity  and  accuracy  of  modern  fire 
are  such  that  whole  files  fall  together,  and  the  accumula- 
tion of  wounded  in  a  very  short  time  is  immense." 

No  better  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  war  of  I'^yy-'j^. 
Professor  Botkin  says  that  the  wounded  remained  not  only 
without  medical  aid,  but  even  without  water  for  days,  and 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED     155 

all  this  thanks  to  the  fact  that  no  one  had  thought  of  this 
matter  in  time.  The  position  of  the  wounded  in  hospital 
was  also  unsatisfactory.  In  a  memorandum  of  the  Chief 
Controller  we  find  it  plainly  stated  that  the  military 
hospitals,  both  in  the  Caucasus  and  in  Bulgaria,  were 
characterised  by  great  defects,  especially  when  compared 
with  the  institutions  opened  by  the  Red  Cross  Society,  and 
at  the  expense  of  private  individuals.  The  temporary 
military  hospitals  were  supplied  by  the  commissariat  with 
inferior  stores,  and  the  medicine-chests  were  lacking  in 
some  of  the  most  necessary  remedies.  The  supply  of  the 
hospitals  was  carried  on  unpunctually,  and  sometimes 
resulted  in  a  lack  of  medical  attendance.  These  defi- 
ciencies were  especially  felt  in  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of 
typhus  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

The  chief  representative  of  the  Red  Cross  Society,  Mr. 
P.  A.  Richter,  writes  in  his  report  as  follows  :  "  Of  what 
were  the  military  hospitals  in  need  ?  It  would  be  easier 
to  answer  this  question  if  it  were  reversed,  and  it  were 
necessary  to  enumerate  not  those  things  which  they 
wanted,  but  those  with  which  they  were  fully  supplied." 
Again  he  says  :  ''The  shortsightedness  and  inactivity  of 
the  military  administration  in  this  case  cannot  be  placed 
to  the  account  of  the  hospitals  themselves."  Among  other 
things,  Richter  complains  bitterly  of  the  absence  of 
clothing. 

All  society  is  anxious  to  know  that  such  events  should 
not  be  repeated  in  a  future  war.  It  is  interesting  to  see 
what  improvements  have  been  made  in  this  department 
of  military  administration. 

Let  us  take  France  as  an  example.  In  1870  France 
committed  the  unpardonable  sin  of  considering  herself 
ready  for  war.  In  the  present  day  we  also  hear  complaint 
as  to  the  possible  failure  of  arrangements  to  fulfil  in 
practice  what  has  been  claimed  for  them.  When  in 
1 88 1  General  Farre  was  questioned  as  to  the  sending  of 
dressing  materials  for  the  Algiers  and  Tunis  armies  he 
replied  :  '*  Our  ambulances  will  in  no  respect  show 
deficiencies."       In    reality   it    was     shown    that   in    this 


156  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

respect  nothing  was  ready.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
all  the  necessary  material  was  bought  with  a  liberal  hand, 
it  did  not  reach  its  destination.  It  even  appears  that  in 
Kef  (May  1881)  after  numberless  vain  applications 
the  officers  were  obliged  to  raise  a  subscription  among 
themselves  for  the  purchase  of  sugar,  wine,  and  coffee 
for  the  sick  in  the  improvised  ambulances.  In  Grardi- 
may  in  May  1 89 1  the  wounded  and  sick  of  General 
Lozhero's  column  awaited  for  twenty  days  the  arrival  of 
material  from  the  regular  ambulance.  In  Gulletta  in  May 
and  June  1881  the  sick  officers  were  compelled  to  live  at 
their  own  expense  in  the  wretched  coffee-houses  of  the 
town  ;  and  on  the  whole  extent  of  coast  from  Gulletta  to 
Philippeville  the  ambulances  and  hospitals  were  over- 
crowded to  such  an  extent  that  by  August  no  more  could 
be  admitted,  and  the  sick  from  Gulletta  had  to  be  sent 
down  to  the  coast  and  set  on  board  ship,  until  finally  they 
were  again  brought  to  Philippeville.  At  Pont  de  Fahs  in 
October  1881,  4000  sick  men  of  Filbert's  brigade,  finding 
themselves  left  to  the  care  of  a  single  doctor,  were  com- 
pelled, owing  to  the  absence  of  transport,  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  wretched  waggons  hired  from  the  natives  in 
order  to  bring  them  to  Tunis. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  the  Italian  army  in  the  Abys- 
sinian war  was  no  better. 

There  is  reason  for  turning  attention  to  the  aid  of  the 
wounded  and  sick,  the  more  so  since  the  new  weapons  have 
made  the  position  of  affairs  infinitely  worse ;  increase  in 
the  number  of  wounded  will  increase  proportionately  the 
difficulties  of  the  ambulance  corps  ;  the  time  for  its  opera- 
tions is  diminished,  thanks  to  the  greater  accuracy, 
rapidity,  and  range  of  fire  which  sometimes  must  make  it 
impossible  to  carry  off  the  wounded  and  grant  them  first 
aid  ;  while  there  is  an  inevitable  loss  of  working  force 
caused  by  greater  distance  of  the  dressing  stations  from 
the  fighting  line  which  the  immense  range  of  modern 
fire-arms  must  involve. 

One  of  the  most  celebrated  surgeons  of  the  century, 
Professor  Bilroth,  declared  that  in  order  to  give  full  assist- 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED     157 

ance  to  the  wounded,  the  sanitary  corps  must  be  equal  in 
strength  to  the  combatants.  This  is  in  no  way  an  exag- 
geration, but  merely  expresses  the  fact  that  with  the 
modern  conditions  of  war,  and  the  probable  great  length 
of  battles,  it  will  be  almost  impossible  fully,  immediately, 
and  satisfactorily  to  give  medical  assistance  to  the 
wounded.  The  very  work  of  removing  the  wounded 
must  be  carried  on  under  fire,  and  will  be  extremely 
difficult.  The  ambulance  servant  must  pick  his  way  with 
his  burden,  bending  down  to  avoid  the  shots  if  both  he 
and  the  wounded  man  he  bears  are  not  to  be  killed.  The 
work  of  collecting  the  wounded  will  be  made  even  more 
difficult  by  the  fact  that  they  must  be  sought  for  in  the 
covered  positions  where  they  lie.  And  delay  in  the  carry- 
ing off  of  the  wounded  means  an  increased  percentage 
of  deaths,  not  only  from  loss  of  blood  but  even  from 
hunger. 

In  a  time  when  rifle  and  artillery  fire  were  beyond  com- 
parison weaker  than  they  are  now,  those  who  were  left 
unhelped  on  the  battlefield  might  hope  for  safety.  But 
now,  when  the  whole  field  of  battle  is  covered  with  an 
uninterrupted  hail  of  bullets  and  fragments  of  shells,  there 
is  little  place  for  such  hope.  But  even  here  the  list 
of  terrors  of  a  future  war  does  not  cease. 

The  Bavarian  Chief  Military  Physician  Forth  calls 
attention  to  yet  another  danger  which  may  threaten  the 
wounded.  After  the  battle  of  Worth  he  set  out  with  his 
assistants  to  aid  the  wounded,  and  came  across  a  great 
number  of  Turcos  who  needed  assistance.  After  this,  on 
entering  a  wood  he  came  across  great  walls  of  corpses 
lying  across  the  road.  The  lower  parts  of  these  walls  of 
corpses  were  constructed  regularly,  while  the  upper  parts 
were  formed  of  corpses  lying  in  disorder.  These  last, 
apparently,  were  corpses  of  soldiers  struck  by  bullets 
after  the  wall  had  been  built.  Forth  examined  the  corpses 
carefully  in  order  to  see  if  any  living  men  were  among 
them,  but  found  that  all  were  dead.  "  This  will  easily  be 
understood,"  observes  Dr.  Forth,  *'  as  the  weight  of  those 
on  top  and  fresh  bullets  had  finally  killed  off  any  who  had 


158  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

been  placed  there  alive."  Forth  supposes  that  such  walls 
of  corpses  will  also  be  raised  in  a  future  war.  Trenches 
constructed  in  haste  have  not  any  connecting  passages 
behind,  so  that  the  reinforcements  sent  to  the  front  will 
have  to  pass  an  exposed  space,  and  hastily  jumping  into 
the  trenches  may  cause  injuries  to  the  wounded  already 
lying  there.  When  the  trenches  shall  have  become  en- 
cumbered with  dead  or  those  considered  as  dead,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  throw  these  out ;  they  cannot  be  thrown 
out  behind,  since  such  a  course  would  result  in  impeding 
the  path  of  reinforcements  ;  they  will  be  placed  of  neces- 
sity, in  front  of  the  trench,  that  is,  on  the  side  of  the 
enemy,  thus  forming  a  breastwork.  **  To  be  cast  there 
alive,"  adds  Dr.  Forth,  "  will  be  the  best  of  fates,  for  a  new 
bullet  will  shortly  end  all  sufferings,  while  those  wounded 
who  are  left  lying  in  the  trenches  will  suffer  long." 

It  is  plain  that  the  introduction  of  long-range  rifles,  the 
improvement  of  artillery,  the  immense  increase  in  the 
strength  of  armies,  and  finally,  changes  in  the  rules  of 
war,  demand  the  introduction  of  radical  reforms  in  the 
methods  of  assisting  the  wounded  on  the  field  of  battle. 
For  the  benefit  of  the  ambulance  service,  it  would  be 
absolutely  necessary  to  give  independence  to  the  authority 
to  which  is  subject  both  official  and  voluntary  organisa- 
tions for  aiding  the  wounded. 

Without  voluntary  co-operation,  without  public  partici- 
pation in  time  of  war,  it  would  be  impossible  to  manage, 
but  this  participation  must  be  regulated  in  good  time.  In 
Russia  it  is  especially  necessary  to  constitute  committees 
with  authority:  (i)  Over  the  hospitals;  (2)  over  the 
supply  of  medical  stores  ;  (3)  over  the  transport  of  the 
sick  and  wounded  ;  (4)  over  the  equipment  of  the  hos- 
pitals with  domestic  necessaries.  The  rational  organisa- 
tion of  such  a  committee  would  result  in  immense  benefit. 

We  will  quote  here  some  more  evidence  as  to  the  neces- 
sity for  improvement.  Writing  of  the  Russo-Turkish 
war,  Figorof  says  :  "  In  the  end  of  September,  on  our 
inspection  of  the  hospitals  we  came  across  hundreds  of 
cases  of  frost-bitten   feet,  and  in   answer  to  our  inquiries 


THE  CARE  OF  THE  WOUNDED     159 

found  that  almost  all  ascribed  their  sufferings  to  wet  boots, 
which  for  a  long  time  had  been  worn  without  taking 
off.  If  valenki  (felt  over-boots)  had  been  given  only  to 
half  the  men  in  a  company  it  would  have  saved  many  from 
frost-bites,  as  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  soldiers 
to  take  off  their  boots  and  dry  them." 

Those  who  control  the  lot  of  soldiers  must  remember 
that  although  a  large  increase  in  the  ambulance  service 
would  result  apparently  in  a  loss  of  fighting  strength,  in 
reality  it  would  directly  result  in  strengthening  the  fight- 
ing forces  by  increasing  the  percentage  of  sick  and  wounded 
who  would  return  to  the  front,  by  diminishing  the  mor- 
tality and  by,  raising  the  spirits  of  soldiers  in  consequence 
of  the  conviction  that  care  would  be  taken  of  the  victims. 

And  in  the  present  time,  when  in  a  battle  between  the 
armed  forces  of  Europe,  the  mechanism  of  destruction  is 
so  perfect  that  shells  may  be  thrown  with  unexampled 
rapidity  to  unheard-of  distances,  creating  on  every  field 
a  vast  area  of  absolute  destruction  ;  when  owing  to  power 
of  fire  attacks  can  only  be  made  in  loose  formation, 
and  every  soldier  may  shirk  the  battle — the  spirit  of 
armies  has  a  much  greater  importance  than  before. 


END    OF    PART    L 


PART    II 

ECONOMIC    DIFFICULTIES    IN    TIME 

OF  WAR 


CHAPTER    I 

IN    RUSSIA 

In  order  to  understand  the  economic  and  social  conse- 
quences which  would  follow  a  war  in  which  Russia  was 
engaged,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  degree  of  well- 
being  of  the  population,  and  the  amount  of  its  income  ; 
and  to  explain  how  war  will  shorten  the  demand  for  certain 
products  and  increase  the  demand  for  others  ;  lessen  the 
exports,  and  deprive  a  considerable  portion  of  the  popula- 
tion of  their  means  of  livelihood.  In  considering  **  Plans 
of  Military  Operations  "  in  a  struggle  between  the  two 
great  continental  alliances  we  attempted  to  make  some 
comparison  of  the  endurability  of  the  states  engaged 
against  the  destructive  influences  of  war.  The  conclusions 
which  sprang  from  a  general  consideration  of  military 
plans  were  in  accord  with  the  following  proposition  of 
General  Brialmont,  that  **  the  state  to  which  war  is  least 
dangerous  is  Russia,  guaranteed  as  she  is  by  the  immen- 
sity of  her  territories,  the  character  of  her  soil  and  climate, 
and  still  more,  by  the  social  condition  of  her  people,  occu- 
pied for  the  greater  part  by  agriculture."  Rich  in  men,  in 
horses,  and  in  food,  having  many  industrial  and  trading 
centres,  accustomed  for  a  century  to  the  circulation  of 
paper  money,  Russia  is  in  a  state  to  keep  up  a  defensive 
war  for  some  years,  which  the  Western  and  Southern 
powers,  standing  on  a  high  degree  of  culture,  but  producing 
insufficient  food  for  their  populations,  could  not  do.  These 
rather  would  be  threatened  with  ruin  and  even  disintegra- 
tion. The  strategical  superiority  of  Russia  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  occupation   by  an  enemy  of  all  her  frontier  terri- 


1 64  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

tories  would  not  produce  a  decisive  result.  Even  the 
taking  of  both  her  capitals,  and  the  defeat  of  all  her  ready 
forces,  would  not  deprive  her  of  the  means  of  resistance, 
whereas  any  Western  state  in  such  circumstances  would 
be  decisively  crushed.  Such  are  the  general  conclusions 
to  which  a  consideration  of  the  plans  of  attack  on  Russia, 
formulated  by  foreign  authorities,  have  led. 

But  in  considering  the  effect  of  war  on  the  condition  of 
the  people  in  Russia,  we  are  compelled  to  glance  more 
closely  than  will  be  necessary  in  the  case  of  other  states, 
if  only  for  the  reason  that  the  enormous  extent  of  Russia, 
and  the  immense  reserve  of  men  for  the  formation  of  new 
armies — that  is.  the  two  unquestioned  elements  of  Russian 
superiority — are  likely  to  inspire  far  too  optimistic  hopes. 
In  the  opinion  of  foreigners,  military  specialists  in  Russia 
in  this  respect  are  liable  to  exaggeration,  forgetting  that  in 
Russia  as  elsewhere  war  would  be  felt  intensely,  and,  in 
certain  respects,  even  more  disastrously,  on  the  finances 
and  on  the  general  economic  condition  of  the  country. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  these  exaggerated 
views  are  current  in  all  military  circles  in  Russia.  But  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  very  strength  of  Russia,  her 
richness  in  territory  and  in  men,  affords  a  basis  to 
certain  minds  for  very  natural  exaggeration.  That  such 
exaggerations  have  their  dangerous  side  is  unquestioned 
by  every  impartial  student  of  history,  from  which  we  learn 
that  exaggeration  has  led,  if  not  directly  to  military  enter- 
prises, at  least  to  more  decisive  actions  which  easily  awaken 
the  dangers  of  war. 

Unfortunately,  the  difficulty  of  a  detailed  investigation 
of  the  present  condition  of  Russia  and  the  future  conse- 
quences which  a  war  would  entail  for  her,  is  very  great, 
owing  to  the  absence  of  those  exhaustive  statistics  which 
are  everywhere  available  in  Western  Europe,  in  America, 
and  especially  in  England.  In  Russia  the  compiling  of 
statistics  began  only  in  the  reign  of  Nicholas  I.  But  that 
reign,  based  solely  on  military-bureaucratic  principles,  did 
not  look  with  favourable  eyes  on  the  publication  of  official 
statistics.  Co-operation  or  advice  from  the  side  of  society  in 


IN  RUSSIA  165 

general  was  not  only  not  looked  for,  but  not  even  admitted, 
and  the  need  for  communicating  to  the  public  statistics  on 
which  judgment  might  be  based  was  consequently  ignored. 
Figures  were  a  secret  of  state,  concealed  sometimes  even 
from  the  Council  of  State  itself.  It  was  only  in  later  years 
that  statistics  became  available  to  the  student. 


I. — Fall  in  the  Funds  and   Influence  of  War  on 

THE    Finances. 

In  order  to  determine  the  economic  durability  of  Russia 
against  the  influences  of  war,  we  are  compelled  to  consider 
two  contingencies,  that  is,  a  war  carried  on  with  the  aim  of 
invasion  of  an  enemy's  territory,  and  a  war  carried  on  with 
the  object  of  repulsing  attack,  and,  in  the  latter  case  also,  to 
consider  what  forces  Russia  would  dispose  of  if,  after  the 
repulse  of  the  attack,  she  decided  to  undertake  a  counter- 
invasion  of  the  territories  of  the  enemy.  First  of  all,  of 
course,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  perturbations  which 
must  be  produced  immediately  after  the  declaration  of 
war.  Whatever  might  be  the  causes  of  war,  it  may  be 
assumed,  that  mobilisation  would  be  accepted  as  something 
inevitable,  and  the  possibilities  of  difficulty  which  might 
arise  in  Western  states  if  war  were  declared  in  defiance  of 
popular  feeling,  in  Russia  need  not  be  considered. 

The  immense  majority  of  the  soldiers  mobilised  will 
consist  of  peasant-agriculturists,  men  of  simple  minds, 
uninterested  in  political  questions.  The  educated  soldiers 
will  be  mainly  officers,  who  will  also,  without  question, 
obey  orders,  and  easily  assimilate  official  declarations  as 
to  the  unavoidability  of  war.  The  number  of  soldiers 
taken  from  trade  and  industry  in  Russia  will  be  compara- 
tively small.  But  it  is  unquestioned  that  among  the 
Russian  soldiers  belonging  to  this  category,  perturbations 
may  be  called  forth  even  more  serious  than  those  which 
will  arise  in  Western  states.  The  systems  of  agriculture, 
industry,  and  of  trade  in  Russia  are  less  elaborate 
than  in  Western  countries.  Owing  to  the  absence  of 
educational    institutions    the  knowledge    and    morale   in 


1 66  JS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

trade  and  industry  are  low  ;  the  women  of  Russia,  whom, 
of  course,  mobiHsation  will  not  directly  affect,  are  little 
engaged  in  business ;  and  therefore  it  will  be  more 
difficult  to  replace  the  directing  forces  summoned  under 
the  flag  than  it  would  be  in  the  West. 

Of  the  difficulty  of  satisfying  demands  for  money  for 
the  mobilisation  of  the  army  we  have  already  spoken. 
Here  it  is  only  necessary,  in  view  of  the  possible  occu- 
pation by  an  enemy  of  Russian  territory,  to  set  out  the 
distribution  of  the  revenue,  &c.,  over  the  different  parts 
of  the  Empire — in  one  word,  to  present  a  financial 
physiological  picture  of  Russia  in  the  present  day. 

It  needs  no  evidence  to  show  that  the  perturbations 
which  a  future  war  will  cause  in  the  sphere  of  finance 
will  be  incomparably  more  serious  than  those  caused  by 
the  war  of  1877.  The  finances  of  Russia  are  distinguished 
by  the  fact  that  even  in  times  of  peace  the  course  of 
Government  securities  and  paper  money  is  most  variable. 
In  a  memorandum  presented  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  III. 
in  1882,  M.  N.  H.  Bunge  thus  defined  the  causes  of 
these  fluctuations  (in  addition  to  the  main  reason — 
unlimited  issue),  (i)  The  internal  political  position  of 
the  State,  the  danger  of  risings,  anarchy,  the  absence  of 
settled  political  programmes.  (2)  The  internal  economic 
condition  of  the  country,  famines,  crises  in  industrial, 
commercial,  and  banking  circles,  caused  by  dishonesty, 
speculation,  and  failures,  and  so  forth.  (3)  The  general 
financial  position,  disproportion  between  revenue  and 
expenditure,  financial  extravagance,  deficits,  and  so  forth. 
Independently  of  these  internal  elements  are  others — for 
instance,  the  danger  that  the  state  may  be  drawn  into  a 
great  European  war,  and  the  risk  of  military  failure. 

Such  is  a  judgment  formulated  in  1882.  Since  then 
fifteen  years  have  passed,  and  in  that  period  the  position 
has  improved  in  many  ways,  but  not  enough  to  guarantee, 
in  the  event  of  war,  that  the  description  quoted  above 
would  not  agam  apply  in  full  force. 

We  have  seen  that  in  1870  the  Prussian  state  and 
municipal   loans    were    depreciated    25     per    cent.,    and 


IN  RUSSIA  167 

banking,  industrial,  and  railway  shares  35  per  cent.  In 
1877  the  value  of  the  Russian  credit  rouble  (100  kopecks) 
fell  to  56^-  kopecks  metal. 

Thanks  to  the  arrangements  of  the  present  Ministry  of 
Finances,  statistics  are  yearly  printed  as  to  the  value  of 
the  Government  securities  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  distributed.  From  these  statistics  it  appears  that  on 
January  i,  1896,  there  existed  of  such  securities: 

Metallic         .         .         2249  millions  of  roubles* (;^337, 350,000) 
Credit   .         .         .         3330         „  „         (2'449'500»cx>") 


In  all     .         5579         „  „         (;r786,85o,ooo) 

Of  these   in   cash,   in  treasuries,  and  in  banking  institu- 
tions the  amount  of  such  securities  was  : 

Metallic         .         .  210  millions  of  roubles    (;^3 1,500, 000) 

Credit  .         .         .         2293         „  „         (i^343.95o>ooo) 

Thus  it  appears  that  there  were  in  circulation,  partly 
among  private  individuals  in  Russia,  but  for  the  greater 
part  abroad  : 

Metallic  Loans     .         2039  millions  of  roubles  (/"305, 850,000) 
Credit  Loans        .         1037         ,,  „         (2^i55»55o»ooo) 

Now  if  we  take  the  depreciation  in  time  of  war  of 
securities  guaranteed  by  the  Government  at  25  per  cent., 
and  of  other  securities  at  35  per  cent.,  which  depreciation 
has  already  been  experienced  in  the  wars  of  1870  and 
1877,  the  immense  economic  perturbation  which  would  be 
caused  by  war  w^ll  be  at  once  made  plain.  A  deprecia- 
tion of  25  per  cent,  of  the  nominal  value  of  Government 
securities  would  amount  to  52,000,000  of  metallic  and 
573,000,000  credit  roubles  (;^7, 800,000  and  ;£'8 5,950,000)  ; 
a  depreciation  of  35  per  cent,  on  the  nominal  value  of 
securities  unguaranteed  by  the  Government  would  amount 
to  48,000,000  metallic  roubles,  and  404,000,000  credit 
roubles  (;^7, 200,000  and  ;^6o,6oo,ooo).     Thus  war  would 

*  The  rouble  is  taken  as  equivalent  to  its  face  value  of  3s. 


i68 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


at  once  cause  a  depreciation  of  securities  held  within  the 
country  of  1,100,000,000  roubles  (;^  165,000,000). 

Depreciation  of  Securities  circulating  in  Russia  at  the  Outbreak 
of  War  in  Millions  of  Roubles. 


573 


I 

0 

Metal      ■--■    S2 

^^^••■■a •■• ■•••>••••••■•• 

ill  V 

Credu      " 

11 

i^ 

1 

1  u 

Hi 

c 

e 

3 

c 

,*       ,       II J 

Metal       "3    48 

--J    •♦0 

" 

Credit      '.'.'.'. '.'.I' 

AAA 

. 

i:::: 

M 

LLLL. 

, 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  in  the  beginning  of 
war  there  cannot  even  be  thought  of  the  issue  of  new 
loans,  and  therefore  war  can  only  be  carried  on  by  the 
immense  issue  of  credit  notes,  the  unavoidable  conse- 
quence of  which  will  be  to  shake  to  its  foundations  the 
financial  condition  of  the  country. 

The  position  in  which  Russia  found  herself  in  the  war 
of  18 1 2  181 5  is  so  different  from  modern  conditions  that 
to  draw  practical  lessons  from  the  experiences  of  that 
time  is  impossible.  The  extraordinary  outlays  caused  by 
the  Crimean  war  amounted  to  about  i|  milliard  of 
roubles  (;^22 5,000,000),  which  led  to  an  immense  increase 
of  indebtedness  and  to  a  fall  in  the  value  of  the  credit 
rouble,  although  war  was  carried  on  only  at  one  extremity 
of  the  country,  and  the  whole  of  the  western  frontier 
remained  open  to  trade. 

In  the  Turkish  war  of  i^'jj-y^  the  extraordinary  outlay 
amounted  to 


In  1876 
»,  1877 
„  1878 
M  1879 
„  1880 


50,998,114  roubles 

429,328,089       „ 

408,142,970       „ 

132,100,316       „ 

54,818,163       „ 


Total 


1^075,396,652 


(;^64,399,2T3  7s.) 

(;^6i,22i,445  los.) 

(;fi9,8i5,o47  85.) 

(^222,724  9s.) 

(;^i6i,3o8,i67  i6s.) 


IN  RUSSIA  169 

What  may  be  expected  from  a  future  war  ?  First  of  all 
it  must  be  noted  that  the  new  military  organisation  of 
Russia,  founded  on  conscription  and  short  service,  not 
only  has  not  diminished,  but  on  the  contrary  has  increased 
the  ordinary  military  expenditure.  The  expenditure  of 
the  Ministry  of  War  in  the  course  of  the  twenty  years 
period,  1875  to  1894,  increased  from  175,000,000  roubles 
(;^26,25o,ooo)  to  239,000,000  roubles  (i" 3 5, 8 5 0,000).  The 
cause  of  this  increase  lies  partly  in  the  increased  number 
of  the  army,  and  partly  in  the  better  treatment  of  the 
soldiers,  as  is  seen  from  the  following  figures  indicating 
the  cost  of  maintenance  of  a  single  soldier  : 

1874        ....         225  roubles  (£^^  15s.) 
1884        ....         175       »        (£2^    5s.) 

189I  ....  244         „  (^■36    I2S.) 

1896        ....         376       „        (£56     8s.) 

Of  the  proportion  of  expenditure  by  one  inhabitant  on 
army  and  fleet,  estimated  according  to  geographical  position, 
the  chart  on  page  170  gives  a  clear  idea.  A  glance  at  this 
chart  will  show  that  the  satisfaction  out  of  the  ordinary 
revenues  of  the  requirements  of  the  budget  in  time  of  war 
will  be  all  the  more  difficult  since  the  revenue  will  be 
diminished,  while  the  expenditure  on  popular  needs  is  so 
small  that  its  diminution  in  time  of  war  will  be  almost 
impossible. 

Russia,  with  a  mobilised  army  of  2,800,000  men,  will 
daily  need  for  their  maintenance  and  equipment  7,000,000 
roubles  (;^  1,050,000).  In  addition  to  this,  considerable 
sums  will  be  needed  for  the  maintenance  of  families  of 
soldiers  on  service.  The  greater  the  number  of  married 
soldiers  the  greater  will  be  the  need  for  aid.  But,  as  is 
hereafter  shown,  the  number  of  married  persons  and 
children  in  proportion  to  the  general  population  is  greater 
in  Russia  than  elsewhere,  from  which  it  appears  that  the 
expenditure  in  this  respect  must  be  greater. 

It  is  true  that  Russia  will  find  an  advantage  in  the  fact 
that  the  proportion  of  soldiers  withdrawn  from  industry  is 
insignificant  when  compared  with  the  proportion  in  other 
countries,  for  in  Russia  about  86  per  cent,  of  the  number 


I70 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


a 


<*-     Ov     o 

o 

o 

o 

; 

■^   o    ■^ 

f> 

o 

o 

0 

M 

•* 

0\ 

ro 

IN  RUSSIA  171 

summoned  to  the  colours  will  belong  to  the  agricultural 
class.  This  circumstance  is  particularly  favourable  for 
Russia,  as  the  agriculturist  will  leave  behind  him 
members  of  his  family  who  can  continue  his  labour, 
and  such  families  will  not  be  threatened  by  a  complete 
cessation  of  work.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  Russian 
agricultural  population,  which  even  in  times  of  peace  lives 
in  extreme  poverty,  will  soon  exhaust  its  resources,  and 
the  Government  will  be  compelled  to  come  to  its  aid. 
By  exhaustive  examination  of  the  comparative  degrees  of 
well-being  of  the  persons  engaged  in  different  occupations, 
it  would  be  shown  that  Government  will  be  compelled  to 
assist  the  families  of  not  less  than  one  quarter  of  the  soldiers 
engaged  in  agriculture,  of  less  than  half  of  the  small  traders 
and  clerks,  and  of  10  per  cent,  of  the  free  professions. 
Detailed  calculations  show  that  these  number  531,000 
families  in  all.  All  of  which  shows  that  the  expenditure 
in  time  of  war  will  be  immense  and  immediate,  while  to 
cover  it  by  new  taxation  or  by  the  increase  of  old  taxes 
will  be  impossible.  Popular  savings,  which  might  be  taken 
advantage  of  for  loans,  are  in  Russia  extremely  small,  and 
it  is  very  probable  that  in  order  to  cover  the  ordinary 
expenditure  in  time  of  war,  not  to  speak  of  extraordinary 
expenditure,  the  chief  resource  must  inevitably  be  the 
issue  of  credit  notes.  In  the  time  of  the  wars  of  18 12, 
1857  and  1877,  although  financial  crises  occurred  owing  to 
the  increased  issue  of  assignat  and  credit  notes,  these 
crises  were  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  influence  the  con- 
tinuance of  military  operations.  In  all  probability  a  future 
war  will  resemble  the  past  in  this  respect. 

During  the  last  war  with  Turkey  the  value  of  the  rouble 
credit  note  was  depreciated  to  55I  kopecks,  and  that  this 
depreciation  was  not  greater  must  be  ascribed  to  exception- 
ally favourable  circumstances.  On  the  one  hand,  Russia 
possessed  a  large  reserve  of  corn,  and  on  the  other,  in 
consequence  of  scarcity  abroad,  the  prices  of  corn,  the 
chief  article  of  export  from  Russia,  and  many  other  articles 
of  food,  rose  considerably,  thus  increasing  the  export  of 
Russian  products. 


172 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


In  the  second  chapter  of  this  work  we  attempted  to 
show  the  advantages  which  a  defensive  war  promised  to 
Russia,  a  defence  which,  after  exhaustion  and  disorgani- 
sation of  the  enemy's  resources,  might  transform  itself 
into  attack.  But  in  the  economic  relation  such  a  war 
would  have  the  disadvantage  that  the  country  would  be 
compelled  to  support  the  armies  of  the  invader  in  addition 
to  its  own.  We  showed  that  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  a  defensive  war  would  result  in  victory  for 
Russia.  But  this  cannot  alter  the  fact  that  the  sacrifices 
which  the  people  must  sustain  would  be  incalculably  great. 

In  order  to  be  persuaded  of  this,  it  is  not  enough  to 
consider  only  those  perturbations  the  immediate  conse- 
quence of  war,  but  to  examine  also,  although  briefly,  the 
economic  and  moral  condition  of  the  country. 


II. — EeoNOMic  Upheaval  in  consequence  of  the 
Interruption  of  Trade. 

On  the  declaration  of  war,  the  external  European  trade 
of  Russia  will  immediately  cease.  The  losses  which  this 
will  cause  must  be  considered.  The  average  Russian 
export  and  import  for  the  six  years  1889-94  are  shown 
thus  in  millions  of  credit  roubles  : 


Russian  Statistics. 

Export      .     585  (;^87,750,ooo)     .., 
Import      .     399  (;f 59,850,000)     ... 

Let  us  present  this  graphically : 


Foreign  Statistics. 

783  i£^^7A5o,ooo) 
237    (;^35»55o,ooo) 


Average  Export  and  Import^  1 889-1 894,  in  Millions  of  Credit 

Roubles. 
Export  Import 


783 


585 


According   to 
Russian  stat/stjcs 


According  to 
Foreign    statist/cs 


237 


399 


IN  RUSSIA 


173 


If  these  totals  are  distributed  among  the  population  we 
will  find  the  following  export  and  import  for  one  inhabitant : 


Years. 

Roubles. 

Per  cent,  rela- 
tion of  Export 
to  Import. 

Export. 

Import. 

1885-1893 
I 894- I 895 

(los.  6frf.) 

3.89 
(us.  8^) 

2.31 

(6s.  lid.) 

2.87 
(8s.  7id.) 

1.52 
1.26 

Of  the  four  great  groups  under  which  the  foreign  trade 
of  Russia  may  be  classified,  in  export  trade  provisions 
predominate  (57  per  cent.),  after  which  follow  raw  and 
half-dressed  materials  (3/1  per  cent.),  manufactures 
(3J  per  cent.),  and  animals  (2^  per  cent.).  In  imports 
predominate  raw  and  half-dressed  materials  (58  J  percent)., 
after  which  follow  manufactures  (21 J  per  cent.),  provisions 
(20  per  cent.),  and  animals  (^  per  cent.). 

In  the  number  of  Russian  exported  provisions  the  first 
place,  of  course,  is  taken  by  grain,  the  export  of  which, 
although  with  fluctuations,  constantly  increases,  and  in 
1894  had  risen  to  640,000,000  poods*  (205,714,295  cwts.), 
or  54  poods  (192  lbs.)  per  inhabitant.  The  following  table 
illustrates  with  more  detail  the  nature  of  this  export : 


Millions  of  Poods  (English  Equivalent  in  millions  of  lbs.) 

Wheat. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Barley. 

Maize. 

1893-94   • 

200 

22.6 

104 

149 

33 

(7200) 

(803.6) 

(3744) 

(5364) 

(1 1 88) 

1894-95   • 

224 

82.7 

96 

109 

24 

(8064) 

(2977.2) 

(3456) 

(3924) 

(864) 

1895-96    . 

201 

— 

56 

74 

9 

(7,236) 

(2016) 

(2664) 

(324) 

*  A  pood  is  really  equal  to  36.1127  lbs.,  but  for  purposes  of  our 
equivalents  we  take  it  as  equal  to  36  lbs. 


174  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

We  find  that  the  average  harvest  of  corn  for  the  whole 
world,  taking  a  twelve  years  period,  was  3,294,000,000 
poods  (1,058,800,000  cwts.),  while  the  harvest  of 

1893  was  3,427,000,000  poods  (1,101,535,715  cwts.) 

1894  ,,    3,503,000,000      ,,      (1,126,000,000     „    ) 
1^95     M    3,385,000,000      „      (1,088,035,715     „    ) 

By  investigations  lately  made  it  has  been  shown  that  in 
twelve  years  the  3^early  quantity  of  grain  harvested  in 
Russia  increased  by  1 50,000,000  poods  (48,2 14,300  cwts.), 
and  the  area  of  sowing  by  5  per  cent.,  while  the  population 
in  that  period  increased  by  1 1  per  cent.  This  may  be 
expressed  in  another  form  :  the  yearly  increase  of  demand 
in  consequence  of  the  growth  of  the  population  amounts  to 
40,000,000  poods  ( 1 3,000,000  cwts.),  ten  years  400,000,000 
poods  (130,000,000  cwts.),  while  in  that  period  the 
production  of  grain  increased  by  150,000,000  poods 
(48,214,300  cwts.). 

But  the  export  from  Russia  is  composed  only  of  that 
part  of  the  harvest  which  remains  free  after  the  satisfaction 
of  the  minimum  requirements  of  the  population  : 


English  Equivalent  in  Millions  of  lbs. 

Percentage  of 

Export  to  Average 

Harvest. 

Average  Yearly 

Harvest  in  Millions 

Average  Export. 

of  Poods,  1890  94. 

Rye  . 

1059 

32 

30 

(3S,i24) 

(1152) 

Wheat     . 

455 

156 

34-3 

(16.380) 

(5616) 

Oats 

552 

56 

10. 1 

(19,872) 

(2016) 

Barley     . 

286 

I  I  I 

30.0 

(10,296) 

(3996) 

2352 

355 

151 

(84,672) 

(12,780) 

IN  RUSSIA 

Let  us  present  these  figures  graphically  : 

Percentage  of  Export  to  Production  in   1890- 1894, 


175 


Rye 


Wheat 


Oats 


Barley 


All 


3.07. 


34.3VO 


lO.lVo 


so»/c 


15.  IV, 


In  the  chart  on  page  176  we  give  some  figures  as  to  the 
production  of  all  grains.  But  these  figures  give  no  suffi- 
cient material  for  determining  the  influence  vv^hich  war 
would  produce  on  the  trade  in  corn.  This  influence  will 
depend  upon  in  whose  hands  the  superfluity  of  corn  rests, 
whether  in  the  hands  of  private  proprietors  or  in  the  hands 
of  the  peasants.  Among  the  immense  majority  of  larger 
agriculturists  the  superfluity  is  very  considerable,  while 
the  products  of  the  peasants  serve  mainly  to  satisfy  their 
own  needs. 

It  is  obvious  that  private  proprietors  may  bear  the  strain 
better  than  the  peasants.  If  the  export  of  grain  be  only 
shortened  the  first  will  be  able  to  dispose  of  their  grain  by 
such  routes  as  remain  open.  But  if  the  export  of  grain 
entirely  cease  and  prices  in  the  internal  market  con- 
siderably fall,  certain  landowners  will  sustain  the  crisis  by 
means  of  their  reserve  of  capital,  while  those  whose  estates 
are  mortgaged  would  in  case  of  war  take  advantage  of  the 
inevitable  postponement  of  payments  into  bank,  and  in 
addition  to  that  of  the  loans  of  the  Imperial  Bank.  The 
peasants  will  have  no  auxiliary  resources  ;    and  in  the 


17' 


IS   WAR  NOW   IMPOSSIBLE? 


IN  RUSSIA  177 

majority  of  cases  the  corn  they  raise  is  insufficient  for 
their  needs,  for  the  payment  of  taxes,  rent  on  leasehold 
land,  the  purchase  of  implements,  salt,  and  clothing.  The 
income  of  the  peasantry  arises  partly  from  the  sale  of 
corn,  and  partly  from  auxiliary  work,  of  which  some — for 
instance,  temporary  work  in  factories — in  time  of  war, 
must  undergo  diminution.  This  last  circumstance  will 
react  in  terrible  form  on  the  condition  of  the  country 
population. 

With  the  cessation  of  export,  too,  the  demand  for 
corn  will  decrease,  with  a  consequent  fall  in  prices,  and 
diminution  in  the  income  both  of  landowners  and 
peasants.  Fluctuations  in  prices  will  arise,  since  the 
standard  is  determined  by  the  export,  which  will  be 
interrupted.  Increased  purchases  for  the  army  may  to 
some  extent  compensate  for  the  stoppage  of  export. 
But  the  supplying  of  the  army  with  bread  will  be  ex- 
tremely difficult  when  the  rolling-stock  of  the  railways 
is  occupied  with  the  transport  of  troops  and  munitions 
of  war. 

The  remaining  articles  of  export  from  Russia  mainly 
belong  to  the  category  of  raw  or  half-dressed  materials — 
seeds,  flax,  hemp,  timber,  bristles,  wool  ;  these  products, 
together  with  grain,  constitute  80  per  cent,  of  the  whole 
export.  The  cessation  of  the  export  of  these  goods  will 
result  in  confusion  similar  to  that  caused  by  the  cessation 
of  the  export  of  grain. 

The  imports  of  Russia  are  of  a  nature  much  more 
varied  than  the  exports.  Russia  buys  abroad  not  only 
finished  products,  such  as  machinery  and  metallic  wares, 
but  also  raw  materials,  cotton,  wool,  silk,  pig-iron, 
iron,  steel,  coal,  and  paper.  But  the  most  considerable 
part  of  her  imports  consists  of  tea,  coffee,  and  colonial 
products,  wine,  and  other  drinks.  In  the  "  Review  of 
the  External  Trade  of  Russia,"  exports  and  imports  are 
classified  in  four  groups:  (i)  provisions;  (2)  raw  and 
half-worked  materials ;  (3)  animals ;  (4)  manufactured 
articles. 

M 


178 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Export. 

Import. 

1891-94. 

1895. 

1891-94. 

1895. 

Provisions    . 

Raw   and    half-worked 

materials 
Animals 
Manufactured  articles 

7o 
57-08 

37-24 
2.41 

327 

7 
56.90 

37-70 
2.30 
3.10 

7o 
,19.70 

58-32 

0.56 

21.42 

7o 
18.40 

5440 

0.90 

26.30 

But  such  a  classification  gives  no  clear  idea  of  the 
influences  which  would  reveal  themselves  on  the  interrup- 
tion of  foreign  trade.  The  following  classification  under  pro- 
visions, clothing,  agricultural  implements,  building  materials, 
manufactured  products,  intellectual,  various,  gives  a  better 
idea  : 

Imports  into  Russia  in  Millions  of  Roubles  in  i88g. 


Provisions 

Clothing    .... 

Instruments  of  husbandry 

Building  materials    . 

Manufactured  products    . 

Intellectual 

Various      .... 


56.6    (^'8,490,000) 

150.2  (/'22,530,000) 

13-2    (/i, 980,000) 

72.1  (;^io,8i5,ooo) 

71.3  (;f  10,695,000) 

6.2        (;^93o,ooo) 

I '9       (;f  285,000) 


Classification  of  Imports — Raw,  Half -worked^  and  Manufactured. 
Raw.  Half-worked.  Manufactured. 


Provisions 

ii 

W 

n 

:::± 

■ 

^^^^^^^^^^^^H' 

V.:l 

i  I ' ' 

:::i 

■■■■■pIB^HlBll^H^^^^^^^^^H 

Clothing 

1; 

}:;:: 

i 

ik..'.Bt« 

M 

"  t  j  ■ T^.i  '>Trrrr M  /^  "^ 

^ 

^+4tt+H 

-ff 

Agricultural 

ImI'LEMENTS 

—/J -a 

A^^^^^^^m 

/. ,                        1 

I^VPi^^^^^^H 

Building 
Factory 

:: 

i|[||[[[|||llLlllll||ll|l|ii:i|i||||MI| 
:l::^::::,^f,:*llliiii!ll!liU4ill 

Intellkctuai, 

^^  ^  "==SHHiPlil^^^H 

Various 

tfltfr* 

i 

\% 

i 

illtehWtM 

rnr,-r 

100    ' 


IN  RUSSIA  179 

The  first  consequence  of  the  interruption  of  external 
communications  will  be  a  considerable  fall  in  the  price  of 
corn  and  other  chief  articles  of  export,  and  a  rise  in 
the  price  of  articles  of  import,  more  particularly  of 
those  of  which  large  stores  are  not  in  the  hands  of 
traders. 

From  the  interruption  of  export  will  result  a  consider- 
able decrease  in  the  railway  traffic,  and  in  consequence, 
as  the  majority  of  railways  belong  to  the  crown  or  are 
guaranteed  by  it,  the  state  will  sustain  a  loss  of  revenue  ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  railways,  especially  those 
going  westward,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  will  be 
entirely,  and  afterwards  to  a  considerable  extent,  occu- 
pied in  the  transport  of  troops  and  munitions  of  war. 
Great  difficulties  would  arise  from  this  circumstance  were 
it  not  for  the  fact  that  transport  by  water  has  been  so 
developed  that  upon  the  stoppage  of  export  it  will  be 
able  to  satisfy  almost  all  internal  needs.  The  interruption 
of  export  abroad,  the  fall  of  prices,  irregular  supply,  and 
great  local  fluctuations — such  are  the  factors  which  will 
strongly  influence  the  course  of  trade.  It  is  difficult  even 
to  foresee  what  form  they  will  take,  and  by  what  influences 
prices  will  be  determined.  When  internal  competition 
remains  the  only  factor  in  determining  prices,  those  dis- 
tricts will  be  in  the  best  position  where  competition  is 
most  highly  developed,  as  is  the  case  in  the  western, 
southern,  and  metropolitan  governments,  and  in  the  worst 
position  those  districts  where  monopoly  obtains.  As 
relates  to  the  number  of  traders,  it  will  be  found  that 
Russia  is  in  a  less  advantageous  position  than  the  western 
Slates.  Thus  we  find  that  while  out  of  10,000  inhabitants 
in  Belgium  437  are  engaged  in  trade,  in  France  429,  in 
Germany  347,  and  in  Austria  164,  in  Russia  only  G'J 
are  thus  occupied. 

From  the  following  statistics  (pp.  1 80-181)  it  will  be 
seen  that  at  a  time  when  the  interruption  of  communica- 
tions by  a  great  war  would  cause  famine  and  even  social 
convulsions  in  all  western  states  with  the  exception  of 
Austria,  in   Russia  the   danger  will    be    much    less,    but 


i8o 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


n        XT)       \ri 


IN  RUSSIA 


i8i 


:     :; 

- 

r 

- 

t/l 

-a 

o 

^^     a\ 

o> 

o 

o 

N 

•^      *> 

^ 

•* 

«, 

N      m 

o 

o 

0 

-i           M 

M 

ro 

ul 

t^ 

-c> 

X 

^ 

C 

"^ 

. 

►-H 

to 

to 

^J 

o 

'Vi 

6 

■^ 

o 

o 

^ 

g 

%i 

,o 

•r* 

^ 

'^ 

s 

r^ 

•ra 

</3 

00 

•Ci 

00 

1— 1 

H 

t>0 

•^ 

f^ 


l82 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


nevertheless  will  be  expressed  in  a  considerable  decrease 
in  the  income  of  the  population,  and  in  a  difficult  position 
of  trade. 

III. — Manufacturing  Crisis  in  Time  of  War. 

On  the  manufactures  and  industries  of  Russia  a  great 
European  war  cannot  fail  to  react  seriously  in  many 
respects.  The  interruption  of  communications  with  the 
West  will  mean  a  cessation  of  the  supply  of  raw  materials. 
Thus  the  supply  of  American,  Egyptian,  and  Indian  cotton 
will  be  stopped.  The  withdrawal  from  work  of  mechanics 
and  experienced  workmen  will  be  a  factor  of  great  diffi- 
culty. The  sale  of  manufactured  articles  will  decrease, 
firstly,  in  consequence  of  the  difficulty  of  transport  on 
railways  already  occupied  for  military  purposes,  and, 
secondly,  in  consequence  of  a  decreased  demand  resulting 
from  diminished  incomes  and  from  the  dislike  of  the 
moneyed  classes  to  unnecessary  outlay  in  a  critical  time. 
As  a  result  of  these  unfavourable  conditions  production  in 
certain  manufactures  must  be  decreased  considerably,  and 
in  others  entirely  stopped. 

In  the  time  of  the  last  war  with  Turkey  (1877-78),  the 
entire  yearly  industrial  production  of  Russia  barely 
attained  893  million  roubles  (^133,950,000);  at  the 
present  day  it  has  risen  to  1828  million  roubles 
(;^2 74, 200,000),  as  is  shown  by  the  following  table  : 


Year. 

In  Millions  of  Credit  Roubles. 
(English  Equivalents,  in  Parentheses,  in  Millions  of  Pounds  Sterling.) 

Industrial  Pro- 
ducts not  subject 
to  Excise. 

Yearly  Produc- 
tion of  Excis-d 
Articles,  &c. 

Mines  and  Metal 
Workii  g. 

Total.  , 

1878 
1892 

588  (88.2) 
1266  (189.9) 

185  (2775) 

367  (55-05) 

120  (18) 
195  (29.25) 

893  (133-95) 
1828  (274.2) 

The  distribution  of  this  production  is  shown  in  millions 
of  roubles  in  the  plan  on  the  next  page  : 


IN  RUSSIA 


'83 


184 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


In  order  clearly  to  judge  of  the  crisis  which  would  be 
caused  by  war  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  relations  exist- 
ing between  imports  and  home  production.  The  following 
table  shows  the  percentage  relation  of  import  to  produc- 
tion of  some  of  the  chief  imported  articles  in  1876  and  in 
1892  : 


1876. 


1892. 


Steel 

90.4 

31 

Iron 

36.5 

9-6 

Copper    . 

64.7 

65.6 

Stone  Coal 

44.1 

29.4 

Machinery 

40.3 

30.8 

Glass  articles  . 

405 

10.3 

Chemicals  and 

paints 

79.2 

551 

Paper 

. 

24.0 

14.1 

Leather  manufactures 

12.8 

4.9 

Cotton     . 

, 

24.9 

30 

Wool 

. 

77-3 

12. 1 

Sugar 

. 

4.0 

— 

These  statistics  show  the  greatest  development  in  the 
following  industries :  cotton,  wool,  paper,  machinery, 
chemicals  and  paints,  leather,  glass,  and  sugar  refining. 
In  the  same  period  the  working  of  coal  and  of  naphtha 
increased  considerably,  while  iron  smelting  and  the  working 
of  iron  and  steel  also  made  considerable  advances. 

From  the  statistics  above  set  forth  it  is  obvious  that  the 
crisis  which  wars  would  cause  in  industrial  and  manufac- 
turing circles  of  Russia  is  incomparably  less  than  would 
be  produced  in  the  Western  States.  While  in  the  other 
great  European  States  with  the  exception  of  Italy,  industry 
occupies  a  considerable  part — in  England  the  greater  part 
— of  the  population,  in  Russia  the  number  of  workers  in 
all  industries  does  not  exceed  ij  million  men,  out  of  a 
population  of  120  millions.  Further,  from  comparison  of 
the  average  total  of  industrial  productiveness  with  the 
number  of  men  engaged,  it  appears  that  in  Russia  the 
turnover  for  every  workman  engaged  is  only  about  lOOO 
roubles  (;^i5o),  and  that  the  average  factory  has  a  yearly 
turnover  of  50,000  roubles  (i^/SOo),  and  employs  about 
45  hands.     It  is  obvious  that  very  small  industrial  under- 


IN  RUSSIA  185 

takings  are  not  included  in  this  calculation.  But  such  being 
the  statistics  for  large  and  moderate-sized  undertakings, 
taken  together,  it  is  plain  that  in  Russian  industry  the 
mechanical  apparatus  is  much  less  complex  and  engages 
much  less  capital  than  in  those  countries  where  industry 
predominates.  From  this  it  follows  that,  upon  the  decrease 
and  partial  interruption  of  Russian  industry,  the  capital  in- 
vested will  sustain  much  less  loss  from  the  interruption  of 
work  than  capital  similarly  invested  in  the  West.  But  if  we 
suppose  that  war  is  to  be  carried  on  within  the  limits  of 
Russia  itself,  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  difficulties  in 
communication,  and  the  decreased  demand  in  localities 
occupied  b}'  the  combatants.  The  district  where  military 
operations  were  carried  on  might  be  considered  as  lost 
from  the  industrial  point  of  view. 

Russian  industry  is  based  on  internal  demand,  a  fact 
which  constitutes  an  advantage  in  case  of  war,  as  Russian 
manufactures  will  not,  as  those  of  England,  Germany,  and 
France,  be  threatened  with  the  loss  of  foreign  markets  in 
consequence  of  interrupted  communications.  But  this  supe- 
riority will  decrease  proportionately  with  the  increase  in  the 
area  embraced  by  the  war.  And,  although  stoppage  of  work 
would  take  place  in  Russia  on  a  smaller  scale  than  in  the 
West,  it  would  nevertheless  place  in  a  difficult  position  a 
great  number  of  workers.  There  is  a  general  opinion  that 
Russian  factory  hands,  being  peasants,  are  guaranteed  by 
their  land,  and  take  to  industry  only  temporarily,  always 
reserving  the  possibility  of  returning  to  their  farms.  In 
recent  years  this  opinion  has  been  shaken  by  statistical 
investigation  which  undoubtedly  proved  the  existence  in 
Russia  ,of  a  working,  landless  proletariat.  For  such 
workers  the  stoppage  of  production  will  have  precisely  the 
same  consequences  as  in  the  West. 

Mr.  E.  M.  Dementyefif  in  a  recent  work,  on  the  founda- 
tion of  a  series  of  statistics,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  current  belief  as  to  the  absence  in  Russia  of  an  in- 
dustrial class  is  unfounded.  There  is  indeed  no  doubt 
that  this  class  is  still  small.  But  the  question  is  not  one 
of  number,   but    of   the  conditions  rapidly  creating  this 


i86 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


class,    and  of  the  consequences    indissolubly    bound  up 
with  it. 

The  wages  of  workmen  in  Russia  in  comparison  with 
those  which  obtain  in  other  European  states  is  very  low, 
and  it  may  safely  be  assumed  that  the  savings  they 
possess  are  insignificant.  After  a  detailed  calculation 
M.  Dementyeff  declares  that  wages  in  England,  and 
particularly  in  America,  are  greater  than  in  Russia  by 
two,  three,  and  even  five  times.  The  following  table  and 
diagram  show  the  percentage  difference  in  wages  in  these 
countries  : 


Men. 

Women 

Russia     . 

.       lOO 

lOO 

England . 

.      283 

114 

America . 

.      404 

254 

Percentage  Comparison  of  Wages  in  Russia,  Great  Britain, 
and  Northern  America. 


^S^'/" 


"  But  comparison  of  wages  alone,"  says  M.  Dementyeff, 
"  conveys  no  meaning,  and  even  may  lead  to  false  conclu- 
sions, if  the  purchasing  power  of  money  in  the  different 
countries  is  not  taken  into  account.  Only  by  considering 
this  we  can  form  an  idea  as  to  the  extent  to  which  wages 
guarantee  the  existence  of  the  worker."  The  author,  after 
making  a  calculation  as  to  the  quantity  of  the  first  neces- 
saries of  life  which  a  rouble  will  command  in  England  and 
in  Massachusetts,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  *'  the  in- 
comparably lower  wages  in  Russia  can  in  no  way  be 
explained  by  the  greater  cheapness  of  necessaries  ;  such 
an  explanation  could  only  to  a  certain  extent  be  admitted 
even  in  comparison  with  England." 


IN  RUSSIA  187 

A  characteristic  feature  of  the  condition  of  the  Russian 
factory  workers  is  that  they  do  not  Hve  in  their  own 
lodgings.  Of  the  general  mass  of  cases  examined  in  this 
respect  by  M.  Dementyeff,  57.8  per  cent,  lived  at  their 
factories,  either  in  the  workshops  where  they  work,  or  in 
barracks  specially  built  fol  them,  while  the  workers  having 
their  own  lodgings  constituted  only  18.1  per  cent. 

The  lodgings  of  factory  workers,  in  the  majority  of 
cases,  are  such  that  of  the  **  conditions  "  of  their  lives, 
there  cannot  even  be  speech.  '*  Workers  from  distant 
localities  for  the  most  part  have  a  sack  or  box  with  per- 
sonal property,  such  as  changes  of  linen,  and  sometimes 
even  bedding ;  while  those  who  are  regarded  as  not  living 
at  the  factory — that  is,  workers  from  the  neighbouring 
country  who  go  home  on  Sundays  and  on  holidays — have 
literally  nothing.  In  no  case  has  either  one  or  the  other 
class  any  vestige  of  bed." 

The  food  is  no  better.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the 
supply  of  the  workmen  is  carried  on  on  the  artel  principle, 
and  as  far  as  quantity  is  concerned  no  complaint  can  be 
made,  but  the  food  is  of  the  lowest  quality — coarse,  mono- 
tonous, and  with  a  deficiency  of  animal  substance.  It 
consists  of  black  bread,  stchi  of  sour  cabbage,  porridge  of 
wheat  or  buckwheat,  with  beef  fat,  potatoes,  sour  cabbage 
with  hemp-oil,  or  kvas  with  cucumbers — such  is  the  food 
of  the  workers  from  day  to  day,  without  the  slightest 
variety  throughout  the  year ;  only  on  fast  days,  of  which 
there  are  190  in  the  year,  the  beef  or  salt  beef  in  the  stchi 
is  replaced  by  herrings,  &c.,  and  the  beef  fat  by  hemp- 
oil.  The  food  of  the  workers  who  occupy  hired  quarters  is 
still  worse,  both  as  to  quantity  and  quality. 

It  is  obvious  that  with  such  conditions  there  cannot 
even  be  thought  of  savings  for  a  rainy  day,  and  the  crisis 
caused  by  war  will  be  reflected  on  the  life  of  workers  in  a 
fatal  form.  In  view  of  this,  common  sense  will  demand 
that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  organised  help  of  the  workers 
should  be  begun.  But  this  is  a  question  which  ought  to 
be  decided  in  time  of  peace. 


1 88  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


IV. — Economic  Endurability  of  the  Population  in 
Time  of  and  after  War. 

We  have  referred  more  than  once  to  the  tremendous 
effect  which  war  must  produce  in  those  countries  which 
possess  a  highly  developed  industrial  system,  and  where 
the  economic  and  social  order  is  more  complex  than  in 
Russia.  It  will  easily  be  understood  that  the  sudden 
summons  to  the  colours  of  a  great  number  of  masters  and 
experienced  workmen  will  be  felt  especially  severely  in 
those  countries  where  a  highl}^  developed  industry  absorbs 
large  capital,  and  gives  work  to  half  the  population.  This 
crisis  will  be  less  severe  in  those  states  which  still  pre- 
serve a  character  generally  agricultural,  which  have  less 
complex  organisation  and  less  mutual  dependence  between 
the  different  forms  of  social  and  private  enterprise. 

But  from  this,  of  course,  does  not  follow  that  the 
poorer  the  country  the  better  will  it  bear  the  strain  of 
war.  It  is  plain  that  war  breaking  out  after  several  years 
of  good  harvest  would  have  less  effect  than  if  it  were  to 
appear  after  a  series  of  unfruitful  years.  There  is  a 
certain  minimum  of  well-being,  not  only  material  but  also 
moral,  which  will  enable  peoples  and  districts  to  bear 
the  strain  of  war  and  to  recover  from  its  consequences. 
If  we  take  as  example  a  country  standing  on  a  low  level 
of  economic  development,  or  a  semi-barbarous  country, 
we  w]\\  see  that  there  war  cannot  stop  the  turning  of 
millions  of  wheels,  and  will  not  ruin  great  undertakings. 
But  the  economic  consequences  of  war  in  such  a  country 
will  be  extremely  sensible ;  a  considerable  part  of  the 
population  will  die  of  hunger,  and  whole  districts  will  be 
turned  into  wildernesses.  In  Central  Asia  are  districts 
which  formerly  were  flourishing  oases,  but  which,  in  con- 
sequence of  a  series  of  wars  among  a  poor  population, 
were  simply  covered  with  sand  and  turned  into  deserts. 

Thus,  in  considering  the  relative  endurability  of  the 
Russian  population  in  time  of  war  and  afterwards,  we  are 
bound  to  pay  attention  to  the  moral  and  material  level  of 


IN  RUSSIA 


189 


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I90         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

the  population,  and  to  define  the  differences  in  this  level 
in  various  parts  of  the  country  in  order  to  estimate  the 
economic  endurability  not  only  of  the  whole  country  but 
of  its  different  parts. 

Growth  of  the  Population. — Modern  economic  science, 
following  the  statistics  of  biology,  acknowledges  that 
every  limit  placed  on  the  production  of  resources  neces- 
sary for  the  nourishment,  education,  and  moral  well-being 
of  the  people,  is  at  the  same  time  a  principle  inimical  to 
its  very  life — that  is,  to  its  increase.  Thus,  when  consider- 
ing prolonged  periods,  one  of  the  first  standards  must  be 
the  natural  growth  of  the  population  in  the  different  parts 
of  the  kingdom.  In  Russia  nine-tenths  of  the  population 
is  composed  of  peasants,  and  the  general  statistics  of 
growth  relate  mainly  to  them. 

Following  the  system  of  M.  A.  Malshinski  in  his  work 
on  "  Popular  Weil-Being,"  we  adopt  the  following  classifi- 
cation for  determining  the  degree  of  well-being  in  the 
different  governments  of  Russia  : 

(i)  Condition  excellent,  where  the  yearly  growth  of  the 
population  amounts  to  20  and  more  in  every 
thousand  of  the  general  population. 

(2)  Condition  very  good,  with  an  increase  of  from  1 5  to 

20  in  the  thousand. 

(3)  Condition  fair,  with  a  growth  of  from  10  to  15  per 

thousand. 

(4)  Condition  unsatisfactory,  with  a  growth  of  not  less 

than  8  per  thousand. 

(5)  Condition  bad,  with  a  growth  of  less  than  8   per 

thousand. 

As  relates  to  the  general  growth  of  the  population  in 
the  various  governments  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish 
the  natural  growth  from  the  growth  which  has  resulted 
from  immigration.  But  the  chart  on  the  preceding  page 
illustrates  the  comparative  growth  of  the  population  in 
1885  and  1897. 

Distribution  of  the  Population. — But  statistics  as  to 
growth    of   population    are   in    themselves    insufficient  to 


IN  RUSSIA 


191 


Average  Number  of  Houses  in  a  Settlement, 


Four  and  less. 

From    5  to      9.9 

n     10  . 

19.9 

,,     20  , 

39-9 

»     40  , 

59-9 

„     60  , 

79-9 

,,     80  , 

99.9 

„  100  , 

124.9 

Over  125. 


192 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


enable  a  judgment  to  be  formed  as  to  the  level  of  well- 
being.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  complete  them  with 
other  information.  The  distribution  of  the  population  in 
villages  is  another  factor  from  which  conclusions  may  be 
drawn.  The  chart  on  the  previous  page  shows  the 
average  number  of  houses  in  a  settlement. 

Fires. — Of  the  comparative  condition  of  the  country 
population  in  different  parts  of  the  empire  we  may  judge 
by  the  number  of  fires,  and  also  by  the  losses  caused.  It 
is  generally  taken  as  proven  that  the  poorer  the  population 
the  greater  the  number  of  fires,  while  the  losses  from  fires, 
falling  in  general  on  a  single  householder,  are  relatively 
smaller.  In  the  two  charts  (pp.  194- 195)  we  show  the 
average  value  of  a  single  burned  property  in  the  villages 
in  the  period  i860  and  1887  in  roubles,  and  the  average 
total  of  losses  from  fires  in  villages  by  every  100  inhabi- 
tants. From  these  charts  it  appears  that  wealth  is  greater 
in  those  governments  which  may  be  considered  as  the 
theatre  of  war,  as  the  value  of  burnt  properties  is  greater  ; 
while  on  the  other  hand  the  general  loss  is  less  owing  to 
the  smaller  number  of  cases  of  fire.  In  foreign  states  the 
yearly  losses  from  fire  per  hundred  inhabitants  are  shown 
in  the  following  table  in  metallic  roubles  : 


Great  Britain 

France     . 

Germany 

Austria    . 

Belgium  . 

Holland  . 

Sweden  and  Norway 

United  States 

Canada  . 


160  {£2^ 
50  {£^  los.) 
81  (/•12  zs) 
63  (;^9  9S.) 
55  (£8  55.) 

63  (/"g  9s.) 

99  (i;"H  175-) 

220  (;f33) 
288  {£^1  4S.) 


In  Russia  the  losses  from  fire  in  the  period  i860- 1887 
amounted  to  116  roubles  {^£i'J  85.)  per  hundred  inhabi- 
tants of  the  towns,  and  52  roubles  {£j  i6s.)  per  hundred 
inhabitants  in  the  country,  in  all  about  62  roubles  (£<^  6s?) 
From  this  we  see  that  of  all  the  European  states  only 
in  France  and  Belgium  do  fires  cause  less  damage  than 
in   Russia,  notwithstanding    the    fact    that    the   Western 


IN  RUSSIA 


193 


states,  as    far   as  wealth  is   concerned,    generally   stand 
much  higher  than  Russia. 

It  is  useful  here  to  note  the  relation  of  values  insured  to 
losses  in  different  countries  : 


Per  Cent, 

Per  Cent 

France  . 

•      75 

Canada 

•       44 

Germany 

•       74 

Belgium 

.       43 

United  States 

55 

Russia  . 

9 

Great  Britain 

.       46 

From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  in  Russia  guarantee 
against  fire  by  insurance  is  from  6  to  8  times  less  than  in 
other  countries. 

Towns. — Through  insufficiency  of  statistics  it  is  difficult 
to  speak  of  the  towns  in  Russia.  One  thing,  however, 
stands  out  in  relief — that  is,  that  they  grow  more  slowly 
than  in  Western  countries,  while  the  population  of  the 
country  increases  quickly.  In  Western  Europe  the  agri- 
cultural population  increases  slowly,  and  even  inclines 
to  diminution,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following  table  : 


Percentage  Growth  of  Town  and  Country  Populations  to  1885, 
taking  the  Population  in  1863  as  100. 


Country. 

Towns. 

European  Russia     . 

.       +    31 

+    64 

Poland     . 

.       +    65 

+   75 

Austria     . 

+       2.5 

+  117.9 

Germany 

-     4-6 

+  61 

Prussia    . 

-      5-3 

+  80.1 

Saxony    .         .         .         . 

+      1.4 

+   76.9 

France     .         .         .        . 

-     3-6 

+   26.6 

Savings. — The  level  of  deposits  in  the  savings  banks  is 
one  of  the  best  bases  for  judging  of  the  degree  of  well- 
being  of  a  population.  But  in  Russia  this  factor  cannot 
wholly  be  relied  upon,  as,  although  since  the  foundation  of 
savings  banks  the  agricultural  population  has  begun  to 
entrust  to  them  its  savings,  still  this  practice  has  not 
yet  become  as  general  in  Russia  as  abroad.     Compared 

N 


194         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Average  Value  of  one  Property  destroyed  by  Fire,  between 
1860-87,  in  Roubles, 


FtZt-]  199  and  less. 

From  200  to  299 
,,  300  »  399 
,,  400  „  499 
,,  500  „  649 
„      650  M  999 

1000  and  over. 


IN  RUSSIA 


^95 


Average  Losses  from  Fires  in  the  Country,  in  Roubles,  per  loo 
Inhabitants,  between  1860-68. 


196  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

with  the  other  European  states  Russia  in  this  respect 
occupies  the  last  place. 

Condition  of  Agriculture. — The  emancipation  of  the 
serfs  thirty-five  years  ago  could  not  fail  to  react  upon  the 
condition  of  agriculture.  Both  large  and  small  agriculture, 
with  the  abolition  of  free  labour,  had  to  be  reformed 
radically  on  the  principles  of  hired  labour  and  intense 
cultivation.  Resources  for  floating  capital  were  realised 
through  ransom.  But  the  suddenness  of  the  transfer  to 
the  new  conditions  operated  in  such  a  way  that  the 
majority  of  private  landowners  could  not  or  would  not 
undertake  the  new  work.  Some  proprietors  abandoned 
personal  participation  in  agriculture,  and  went  into  the 
services ;  others  continued  to  work,  as  far  as  was  possible, 
on  the  old  basis,  with  the  difference  that  they  no  longer 
had  the  advantage  of  free  labour.  It  may  be  said  that 
agriculture  in  Russia  presents  a  compromise  between  the 
conditions  of  serfage  culture  and  the  requirements  of  a 
rational  system.  To  a  considerable  extent  it  is  still 
carried  on  without  working  capital,  labour  being  paid  for 
with  a  proportion  of  the  harvest ;  and  agriculture  remains 
almost  in  the  same  position  as  in  the  days  of  free  labour. 

To  introduce  variety  in  cultivated  products  in  peasant 
agriculture  is  very  difficult.  The  peasants  specialising 
ever  more  and  more  in  one  kind  of  corn,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  fall  of  prices,  cannot  draw  from  agriculture, 
even  in  the  event  of  superfluous  crops,  sufficient  money 
for  redemption  payments,  taxes,  and  for  the  purchase 
of  necessary  articles.  To  all  these  requirements  for 
ready  money,  owing  to  the  growth  of  the  population 
is  added  the  necessity  for  leasing  land  from  private 
proprietors  and  from  the  Crown  ;  for  even  in  the  case 
of  lease  from  private  proprietors  payment  is  made  not 
only  in  kind — that  is,  by  ploughing,  harvesting,  and 
threshing — but  partly  also  in  money.  Thus  the  growing 
need  of  the  peasantry  for  money  has  led  them  into  debt, 
and  encouraged  in  the  country  the  growth  of  a  burden- 
some usury. 

The  increased  tendency  of  the  peasantry  in  many  locali- 


IN  RUSSIA  197 

ties  towards  emigration  shows  that  peasant  agriculture  has 
been  played  out  in  consequence  of  the  exhaustion  of  the 
land  and  of  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  money.  Together 
with  this,  the  decrease  in  the  number  of  cattle,  the  absence 
of  improvements  in  tillage,  and  the  poverty  of  domestic  life, 
show  the  wretched  condition  in  which  the  remaining 
peasants  find  themselves.  And,  indeed,  in  some  govern- 
ments the  greater  part  of  the  peasants,  in  order  to  satisfy 
their  needs,  are  compelled  to  seek  additional  support  in 
labour  away  from  home. 

With  such  extremely  unsatisfactory  conditions  the  con- 
sequence of  a  great  war  could  only  be  to  increase  the 
difficulties  of  peasant  agriculture,  all  the  more  so  since  a 
war  would  interrupt  for  a  long  time  many  auxiliary 
employments. 

In  relation  to  indebtedness,  large  and  especially 
moderate  landowners  are  in  no  better  position  than  the 
peasantry.  Compelled  to  seek  floating  capital  for  the 
carrying  on  of  industry,  landowners  had  recourse  to 
mortgage.  True,  the  advances  they  received  were  made 
on  terms  incomparably  lighter  than  those  made  to  the 
peasants,  but  their  total  indebtedness  is  unquestionably 
greater  than  the  indebtedness  of  the  peasantry.  On  the 
1st  January,  1896,  the  value  of  mortgages  issued  by 
thirty-six  lending  institutions  was  1,618,079,807  credit 
roubles  (;£"242, 71 1,971  15.),  2,689,775  roubles  metal 
(;^403,466  5s.),  and  7,101,900  German  marks  (;£^35 5,095). 

Although  before  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs  a  con= 
siderable  proportion  of  Russian  estates  was  mortgaged, 
yet  the  percentage  charged  by  the  Imperial  Loan  Bank 
was  lower  than  that  since  charged  by  joint-stock  banks ; 
and  as  the  loans  were  made  upon  the  number  of  souls,  the 
very  growth  of  the  population,  by  remitting  auxiliary 
loans,  facilitated  the  payment  of  part  of  the  first  loan. 
The  institution  of  the  Nobility  Bank,  and  the  consequent 
diminution  of  yearly  payments,  constituted  indeed  a  con- 
siderable relief;  but,  without  dwelling  upon  the  fact  that 
credit  in  the  Nobility  Bank  is  not  accessible  to  all 
landowners,  borrowing  generally  lays  upon  agriculture  a 


198  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

heavy  burden,  and  can  only  result  in  advantage  when  the 
money  raised  is  devoted  to  increased  production,  and  even 
this  depends  upon  satisfactory  harvests.  But  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  the  greater  part  of  these  loans  was 
employed  in  unproductive  objects,  and  also  in  provision 
for  inheritances,  so  that  the  growth  of  the  population 
acted  injuriously. 

To  such  influences  were  added  the  fall  in  the  price  of 
corn  in  Europe,  in  consequence  of  trans-oceanic  competi- 
tion, and  in  Russia  by  special  local  circumstances.  In 
addition,  it  must  be  remembered  that  local  purchasers  of 
corn  are  less  numerous  in  Russia  than  in  other  European 
states,  owing  to  the  relatively  smaller  urban  and  industrial 
population.  If  the  production  of  corn  did  not  decrease, 
it  is  due  to  the  opening  up  of  new  lands,  and  increased 
attention  to  tillage  in  the  south  and  east  of  the  country. 
For  further  extension  of  tillage,  room  remains  now  only 
in  the  east  and  in  the  north.  In  the  course  of  time, 
if  the  present  primitive  methods  for  working  the  land 
are  not  improved — and  for  this  are  required  those  financial 
and  intellectual  forces  which  are  now  devoted  to  the 
strengthening  of  the  military  power  of  Russia — the  pro- 
duction of  corn  will  not  only  cease  to  increase,  but  will 
begin  to  diminish.  Even  now  the  breeding  of  sheep  and 
cattle  is  declining. 

Number  of  Domestic  Animals. — The  quantity  of  cattle 
raised  is  a  chief  sign  of  the  well-being  of  the  agriculturist, 
not  only  because  cattle  represent  capital,  but  because  the 
very  feeding  of  the  population  can  be  guaranteed  only  by 
the  aid  of  the  products  of  cattle  raising.  In  this  respect 
large  horned  cattle  take  the  most  important  place,  ^nd 
the  quantity  of  these  in  different  parts  of  the  Empire 
differs  and  submits  to  fluctuations.  Up  to  the  time  of 
the  building  of  railways,  the  raising  of  cattle  was  generally 
looked  upon  as  a  necessary  evil,  for  the  price  of  such 
products  was  very  low.  Nevertheless  as  the  outlay 
caused  by  the  distance  of  the  markets  from  the  'place  of 
production,  owing  to  primitive  methods  of  transport,  was 
great,    proprietors    of  necessity   had    recourse   to   cattle 


IN  RUSSIA 


199 


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CTv  C  O  O  O" 
^      ID    \G       t^    CO 


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r-j       i)-      li-.    vc       r^    CO 


200 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


breeding  in  order  to  draw  some  revenue  from  their 
estates.  It  is  very  natural  that  after  the  building  of 
railways  cattle  breeding  in  those  districts  where  improve- 
ment was  not  valued  began  to  decay,  at  the  same  time 
the  production  of  corn  giving  much  worse  results.  In  the 
chart  on  the  preceding  page  will  be  found  the  distribution 
of  stock  in  the  different  governments,  taking  as  unity  a 
head  of  large  cattle,  or  lo  sheep,  12  goats,  4  pigs,  and 
I  horse. 

Comparative  Merit  of  Agriculture. — It  is  well  known 
that  by  the  number  of  domestic  animals  we  may  judge  of 
the  merit  of  agriculture  in  a  given  locality.  The  more 
persistently  agriculture  is  carried  on,  the  more,  with  normal 
conditions,  it  requires  improvement  of  the  soil,  and  in 
consequence  the  quantity  of  domestic  animals  must  be 
greater.  Now  the  productiveness  of  land  in  Russia  is 
much  lower  than  in  other  states,  as  will  be  seen  in  the 
annexed  chart. 


Yield  per  Desyatin  {=  2.70  acres)  in  Quarters. 

Germany. 

J^ 


To  10 
From  10. 1  to  13 
»      13-1  ..  16 
Over  16. 1. 


y  T 

Austria.     Poland. 


The  circumstance  is  not  without  significance  that  in  case 
of  war  a  certain  area  of  land  gives  a  small  reserve   of 


IN  RUSSIA 


20I 


corn.  By  comparing  harvests  with  the  number  ofdomestic 
animals,  the  condition  of  Russia  is  also  shown  to  be  very 
bad,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following  chart : 

Number  of  Large  Cattle  per  loo  Quarters  yield. 


To  6.9 
From    7  to    9.9 
„      ID  „  19.9 
Over  20. 


The  following  table  is  even  more  instructive  : 


On 

100  Desyatins  of 

The  Harvest  from  a 

Land 

under  Seed  Russia 

Desyatin  of  Land  ia 

has  Less  Cattle 

than 

Russia  is  Less  by 

England  . 

.     75  per  cent. 

73  V^^  cent 

Belgium  . 

.     63 

?j 

69 

Austria     . 

•     53 

n 

38 

Germany 

•     51 

5J 

58 

France     . 

•     43 

)» 

58 

Average 


62 


59 


From  which  we  see  that  in  Russia  lOO  desyatins  {2yo  acres) 
of  corn  land  have  62  per  cent,  less  domestic  animals,  and 
yet  produce  a  harvest  only  59  per  cent,  less  than  in  other 
states.  Such  a  comparatively  favourable  result  proceeds 
from  the  fact  that  in  recent  times  much  land  formerly 
lying  idle  has  been  devoted  to  agriculture,  and  partly  from 
the  abundance  of  land ;  for  Russia  in  comparison  with 
other  states  has  the  smallest  proportion  of  her  land  under 


202  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

seed — precisely  26  per  cent,  of  her  area — while  the  other 
states  have  43  per  cent. 

The  time  in  the  course  of  which  the  population  of  each 
government  of  Russia  might  feed  itself  from  its  own  har- 
vests is  shown  in  the  chart  on  the  next  page,  from  which  it  is 
seen  that  the  most  unfavourable  conditions  in  this  respect 
would  be  found  by  an  invading  enemy  in  the  governments 
of  Vilna,  Grodno,  Minsk,  Vitebsk,  Moghilef,  and  Tcher- 
nigov.  This  conclusion  is  founded  on  statistics  as  to  the 
relations  of  population  to  harvest — that  is,  on  the  extent  of 
the  superfluity  of  the  general  harvest.  To  give  a  clearer 
idea  of  this  matter  it  is  necessary  to  show  separately  the 
harvests  on  the  lands  of  private  proprietors  and  on  the 
lands  held  by  the  peasantry.  Private  proprietors  of 
course  utilise  a  very  insignificant  proportion  of  the  grain 
they  raise,  while  the  peasants  chiefly  live  on  their  own 
corn,  and  sell  only  a  small  surplus,  sometimes  even  being 
forced  to  buy.  In  view  of  the  importance  of  this  question, 
we  show  in  the  two  diagrams  on  page  205  the  harvest  of 
the  chief  grains  on  the  lands  of  proprietors  and  peasants  in 
millions  of  quarters  in  1893,  ^^^  fifty  provinces  of  European 
Russia,  and  ten  governments  of  Poland. 

The  tillage  of  land  by  proprietors  might  be  considered 
a  favourable  factor  if  it  were  a  sign  that  proprietors 
occupy  themselves  with  agriculture,  and  exploit  the  land 
in  regular  form.  But,  unhappily,  facts  are  entirely 
opposed  to  this.  In  the  majority  of  cases  proprietors 
have  no  interest,  under  present  circumstances,  in  working 
the  land  with  their  own  resources,  and  lease  it  to  the 
tenants  by  the  dcsyatin*  at  a  rent,  for  a  proportion  of  the 
harvest,  or  for  labour.  To  improve  the  methods  of 
agriculturists  is  extremely  difficult.  The  conditions  unxier 
which  the  emancipation  of  the  peasantry  took  place,  the 
consequent  agricultural  crisis,  and  those  measures  which 
were  taken  in  foreign  countries  for  its  avoidance,  placed 
Russian  agriculturists  in  an  extremely  difficult  if  not 
hopeless  position.     And  there  is  no  need  to  be  a  prophet 

*  A  desyatin  is  equivalent  to  2.70  acres. 


IN  RUSSIA  203 

to  foretell  that  the  economic  condition  of  Russia  will 
become  every  year  worse  and  worse  if  the  present  state  of 
affairs  continues.  Russia  is  a  country  which  exports 
agricultural  products,  yet  by  that  very  action  she 
exports  also  the  native  virtues  of  her  soil.  From  an 
estimate  of  the  quantity  of  wheat,  oats  and  barley — that 
is,  the  chief  grains — and  the  number  of  domestic  animals 
and  bones  exported,  it  appears  that  Russia  sends  out 
of  the  country  every  year  more  than  80  million  roubles 
(;^ 1 2,000,000)  worth  of  the  value  of  the  soil.  These 
figures  are  in  no  way  surprising.  By  calculations  made 
by  Komers  it  is  shown  that  in  order  to  retain  the  fruit- 
fulness  of  the  soil  it  is  necessary  to  devote  to  that 
purpose  from  20  to  33  per  cent,  of  the  income  which 
it  yields. 

A  more  intense  system  of  culture  is  therefore  for 
Russia  a  first  necessity ;  but  for  this  is  required  a  certain 
tension  of  intellectual  and  material  resources  of  which  a 
deficiency  is  now  experienced.  In  the  "Agricultural 
Reviews,"  published  by  the  Russian  Department  of 
Agriculture,  we  constantly  meet  the  statement  that  the 
unsatisfactory  harvests  of  Russia  depend  less  upon 
climatic  and  natural  conditions  than  upon  unsatisfactory 
methods  of  culture.  Especially  loud,  in  this  respect, 
are  the  complaints  made  against  the  methods  of  the 
peasantry. 

It  is  necessary  to  repeat  that  the  emancipation  of  the 
serfs  left  landed  proprietors,  as  concerns  resources,  in  the 
most  lamentable  position.  More  than  three-quarters  of 
the  total  number  of  estates  were  mortgaged  to  the  old 
Credit  Associations,  scarcely  one  proprietor  possessed 
savings,  and  agriculture  was  carried  on  only  because  free 
labour  enabled  proprietors  to  do  without  ready  money. 
Even  agriculture  carried  on  on  a  large  scale  in  pre- 
emancipation  times  required  the  most  inconsiderable 
capital.  But  agriculture  as  lately  carried  on,  without 
floating  capital  and  without  productive  outlay,  can  only 
lead  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  soil. 

Indebtedness     of    the     Peasantry. — As     concerns     the 


204 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


peasantry  emancipation  shook  the  country  out  of 
torpitude,  and  introduced  new  conditions  of  Hfe,  freedom 
of  activity,  and  immediate  responsibihty  for  payments  to 
the  state.  The  possibihty  was  created  of  buying  and  leasing 
land,  but,  at  the  same  time,  arose  also  the  need  of  ac- 
quiring bread  and  seed,  and  other  objects  formerly  received 

Harvest  in  Millions  of  Quarters  in  1893. 
Proprietors. 


36a 


Wheat 


73 


u 


Rye 


64 


29 


LU 


Oats 


Barley 


Wheat 


Peasants 


Rye         :: 


Oats 


Barley 


28 


51 


578 


23. 


from  the  proprietor,  or  gained  by  work  at  home.  The 
peasants  disposed  of  more  time  for  work  among  them- 
selves, but,  at  the  same  time,  a  need  arose  for  money 
payments  instead  of  service.  Natural  agriculture  was 
replaced  by  agriculture  on  a  money  basis.  It  was  plain 
that  money  was  to  serve  as  the  chief  factor  in  the  new 
conditions. 

It  was  from  such  a  circumstance  that  the  indebtedness  of 
the  peasantry  arose.     It  is  obvious  that  if  extreme  need 


IN  RUSSIA  205 

for  money  were  only  experienced  by  the  peasants  on 
special  occasions,  they  might  either  take  advantage  of 
their  own  savings  or  borrow  money  from  their  neigh- 
bours. But  with  the  absence  among  the  people  of  any 
considerable  savings,  and  the  non-existence  of  popular 
credit,  the  peasants  were  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the 
so-named  miroyeds  and  usurers,  on  the  most  burdensome 
terms. 

A  systematic  and  comprehensive  investigation  of  the 
debts  of  the  Russian  peasantry  has  not  yet  been  made. 
For  this  purpose  it  would  be  necessary  to  collect  precise 
information  in  all  governments,  as  has  been  done  by  the 
Zemstva  in  those  governments  where  statistical  bureaux 
exist.  At  the  present  time  we  have  only  fragmentary 
statistics. 

From  the  statistics  collected  by  the  Zemstva  it  is  shown 
that  private  credit  costs  the  peasants  of  Great  Russia  from 
40  to  60  roubles  (^£6  to  £<^  yearly  on  a  loan  of  100  roubles 
(;^I5),  and  this  only  for  common  loans,  individuals  paying 
at  a  higher  rate,  even  as  much  as  1 50  per  cent.  ^'  Owing  to 
the  difficulty  of  obtaining  money  on  any  conditions,"  writes 
M.  Sokolovski  in  his  work  on  the  subject,  "the  peasants 
have  recourse  to  the  most  ruinous  means — to  the  sale  of 
their  summer  labour  in  advance,  to  the  sale  of  corn  neces- 
sary for  their  families,  even  to  the  sale  of  corn  immediately 
after  harvest.  It  may  be  imagined  that  in  such  conditions 
the  very  lowest  prices  are  obtained  ;  thus  soon  appears  the 
necessity  for  new  loans,  and  a  veritable  system  of  slavery 
results. 

^*  Such  slavery  in  the  Great  Russia  is  exploited  by  the 
miroyed  on  a  lawful  basis.  .  .  .  Thus,  for  instance,  the 
winter  price  of  summer  field  labour  is  but  a  half  or  a 
third  of  the  summer  price,  so  that  the  kulak  having  made 
a  loan  on  this  basis  receives  from  100  to  300  per  cent,  on 
his  advance.  .  .  .  There  exists  a  veritable  trade  in  slave 
labour.  Travelling  from  village  to  village  these  usurers 
furnish  the  peasantry  with  money,  binding  the  borrower 
to  repay  the  debt  by  summer  work  ;  and  having  thus 
acquired  a  working  force,  sell  it  at  a  price  two  to  three  times 


2o6 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


higher  to  those  who  require  summer  labour.  This  system 
obtains  as  generally  in  the  south  as  it  does  in  the  north. 
In  winter  time  when  some  unfortunate  peasant  is  threatened 
with  an  execution  for  non-payment  of  taxes,  or  in  spring 
when  he  is  threatened  with  starvation,  the  usurer  buys 
for  a  trifle  his  summer  labour,  giving  him  in  advance  from 
1 5  to  30  roubles  [£2  55.  to  £/^  los.).  In  spring  the  usurers 
drive  whole  artels  of  labourers  to  field  labour  and  to  fac- 
tories, having  sold  their  labour  at  double  the  price  they 
paid. 

*'  Traders  of  another  sort  travel  through  the  country 
engaged  exclusively  in  the  traffic  in  children.  Many 
poor  parents  for  a  trifling  sum  sell  their  children  for  a 
certain  number  of  years,  in  the  course  of  which  the 
children  are  to  be  left  with  tradesmen  or  artisans  in 
the  capacity  of  apprentices.  Having  bought  in  this 
manner  a  score  of  children,  the  trader  sends  them  in 
carts  to  St.  Petersburg,  precisely  as  traders  of  another 
kind  send  calves.  In  St.  Petersburg  these  children  are 
sold  to  shops  and  factories  at  a  profit  of  from  200  to 
300  per  cent.  Such  a  trade  in  children  and  in  adults  is 
generally  prevalent  in  the  Moscow,  Ryazan  and  other 
governments." 

Marriages^  Births^  and  Deaths  in  Russia. — We  have 
already  considered  the  growth  of  the  population  in  Russia, 
in  its  association  with  other  conditions  of  the  population. 
In  the  following  table  will  be  found  a  comparison  of  the 
growth  of  the  Orthodox  population  of  Russia  with  the 
growth  of  the  general  population  of  other  European 
countries  : 

Increase  in  a  Thousand  Inhabitants. 


1881-85. 

1867-73 

Russia . 

.     15.0 

12.6 

Prussia 

.     12.0 

9.1 

Austria 

.       7-1 

8.8 

England 

.     14.1 

12.2 

Italy     . 

.      9-5 

8.5 

France 

2.5 

2.7 

Belgium 

.      97 

6.9 

IN  RUSSIA 
Let  us  present  this  comparison  graphically  : 


207 


Growth  of  the  Orthodox  Population  in  Russia,  and  the  General 
Population  of  other  Countries,  per  Thousand. 


1881-85. 


1867-73. 


In  Russia  the  proportion  of  marriages,  as  will  be  seen 
from  the  diagram  at  the  top  of  the  next  page,  immensely 
exceeds  the  proportion  of  other  states. 

In  the  number  of  births  a  similar  preponderance  is 
shown  in  the  case  of  Russia,  the  rate  being  twice  as  great 
as  that  of  PYance,  and  one  and  a  half  times  greater  than 
that  of  England. 

The  number  of  births  in  Russia  in  the  period  188 1- 
1885  in  1000  inhabitants  is  expressed  by  the  figure  56.0, 
while  among  the  other  European  states  the  greatest  birth- 


Number  of  Marriages  per  looo. 

1^ 7.8  7,7  7.5  7.5 


4-11  Ml'  l-^-»-H-  /-I 

lltlHHH^      0,6 


Q 

Z 

< 

> 

o 

< 

h 

o 


a 
a 

ta 
C/3 


Number  of  Births  per  Thousand, 

IhllHIIIIIIIlll 


IN  RUSSIA 


209 


rate  was  only  39.2  (Austria).  But  at  the  same  time  the 
mortality  in  Russia  is  greater  than  elsewhere  in  Europe  ; 
in  the  above-mentioned  period  it  amounted  to  41  in  the 
thousand,  while  in  other  countries  the  greatest  mortality, 
that  of  Austria,  was  only  31.4  in  the  thousand. 


Mortality  per  1000. 


In  Russia  the  death-rate  of  children  is  especially  high. 
In  the  period  1 865-1 878,  out  of  100  deaths  the  number 
of  children  under  11  years  old  in  Russia  was  36.2,  in 
Prussia  32.2,  and  in  France  only  18.7. 

Still  more  characteristic  is  the  mortality  among  infants 
under  one  year  old  ;  in  Russia  it  amounts  to  29.5  percent, 
of  the  number  born,  and  in  certain  governments,  for 
instance  Pskov  ^nd  Smolensk,  to  31.4  per  cent.  ;  in  foreign 

o 


2IO 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


countries,  as  is  shown  by  the  following  diagram,  the  mor- 
tality of  infants  of  under  one  year  is  higher  only  in  Bavaria 
and  in  Wurtemburg. 

Percentage  Mortality  of  Children  under  One  Year, 


29,5 

Oljt 

29.8  30.2 



24,9 







12.6 

14.5 

16.6 

20.4 

r ' 

20.9 

_ 

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The  mortality  of  infants  of  this  age  is  an  important 
factor  in  judging  of  the  degree  of  culture  of  a  people  and 
of  its  moral  condition.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  eco- 
nomic well-being  and  intellectual  development  constitute 
factors  opposed  to  a  heavy  infant  mortality.  It  is  obvious 
that  in  the  interests  of  a  state  it  is  less  important  that 
children  should  be  born  than  that  those  born  should  live, 
the  consequence  of  which  is  the  preservation  of  a  greater 
quantity  of  working  forces  and  money  resources,  not 
only  in  individual  families,  but  in  the  whole  country. 
Infant  mortality  depends  mainly  upon  nourishment, 
or  in  other  words  on  the  degree  of  prosperity  of  the 
people.     The  investigations  of   Pfeiffer  show  that  of  the 


IN  RUSSIA  211 

total  number  of  infants  dying  within  a  year  of  birth, 
from  40  per  cent,  to  70  per  cent,  die  from  bad  or 
insufficient  food. 

Deficiency  of  suitable  food,  that  is,  plainly,  hunger,  is 
the  cause  of  the  high  mortality  among  the  infant  popula- 
tion of  Russia.  The  Protoierei  Gilyarovski,  in  his  valu- 
able work,  **  A  Sanitary  Investigation  of  the  Government 
of  Novgorod,"  mentions  the  following  circumstance  as  an 
illustration  of  the  condition  of  the  agricultural  population. 
The  labourers  on  going  to  work  leave  the  unweaned 
infants  behind,  and  in  order  to  prevent  their  death  by 
hunger,  owing  to  want  of  milk,  ''employ  a  system  which 
for  simplicity  and  horror  might  be  the  method  of  savages. 
Having  made  dumplings  out  of  masticated  black  bread, 
they  bind  them  to  the  hands  and  feet  of  the  children,  in 
the  belief  that  the  child  when  rolling  on  the  floor  will  lift 
its  hands  and  feet  to  its  mouth  and  suck  the  nourishment 
from  the  bread." 

Mortality  is  also  found  to  depend  upon  a  number  of  other 
conditions — geographical,  climatic,  and  racial,  from  the 
occupations  of  a  people  and  from  its  medical  organisation. 
But  the  chief  factor  determining  mortality  remains  never- 
theless the  degree  of  economic  well-being  ;  and  thus  from 
the  mortality  statistics  we  may  fairly  judge  of  the  condi- 
tion of  a  population. 

We  have  already  quoted  statistics  showing  that  in  1867- 
73  the  mortality  of  the  Orthodox  population  of  Russia 
amounted  to  40.2  in  the  thousand,  and  in  the  period  1881- 
85  to  41.  The  growth  of  the  population,  representing  the 
preponderance  of  births  over  deaths  among  the  orthodox 
population  in  the  period  1867-73  was  12.6,  and  in  the 
period  1881-85,  I5- 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  statistics  of  births,  morta- 
lity, the  composition  of  the  population,  age,  &c.,  in  Russia, 
are  extremely  unsatisfactory  in  comparison  with  those  of 
other  states.  It  is  enough  to  emphasise  the  fact,  illus- 
trated by  the  chart  on  the  next  page,  that  of  IQOO  persons  of 
both  sexes  born  in  Norway,  717  attain  the  age  of  25  years, 
in.  Prussia  581,  while  in  Russia  only  508  attain  that  age. 


212 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


100  0 

975 

Number  of  Survivors  out  of  1000  Children  Born,  at  all 

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le   15   20   25   30   SS    40   4S   50   55   60   65   70   75 


IN   RUSSIA  213 

The  life  of  every  individual  represents  a  certain  quantity 
of  potential  energy  necessary  for  the  fulfilment  of  his 
appointed  work  ;  in  other  words,  the  life  of  every  man  has 
a  definite  value  to  the  state.  The  value  of  life  on  the 
basis  of  potential  energy  is  estimated  in  England  in  the 
following  form  : 

A  new-born  child  of  the  farming  class  has  a  value  of      5 

At    5  years  of  age  has  a  value  of       .         .         .         -56 

„    10         ,,  ,,  „  ....  117 

j»i5         »'  "  '»  •         •         •         •  ^92 

»   20         „  „  „  ....  234 


It  is  necessary  to  observe  that  up  to  the  age  of  17  years 
the  average  value  of  the  labour  of  a  man  is  lower  than  the 
cost  of  his  maintenance.  The  value  of  human  life  in 
Prussia,  estimated  in  five-yearly  periods,  separately  for 
manual  and  for  intellectual  work,  is  given  by  Professor 
Wittstein,  as  in  the  diagram  on  the  following  page. 

But  in  addition  to  the  loss  of  capital,  the  death  of  every 
man  causes  special  outlay  for  medical  treatment  and  burial, 
and  constitutes  a  direct  loss  to  the  state.  The  figures 
given  in  the  following  table,  taking  1000  births,  show  that 
the  number  of  individuals  living  to  a  working  age  of  15 
years,  and  also  to  60  years,  is  less  favourable  to  Russia 
than  to  other  states  : 


Russia 

Sweden 

England 

Switzerland 

France 

Germany    . 

Italy  . 


Having  examined  these  statistics  of  mortality,  it  is 
impossible  not  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  cause  of 
the  greater  mortality  in  Russia  is  the  poverty  of  its  popu- 
lation and  the  lower  degree  of  its  culture. 


To  15  years. 

To  60  years 

452 

213 

727 

440 

695 

365 

694 

362 

680 

383 

609 

311 

576 

320 

214         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Value  of  H II wan  Life  in  Thousands  of  Thalers. 
H^L  3.5  3, 


Engaged     in      Physical    Work 


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Engaged   in    Intellectual  Work 


V. — Moral  Condition  of  the  Population. 

We  have  already  cited  a  number  of  facts  indicating  the 
condition  of  poverty  of  the  mass  of  the  population  of 
Russia.  This  question  especially  required  enlightenment 
in  view  of  the  gravity  of  the  consequences  which  war 
might  call  forth  and  which  might  follow  in  its  wake. 
General  conclusions  here  can  only  be  drawn  from  the 
impartial  evidence  of  figures,  and  it  was  this  consideration 


2i6         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

which  impelled  us  in  treating  partly  of  the  economic  and 
partly  of  the  moral  condition  of  the  country  to  treat  also  of 
matters  which  it  may  appear  have  no  direct  immediate 
bearing  upon  the  contentions  of  this  work.  But  this  incon- 
sequence is  only  apparent.  The  significance  of  war  for 
Russia,  as  for  all  other  countries,  cannot  be  estimated 
merely  by  the  number  of  armies  which  may  be  put  in  the 
field,  the  number  of  shells  which  may  be  discharged  in  a 
given  time,  and  the  extent  of  ground  which  would  be 
covered  by  their  fragments.  Many  factors  in  the  policies 
of  peoples  which  in  times  of  peace  stand  little  in  relief, 
in  that  revolution  of  all  conditions  which  war  may  cause 
will  acquire  a  special  significance,  and  it  is  in  the  con- 
sideration of  these  factors  that  we  find  it  necessary  to 
delay. 

Popular  Education. — In  Russia  popular  education  stands, 
unhappily,  on  a  very  different  foundation  from  that  which 
would  be  desired.  Devoting  all  its  resources  to  the  satis- 
faction of  military  requirements  and  the  payment  of  loans, 
the  Government  has  had  little  left  to  devote  to  education. 
From  the  chart  on  the  preceding  page,  which  shows  the 
yearly  outlay  on  education  for  one  inhabitant,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  expenditure  on  education  is  distributed  over 
the  country  very  unequally,  fluctuating  between  3  kopecks 
and  4  roubles  90  kopecks  (from  ^d.  to  14s.  8f</.) 

The  low  level  of  education  in  Russia  is  shown  most 
clearly  of  all  by  the  number  of  illiterates  accepted  for 
military  service.  It  will  be  seen  from  the  diagrams  on  the 
opposite  page  that  the  number  in  Russia  is  50  times  greater 
than  in  Germany,  6  times  greater  than  in  France,  and 
50  per  cent,  greater  than  in  Italy. 

If  we  examine  the  distribution  of  illiteracy  by  govern- 
ments we  shall  see  that  in  the  Baltic  provinces  the  number 
of  illiterates,  compared  with  the  total  population,  is  less 
than  5  per  cent.,  whereas  in  Great  Russia  it  is  as  high  as 
94  per  cent.  In  the  government  of  Moscow  it  is  47  per  cent., 
and  in  the  six  contiguous  governments  it  fluctuates  between 
58  per  cent,  in  Vladimir  and  76  per  cent,  in  Smolensk.  In 
Kishenef  and  Ufa  the  number  of  illiterate  recruits  in  the 


IN  RUSSIA 


217 


period  1874-83  was  92  per  cent,  and  94  per  cent  respec- 
tively. 

Such   a  lamentable  condition  of  things  is  not  confined 


77-95 


Percentage  of  Illiterates  accepted  for  Military  Service. 
83-24 

49-21  ^^'^^ 


68-7 


10-86 


47-96 


82  2 


In  1886-1887. 


to  the  lower  levels  of  education  only.  In  intermediate 
and  higher  education  we  find  a  state  of  things  relatively 
similar.  The  diagrams  on  pp.  218-219  give  some  illustra- 
tion of  this  statement. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  deficiency  of  special  training 


2l8 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Number  of  Students  in*  Higher  and  Intermediate  Educational 
Institutions,  per  100,000  of  the  Population,  Classified  accord- 
ing to  Social  Condition. 

IN    UNIVERSITIES. 

Russia. 

616 

497 


Poland. 


16 

740 

m\ 

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Nobles 

Clergy 
Others 

IN  RUSSIA 


219 


Ntimber  entering  Universities  per  1000  trained  in  Intermediate 

Schools. 


Russia. 


Poland. 


Numbers  Receiving  Special  Training  per  100,000  of  the 

Population. 


Jews. 


Russia. 


Agricultural 


Technical 


Medicai 


Commercial 


O.her  Religions. 
1 20 


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Poland. 


Oth^r  Religions. 


35 


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220 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


in  Russia  we  have  constructed  the  following  diagram 
showing  the  number  of  doctors  in  Russia  and  in  other 
states  : 

Number  of  Doctors  in  European  States  per  100,000  Inhabitants 


From  the  above  diagram  it  will  be  seen  that  the  number 
of  doctors  in  Russia  is  quite  insignificant,  being  from  3  to 
8  times  less  in  proportion  than  in  other  European  states. 
In  the  first  place  stand  the  metropolitan  governments  ;  in 
the  government  of  St.  Petersburg  the  number  of  doctors 
for  every  million  of  the  population  is  557,  and  in  the 
Moscow  government  420.     The  minimum  is  found  in  the 


IN  RUSSIA 


221 


government  of  Vologda,  with  37  to  the  million,  in  Ufa 
with  35,  in  Orenburg  with  31  and  in  Vyatka  with  30. 
Still  more  striking  are  the  facts  illustrated  by  the  following 
diagram  : 

Number  of  Quadratic  Kilometres  for  every  Doctor. 


Thus  considered  in  relation  to  area  we  find  in  Russia  44 
less  number  of  doctors  than  in  Belgium,  35  less  than  in 
Italy  and  in  England,  16  times  less  than  in  France,  and  14 
times  less  than  in  Germany  and  Austria.  Norway  alone 
approaches  Russia  in  this  respect.  Statistics  as  to  the  out- 
lay on  medicine  are  alsointeresting,as  showing  the  immense 
disproportion  of  means  of  relief  attainable  in  various  parts 
of  the  Empire.  The  chart  on  the  next  page  illustrates  this 
subject : 


222  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


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IN  RUSSIA  223 

Sickness. — As  a  natural  consequence  of  poverty,  igno- 
rance, and  the  absence  of  medical  aid,  we  find  a  corre- 
spondingly unsatisfactory  state  in  the  health  of  the  popu- 
lation. In  the  number  of  serious  illnesses  typhus  takes 
the  first  place.  Although  in  recent  times  it  is  acknow- 
ledged that  typhus  is  caused  by  a  peculiar  infectious 
micro-organism,  still  the  proportion  of  cases  of  sickness  to 
cases  of  death  must  be  acknowledged  as  a  symptom  of  more 
or  less  culture.  In  this  respect  Russia  also  finds  herself 
in  an  unfavourable  condition.  From  the  statistics  for  the 
period  1887-91  (see  next  page)  it  is  shown  that  the  num- 
ber of  cases  of  t3^phus  fluctuated  in  various  governments 
from  57  per  100,000  in  the  Astrahkan  government  to  914 
per  100,000  in  the  government  of  Tula,  and  that  the  pro- 
portionate mortality  from  this  illness  was  immense  in 
certain  places,  amounting  to  as  much  as  21  per  cent,  in 
the  government  of  Siedlicz. 

In  other  respects,  as  regards  health,  it  will  be  found 
that  Russia  is  in  an  equally  unfavourable  condition.  And 
if  unfavourable  material  conditions  increase  the  liability  to 
sickness  and  death  of  a  population,  these  same  conditions 
similarly  react  on  its  moral  condition.  It  is  obvious  that 
where  the  general  level  of  material  prosperity  is  high 
there  will  appear  less  tendency  to  crime,  greater  softness 
of  manners,  and  a  stronger  tendency  towards  education. 
It  is  interesting  therefore  to  consider  some  phenomena 
illustrating  the  moral  condition  of  the  country. 

Illegitimacy. — Although  it  must  be  admitted  that  certain 
of  the  causes  increasing  the  figures  of  illegitimacy  must  be 
sought  outside  the  domain  of  ethics,  nevertheless  statistics 
on  this  subject  may  be  considered  as  proving  much  as  to 
the  moral  condition  of  a  people.  In  relation  to  illegiti- 
macy Russia  finds  herself  in  a  favourable  position,  the 
percentage  of  illegitimate  births  being  less  than  in  any 
other  European  state,  as  is  shown  by  the  diagram  on 
page  225. 

This  circumstance  is  explained  by  the  comparative  earli- 
ness  of  marriage  among  the  peasantry.  The  percentage  of 
married  soldiers  accepted  for  military  service  in  the  period 


224  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


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IN  RUSSIA 


225 


1874-83  reached  in  four  governments  over  per  cent., 
and  in  the  greater  part  of  Russia  was  betw^een  30  per 
cent,  and  60  per  cent.,  though  in  the  Northern  and  North- 
Western  provinces  it  fluctuates  between  2  per  cent,  and 
18  per  cent. 

Suicide. — Professor  Oettingen   in  his  work  on  '*  Moral- 
statistik,"  declares  that  suicide   **  is  the  consequence  of 

Number  of  Illegitimates  in  1000  Births. 

135 

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that  despair  which  results  from  social  evils  and  from 
immoral  social  relations."  The  new  school  of  Italian 
physiologists  and  psycho-criminologists,  at  the  head  of 
which  stand  Lombroso  and  Morselli,  on  the  other  hand, 
find  the  cause  of  suicide  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Professor  Gvozdeff,  at  the  beginning  of  his  remarkable 
work  on  suicide,  sets  down  the  following  words  :  *'  In  pro- 
portion as  the  requirements  from  life  increase  increases  also 
the  number  of  suicides."  Thus  suicide  is  one  of  the  gravest 
questions  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  statistics  as  to  its 
prevalence  may  serve  as  an  indication  of  the  condition  of 
a  people. 

From   general  statistics  we  find  that  the    increase    of 


226 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


drunkenness  corresponds  to  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
suicides.  Mulhall  finds  that  approximately  1 5  per  cent, 
of  suicides  in  Europe  result  from  drunkenness.  From 
20  per  cent,  to  30  per  cent,  of  suicides  are  caused  by  dis- 

N umber  of  Suicides  per  100,000  Inhabitants. 

Men. 

64.5 


17.5 


4.6       4.5 


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satisfaction  with  material  conditions  ;  from  which  we  must 
conclude  that  unfavourable  economic  conditions  are  an  im- 
portant factor  in  determining  the  number  of  suicides.  The 
proportion  of  suicides  in  Russia  is  much  smaller  than  in 
other  states,  as  maybe  seen  from  the  above  diagram,  showing 
the  number  of  suicides  among  men  and  women  in  Europe. 


IN  RUSSIA  227 

It  is  impossible  not  to  notice  the  characteristic  fact  that 
the  proportion  of  female  to  male  suicides  is  greater  in 
Russia  than  in  other  states,  a  fact  which  may  be  explained 
by  the  lamentable  position  of  women  in  Russia. 

Drunkenness. — It  is  well  known  that  in  Russia  drunken- 
ness is  a  widespread  social  evil,  eating  away  the  lives  of 
whole  generations,  ruining  the  organisms  not  only  of  men 
but  of  women  and  even  children.  Without  taking  into 
consideration  those  dying  directly  from  drunkenness,  drink 
is  the  cause  of  serious  illnesses,  with  all  their  unfortunate 
consequences.  The  victims  of  alcoholism,  as  those 
deprived  of  reason,  lose  all  power  of  resisting  their 
passions.  Their  actions  are  carried  on  under  the  influ- 
ence of  immediate  animal  impulses,  in  no  way  regulated 
by  reason.  The  poisoning  of  the  brain  of  alcoholics  does 
not  at  once  react  upon  the  physical  strength,  but  their 
conduct  shows  no  trace  of  a  rational  will.  In  such  form 
they  become  insane  or  criminal,  and  in  any  case  dangerous 
members  of  society  both  in  the  present  and  in  the  future. 
In  Germany,  Herr  Baer,  chief  physician  of  the  Plotzensee 
Central  Prison,  showed  on  the  basis  of  statistics,  the  rela- 
tions between  drunkenness  and  crime.  He  found  that  out  of 
32,837  criminals  confined  in  120  German  prisons,  13,706, 
or  42  per  cent.,  were  drunkards.  Investigation  as  to  the 
causes  of  insanity  in  England,  France,  Denmark,  and  in 
the  United  States  showed  that  approximately  14  per  cent, 
of  cases  were  caused  by  drunkenness.  In  France  insanity 
caused  by  the  excessive  employment  of  spirituous  liquors 
grows  continually.  In  1836,  7  per  cent,  of  cases  of 
insanity  were  found  to  be  caused  by  drunkenness.  From 
the  last  available  statistics  we  find  that  this  percentage 
had  increased  to  21  per  cent.,  or  three  times.  In 
Holland  in  1882,  12  per  cent,  of  the  cases  of  insanity 
were  traced  to  excessive  drinking.  Similar  figures  are 
found  for  other  European  countries.  In  the  United 
States  the  proportion  of  insanity  caused  by  alcoholism 
amounts  to  26  per  cent. 

In  Russia  the  use  of  alcohol  per  unit  of  the  population 
is  less  than  in  other  countries.     But  this  depends  upon 


22  8  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  irregular  use  of  vodka,  and  in  no  way  affects  the  fact 
that  in  that  country  drunkenness  is  very  common.  Rarely 
does  the  peasant  or  workman  in  Russia  consume  alcohol 
in  small  innocuous  quantities.  Usually  Russians  either 
do  not  drink  at  all  or  drink  to  stupefaction,  and  often  to 
unconsciousness.  In  addition  to  this,  in  the  opinion  of 
many  investigators,  the  use  of  alcohol  in  Russia  is  espe- 
cially injurious  in  consequence  of  climatic  conditions. 

Nevertheless,  the  opinion  which  attributes  the  eagerness 
of  the  peasantry  for  spirituous  liquors  to  an  immoral 
impulse  is  narrow  and  unfounded.  That  eagerness  is  the 
consequence  of  many  elements — the  lamentable  conditions 
of  life,  the  absence  of  recreation,  and  the  very  nature  of  the 
food  of  the  people,  consisting  as  it  does  almost  exclusively 
of  vegetable  substances.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the 
whole  aboriginal  vegetarian  populations  of  islands  dis- 
covered by  Europeans  were  exterminated  by  the  rapid 
spread  of  drunkenness. 

But  whatever  its  causes  may  be,  drink  is  undoubtedly  one 
of  the  causes  of  crime  and  of  impotence  in  the  improve- 
ment of  social  conditions.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that 
as  long  as  the  causes  of  drunkenness  are  not  removed,  no 
restrictive  or  punitive  measures  will  be  effective  in  out- 
rooting  the  evil.  Measures  for  raising  the  economic  level 
of  the  people  and  the  wide  development  of  popular  educa- 
tion are  necessary  first. 

The  consumption  of  spirituous  liquors  in  Russia  in 
comparison  with  other  countries  is  shown  in  the  diagram 
on  the  opposite  page. 

The  number  of  sacrifices  to  drink  is  shown  in  the  dia- 
gram on  page  230. 

Crime. — The  criminal  statistics  of  every  country  may  be 
taken  as  a  factor  in  determining  the  level  of  material  and 
moral  well-being  of  its  population.  A  comparison  of  the 
criminal  statistics  of  Russia  with  those  of  other  countries 
is  made  extremely  difficult  owing  to  the  irregular  classifi- 
cation of  offences,  and  the  irregular  jurisdiction  of  the 
lower  courts.  In  consequence  of  this  the  statistics  found 
in  the  Abstracts  published  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  have 


IN  RUSSIA 


229 


00 
00 

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> 


230 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


little  value  as  a  basis  for  comparison,  and  indeed  com- 
parison of  these  statistics  with  those  of  Western  European 
countries  gives  results  far  too  optimistic  and  quite  untrust- 
worthy, as  a  great  part  of  the  offences  of  the  greater  part  of 
the  population,  which  fall  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Volost  courts,  are  omitted.  An  arithmetical  comparison 
even  of  serious  crimes  cannot  be  safely  made  ;  for  the 


Number  of  Deaths  from  Drunkenness  in  1,000,000  of  the 

Population. 


Volost  courts,  through  ignorance  of  the  law  and  incapacity 
to  distinguish  in  a  single  case  different  forms  of  law- 
breaking,  very  often  determine  criminal  cases  which  by 
law  are  outside  their  competence. 

Information  collected  in  three  governments,  Podolsk, 
Moghilef,  and  Voluinsk,  has  served  as  a  basis  for 
estimating  the  total  number  of  persons  convicted  by  the 
Volost  courts.  Adding  the  number  of  such  convictions  to 
the  figures  in  the  ordinary  criminal  statistics  we  have  con- 
structed the  following  diagram,  showing  the  proportions  of 
crime  in  Russia  and  Poland  : 


IN  RUSSIA 


231 


Average  Number  of  Convictions  in  200,000  of  the  Population 
(100,000  men  and  100,000  women)  in  1878-1885. 


Asvize  and 
Civil  Cou'-ts. 


Volost  Courts. 


Russia 


BG/IOCTHbIMM 

194' 


APECT"b  M  poarn 


201 
nPOSm  HAHA3AHm'i!| 

'" 


492 


Arrest  and  Whipping. 


Other  Punishments. 


The  attempt  to  draw  a  comparison  between  the  amount  01 
crime  in  Russia  and  in  foreign  countries  is  made  extremely 
difficult  by  the  differences  in  criminal  codes.  To  add  to 
this  difficulty  the  criminal  statistics  in  some  countries 
relate  to  the  number  of  accused,  in  some  others  to  the 
number  of  crimes,  and  in  others  only  to  the  number  of 
convicted.  But  even  an  approximate  comparison  cannot 
be  without  value.  The  most  useful  information  would  be 
given  by  the  distribution  of  convicts  according  to  religious 
faiths,  but  unfortunately  through  the  lack  of  statistics  as 
to  the  religious  profession  of  the  peasants  of  the  Empire, 
such  a  classification  was  impossible.  We  have  therefore 
been  compelled  to  divide  the  convicts  in  the  Empire 
into  three  groups — peasants,  Jews,  and  others.  (See  dia- 
grams on  pages  232,  233,  234,  235.) 

It  is  not  without  interest  to  consider  the  number  of 
those  convicted  according  to  sex.  The  table  at  top  of 
page  236  gives  the  percentage  relations  of  the  sexes  in  the 
number  of  convicts. 

To  complete  this  picture  it  is  only  necessary  to  show 
the  increase  or  diminution  of  crime  in  Russia  in  comparison 
with  that  of  other  states.  In  this  case,  irregular  registra- 
tion does  not  play  so  serious  a  part,  as  we  are  not  dealing 
with  the  quantity  of  crime,  but  with  its  increase  and 
diminution  in  a  certain  period.  For  Russia  we  take  the 
periods    1878-82    and     1888-89.     After    examining ..  the 


232 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


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IN  RUSSIA 


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IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE 


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IN  RUSSIA 


235 


Numbers  Condemned  for  Swindling  per  Million  of  ihe 
Corresponding  Population, 


Russia, 
swindling. 


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different  forms  of  swindling. 


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236        IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Percentage  Relations  of  Men  and  Women  Convicted, 
^9  87  _ 89 87 


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Percentage  Increase  in  the  Fifeeen  Chief  Forms  of  Crime. 


The  Empire. 


Poland. 


IN  RUSSIA 


237 


statistics  of  fifteen  of  the  chief  forms  of  crime  we  find  an 
increase  in  crime  in  the  second  period  in  Russia  of  14  per 
cent.,  and  in  Poland  of  46  per  cent.  The  diagram  at  the 
bottom  of  the  preceding  page  presents  these  relations  more 
effectively. 

For  comparison  with  foreign  states  we  will  take  Great 
Britain,  France,  Austria,  and  Germany.  In  this  respect 
Great  Britain  is  in  the  most  favourable  position  of  all,  as 
the  following  diagrams  show  : 

Number  of  Convictions  in  Great  Britain  per  100,000  Inhabitants. 


1860—1869. 

1870     1879 
1880-1889. 

/y 

rrr-T^    — 

1894. 

u 

f^ 


Thus  we  find  that  since  the  year  i860  the  number  of 
convicted  persons  in  Great  Britain  has  fallen  by  109  per 
cent. 

Among  countries  where  the  increase  of  crime  has  been 
inconsiderable  may  be  named  France  and  Austria : 


Number  of  Convictions  in  Thousands. 
France.  Austria. 


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238         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

In   Germany,  on  the   other   hand,    we  find    the  same 
phenomenon  as  in  Russia. 

Number  of  Convictions  in  Germany  per  100,000  Inhabitants. 


It  is  interesting  in  the  case  of  Russia  to  see  the  distri- 
bution of  crime  among  the  population  in  its  relation  to 
education. 

Poland. 
Per  Cent. 

.08 

134 

85.8 


Empire. 
Per  Cent 

Higher  education 
Educated  . 
Illiterate     . 

1.2 
.      25.3 
•      73-5 

The  chart  on  the  opposite  page  shows  the  outlay  on 
justice  of  all  kinds  and  on  prisons  in  1887  per  inhabitant. 

To  fill  in  this  brief  outline  of  the  moral  condition  of 
Russia  we  will  cite  some  statistics  relating  to  recidivism, 
pointing  out,  however,  that  these  statistics  are  not  quite 
complete.  Nevertheless  they  may  give  a  very  fair  idea 
of  the  amount  of  social  evil  caused  by  reversion  to  crime  : 


Number  of  Recidivists. 

Percentage  Growth 
of  Recidivists. 

1878. 

1889. 

Empire     . 
Kingdom  of  Poland 

10,168 

1.543 

18,993 
3.545 

180 
233 

IN  RUSSIA 


239 


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1 

.§ 

240         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

Those  who  understand  the  gravity  of  criminal  recidivism 
for  the  state  will  be  able  to  judge  of  the  significance  of 
these  figures  in  arriving  at  an  estimate  of  the  moral  con- 
dition of  the  people. 

VI. — Elements  for  the  Renewal  of  the  Army. 

The  greater  the  probability  of  a  prolonged  European 
war,  the  more  serious  becomes  the  question  of  means  and 
methods  for  the  reinforcing  of  armies,  The  general  con- 
clusion, formed  from  an  examination  of  Russia's  resources, 
was  that  Russia,  having  an  almost  inexhaustible  reserve 
of  men  and  horses,  might  sustain  a  prolonged  war  incom- 
parably better  than  the  other  states  of  Europe.  But  in 
this  consideration  we  took  into  account  only  the  average 
statistics  for  the  whole  of  Russia.  The  question  is  made 
more  complex  by  the  fact  that,  in  view  of  the  immensity  of 
Russia,  the  conditions  for  the  renewal  of  armed  forces  in 
various  districts  must  be  very  different,  while  in  the  event 
of  a  defensive  war  a  certain  portion  of  Russia's  territory 
might  be  occupied  by  an  enemy.  In  addition,  with  inter- 
rupted communications,  all  material  for  renewing  armed 
forces  must  be  obtained  within  the  country  itself.  The 
question  therefore  naturally  arises  :  Are  they  sufficient? 

It  is  evident  that  no  deficiency  can  arise  in  men. 
Means  of  provisioning  are  also  so  abundant  as  Lo  con- 
stitute in  the  very  beginning  of  war  a  great  advantage  for 
Russia.  In  an  earlier  part  of  our  work  we  have  given 
figures  to  show  the  advantage  which  Russia  also  possesses 
in  the  matter  of  horses.  The  percentage  of  these  which 
might  be  used  in  war  is  more  important  in  the  present 
connection.  To  form  some  idea  of  this,  the  chart  on  the 
next  page,  showing  the  percentage  and  distribution  of 
grown  horses  over  the  country,  will  be  useful. 

Since  1864  an  immense  increase  has  taken  place  in  the 
number  of  horses  in  the  country,  an  inconsiderable 
decrease  showing  itself  only  in  ten  provinces,  while  all 
over  the  rest  of  the  country  a  large  increase  took  place, 
in  certain  provinces  amounting  to  nearly  300  per  cent. 


IN  RUSSIA 


241 


242  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  no  Western  state  will  find 
itself  in  so  good  a  position  as  relates  to  the  supply  of 
horses ;  and  that  however  great  may  be  the  area  occupied 
by  an  enemy's  forces,  deficiency  in  horses  fit  for  military 
purposes  cannot  arise. 

As  relates  to  the  supply  of  arms  it  may  be  assumed 
that  no  difficulty  will  arise  in  obtaining  workers,  owing  to 
the  stagnation  caused  in  other  industries.  The  working 
and  application  of  iron  has  grown  so  rapidly  that  no  diffi- 
culty can  arise  in  this  respect.  In  1890  the  pig-iron 
worked  amounted  to  55 J  million  poods  (892,000  tons), 
manufactured  iron  to  25f  million  poods  (412,500  tons), 
while  in  1895  the  working  of  pig-iron  amounted  to  87 
million  poods  (1,400,000  tons)  (an  increase  of  57.5 
per  cent.),  and  manufactured  iron  to  27  million  poods 
(434,000  tons)  (an  increase  of  5  per  cent.). 

On  the  chart  given  on  the  next  page  is  shown  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  production  of  iron  and  steel.  From  this 
it  may  be  seen  that  the  chief  resources  of  this  material 
are  situated  in  the  East,  and  far  away  from  those  districts 
which  might  be  occupied  by  an  enemy's  forces. 

VII. — Conclusions. 

From  the  above  statistics  the  conclusion  naturally 
springs  that,  while  the  interruption  of  communication  will 
threaten  with  famine  and  social  perturbations  the  states  of 
Western  Europe,  the  danger  to  Russia  is  less,  although 
still  ver}'  serious,  meaning,  as  it  would,  decrease  in  the 
incomes  of  the  population  and  the  most  lamentable  results 
for  trade  and  industry. 

The  incommensurate  widening  of  the  area  of  production 
at  the  expense  of  the  area  of  nourishment,  the  replacing 
of  horned  cattle  by  horses,  and  the  decrease  of  stock- 
raising  generally,  are  factors  against  which  must  be  placed 
the  systematic  efi'orts  at  improvement.  Otherwise,  in  view 
of  the  yearly  export  of  the  products  of  the  land  and  of  the 
rapid  growth  of  the  population,  Russia  would  go  farther 
and  farther  on  the  path  to  the  exhaustion  of  her  natural 


<fi 

a 

-o 

"O 

_; 

S 

o 
o 

Fi 

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a 

Q. 

B 

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Q 

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8 

a 

— 

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o 

o 

to 

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H 

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H 

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c 

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o 

ts- 

1 

i! 

1 

244         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

resources  and  the  multiplication  of  an  agricultural  pro- 
letariat. 

And  thus  Russia,  although  so  far  as  the  products  of 
agriculture  are  concerned  she  is  in  a  position  to  carry  on  a 
serious  and  prolonged  struggle — such  a  struggle  as  could 
not  even  be  dreamt  of  by  the  states  of  Western  Europe — 
nevertheless  is  as  interested  as  are  those  countries  in 
the  preservation  of  peace. 

In  comparison  with  the  income  derived  from  agriculture 
the  total  of  the  income  received  from  industries  is  insig- 
nificant. But  in  the  event  of  a  great  war  even  this 
income  must  diminish  to  a  considerable  extent.  In  such 
industries  as  directly  or  indirectly  relate  to  the  supply  and 
armament  of  the  army  there  will,  of  course,  be  no  stagna- 
tion. But  the  interruption  of  the  supply  of  trans-oceanic 
cotton  and  various  other  materials,  and  difficulties  in  the 
supply  of  coal,  will  shorten  the  output  of  many  articles. 
It  is  true  that  Russian  industry,  relying  upon  an  internal 
sale,  will  not  lose  its  market  in  consequence  of  interrupted 
communications,  as  English,  German,  and  French  industry 
will.  But  in  time  of  war  the  demand  on  the  internal 
market  would  undoubtedly  fall,  proportionately  with  the 
fall  in  incomes  derived  from  agriculture  and  the  general 
disruption  in  agricultural  life.  Russian  industry  relies 
mainly  on  the  demands  of  the  peasantry.  Thus,  even  in 
times  of  peace  every  serious  failure  of  crops  causes 
stagnation.  It  is  obvious  that  the  diminution  in  the 
resources  of  the  peasantry  caused  by  war  would  react  on 
industry  and  shorten  production  considerably.  As  a 
result  of  this,  workers  who  live  in  poverty  and  absolutely 
without  provision  for  the  future  will  find  themselves  in  a 
position  no  less  terrible  than  that  of  the  workers  of 
Western  Europe. 

Only  traders,  in  consequence  of  their  comparative  few- 
ness, and  usurers  who  take  advantage  of  the  backwardness 
of  the  agricultural  population  of  Russia,  will  find  that  war 
creates  favourable  conditions,  opening  a  wider  path  for 
exploitation  of  the  popular  needs. 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that,  in  consequence  of  a 


IN  RUSSIA  245 

generally  unsettled  agriculture,  of  the  primitive  and  already 
insufficient  systems  of  working  land,  of  absence  of  savings, 
and  of  indebtedness  both  of  proprietors  and  of  peasants, 
the  economic  perturbations  caused  by  war  might  assume 
immense  gravity.  We  have  pointed  out  some  of  the 
conditions  which  in  Western  Europe  would  make  a  pro- 
longed war  impossible.  But  there  immense  capital  repre- 
senting the  savings  of  the  people,  high  development  of 
technique,  force  of  social  activity,  and  at  the  same  time  of 
private  enterprise,  would  tend  towards  quicker  healing  of 
the  wounds  caused  by  war  in  the  popular  organism.  That 
this  might  be  is  shown  by  the  history  of  France  since  the 
war  of  1 870-7 1.  We  may  suppose  that  a  future  war 
would  result  even  more  disastrously,  but  it  is  unquestion- 
able that  a  strong  economic  organism  might  rapidly 
recover.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Western  states  have 
less  to  fear  from  the  economic  consequences  which  might 
arise  from  war  than  from  the  growth  of  socialism  and  the 
possibility  of  revolution. 

It  is  not  so  in  Russia.  The  weaker  the  economic 
activity  is,  the  less  are  its  dangers  from  war.  Where 
accumulated  riches  are  small  and  economic  life  simple,  the 
direct  losses  will  not  be  so  acutely  felt.  But  for  a  country 
mainly  agricultural,  in  which  both  peasants  and  proprietors 
can  hardly  make  both  ends  meet  even  in  times  of  peace  ;  a 
country  burdened  with  indebtedness  and  in  consequence 
cursed  with  forced  labour  ;  a  country  w^here  the  finances 
have  only  lately  been  reduced  to  order,  and  would  again 
be  disorganised  by  a  great  issue  of  paper  money — for  such 
a  country  the  consequences  of  war  would  be  especially 
disastrous,  and  would  result  in  an  economic  crisis  and  a 
loss  of  productive  forces  from  which  it  would  need  a  long 
time  to  recover.  And  thus,  although  Russia  is  not 
threatened  with  those  revolutions  which  might  be  feared 
in  Western  Europe  after  a  great  war,  yet  the  consequences 
for  her  of  such  a  war  would  be  in  the  highest  degree 
serious. 

The  necessity  for  Russia  not  to  fall  below  the  other 
states  in  expenditure  on  armaments  entails  on  her  a  heavier 


246         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

burden  than  France  and  Germany  and  even  Austria  have 
to  bear.  In  those  countries  the  war  budget,  however 
immense  it  may  be,  constitutes  only  a  small  part  of  the 
expenditure  of  the  state,  of  the  municipalities,  of  private 
associations  and  of  village  communities,  on  productive 
works,  on  improvements  in  agriculture  and  in  sanitation, 
on  the  development  of  communications,  trade  and  industry, 
and  finally  (although  this  is  by  no  means  the  least  important 
item)  on  the  spread  of  education.  In  Russia,  the  expendi- 
ture on  land  and  sea  forces  constitutes  a  third  of  the  whole 
budget ;  and,  if  we  deduct  the  sums  devoted  to  interest 
on  the  Imperial  debt,  we  find  that  all  expenditures  which 
might  in  any  way  be  productive  taken  together  are  less 
than  the  expenditure  on  a<rmaments  alone. 

In  view  of  all  these  circumstances  it  is  impossible  not 
to  conclude  that  a  great  European  war  would  move  Russia 
still  further  back  in  economic  relations,  it  may  be,  even 
for  a  prolonged  time.  And,  bearing  this  in  mind,  it  may 
well  be  asked  whether  even  the  most  successful  war  could 
result  in  sufficient  compensation  for  such  sacrifices. 

True,  facts  and  figures  demonstrate  that,  thanks  to  her 
immensity  and  to  the  nature  of  her  soil  and  climate, 
Russia  is  less  vulnerable  than  other  countries.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  with  her  vast  population,  her 
abundant  production  of  food  and  horses,  and  with  in- 
dustries guaranteeing  the  equipment  of  her  army,  Russia 
might  carry  on  a  defensive  war  for  a  long  time.  Even 
financial,  conditions  would  not  operate  disadvantageously 
at  first,  for  Russia  has  for  a  long  time  been  accustomed 
to  the  circulation  of  paper  money.  All  these  are  plainly 
advantages  for  Russia  in  a  defensive  war  against  countries 
enjoying  a  higher  degree  of  culture,  possessed  of  great 
industries  and  trade,  but  which,  through  deficient  pro- 
duction of  corn  for  the  feeding  of  their  populations,  could 
not  carry  on  war  for  years,  as  would  certainly  be  possible 
for  Russia. 

But  in  an  offensive  war  these  factors,  which  constitute 
an  advantage  for  Russia  in  defence,  would  be  turned  into 
disadvantages. 


IN  RUSSIA  247 

From  detailed  investigation  of  the  economic  condition  of 
different  districts  of  Russia,  we  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  however  sensibly  she  were  to  feel  the  occupation  by 
an  enemy  of  her  frontier  provinces,  such  occupation  could 
not  produce  any  decided  result.  The  opposition  of  Russia 
could  not  be  broken  at  once,  even  by  the  irruption  of 
innumerable  forces.  In  the  extreme  case  of  the  Russian 
armies  experiencing  such  defeats  as  to  expose  the  capitals, 
the  vastness  of  the  country  and  the  immensity  of  its 
population  would  supply  the  means  for  continuing  the 
struggle.  The  fragments  of  her  defeated  forces,  retreating 
to  distant  centres  of  population,would  form  the  nuclei  of  new 
armies,  and  the  struggle  would  burst  out  again  with  fresh 
fierceness — and  that  in  the  very  moment  when  the  weak- 
ened and  exhausted  invaders  were  compelled  to  retreat. 

But  it  must  not  be  assumed  from  this  that  victory,  by 
means  of  pursuing  the  invaders  and  carrying  the  war  into 
their  own  country,  would  be  an  easy  task.  Pursuit  would 
have  to  be  carried  on  through  the  ruined  districts  of  Russia 
into  the  exhausted  territory  of  the  enemy  ;  while  for  the 
successful  carrying  on  of  an  offensive  war  new  armaments, 
war  material  generally,  would  be  required,  and,  above 
all,  armies  would  have  to  be  supplied  exclusively  from 
purchased  provisions. 

To  this  would  have  to  be  added  financial  difficulties 
almost  impossible  to  be  overcome,  for  the  economic  per- 
turbations produced  by  war  would  be  of  such  gravity  as  to 
prevent  the  further  straining  of  the  national  resources. 

Russia,  has  now  within  the  country,  in  circulation  and 
on  deposit,  Government  securities  to  a  sum  of  two  and  a 
half  milliard  roubles  (;^ 3 7 5, 000, 000),  and  other  securities 
to  a  sum  of  1200  million  roubles  (;^  180,000,000).  On  the 
declaration  of  war  the  depreciation  of  these  securities  would 
entail  a  loss  of  iioo  millions  of  roubles  (;^  165,000,000).  It 
is  obvious  that  the  issue  of  new  Government  loans  to  pro- 
vide for  the  immediate  necessities  of  war  would  be  impos- 
sible. From  this  would  inevitably  result  the  issue  of  paper 
money  in  immense  quantities. 

The  history  of  past  wars  of  Russia  can  give  no  idea  of 


248  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  economic  perturbations  which  would  be  caused  by  war 
to  day,  in  view  of  the  vastness  of  the  army  and  the  com- 
plexity and  costliness  of  all  military  apparatus.  The 
occupation  by  an  enemy  of  the  Western  and  Southern 
provinces,  now  in  the  most  satisfactory  economic  con- 
dition, and  the  interruption  of  internal  communications, 
would  have  a  tremendous  effect  on  the  receipt  of  the 
ordinary  Imperial  revenues.  Even  the  war  of  18 12 
cannot  be  compared  with  the  irruption  into  Russia  of 
armies  counted  by  millions,  while  the  need  for  money 
in  the  present  composition  of  the  army  would  be  unpre- 
cedented. It  is  enough  to  repeat  that  for  the  satisfaction 
of  military  requirements  in  a  state  of  war,  under  present 
conditions,  Russia  would  be  compelled  to  spend  daily 
about  seven  millions  of  roubles  (;f  1,050,000). 

As  we  have  pointed  out  (in  the  section  devoted  to 
"Plans  of  Military  Activity"),  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
admit  that  a  war  with  Russia  could  be  decided  in  less 
than  two  years.  For  such  a  war  lasting  two  years  five 
milliards  would  be  required  (;^7 50,000,000).  The  late 
N.  K.  Bunge,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  declared 
that  if  credit  notes  were  issued  for  300  million  roubles 
(;^45,ooo,ooo)  their  value  would  fall  25  kopecks  the 
rouble  (that  is,  one-fourth).  With  the  issue  of  paper 
money  in  a  quantity  seventeen  times  greater  it  is  quite 
impossible  to  see  the  extent  of  depreciation.  It  is  very 
probable,  however,  that  depreciation  would  reach  the  same 
level  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  century — that  is, 
that  paper  money  issued  for  the  carrying  on  of  war  would 
be  depreciated  by  three-fourths  of  its  nominal  value. 
Under  such  circumstances  even  the  estimated  five  milliards 
might  prove  insufficient. 

The  prices  of  all  things  would  rise,  and  the  Treasury, 
receiving  taxes  in  depreciated  credit  notes,  would  pay  a 
higher  price  for  everything ;  the  maintenance  of  the  army 
and  of  the  fleet  would  require  immense  outlays.  A  con- 
siderable part  of  the  population  of  towns  and  all  serving 
in  the  army  and  in  the  civil  service  would  suffer  from 
extreme  privation. 


IN  RUSSIA  249 

At  the  moment  of  the  declaration  of  war  the  whole 
export  of  agricultural  products  will  cease.  A  sudden  fall 
of  prices  will  ensue,  with  a  proportionate  diminution  in 
the  incomes  both  of  landowners  and  of  peasants.  These 
phenomena  will  be  accompanied  by  fluctuations  in  prices, 
for  the  standard  of  prices  has  always  been  determined  by 
export,  which  will  cease.  When  the  only  regulator  of 
prices  will  be  internal  competition  those  districts  will  be 
in  the  best  position  where  competition  in  trade  is  most 
highly  developed,  as  is  the  case  in  the  Metropolitan, 
Northern,  Southern  and  South-Western  provinces  and 
also  in  the  Southern  provinces,  and  in  the  worst  position 
those  where  trade  is  to  a  great  extent  a  monopoly. 

In  addition  to  the  economic  shock,  recovery  from  which 
will  take  years,  many  material  and  moral  factors  which 
we  have  examined  in  detail,  which  have  little  visible 
effect  in  times  of  peace,  will  in  the  revolution  which 
war  causes  have  grave  significance. 

All  of  which  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  war  for 
Russia,  whatever  might  be  its  issue,  could  not  be  less 
ruinous,  although  from  other  causes,  than  for  her  enemies. 
But  this  conclusion  is  not  enough.  A  consideration 
from  all  points  of  view  of  the  influences  which  war  might 
exert  on  the  economic  condition  of  the  country,  leads  to  a 
conviction  not  less  important — that  is,  that  a  decrease  of 
expenditure  on  preparations  for  war  is  no  less,  and  it  may 
be  even  more,  unavoidable  in  Russia  than  in  other 
European  states. 

The  conversion  to  productive  purposes  of  a  part  of  the 
outlay  now  fruitlessly  devoted  to  armaments — since  there 
is  not  even  a  probability  of  war  breaking  out — is  the  first 
interest  of  the  people,  and  is  essential  for  the  development 
of  the  vital  forces  of  the  country.  These  forces  are 
needed  by  Russia  for  the  carrying  on  of  a  successful 
struggle,  not  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  with  her  economic 
backwardness  and  the  poverty  and  ignorance  of  her 
people.  Progress  in  her  internal  life,  and  the  develop- 
ment of  productive  forces  are  far  more  necessary  for 
Russia,   which,   even  in    the   case  of  war,   would,   in   all 


2  50  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

probability,  at  first  have  to  content  herself  with  defensive 
operations,  than  the  increase  of  armed  hordes  and  the 
accumulation  of  implements  and  munitions  of  destruction. 
But  if,  even  in  times  of  peace,  we  find  all  possible 
preparations  made,  so  that  the  country  in  time  of  war 
shall  in  no  respect  be  behind  its  enemies,  how  much  more 
necessary  is  it  to  prepare  to  meet  those  perturbations  and 
difficulties  of  every  kind  which  will  be  caused  by  war  in 
the  economic  position  of  the  country. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE  ECONOMIC  DIFFICULTIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

IN  TIME  OF  WAR 

A  GREAT  European  war  must  react  disastrously  on  the 
economic  condition  of  Great  Britain  even  in  the  event  of 
her  taking  no  part  in  that  war.  The  interruption  of 
maritime  communications  will  affect  disastrously,  it  may 
be  even  fatally,  the  industries  of  the  country  and  the 
feeding  of  her  population.  The  immense  development  of 
British  industry  is  calculated  upon  access  to  the  markets 
of  the  whole  w^orld,  and  relies  upon  the  uninterrupted 
export  of  products.  In  England  every  cessation  of  export 
means  a  stoppage  of  work,  involving  the  withdrawal  of 
the  means  of  subsistence  from  the  greater  part  of  her 
population.  The  production  of  wheat  in  that  country, 
notwithstanding  the  increase  in  the  population,  has 
steadily  diminished,  diminished  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
stoppage  of  the  import  of  wheat  into  England  would 
threaten  the  whole  population  with  famine. 


I. — Deficiency  of  Production. 

The  diminution  in  the  area  devoted  to  the  raising  of 
grain  in  England  may  be  illustrated  by  the  following 
figures : 


252 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


In  Thousands  of  Hectares. 

(English  Equivalents,  in  Parentheses,  in  Thousands 

of  Acres.) 

Year. 

Area  devoted  to 

Under                          rr  .  1 

Raising  Grain. 

Meadow. 

J.Ulill. 

1875             .            .            . 

7330 

5389 

12,719 

(18,325) 

(13,473) 

(31,798) 

1880 

7156 

5841 

12,997 

(17,890) 

(14,603) 

(32,493) 

1885            .           .           . 

6964 

62II 

13,175 

(17,410) 

(15,528) 

.    (32,938) 

1890 

6782 

6485 

13,267 

(16,955) 

(16,213) 

(33,168) 

1895             .           .           . 

6464 

6725 

13,189 

(16,160) 

(16,813) 

(32,973) 

Thus  the  area  of  land  devoted  to  agriculture  in  twenty 
years  increased  to  the  insignificant  amount  of  1175  thou- 
sands of  acres.  And  not  only  does  all  this  increase  come 
under  meadow,  but  under  meadow  we  also  find  2250 
thousands  of  acres,  that  is,  almost  one-eighth  part  of  the 
land  formerly  devoted  to  tillage. 

The  average  harvests  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  recent 
years  are  shown  in  thousands  of  quarters  in  the  following 
table : 


Crop. 

1893. 

1894. 

1895. 

Average 
1893-95. 

Oats      . 

21,074 

23,858 

21,810 

22,247 

Barley  . 

8,218 

9,825 

9,378 

9,140 

Wheat  . 

6,364 

7,588 

4,786 

6,246 

Beans    . 

608 

900 

703 

737 

Peas 

594 

779 

591 

655 

The  average  yearly  harvest,  expressed  in  kilogrammes 
is  shown  by  the  following  figures : 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


253 


Oats  . 

282,537  thousand  kilos. 

Barley 

116,078             „ 

Wheat 

79.324 

Beans 

9.360             „ 

Peas  . 

8,319 

The  import  into  England  of  bread  stuffs  is  shown  in 
thousands  of  kilogrammes  in  the  following  table : 


1890. 

1893. 

1894. 

Average. 

Grain — 

Wheat   . 

768,020 

831.367 

890,600 

829,996 

Barley    . 

211,811 

290,119 

396,761 

299.563 

Oats 

161,633 

177,228 

190.233 

176,365 

Maize     . 

551,662 

417.855 

449.136 

472,884 

Others   . 

74.511 

89.954 

110,198 

91.554 

Flour — 

Wheaten 

200,317 

259,182 

243,014 

234.171 

Others   . 

8,420 

8.395 

9.830 

8,882 

Total . 

i»976,374 

2,074,100 

2,289,772 

2,113.415 

This  table,  in  thousands  of  English  quarters  (reckoning 
I  kilogramme  as  equal  to  22  lbs.),  would  be  as  follows : 


1890. 

1893. 

1894. 

Average. 

Grain — 

Wheat 

60,344.4 

65,321.70 

69,976 

65,214 

Barley 

16,642.2 

22,795.07 

31,174-1 

23,537-13 

Oats  . 

12,699.7 

13,925.06 

14,946.9 

13,857-22 

Maize 

43,345-1 

32,831-50 

35,289.3 

37,155-3 

Others 

5.854-6 

7,067.90 

8,658.4 

7,193-7 

Flour — 

Wheaten  . 

15.739-2 

20,364.30 

19,094 

18,399.2 

Others 

662.0 

659.00 

772-3 

697.8 

Total      . 

155,287.2 

162,964.53 

179,911 

166,054.35 

254         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

From  this  table  it  is  seen  that  the  import  of  bread  stuffs 
to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  population  continually 
grows.  The  import  of  wheat  is  more  than  ten  times 
greater  than  the  home  growth :  of  oats  alone  the  home 
production  exceeds  the  import  in  the  proportion  of  three 
to  two.  If  we  calculate  the  number  of  days  on  which 
bread  would  be  lacking  in  England  if  she  were  forced  to 
rely  alone  upon  her  own  harvests,  it  will  appear  that 
England  would  be  without  wheat  for  333  days,  with- 
out barley  for  263  days,  and  without  oats  for  140 
days. 

A  more  favourable  result  is  obtained  by  a  comparison 
of  the  growth  and  import  of  potatoes.  The  growth  approxi- 
mately expressed  in  thousands  of  tons  amounts  to 


1893 6541 

1894 4662 

1895 7065 


Average 


6089 


The   import   of  potatoes   is   shown   by  the   following 
figures : 


In  1893 
In  1894 


142  thousand  tons. 
135        ».  » 


As  concerns  meat,  England  is  still  less  dependent  on 
products  from  abroad.  The  number  of  head  of  cattle  and 
sheep  imported  into  England  is  shown  by  the  following 
table : 


Cattle. 

Sheep. 

1880 . 

.   389,724 

941,121 

1885 . 

•   373,078 

750,886 

1890  . 

•   642,596 

358,458 

1893  .     . 

•   340*045 

62,682 

1894 . 

•   475,440 

484,597 

In  addition  to  this,  England  imports  a  quantity  of  carcases 
here  set  out  in  thousands  of  hundredweights  : 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


255 


1891. 

1893. 

1894. 

Average. 

Bacon    .... 
Beef      .... 
Salt,  and  other  sorts  of 

5000 
2129 

4187 
2008 

4819 
2346 

4669 
2161 

fresh  meat 
Meat  dried  and  in  pre- 

1760 

2149 

2484 

213I 

serve 
Fresh  pork     . 

735 
300 

561 
369 

554 
405 

627 
358 

In  order  to  illustrate  the  relation  between  the  import 
and  production  of  meat  in  England,  we  give  the  following 
totals,  it  being  understood  that,  following  the  general 
principle,  ten  sheep  or  pigs  or  fifteen  hundredweight  of 
meat  are  considered  as  a  head  of  cattle. 

The  number  of  cattle  held  in  England  are  presented  by 
the  following  tables : 

Horned  Cattle. 
In  Thousands. 


In 

Thousands. 

Cows  ...                     ... 

Horned  cattle  of  two  years  and  over 
,,             ,,       from    one    to    two 

2,486 
1,432 

years  . 
„             „      less  than  one  year 

1,190 
1,247 

Sheep  and  rams   one  year  old  and 

over 15,997 

Lambs 9,795 


6,355     =     6,355 


Pigs 


25,792     =     2,579 

2,884     =        288 


9,222 


By  this  process  of  reducing  all  stock  to  units  we  find 
that  England  possessed  in  1895,  9222  thousand  head  of 
native  cattle.  The  import  into  England  in  1894  was  523 
thousand  head  of  living  cattle,  and  10,608  thousand 
hundredweight   of  meat   of  different  sorts,  representing 


256 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


707  thousand  head  of  cattle.  That  is  to  say,  the  import 
into  England  amounted  to  1230  thousand  head  of  cattle, 
or  13  per  cent,  of  the  number  in  the  country. 


Number  of  Native  and  Imported  Cattle  in  England  in  Thousands 

of  Heads. 


Native. 


Imported. 


9222 


1894 


1230 


From  this  it  appears  that  as  far  as  the  supply  of  meat 
is  concerned  England  would  be  guaranteed,  even  in  the 
event  of  import  being  interrupted ;  but  prices  would  rise 
immensely,  as  English  cattle  is  very  valuable,  and  meat  in 
that  country  is  dear  even  at  the  present  day. 

Of  other  products  for  which  the  raising  of  cattle  is 
necessary,  England  requires  yearly : 


In  Thousands  of  Hundredweights. 

Average. 

1890. 

1893. 

1894. 

Butter      .... 

Margarine 

Cheese     .... 

Tallow      .... 

2028 
1080 
2144 
1273 

2327 
1300 
2077 
II18 

2595 
1 109 
2266 
I4OI 

2310 
1 163 
2162 
1264 

With  such  an  immense  demand  it  will  be  no  easy  task 
to  supply  the  interrupted  import  by  increased  internal 
output.  In  these  respects  there  would  undoubtedly  arise 
great  difficulty  in  the  supply  of  the  population.  A  similar 
deficiency  would  exist  in  the  supply  of  various  colonial 
products.     England  imports : 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


257 


1890. 

1893. 

1894. 

! 

Average. 

Rice,  iniooo'sofcwts. 

5»957 

5'449 

5,194 

5,523 

Cocoa      ,,         lbs. 

28,112 

32.982 

39,116 

33,403 

Coffee      ,,        cwts. 

864 

827 

731 

807 

Tea          ,,         lbs. 

223,494 

249,546 

244,311 

239,117 

Sugar      ,,        cwts. 

9^977 

11,550 

13,945 

11,824 

Rawsilk  ,,           ,, 

15.717 

16,032 

14,306 

15,352 

Molasses,,           „ 

563 

585 

853 

667 

Glucose  ,,           ,, 

737 

1,236 

1,062 

1,012 

Rum        ,,        gals. 

6,238 

5,942 

6,123 

6,101 

Cognac   ,,           ,, 

3,100 

2,739 

3,402 

3,080 

Other      spirituous 

drinks     (colonial 

and    foreign),   in 

thousands  of  gals. 

3,375 

2,182 

2,495 

2,684 

Wine  (in  ditto) 

16,194 

14.675 

14,369 

15,079 

A  clearer  picture  is  presented  by  the  following  table, 
which  shows  the  average  consumption  per  inhabitant  of 
the  United  Kingdom  of  imported  articles  of  food  and 
drink : 


Imported  Products. 

1892. 
14.10 

1893. 

1894. 

Bacon 

(in  lbs.) 

11-73 

13.29 

Beef,  fresh  and  salted 

5, 

6.70 

5-68 

6-59 

Smoked  and  preserved  meat ,, 

2.10 

1-55 

1.49 

Mutton,  fresh  . 

>» 

4.99 

5-74 

6.62 

Pork,  fresh  and  salt 

)» 

0.98 

1.03 

1. 12 

Butter  and  margarine 

,, 

6.23 

6-59 

7.27 

Margarine 

», 

3.80 

3.75 

3-17 

Cheese     . 

), 

6.39 

5.87 

6.38 

Cocoa 

»» 

0.55 

0.54 

0.58 

Coffee 

», 

0.74 

0.69 

0.69 

Wheat  in  grain 

,, 

180.40 

188.82 

201.48 

Wheaten  flour 

J» 

64.36 

58.83 

54-71 

Currants  and  raisins 

,, 

4-58 

5-02 

4.90 

Eggs         .         .         .        (] 

Qumber) 

35-03 

34-39 

36.68 

Potatoes  . 

(in  lbs.) 

8.71 

8.14 

7.68 

Rice 

,, 

8.91 

8.54 

7.26 

Sugar,  raw 

,, 

47.22 

45-68 

40.17 

1 

R 


258 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Import'fd  Product-i. 

1892. 

1893. 

1894. 

Sugar,  refined .         .           (in  lbs.) 

30.62 

3317 

3989 

Tea 

5-43 

541 

5-52 

Tobacco  .         .         .         .       ,» 

1.64 

1.63 

1.66 

Wine        .         .         .    (in  gallons) 

0.38 

037 

0.36 

Spirituous  liquors    .              ,, 

0.21 

0.20 

0.20 

Wine  and  strong  drinks 

together  (imported)      .     ,, 

1.04 

0.98 

0.97 

II. — Fall  of  Wages  and  Incomes. 

In  England  the  cost  of  the  first  necessaries  of  life  is 
high,  and  the  means  for  obtaining  them  constantly 
diminish. 

The  population  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  engaged  in 
the  following  occupations,  per  thousand  of  the  population 
of  all  ages : 


England 

United 
Kingdom. 

and 
Wales. 

Scotland. 

Ireland. 

Liberal  professions 

32 

28 

44 

33 

Domestic  service  . 

66 

50 

51 

62 

Trade    .... 

48 

45 

20 

44 

Agriculture    and    fish- 

eries .... 

46 

62 

200 

67 

Industry 

253 

256 

140 

239 

Without   settled   occu- 

pation 

555 

559 

545 

555 

1000 

1000 

1000 

1000 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  question  we  will  present 
these  figures  graphically. 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


259 


Classification  by  Occupation  of  1000  of  the  Population  of 
Great  Britain. 


Free    Pro- 
fessions 


Domestic 
Service 


Trade 


Agriculiure 

and 

Fisheries 


Industry 


Without 

settled 

Occupation 


33 


62 


44 


67 


239 


555 


The  existence  of  an  income  tax  in  England  has  resuhed 
in  the  compiling  of  precise  statistics  which  give  some  idea 
of  the  pertm'bation  which  war  would  cause.  We  quote 
here  some  of  the  more  apposite  figures.  The  yearly 
value  of  the  real  estate,  capital  and  earnings  subject  to 
this  tax  is  shown  in  pounds  sterling  in  the  following 
table : 


England 
Scotland 
Ireland  . 

United  Kingdom 


;^6o2,388,69g 
65,188,840 
38,553'336 

;^7o6,i3o,875 


Out  of  this  total  of  706  millions  sterling,  263  millions 
arise  from  the  possession  or  lease  of  land  and  immovable 
property,  91  millions  from  pensions  and  salaries,  and  the 
remaining  352  millions  from  industrial  and  professional 
occupations. 


26o 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Distribution  of  the  Income  of  the  Population  of  England  in 
Millions  of  Pounds  Sterling. 


From  Land 

and  Immovable 

Estate. 


Fiom  Pensions 

and 
Salaries. 


From  Pro- 
fessions and 
Industries. 


263 


91 


352 


These  figures  be^r  eloquent  testimony  to  the  tremendous 
economic  earthquake  which  war  and  the  resulting  decrease 
and  even  stoppage  of  industrial  activity  would  create  in 
England.  On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  reser\-es  of  money  are  greater  in  England  than 
anywhere  else ;  the  whole  public  debt  is  placed  inside  the 
country,  and  an  immense  total  of  foreign  values  is  held. 

But  a  ver}'  grave  circumstance  presents  itself  in  the 
fact  that  these  resources  are  in  the  hands  of  a  ver}^  small 
number  of  persons.  Precise  statistics  as  to  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  public  debt  of  Great  Britain  are  available 
only  up  to  i88o.  But  these  statistics  show  that  the 
number  of  persons  who  receive  interest  on  the  public  debt 
are : 


£ 

In  1855. 

In  1880. 

Up  to      5          .         . 

83.877 

71.756 

„          lO           .          . 

38,129 

32.662 

50 

82.426 

67,068 

„       100 

21.978 

17456 

M             200 

12.418 

9.439 

»             300 

3.501 

2,655 

»             500 

2,342 

1,966 

„       ICXX) 

1,051 

990 

,,     2000 

299 

356 

Over  2000 

145 

217 

246,166 


204,575 


Thus  we  find  that  the  number  of  proprietors  of  consols 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


261 


has  increased  only  in  the  two  highest  categories,  and  in 
all  the  lower  has  decreased.  It  may  be  assumed  that  this 
phenomenon  continues  the  same  to-day. 


¥ 


The  sums  deposited  in  the  Post  Office 

Savings  Bank  amounted  to  . 
In  Savings  Banks  .         .         .         . 

Total 

The  number  of  depositors  is : 

In  the  Post  Office  Savings  Bank 
In  Savings  Banks 

Total 


;^8g,266,o66 
43,474,904 

^^132,740,904 


6,108,763 
1,470,946 


7.579.709 


State  of  Savings  in  Great  Britain  in  1895. 


Depositors  in  Millions. 


Deposits  in  Millions  of  Pounds  Sterling. 


7.6 


1894 


132.7 


However  it  ma}'  be,  the  distribution  of  riches  in  England 
is  more  unequal  than  in  any  other  country.  Even  in  time 
of  peace,  with  normal  conditions,  the  state,  various  philan- 
thropic institutions  and  societies  are  forced  to  give  monetary 
assistance  to  a  considerable  part  of  the  population  to  an 
extent  unheard  of  among  the  peoples  of  the  Continent. 
The  following  figures  relating  to  January  1895  show  the 
number  of  poor  receiving  help  (w^ith  the  exception  of 
tramps)  from  the  Boards  of  Guardians : 


England  and  Wales 
Scotland    . 
Ireland 


Total 


817431 
126,918 
101,071 

1,045,420 


The  danger  in  the  event  of  a  great  economic  upheaval 
is  all  the  greater  since  the  unquiet  elements  crowd  into 


262  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  cities,  and  the  population  of  the  towns  in  Great 
Britain  exceeds  the  population  of  the  country,  at  the 
expense  of  which  they  constantly  grow,  as  is  shown  by 
the  statistics  relating  to  Scotland,  where  in  the  decade 
1881-91  the  urban  population  increased  by  324,446,  and 
the  village  population  by  17,952,  while  the  country  popula- 
tion decreased  by  52,324. 

It  is  impossible  owing  to  the  absence  of  statistics  to 
show  in  similar  form  the  change  in  the  distribution  of  the 
population  of  the  entire  United  Kingdom.  But  there  is 
sufficient  indication  that  the  position  there  is  similar  to 
that  of  Scotland.  In  England  and  Wales  in  1891  the 
country  population  consisted  of  8, 198,248  souls,  that  is  to 
say,  only  28.3  per  cent,  of  the  whole,  while  the  urban 
population  consisted  of  71  7  per  cent.  Thus  two-thirds 
of  the  population  of  Great  Britain  resides  within  towns. 
In  addition  to  that  it  must  be  noted  that  the  proportion  of 
women  to  men  in  towns  is  7  per  cent,  greater  than  in  the 
country,  and  it  is  well  known  that  in  times  of  crises  women 
constitute  the  least  tranquil  element. 

Statistics  show  that  in  the  towns  of  England  is  crowded 
an  immense  number  who  do  not  wish  to  work,  and  a  still 
greater  number  who  cannot  find  work.  To  this  idle 
crowd  will  join  the  workers  discharged  from  factories  and 
workshops  on  the  shortening  of  work.  An  approximate 
idea  may  be  formed  of  their  number  by  the  fact  that 
in  the  weaving  industry  alone  1,084,000  persons  are 
employed,  in  the  number  being  428,000  men  and  656,000 
women. 

The  majority  of  this  working  class  is  engaged  in 
factories,  of  which  the  largest  group  constitutes  cotton- 
spinning,  weaving,  and  printing.  It  is  this  work  which 
must  cease  in  the  event  of  the  interruption  of  the  import 
of  material  by  sea.  Bankruptcy  in  industrial  circles  will 
inevitably  appear,  as  such  factories  are  not  guaranteed  by 
sufficient  reserves  of  capital. 

The  system  of  joint-stock  companies  in  recent  times  has 
made  possible  an  immense  development  of  trade  and 
industry.     In  the  report  of  the  Commission  appointed  by 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  263 

the  Board  of  Trade  the  number  of  joint-stock  companies 
on  the  1st  of  April,  1894,  is  given  as  18,361,  with  a  total 
capital  of  ;^i, 035, 029,835,  while  in  France  the  total  capital 
of  such  companies  is  ;^420,OC)0,C)00  only,  and  in  Germany 
from  ;^20o,ooo,ooo  to  ^"300,000,000. 


III. — Conclusions. 

If  the  waters  which  wash  the  British  Isles  ensure  a 
greater  security  than  the  frontiers  of  the  Continent,  never- 
theless they  place  the  country  in  direct  dependence  from 
uninterrupted  and  regular  maritime  communication.  The 
immense  fleet  of  Great  Britain,  although  guarding  her 
against  the  attacks  of  an  enemy,  cannot  guarantee  the 
security  of  her  merchant  vessels  in  all  the  w^aters  of  the 
world.  A  few  swift  cruisers  would  be  enough  to  interrupt 
the  maritime  trade  of  Great  Britain.  And  with  the 
immense  development  of  English  industry,  and  the  insuffi- 
cient local  production  of  food  stuffs,  the  stoppage  of 
maritime  communications  would  threaten  England  with 
stoppage  of  work,  would  involve  a  great  rise  in  the  price 
of  provisions,  and  terminate  in  famine. 

In  such  events  attempts  even  at  revolution  are  probable, 
all  the  more  probable  because  the  British  army  is  small, 
recruited  from  the  lowest  ranks  of  the  population  and 
composed  of  hired  soldiers.  In  the  English  army  cases 
of  general  insubordination  have  been  by  no  means 
rare. 

In  addition  to  this,  a  considerable  agitation  in  England 
is  carried  on  against  the  burdens  enforced  on  the  popula- 
tion by  the  army  needed  for  the  preservation  of  British 
power  in  subject  countries,  and  more  particularly  by  the 
gigantic  fleet.  Yet  the  expenditure  on  armaments  con- 
tinually grows,  as  the  following  table  shows : 

1864-5  •  •  •  •  ;^25,28l,000 

1874-5        ....         25,779,000 

1884-5  ,        •         •         •         •  27,000,000 

1894-5        ....         35,449,000 


264 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Expenditure  of  England  on  Armed  Forces  in  Millions  0/  Pounds 

Sterling. 


In  1864-5 


In  1874-5 


In  1884-5 


In  1894-5 


25.3 


25. 


8 


27., 


35.4 


Thus  in  the  ten  years  period  1 884-1 894  the  expenditure 
on  armaments  has  increased  by  ;f  8,449,000  steding.  In 
addition  to  this  a  yearly  expenditure  of  ;^  18,000,000 
represents  the  result  of  former  wars,  and  agitators  lose 
no  opportunity  of  calling  attention  to  it.  In  1727,  at  the 
death  of  George  I.  the  public  debt,  increased  in  con- 
sequence of  the  Spanish  war,  stood  at  ;^5 2, 500,000,  and 
the  interest  at  ^2,360,000.  In  1775,  before  the  war  with 
the  American  colonies,  the  debt  was  ;^  126,000,000  capital, 
and  ;^4, 650,000  interest.  This  vast  increase  was  the 
consequence  of  another  war  with  Spain  over  the  right 
claimed  by  England  of  searching  merchant  ships,  after- 
wards of  a  war  with  France  over  the  Austrian  legacy,  and 
finally  from  the  action  she  took  during  the  Seven  Years 
War.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  second  of  these 
wars  England  helped  Maria  Theresa  against  Frederick  II., 
and  in  the  last  Frederick  II.  against  Maria  Theresa. 

In  1792,  before  the  beginning  of  the  long  war  with" 
France,  the  public  debt  of  England  amounted  to 
^237,400,000,  paying  interest  at  ;^9, 300,000,  an  increase 
mainly  resulting  from  the  war  with  her  North  American 
Colonies.  And  this  war  in  reality  was  caused  because 
the  proprietorial  classes   in    England,   predominating   in 


IN  GREAT  BRITAIN  265 

Parliament,  desired  to  shift  the  burden  of  increasing 
taxation  upon  the  shoulders  of  others. 

In  1816-— that  is,  the  year  after  the  battle  of  Waterloo — 
the  debt  of  England  amounted  to  ;^846,ooo,ooo  in  capital, 
with  yearly  interest  of  ;^ 3 2, 100,000. 

The  war  with  France  which  cost  such  immense  sums 
arose  from  the  interference  of  England  in  the  struggle 
against  the  French  Revolution,  in  which  the  propertied 
classes  who  ruled  England  saw  a  danger  to  their  privileges 
and  to  their  exploitation  of  the  whole  country.  The  duty 
on  imported  corn  set  in  time  of  war  was  kept  in  force  by 
the  landlord  class  even  after  the  end  of  the  war,  mainly  in 
order  to  sustain  the  high  price  of  corn,  and  in  consequence 
the  high  incomes  from  their  property. 

In  1854,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Crimean  war,  the  debt 
of  England  had  decreased  to  ^794,713,000  capital,  paying 
a  yearly  interest  of  ;^25, 662,000.  In  1856,  on  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  it  had  risen  to  ;^826,ooo,ooo  capital, 
with  ;£"2 5, 545,000  interest.  This  war  also  was  waged  in 
no  way  in  the  interests  of  the  English  people.  Finally,  in 
1893  the  debt  of  England  (not  including  the  value  of  her 
shares  in  the  Suez  Canal)  amounted  to  ;^65 8,944,000 
capital,  paying  an  interest  of  ^18,302,000. 

From  the  above  statistics  it  is  shown  that  as  long  as 
the  aristocracy  carried  on  war  itself,  and  bore  the 
expenses,  a  public  debt  did  not  exist.  Afterwards,  thanks 
to  its  numerical  preponderance  in  Parliament,  it  sucaeeded 
in  managing  so  that,  however  great  might  be  the 
expenditure  of  the  state,  the  sum  of  tax  from  the  land 
should  not  exceed  two  million  pounds  yearly ;  the  debt 
began  to  rise,  and  war  after  war  followed.  These  wars 
were  directly  advantageous  to  the  aristocracy,  as  they 
increased  employment  in  the  army,  and  in  addition 
resulted  in  raising  the  price  of  corn. 


CHAPTER    III 

ECONOMIC    DIFFICULTIES    OF    GERMANY    IN 
TIME   OF   WAR 

In  order  to  explain  the  economic  and  social  consequences 
which  would  result  from  war  in  Germany,  it  is  necessary 
first  to  examine  the  distribution  of  the  population  accord- 
ing to  occupation,  the  height  of  incomes,  and  probability 
of  savings,  and  then  to  consider  how  a  war  would  shorten 
demands,  decrease  the  sale  of  products,  and  in  consequence 
cause  stagnation  in  industry. 

We  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  interruption  of 
land  and  sea  communications  must  cause  an  immense  rise 
in  the  price  of  agricultural  products,  particularly  in  indus- 
trial districts.  And  as  at  the  same  time  work  will  cease, 
the  danger  of  disaster  will  be  great.  To  a  certain  extent 
government  aid  may  be  relied  upon.  But  whether  this 
will  be  effective  or  not  depends  upon  the  gravity  of  the 
crisis  produced  by  war. 

The  question  as  to  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  life  con- 
cerns only  those  classes  which  are  imperfectly  guaranteed 
— that  is,  to  those  with  insufficient  and  moderate  incomes  ; 
the  wealthy  class  will  always  be  safe  as  regards  the  neces- 
saries of  life. 

The  following  table  represents  the  distribution  of  the 
population  by  occupation  in  1882  : 

Percentage 

of  the 
Population. 

«    (Agriculture      ....     40.75 
'  {Arboriculture ....      0.65 

41.40 


IN  GERMANY 


267 


I  Mining    . 
Building. 
Manufacture  . 
Communications 
Transport 


Percentage 

of  the 
Population. 

2.96 
6.08 

24-93 
3.16 

2-95 


III.     Trade 5.27 

Engaged   in   medical,  educa- 
tional, and  religious  pursuits       i  .65 
Administration        .         .         .1.45 
Military 1.17 


40.08 
5.27 


IV. 


V.     In  service        ....      4.30 
VI.     Without  regular  occupation  ,      4.67 

Thus  we  have  six  main  classes  as  follows 


I. 

II. 
III. 


Per  Cent. 
41.40 
40.08 

5-27 


IV. 

V. 

VI. 


4.27 

4-30 
4.67 


Per  Cent. 

4.27 

4-30 
4.67 


The  effect  on  the  first  of  these  classes  will  be  compara- 
tively small.  But  owing  to  the  bonds  joining  to  a  certain 
extent  all  classes  of  the  population,  the  crisis  called  forth 
by  war  may  in  the  course  of  time  react  even  upon  the 
agricultural  population.  The  first  consequence  of  the  rise 
in  prices  will  be  an  increase  in  the  income  of  this  class  of 
the  population.  Part  of  the  agricultural  labourers  will  be 
taken  from  work,  but  these  may  be  replaced  by  contingents 
of  men  engaged  in  industry,  who  will  be  deprived  of  work 
in  consequence  of  the  shortening  of  production. 

The  fifth  class  is  also  comparatively  secure,  since  in 
consequence  of  mobilisation  a  deficiency  of  such  will 
arise. 

The  third  class,  engaged  in  trade,  may  also  be  regarded 
as  secured,  since  war,  while  lessening  certain  forms  of 
activity,  will  give  rise  to  others.    But  individually,  members 


268  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

of  this  class  will  suffer  greatly.  As  the  crisis  entailed  by 
war  approaches  there  will  be  lessened  activity  in  trade, 
the  prices  of  goods  will  fall,  and  only  those  traders  who 
happen  to  have  reserves  of  products  required  for  the 
army,  or  products  the  import  of  which  will  be  stopped, 
will  draw  advantage.  Generally  speaking,  in  consequence 
of  sudden  changes  in  prices  immense  difficulties  will  arise 
in  trade. 

The  second  class — that  is,  those  engaged  in  industrial 
undertakings,  either  as  masters  or  servants — will  suffer  the 
most.  The  greater  part  of  this  class  is  composed  of 
persons  occupied  in  factory  work,  and  these  will  suffer 
immense  losses.  And  the  proportion  of  this  group  to  the 
general  population  of  Germany  is  very  considerable, 
amounting  to  40.08  per  cent.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  these  figures  relate  to  the  whole  of  Germany,  and 
that  in  various  parts  of  the  country  the  proportions  are 
very  different.     Occupied  in  agriculture  we  find  : 

In  Saxony     .         .     ig.7  per  cent,  of  the  population. 
In  Posen       .         .63.1  „  „  „ 

On  the  other  hand,  we  find  16  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion is  occupied  in  industries  in  one  province,  and  as 
much  as  62  per  cent,  in  others.  The  proportions  occupied 
in  trade  in  difterent  parts  of  the  country,  excluding  the 
great  centres,  fluctuate  between  57  and  1 1  per  cent. 

It  will  be  understood  that  the  greater  the  proportion 
occupied  in  industry,  the  greater  the  crisis  caused  by  war. 
In  some  of  the  great  industrial  localities  the  stoppage  of 
work  may  cause  serious  disorders  such  as  happened  in 
June  1848,  and  March  1871  in  Paris. 

That  stagnation  and  inevitable  crisis  in  industry  will  be 
caused  by  war  is  inevitable,  for  certain  reasons.  The 
increase  in  the  price  of  provisions  in  consequence  of  the 
interruption  of  communications  will  immediately  diminish 
the  purchasing  resources  of  the  population.  On  the 
declaration  of  war  all  state,  commercial,  and  industrial 
securities   will   be   depreciated,  want   of    money  will   be 


IN  GERMANY  269 

seriously  felt,  and  the  rate  of  discount  will  be  raised. 
The  more  highly  developed  the  trade  and  industry,  the 
greater  will  be  the  perturbations  caused  and  the  more 
numerous  will  be  cases  of  failure.  Generally  speaking, 
not  only  will  the  credit  of  the  state,  but  the  credit  of 
all  private  individuals  in  all  classes  of  society,  be  im- 
paired. 

The  following  forms  of  industry  will  suffer  most  of  all : 


Working  and  manufacture  of  metals 

Machine  building        .         .         .         . 

Chemical  manufacture 

Spinning  and  weaving 

Leather  working  and  paper  making 

Manufacture  from  wood     . 

Building 

Preparation  of  clothing 


607,481 
94,807 

7i'777 
910,089 
221,688 
469,695 

533,511 
1,259,791 


Does  there  exist  among  the  German  working  classes 
such  savings  as  would  make  the  stoppage  of  work  called 
forth  by  war  unfelt  ?  The  accumulation  of  savings 
depends  upon  national  and  individual  character,  and  also 
upon  the  level  of  work  in  normal  times.  The  thrift  of  the 
Germans  is  unquestioned.  But  a  considerable  part  of  the 
population  receives  insignificant  wages,  which  only  satisfy 
their  daily  needs ;  and  among  this  class  there  can  hardly 
be  any  savings. 

The  existence  in  Prussia  of  an  income  tax,  and  the 
corresponding  statistics,  make  it  possible  to  judge  of  the 
distribution  of  income  among  the  population,  and  con- 
clusions drawn  from  Prussia  may  be  applied  approximately 
to  the  rest  of  Germany.  The  following  figures  relate  to 
the  year  1 890  : 

Proportion  of  the 

Population.  Average  Income. 

Incomes  insufficient     .  40.11  per  cent.  ...  197  m.  (;^9  17s.) 

„         small      .         .  54.05        „  ...  276  „    (7'i3  i6s.) 

„         moderate       .  4.81        ,,  ...  896  ,,    (;^44  i6s.) 

„        considerable           1.3        ,,  ...  2781  ,,    (;^i39  is.) 

Thus  we  see  that  40  per  cent,  of  the  population  belong 
to  the  necessitous  class,  while    54   per  cent,   have  small 


270  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

incomes,  and  are  hardly  in  a  position  to  save.  The 
average  income  of  an  individual  of  the  first  class  is  only 
1 97  marks  {£g  1 75.),  and  of  the  second  class  only  276  marks 
(;f  13  165.). 

For  the  more  precise  exposition  of  this  matter  let  us 
take  a  province  with  developed  industries.  The  following 
figures  relate  to  the  kingdom  of  Saxony.  In  1894  '-he 
number  of  persons  in  Saxony  receiving  incomes  was 
estimated  at  1,496,566.     The  number  of  these 

Who  did  not  pay  income  tax  was  only         .     85,849  or  5-7  % 

Having  incomes  under  600  m.  (;^3o)     .         .  633,929  ,,  424  ,, 

„                from  600  to  2200  m.  (;^i  10)   675,862  ,,  45.2  „ 

»                    „  2200  to  6300  „    (-^315)     79,928  „  5.3  „ 

The  incomes  of  the  population  of  Saxony  are  thus 
distributed  : 

From  landed  property  .     287  mill.  m.  (;^i4,35o,ooo)  or  22.5  % 
„      capital  .         .     220     „       „    (2" 1 1,000,000)  „    17.2    „ 

„      salary  and  wages     771     „       „    (;f38»550,ooo)  »   60.3   „ 

1278       „  „      (;^63, 900,000)    „        100     „ 

From  this  it  will  be  easily  seen  what  convulsions 
would  be  caused  by  the  stoppage  of  work.  The  following 
are  the  figures  relating  to  all  Germany.  The  general 
income  of  the  population  estimated  on  the  years  1893-94 
amounted  to  5,725,338,364  marks  (;£'286,266,9i8  4s.). 
This  income  was  distributed  as  follows  : 

Urban  population    .     3878  million  m.  (;^i93, 900,000)  or  68  % 
Country        „  .     1846        „       „    (;^92, 300,000)     „  32  „ 

In  1866  the  total  income  amounted  to  3,6oo,CX)0,000 
marks  (^£  1 80,000,000)  and  was  distributed  thus : 

Urban  population     .     1620  million  m.  (;^8 1,000,000)  or  45  % 
Country         „  .     1980         „       „  (-f 99, 000,000)  „   55  „ 

Thus,  when  in  1866  the  incomes  of  the  urban  popula- 
tion of  Germany  amounted  to  45  per  cent,  of  the  general 


IN  GERMANY  271 

income,  the  crisis  caused  by  war  affected  only  ;{^8 1,000,000 
of  the  income  of  the  people.  To-day  such  a  crisis  would 
threaten  an  income  of  ;^  193,900,000,  for  now  not  a  half 
but  two-thirds  of  the  general  income  proceeds  from 
industry  and  trade. 

All  this  indicates  a  position  by  no  means  favourable. 
But  it  is  improved  by  the  fact  that  the  amount  of  savings 
is  considerable.  Thus  in  Saxony  in  1893  the  number  of 
pass  books  issued  by  the  savings  banks  was  1,783,390. 
The  average  deposit  was  £iS  gs.  But  though  the 
existence  of  such  savings  is  favourable  as  an  economic 
phenomenon,  it  could  hardly  serve  to  stave  off  the  crisis 
naturally  resulting  from  war.  The  average  deposit, 
;^i8  9s.,  is  too  small.  In  addition,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  savings  banks  would  not  be  in  a  position  to 
meet  a  general  or  even  a  very  large  withdrawal  of 
deposits.  The  deposits  in  these  savings  banks  amount  to 
;f 32,900,000,  of  which  over  ^25,000,000  is  placed  on 
mortgage,  and  ;^63, 500,000  in  the  public  funds.  It  is 
obvious  that  to  realise  these  mortgages  in  a  short  time 
would  be  impossible,  while  state  securities  in  a  time  of 
war  could  only  be  sold  at  an  immense  loss.  The  associa- 
tions and  individuals  to  whom  the  remainder  of  the 
money  is  lent  would  not  be  able  in  a  moment  of  crisis 
to  repay  their  loans,  and  only  the  cash  in  the  offices  of 
the  savings  banks — that  is,  but  ;^3 50,000 — would  be  at 
the  disposal  of  the  depositors. 

It  is  very  necessary  to  note  that  in  those  industrial 
localities  where  the  stoppage  of  work  would  be  felt  most 
acutely,  the  Socialist  teaching  and  propaganda  are  most 
widely  spread. 

With  such  a  state  of  affairs,  what  could  the  govern- 
ment and  society  do  to  lessen  the  disaster  ?  A  certain 
number  of  hands  deprived  of  industrial  work  might  be 
turned  to  agriculture,  and  replace  the  agricultural 
labourers  summoned  to  the  colours.  But,  in  the  first 
place,  only  the  strongest  of  the  manufacturing  class  could 
turn  to  labour  in  the  field,  and  the  vast  majority  is  unfit 
for  such  work.     In  addition,  such  men  would  unwillingly 


272 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


take  to  field  labour,  all  the  more  so  because  the  treatment 
of  agricultural  labourers  in  Germany  is  inferior  to  that  to 
which  factory  hands  have  been  accustomed. 

To  organise  public  works  on  a  great  scale  is  a  difficult 
task.  And  the  ver}-  nature  of  such  works  by  which  the 
state  might  undertake  to  help  the  unemployed  is  by  no 
means  fit  for  all.  Public  works  require  either  great  physical 
strength  or  special  training.  And  workmen  who  have  beea 
engaged  in  weaving,  in  spinning,  or  in  the  manufacture  of 
chemicals  would,  for  the  greater  part,  be  incapable  of 
work  with  the  crowbar,  the  pickaxe  and  the  wheel- 
barrow. The  experience  of  Paris  in  1848  in  this  respect 
is  instructive.  When  workmen  formerly  engaged  in 
trades  which  required  only  attention  and  some  dexterity 
were  given  pickaxes  and  spades,  it  was  found  they  could 
not  stand  the  bent  position  of  the  body,  and  soon  had 
their  hands  raw  from  the  friction  of  the  tools.  The 
government  may  give  aid  to  the  families  of  soldiers  on 
service,  but  obviously  cannot  feed  the  whole  of  the 
unemployed  population. 

It  must  be  noted  that  in  German}',  in  the  number  of 
persons  receiving  incomes,  the  proportion  of  women  is 
very  considerable.  Out  of  every  thousand  persons 
occupied  in  industry,  trade  and  manufacture  respectively, 
176,  190,  and  312  are  women.  The  number  of  women  is 
especially  great  in  the  lower  and  ill-paid  forms  of  work. 
The  greater  part  of  the  women  are  engaged  in  the  follow- 
ing industries : 

Percentage  of 


umber  of 

Total  Num 

men  Engaged. 

Worker 

Making,  repairing,  and  cleaning 

of  clothing 

55i'303 

43.8 

Spinning  and  weaving 

362,138 

39-8 

Trade          .... 

184,537 

22.0 

Hotels  and  buffets 

141,407 

45.0 

Preparation  of  food  products 

96,724 

13.0 

Paper  making     . 

31,256 

31-2 

Stone  working    . 

27,660 

7.9 

Wood        „         .         .         . 

27,372 

5.8 

In  general  in  Germany  the  rate  of  wages  is  very  low, 


IN  GERMANY 


273 


the  yearly  earnings  of  individuals  engaged  in  industry 
fluctuating  between  £'^0  6s.  and  ;^50  25.,  which  to  the 
large  families  of  the  German  working  classes  means 
poverty.  Women  workers  in  Germany  receive  much  less 
than  men,  generally  less  than  a  shilling  a  day,  while  no- 
where except  in  Anhalt  do  the  daily  earnings  of  women 
reach  two  shillings.  If  24  shillings  a  week  be  considered 
moderate  payment,  over  24  shillings  high,  and  under 
15  shillings  low,  the  distribution  of  workers  according 
to  these  categories  appears : 


Men  and  women  together 
Men  separately 
Women  separately 


Low 
Wages 

Moderate 
Wages. 

High 
Wages. 

V. 

7o 

7o 

29.8 

49.8 

20.4 

20. 9 

56.2 

22.9 

99.2 

0.7 

0.1 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  this  question  we  present 
the  result  graphically  : 


Classification  of  Workers  in  Germany  according  to  Wages. 

Men.  Women. 


56. 2  ^io 


20.9  0(0 


22.9^10 


Low 
Wages 


H(GH 


Average 


J 


0.  7  0|o 

0. 1  ofo 


■ 


99.2^)0 


From  this  it  will  be  seen  that  women  receive  much 
lower  wages  than  men.  Less  than  a  fifth  part  (19.76  out 
of  99.2)  receive  more  than  10  shillings  a  week,  while  70 
per  cent,  receive  less  than  10  shillings,  and  more  than 
half  receive  less  than  8  shillings  a  week.  To  such 
women,    living   independently,    the    cost   of   lodging  and 

s 


274 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


food  is  not  less  than  5  shillings  a  week.  It  will  be 
seen  how  little  remains  out  of  weekly  earnings  of 
6  to  8  shillings,  for  clothing,  against  sickness,  and  for 
other  unforeseen  contingencies. 

Thus  it  cannot  be  expected  that  on  a  stoppage  of 
work  caused  by  war  the  workers  of  Germany  could  find 
any  considerable  resource  in  their  savings.  In  particular 
this  will  be  the  case  with  the  women  workers,  and  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  in  times  of  disorder  women  always 
appear  as  a  dangerous  element.  The  assistance  which 
the  government  grants  to  the  women  whose  fathers  and 
husbands  have  been  called  away  to  the  army  will  be 
insignificant,  especially  in  view  of  the  rise  in  the  price  of 
food  of  which  we  have  above  spoken. 

It  is  very  probable  that  the  condition  of  the  working 
classes  in  Germany  will  constantly  deteriorate.  It  is  true 
that  emigration  to  America  in  recent  years  has  fallen  off,  as 
the  following  diagram  shows. 

Emigration  from  Germany  to  America  in  Thousands, 


1891 


1892 


1893 


1894 


115 
112 


84 


39 


But  such  a  decrease  took  place  in  consequence  of  the 
difficulties  with  which  emigration  was  attended.     In  view 
of   the    immense  development  of   German  industry,   and 
of  the    raising   of   protective    duties   in    other  countries, 
Germany,    in    order    to   keep    her    place    in   the   foreign 


IN  GERMANY  275 

markets,  has  been  forced  to  work  and  sell  more  cheaply. 
The  lowering  in  the  price  of  manufactured  goods  has  had 
its  natural  consequence  in  a  fall  of  wages.  This  in  itself 
is  a  misfortune.  But  when  we  add  the  misfortunes  of  war, 
which  will  shorten  work  even  at  low  wages,  it  is  difficult 
to  foresee  the  consequences. 

It  is  necessary  also  to  consider  how  war  will  react  on 
the  interests  of  the  propertied  classes  in  Germany.  Their 
savings  are  very  considerable,  and  the  German  debt  is 
almost  all  held  in  Germany.  War  will  produce  a  great 
panic  on  the  money  market,  and  the  value  of  the  securities 
in  which  are  invested  the  savings  of  the  propertied  classes 
will  be  greatly  depreciated.  To  carry  on  war  it  will 
be  necessary  to  obtain  a  loan  of  fifty  millions  sterling, 
and,  in  the  event  of  failure,  it  may  be  of  several  times 
this  sum  to  pay  contributions.  And  even  in  the  event  of 
a  successful  war  those  loans  which  will  be  issued  for 
carrying  on  operations  can  be  placed  only  at  low  prices. 
So  early  there  can  be  no  assurance  of  victory,  while 
defeat  might  entail  the  disruption  of  the  German  Empire. 

It  need  hardly  be  pointed  out  that  shares  in  industrial 
undertakings  will  fall  even  more  than  government  securi- 
ties. But  in  addition  to  government  funds  and  industrial 
securities,  foreign  securities  are  held  in  Germany  to  an 
immense  amount.  Since  the  introduction  of  a  stamp 
duty  on  foreign  securities,  on  their  admission  on  the 
German  Bourses,  vast  quantities  of  such  securities  have 
been  acquired.  Between  1882  and  1892  foreign  papers 
were  presented  for  stamping  to  the  value  of  20,731 
million  marks  (;^  1,036, 5  50,000),  of  which  5644  millions  of 
marks  (;^282, 200,000)  were  actually  stamped,  that  is, 
admitted  officially  on  the  Bourse.  In  this  number  were 
admitted  securities  of  countries  which  might  take  part 
in  a  war. 

Russian  .  .  1003  million  marks  (;^5o,  150,000). 

Italian    .  .  .  968       ,,           „       (;£'48,40o,ooo). 

Austrian  .  .  660       ,,           „        (£33,000,000). 

Turkish  .  •,  266       „            „        (;^i3,30o,ooo). 

Servian  .  .  ■  .  57      „           „         (;^2,85o,ooo). 


276  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

We  will  present  this  graphically  : 

Value  of  Foreign  Securities  stamped  in  Germany  in  Millions 

of  Marks. 


Of  course  not  all  of  the  securities  stamped  in  Germany 
remained  there  in  circulation.  But  if  this  be  so,  they  have 
been  replaced  by  others,  since  local  capital  still  continues 
to  seek  advantageous  investments. 

The  immense  quantities  of  government  and  trading- 
industrial  securities,  both  local  and  foreign,  circulating  in 
countries  where  the  propertied  classes  are  numerous  and 
dispose  of  immense  savings,  increase  the  risk  of  war  for 
such  countries,  and  accentuate  the  crisis  which  it  will 
cause.  Thus  in  Germany  an  unsuccessful  war  would 
result  in  immense  losses  in  such  securities,  and  in  those 
which  would  be  issued  to  meet  military  necessities.  But 
even  in  the  event  of  a  successful  war,  Germany  would 
sustain  great  losses  in  the  securities  of  those  countries 
which  had  lost. 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE   ECONOMIC    DIFFICULTIES    OF    FRANCE    IN 
TIME   OF  WAR 

A  CONSIDERATION  of  the  economic  convulsions  which  war 
would  cause  in  France  is  not  only  very  important  in  itself, 
but  instructive  in  view  of  the  fact  that  France  has  within 
recent  times  felt  the  whole  burdens  of  a  war.  Judging  by 
appearances,  it  might  be  supposed  that  a  future  war  would 
have  precisely  those  consequences  which  the  war  of  1870 
produced.  A  detailed  consideration  of  the  results  of  the 
war  of  1870,  and  of  the  degree  of  economic  prosperity  of 
France  before  and  after  that  war,  would  show  with  what 
caution  such  a  judgment  must  be  received. 

The  change  of  rule  in  1871  had  a  favourable  influence 
on  the  economic  life  of  the  country.  Although  for  a  long 
time  it  was  feared  that  the  Germans  would  take  advantage 
of  the  first  pretext  to  declare  war  again  and  effectively 
restrain  the  military  development  of  France,  these  fears  in 
no  way  hindered  the  economic  regeneration  of  the  country. 
Disappearance  of  the  dread  of  those  political  adventures 
so  long  carried  on  by  Napoleon  III.  ;  the  general  tenden- 
cies of  the  new  government  encouraging  the  spread  of 
education  and  economic  prosperity ;  the  keen  struggles  of 
political  parties  which  prevented  the  unpunished  violation 
of  the  law — all  these  in  no  small  measure  helped  the 
development  of  France.  The  very  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
reacted  favourably  on  her  trade  and  industry.  In  those 
provinces  industry  was  so  highly  developed  that  they 
furnished  the  rest  of  France  with  their  products.  With 
the  foundation  of  the  Republic   began  a  great  increase 


278 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


in  other  locaHties   in  the  production  of  goods  formerly 
obtained  from  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

In  this  time,  also,  when  the  prosperity  of  foreign  and 
especially  of  trans-oceanic  countries  increased  rapidly, 
there  began  an  increased  demand  for  French  articles  of 
luxury  and  fashion.  The  following  diagram  illustrates 
the  position  of  French  trade  since  i860  : 

Imports  and  Exports  of  France  in  Millions  of  Francs. 


Imports. 


EXPOSTS. 


.  Thus  statistics  show  us  that  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
had  no  considerable  influence.  The  exports  in  the  period 
1869-73  increased  at  a  greater  rate  than  in  the  period 
1860-69.  From  that  time  the  increase  of  exports  con- 
tinued uninterruptedly  to  189 1,  after  which  we  find  a 
decrease,  caused  by  the  protectionist  policy  of  Europe. 
These  fluctuations  became  still  more  noticeable  if  we  take 
the  average  yearly  increase  of  imports  and  exports  in  the 
period  1860-69  at  100,  and  show  the  corresponding  fi'gures 
for  the  following  years  : 


Absolute  Figures  of 

Increase  or  Decrease 

of  Imports  in 

Millions  of  Francs. 

Absolute  Figures  of 
Increase  or  Decrease 

of  Exports  in 
Millions  of  Francs. 

In  the  period  i86o-6g 
„           1869-73 
ij           1873-91 
„           1891-94 

4-150       4-100 

+  142      4-    94-7     •• 

4-   41      +   27.3     .. 

-175    -II6.7   .. 

.      4-   94     4-100 
.      4-  207     4-  220.2 

—       I       —       I.I 

.       -  226       -  240.4 

IN  FRANCE 


279 


If  instead  of  values  which  change  we  take  the  quantity 
of  imports  and  exports,  we  receive  results  indicated  by  the 
following  diagram  : 

Trade  of  France  in  Thousands  of  Tons. 
4165  !■ 


I860 


15.599 


14.065 


4290 
6847 
7969 


16001 


14472 


But  these  figures  give   no   precise   idea  as   to   French 
trade.     The  following  table  is  more  detailed  : 


- 

Imports. 

1863. 

1869. 

1873. 

1894. 

Cheese,  butter,  margarine 

(in  thousands  of  tons) 

7 

14 

15 

20 

Coal  and  coke        ,,               „ 

53«« 

7457 

7461 

10,266 

Coffee                       ,,               ,, 

39 

50 

44 

69 

Cotton,  raw             ,,              „ 

55 

124 

88 

186 

Cotton  manufactures 

(in  thousands  of  pounds 

sterling) 

360 

920 

1880 

1280 

Flax                       „                „ 

920 

1760 

2520 

2440 

Guano  and  manure 

(in  thousands  of  tons) 

82 

118 

137 

181 

Hides  and  fur         ,,              „ 

45 

64 

61 

67 

Cotton  yarn 

(in  thousands  of  pounds 

sterling) 

280 

480 

840 

720 

Silk  manufactures  ,,              ,, 

180 

1120 

1200 

1640 

Woollen     ,,             „               ,, 

1320 

2880 

2360 

1720 

28o 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE 


Imports. 

1863. 

1869. 

1873. 

1894. 

Meat        (in 

thousands 

of  tons) 

8 

6 

23 

24 

Silk,  raw 

»> 

)> 

7 

8 

9 

II 

Sugar 

j» 

»> 

236 

201 

154 

166 

Tallow,  &c. 

j> 

»> 

40 

37 

36 

32 

Wool 

)> 

>» 

63 

108 

120 

224 

In  comparing  yearly  statistics  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in 
mind  that  certain  articles  of  import  diminished  owing  to 
the  development  of  industry  within  the  country,  and  were 
partly  replaced  by  other  imports.  Thus  the  diminished 
import  of  sugar  is  explained  by  the  production  of  beet- 
sugar  at  home,  which  increased  from  3833  million  kilogrs. 
(3»833,000  tons)  in  1873-74  to  5148  million  kilogrs. 
(5,148,000  tons)  in  1893-94. 

The  following  two  diagrams  show  the  fluctuations  in 
the  external  trade  of  France  since  1883,  in  millions  of 
francs  : 


French  Trade  in  Millions  of  Francs. 


1883-1885. 


Import. 


1892-94. 


2210 


IN  FRANCE 

Export. 


281 


s 

It 

794 

Pro-      :::::::: 

41    ^lA 

M    71? 

*  i4» 

9 

739 

M    ■•tf%ik 

41   iHl 

Products.      ......,, 

fl   'O/ 

(724 

factured       ........ 

A  t-f  t/^]^o 

1759 


The  revenue  of  France,  which  may  be  considered  as  a 
measure  of  the  prosperity  of  the  population,  is  shown  in 
the  following  diagram  : 

Revenue  and  Expenditure  of  France  in  Millions  of  Francs, 
Revenue.  Expenditure. 


1866 
2105 


3366 


1861. 


1869 


1893 


2170 
2(45 


3450 


A  striking  example  of  financial  self-sufficiency  is  pre- 
sented by  France.  The  war,  the  Commune,  the  payment 
of  five  milliards  (;^200,ooo,ooo),  the  payment  of  the  ex- 
penses of  the  war,  the  reorganisation  of  the  army,  the 
reform  of  the  government  in  all  its  departments — all 
this  required  immense  expenditure,  yet  France  found  all 
these  resources  within  herself. 

The  debt  of  France  has  grown  immensely,  as  is  shown 
by  the  following  diagram  : 


282 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Debt  of  France  in  Millions  of  Francs. 

Current.  Consolidated. 

I 


25966 


Thus  since  1871  the  debt  of  France  has  grown  by 
almost  14  milliards  of  francs  (^560,000,000).  All  this 
sum  was  found  within  the  country,  and  in  addition, 
immense  sums  were  invested  in  industrial  undertakings 
and  in  foreign  loans. 

As  a  measure  of  the  increase  of  wealth  in  France  we 
may  take  the  statistics  of  the  savings  banks.  The  number 
of  depositors  and  the  amount  of  deposits  are  shown  in  the 
following  table  and  diagram  : 


Pass  Books. 

Deposits. 

1869  .           ,      2,130,000 

7 1 1 ,000,000  fr.    (;^28,440,ooo) 

1894-95       .      6,314,000 

3,260,000,000  „   (;^i 30,400,000) 

Savings 

in  France. 

Number  of  Depositors'  Books 
in  Millions. 

Deposits  in  Millions 
of  Francs. 

6.^ 


1869    . 


1894/5 


711 


3260 


Consideration  of  other  statistics  confirms  the  general 
belief  as  to  the  increase  of  wealth  in  France.  In  France  the 
transfer  of  estates  is  subjected  to  a  duty.     The  following 


IN  FRANCE 


283 


diagram  shows  the  value  of  estates  passing  by  legacy  and 
gift  in  France  in  millions  of  francs  : 

Average  value  of  Properties  passing  by  Legacy  and  Gift  in 
Millions  of  Francs. 


1873—1875 


1890-1892 


TTT 


3965 


6005 


From  these  brief  statistics  it  may  be  concluded  that 
France  has  borne  the  heavy  losses  caused  by  the  war  of 
1870  much  more  easily  than  any  other  state  could  have 
done. 

The  economic  consequences  of  war  would  be  much  more 
easily  borne  in  France  than  in  other  countries  if  it  were 
not  for  a  whole  series  of  unfavourable  circumstances, 
thanks  to  which  the  image  of  war  appears  not  less 
threatening  for  her  than  for  every  other  country.  The 
interruption  of  communications  will  be  alone  sufficient  to 
strike  a  deadly  blow  to  industry.  The  moment  export  and 
import  by  sea  have  ceased  the  price  of  the  necessaries  of 
life  will  rise,  the  springs  of  income  will  be  dried  up,  and 
many  diff'erent  industries  will  be  unable  to  continue  the 
production  and  sale  of  their  goods.  The  theatre  of  war 
will  become  a  closed  market.  In  the  country  itself  the 
demand  for  manufactured  articles  will  decrease,  not  only 
owing  to  the  fall  in  the  income  of  the  majority  of  the 
population,  living  from  day  to  day,  but  also  owing  to  the 
natural  indisposition  of  the  propertied  classes  to  unneces- 
sary expenditure  in  tiine  of  war.  Factories,  mines,  and 
workshops,  with  the  exception  of  those  whose  products 
are  necessary  for  the  equipment  of  armies,  will  be  com- 
pelled to  decrease  their  output.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  in  France  a  great  number  of  foreigners  are  engaged 


284 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


in  industry.  The  production  of  these  in  time  of  war  would 
also  cease.  In  certain  industries  the  number  of  foreigners, 
rises  as  high  as  22  per  cent.  Another  circumstance  which 
must  have  a  serious  influence  and  cause  great  difficulties, 
is  that  a  high  percentage  of  the  population  will  be  sum- 
moned under  the  colours. 

The  following  diagram  illustrates  the  distribution  by 
occupations  of  the  population  of  France  in  1886  : 

Distribution  of  the  French  Population  according  to  Occupation 

in    1886. 


Capitalists  and 

Independent 

Persons. 


Liberal 
Professions. 


Government 
Service. 


Army. 


Trade. 


Transport. 


Industry, 


Agriculture 


6.2 


3-0 


1.9 


1.6 


II. 5 


2.8 


25.2 


it 


47.8 


From  this  we  see  that  nearly  half  the  population  of 
France  is  engaged  in  agriculture.  The  agricultural 
class    of  the    population    is    divided    into    the    following 


IN  FRANCE  285 

classes  :  Large  and  small  proprietors,  farmers  and  hired 
labourers.  Of  17,698,000  persons  belonging  to  this  class, 
the  labourers  number  about  2,772,000  men.  In  a  country 
where  landed  property  is  distributed  among  a  large  number 
of  families,  peasant  proprietors  constitute  the  chief  part  of 
the  population,  and  wages  are  comparatively  low  every- 
where excepting  in  those  departments  where  large 
farming  prevails.  The  struggle  for  existence  in  this 
class  of  the  population  is  much  less  serious  than  it  was 
twenty  years  ago  in  many  departments.  Although  agri- 
cultura'  labourers  suffer  less  than  factory  hands  from 
uncertainty  as  to  regular  work,  their  life  on  the  whole  is 
more  difficult  owing  to  the  fact  that  they,  while  knowing 
the  extent  of  their  earnings,  are  deprived  of  all  hope  of 
improving  their  position.  The  peasant  proprietor,  the 
corner-stone  of  France,  is  bad  material  for  agitation,  but 
the  hired  labourer  is  in  a  very  different  position.  It  must 
not  be  thought,  however,  that  in  the  event  of  war  no  danger 
for  the  state  would  arise  from  the  agricultural  class. 
The  fact  is  that  the  agricultural  population  is  not  in  a 
position  to  feed  itself  out  of  the  land.  Investigations 
made  in  1882  show^ed  that  out  of  5,672,007  registered 
agricultural  properties  2^\6j^^^']  were  of  an  area  of  less 
than  a  hectare  (two  and  a  half  acres),  and  1,865,878  were 
of  an  area  of  one  to  five  hectares  (from  two  and  a  half  to 
twelve  and  a  half  acres).  A  detailed  examination  of  these 
statistics  would  considerably  reduce  the  number  of  small 
properties  ;  but  it  would  still  show  that  1,700,000  persons 
of  this  class  are  little  removed  from  the  position  of 
agricultural  labourers. 

Still  the  danger  to  the  state  from  the  agricultural  popu- 
lation will  be  small.  Of  other  classes  of  the  population 
this  cannot  be  said.  In  order  to  be  convinced  of  this  it  is 
only  necessary  to  consider  the  distribution  of  the  incomes 
of  the  population. 


286 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


I.  Personal  Earnings. 


3,434,938  agricultural  labourers  . 

3,834,580  workers  engaged  in  indus- 
try, trade,  and  transport   . 

1,132,076  serving  for  wages 

1,950,208  domestic  servants 

3,700,000  small  landowners,  artisans, 
traders,  porters,  soldiers, 
sailors,  lower  officials, 
teachers,  and  others,  whose 
earnings  little  exceed  the 
earnings  of  labourers 


Millions  of 
Francs. 


2,000  (;^8o,ooo,ooo) 

3,600  (;{' 1 44,000,000) 
1,000      (^"40,000, 000) 

1,400    (2'56,ooo,ooo) 


4,000  (;^  1 60,000,000) 


II.  Capitalists. 

1,683,192  landed  proprietors  from^ 
3.\  to  4.\  milliards 

1 ,009,914 manufacturers,  merchants, 
and  others,  from  3.5  to  4I 
milliards     . 

1,053,025  of  private  property,  ren- 
tiers, and  free  profes- 
sions, from  2|  to  3 
milliards     .         .         .       / 


y  10,500  (;f 420,000,000) 


i7»797'933 


Total 


22,500   (;^90o,ooo,ooo) 


These  figures,  of  course,  are  only  approximately  correct, 
but  they  may  serve  as  a  basis  for  determining  different 
influences  on  the  economic  condition  of  the  people.  We 
see  that  the  whole  10^  milliards  (;^420,ooo,ooo)  when 
divided  among  3,746,131  capitalists  represents  only 
2800  francs  (;^II2)  the  family.  Leroy-Beaulieu  sup- 
poses that  in  all  France  there  are  only  700  or  800 
persons  with  incomes  of  250,000  francs  (;^  10,000)  or 
over,  and    from    18,000  to   20,000  with  incomes  of  from 

50,000    to     250,000    (^2000    to    ;^  I  0,000). 

From  statistics  relating  to  May  1886  in  a  population  of 
38.2  millions,  the  distribution  by  occupation  was  as 
follows  : 


IN  FRANCE 


287 


Agriculture  and  woods    . 

Independent  persons 

Persons  with  higher  duties 

Labourers 

Hotels  and  restaurants    . 

Spinning  and  weaving     . 

Tailoring,  &Co  . 


Wcjmen. 

Men. 

.   2,138,236   .. 

.  4,777'729 

937 '539  .. 

.  3,108,625 

42,428  .. 

55,407 

.  1,158,269  . 

.  1,613,697 

1 6/.,  964  . 

325,318 

376,602  . 

414,695 

433,650  . 

130,999 

In  addition  to  these  France  has  many  important  fields  of 
labour  for  women.     In  trade  and  in  the  banks  served  : 


Women  . 
Men 


503,197 
909,058 


or 


35.6  per  cent. 
64.4         „ 


In  case  of  the  interruption  of  the  general  economic  life 
of  the  people  the  agricultural  class  will  feel  the  crisis  less 
acutely  than  others.  On  every  farm  exists  some  reserve 
of  food,  while  that  part  of  the  population  whose  earnings 
come  from  industry  and  trade,  and  a  considerable  pro- 
portion of  those  living  in  service,  will  be  in  a  desperate 
position — all  the  more  desperate  since  in  France  women,  as 
is  seen  by  the  above  statistics,  live  by  their  own  earnings. 
Taking  such  an  active  part  in  national  work,  the  French 
woman  has  an  extraordinarily  beneficent  influence  on  her 
country.  It  would  be  very  interesting  to  consider  what 
direction  the  activity  of  French  women  would  take  in  a 
critical  moment  of  the  war.  But  here  it  is  impossible  to 
enter  into  the  question. 

France  is  generally  considered  to  be  a  rich  country,  but 
even  if  we  suppose  that  only  5  per  cent,  of  the  population 
lives  in  poverty,  it  appears  that  2,000,000  persons  require 
in  times  of  peace  either  state  or  private  assistance.  In 
time  of  war  the  number  of  the  needy  population  would,  of 
course,  increase.  Indeed,  the  proportion  of  unemployed 
will  be  greater  in  France  than  in  other  countries  in  con- 
sequence of  the  fact  that  the  most  important  section  of 
her  products  are  articles  of  fashion  and  luxury,  the  sale  of 
which  would,  of  course,  decrease.  The  number  of  un- 
employed in  France  even  in  normal  times  is  considerable. 


288 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


If  we  may  believe  the  French  Radicals  the  proportion  out 
of  work  in  France  amounts  to  one-fifth,  or  at  the  very 
least  to  one-sixth  of  the  population.  In  Paris  things  are 
even  worse.  In  favourable  times  one-fifth  of  the  working 
classes  are  without  employment  for  three  to  four  months, 
while  in  years  of  crisis  45  per  cent,  of  the  working  classes 
are  without  employment — that  is  to  say,  300,000  families 
are  without  the  means  of  subsistence.  In  ordinary  times 
these  unemployed  draw  little  attention  upon  themselves, 
but  in  time  of  war  their  number  would  undoubtedly  grow, 
and  all  would  consider  they  had  a  right  to  government 
assistance.  The  following  diagram  shows  approximately 
the  amount  of  assistance  given  to  the  poor  in  France  in 
1889: 

Assistance  given  to  the  Poor  in  France  in  1889. 


Number  receiving 
assistance  (in 
thousands). 

1672 

...... 

Number  of  da\s 
Oil  which  assi  t- 
ance  given.          | 

2654 


It  is  easy  to  foresee  the  consequences  which  must  result 
from  such  a  state  of  things  in  a  country  like  France,  where 
the  socialistic  movement  bears  unerring  witness  to  the 
existence  of  general  discontent  with  the  existing  order  of 
things.  If  after  the  war  of  1870  a  Commune  sprang  up, 
what  must  we  expect  now  when  Socialism  has  raised  its 
head  and  created  a  permanent  organisation,  while  before 
the  war  the  government  of  Napoleon  III.  crushed  every 
attempt  at  socialist  propaganda. 

For  another  peculiar  reason  war  would  be  more  dis- 
astrous for  France  than  for  any  other  country.  We  have 
seen  how  rich  is  France  in  capital,  how  industrious  and 
how  economical  is  her  people.  But  all  these  factors  would 
not  be  so  remarkable  if  it  were  not  for  a  special  circum- 


IN  FRANCE 


289 


stance  which,  while  heing  itself  of  a  negative  character, 
has  an  immense  influence  on  the  growth  of  wealth. 

As  is  well  known,  the  htrth-rate  in  France  is  consider- 
ably lower  than  in  other  states,  while  the  death-rate  is 
almost  the  same,  so  that  the  growth  of  the  population  is 
quite  insignificant.  There  have  even  been  years  when 
the  growth  not  only  ceased,  but  a  loss  actually  occurred. 
The  following  diagram  shows  the  proportion  of  old  men 
and  children  in  percentage  relation  in  the  population  in 
some  of  the  chief  European  states. 


c4 


Number  of  Old  Men  and  Children  in  Percentage  Relation 
to  Population. 


Persons  over  60 
years  of  age. 


Children  below  ten 
years  of  age. 


24.2 


23-9 


26.2 


239 


17-5 


Thus  in  France  the  proportion  of  children  under  the 
age  of  ten  years  is  only  ijh  per  cent,  of  the  population, 
while  in  other  countries  it  rises  as  high  as  24  per  cent, 
and  26  per  cent.  Persons  of  60  years  and  over  in  France 
constitute  12.6  per  cent.,  and  in  other  countries  7-8  per 
cent.  The  relation  of  married  and  unmarried  persons  in 
France  is  also  less  favourable  than  in  other  countries,  as  is 
shown  by  the  following  sketches  : 

T 


290         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Number  of  Bachelors  in  Percentage  Relation  to  Population. 


40  Years  and  over. 


12.4 


lO.I 


II.6 


8-3                                   Germany 

Austria 

4                      Hungary 

^                                            England 

3                                              France 

i 

II-3 


10. 


«;o  Years  and  over. 

'                                       Germany 

Austria 

3.4                     Hungary 

England 

France 

The  diagram  opposite  shows  the  unfortunate  position 
of  France  in  all  its  blackness. 

From  this  we  see  that  in  France  the  birth-rate  is  ap- 
proximately equal  to  the  death-rate,  while  in  Germany 
the  birth-rate  exceeds  the  death-rate  by  12  in  every 
thousand.  The  diagram  relates  only  to  the  last  ten 
years.  But  the  same  phenomenon  may  be  seen  during 
the  whole  of  the  present  century. 

From  the  diagram  on  p.  292  it  will  be  seen  that  100  years 
ago  the  strength  of  Germany  was  40  per  cent,  lower  than 
that  of  France,  while  at  the  present  day  France  is  weaker 
than  Germany  by  20  per  cent.  From  these  statistics  ^we 
must  conclude  that  France  will  become  weaker  in  com- 
parison with  other  countries  where  the  growth  of  the 
population  is  more  normal.  The  artificial  measures  pro- 
posed for  the  increase  of  the  birth-rate  cannot  be  of  much 
avail.  Projects  may  be  drawn  up  to  increase  the  birth- 
rate, but  to  carry  them  out  is  shown  to  be  impossible. 

The  decrease  in  the  birth-rate  has  yet  this  inconvenience, 
that  more  care  is  taken  of  children,  the  death-rate  among 


IN  FRANCE 


291 


Increase  or  Decrease  of  the  Population  in  France  and  Germany 

per  Thousand. 


+  11.S 

+  11.3 
+  10.8 


4-  127 


+  12.9 


+  12.7 


+  11.3 


+  13.^ 


+  11.6 


i-  12. 1 


+  13-5 


Germany. 


France. 


ii 


1 


ift--^4 


188^ 


1886 


1887 


1888 


1893 


1S94 


+  1-7 
+  2.3 


14 


+    1.4 

+  1-5 

4-   1.2 


+  25 


4-  0.1 


+    IX 


292 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


them  is  smaller,  and  the  natural  process  of  the  elimination 
of  weak  organisms  is  stopped,  from  which  the  general 
physique  of  the  people  is  bound  to  suffer.  In  France  even 
at  the  present  time  the  race  is  weaker  than  in  England, 
Germany,  or  Russia. 

Number  of  Population  in  1788  and  1888  in  Millions. 
1788  1888 


25 


25 


15,5                        GermaNV 

-  •    ■  -  - 

48 

1 1.5                       Austria 

. 

26 

16.5                         Italy 



30 

37 

12                                     (".RE  AT 

Bkhain 

>■ = :- 

. 

0  e                         United 
^'-^                        States 

.:. : 

60 



r 

f  '        '                        Russia 

-                ^ 



France 

38 

. 



This  unfortunate  position  of  affairs  has,  however, 
although  only  temporarily,  good  sides,  since  with  an  incon- 
siderable growth  of  the  population  France  has  more  room 
and  a  less  serious  struggle  for  the  development  of  produc- 
tive forces.  In  addition,  the  people  spend  less  money  on 
education  and  save  all  the  more ;  capital  is  not  split  up 
as  it  is  in  more  populous  states,  and  in  consequence 
material  prosperity  increases.     But  these  considerations 


IN  FRANCE 


293 


do  not  alter  the  fact  that  every  year  the  strength  of  France 
grows  less  and  less  in  comparison  with  that  of  other  states. 
But  for  the  masses  living  to-day  the  future  is  hidden  in 
the  splendours  of  a  temporary  prosperity. 

If  we  take  the  value  of  each  inhabitant  at  3000  francs 
(^120)  and  make  an  estimate  of  such  wealth  accumulated  by 
France  and  Germany  in  the  past  century,  we  will  get  some 
interesting  results,  as  shown  on  the  following  diagram  : 

Value  of  Growth  of  Population  from  1788  to  1888  in  Millions 

of  Francs, 


France 

39 

Germany 

97.5 


In  the  event  of  a  war  unaer  modern  conditions  the 
losses,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  would  be  immense 
for  all  states  engaged.  But  France,  above  all,  must  avoid 
loss  of  men  in  consequence  of  her  present  position,  as  losses 
would  be  relatively  greater  for  her  than  for  other  states. 
War  could  in  no  possible  way  change  the  position  of 
France  for  the  better.  With  the  loss  of  the  flower  of  her 
youth  would  follow  not  merely  the  **  national  danger"  but 
absolute  ruin. 

France  with  so  many  milliards  invested  in  foreign 
countries,  and  with  the  greater  part  of  her  savings  invested 
in  her  own  debt,  is  a  country  which,  while  admitting  no 
offence  against  her  honour  or  her  interests,  must  at  the 
same  time  aspire  to  peace,  as  in  peace  alone,  and  not  in 
war  with  all  its  disasters  and  misfortunes,  will  she  find 
the  best  path  for  a  national  genius  to  which  all  humanity 
is  indebted. 


CHAPTER  V 

EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  VITAL  NEEDS  OF 

PEOPLES 

Difficulties  in  the  satisfaction  of  the  vital  needs  of  popu- 
lations, interruption  or  stagnation  in  the  employment  of 
the  productive  forces  of  the  population — these  are  the 
factors  which  will  influence  statesmen  against  undertaking 
war,  or  if  war  be  undertaken,  these  are  the  factors  which 
will  at  one  moment  or  another  decidedly  veto  its  continu- 
ance. For  certain  states  yet  another  danger  appears  (as 
one  phantom  hastens  after  the  other  in  the  vision  of 
Macbeth),  that  is,  the  danger  of  revolutionary  movements, 
not  only  political  but  also  socialistic. 

In  considering  the  effect  of  a  future  war  it  is  essential 
to  examine  the  manner  in  which  it  will  react  on  the  needs 
and  condition  of  the  people.  If  famine  is  not  to  find  states 
unprepared,  some  account  of  the  dangers  which  follow 
on  war  must  be  taken.  The  consideration  of  this  question 
may  be  useful  in  another  way.  By  revealing  with  what 
a  tremendous  influence  a  great  war  may  react  on  the  con- 
ditions of  peoples,  it  must  result  in  a  tranquillising  con- 
viction that  in  our  time  to  decide  on  war  without  grave 
hesitation  will  be  impossible. 

I. 

Those  countries  which  in  times  of  peace  import  large 
quantities  of  grain  and  other  necessary  products  will  stand 
in  a  particularly  critical  condition.  Supply  by  means  of 
railroad  will  be  extremely  difficult,  and  indeed  there  will 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  295 

be  no  country  whence  to  import,  since  every  European 
country  will  be  compelled  to  shift  for  itself.  Of  the  two 
countries  which  serve  as  the  granaries  of  Europe,  Hungary 
will  be  forced  to  place  her  superfluity  at  the  disposal 
of  Austria,  while  Russia  will  be  deprived  of  the  possibility 
of  supplying  her  friends  with  grain,  and  will  not  wish 
to  supply  her  enemies. 

Transport  by  sea  from  America,  India,  and  Australia 


Home  Production  and  Import  of  Wheat,  Barley,  and  Rye. 


— 

-J 
.2H 

£-3 

1888-91. 

1894-95. 

• 

Import  in 

Thousands  of 

Tons. 

Import  in  Percentage 

Relation  to  Home 

Production. 

Import  in 

Thousands  of 

Tons 

Import  in  Percentage 

Relation  to  Home 

Production. 

■^ 

3 

E; 
0 

u 

Ic3 

■^ 

3 
Pi 

S 
2 

<u  in 

0  iz 
E§ 

Germany 
France   . 
England 
Italy  .     . 
Austria  . 

10,151 
9.852 
3.672 
2,410 
6,016 

1254 
295 
721 

361 

853 

656 

2770 
262 

28 

20.7 

9.6 

95.0 

25.8 

0.5 

1773 

448 

1885 

535 
47 

1330 
635 

3493 
83 
62 

30.5 

II.O 

146.4 

25-7 
1.8 

will  become  impossible,  as  it  is  unquestionable  that  in  the 
beginning  of  war  privateering  will  be  carried  on,  inter- 
rupting communication  with  trans-oceanic  countries,  or  at 
the  very  best  making  transport  so  difficult  that  freight 
and  insurance  will  rise  very  high,  and  thus  the  price 
of  trans-oceanic  supplies  will  rise  prohibitively.  It  is 
enough  to  remember  that  in  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
war,  when  import  from  Russia  alone  ceased,  the 
price  of  wheat  in  England  rose  80  per  cent.  In  the 
American  Civil  War  the  operations  of  a  single  Southern 


296 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


cruiser,  the  Alahijua,  were  enough  to  cause  a  perceptible 
rise  in  tlie  price  of  wheat. 

Thus  it  becomes  necessary  to  determine  the  degrees  of 
peril  to  which  in  the  event  of  a  great  war  the  different 
states  of  Europe  will  be  subjected  in  the  feeding  of  their 
populations. 

A  calculation  of  the  times  in  the  course  of  which  the 
population  of  each  state  may  exist  on  the  local  production 
of  wheat,  barle}^,  and  rye  can  Le  made  from  the  table  given 
on  the  preceding  page.* 

If  on  the  foundation  of  these  figures  we  calculate  the 
number  of  days  on  which  food  will  be  lacking  after  the 
exhaustion  of  local  products  we  find  the  following  results  : 


18S8-91. 

1894-95. 

In  Germany . 

.     6q  days 

102  davs 

„  France 

.     32     » 

36          M 

„  Eng:land    . 

.  178     „ 

274     „ 

„  Italy 

.           76           M 

75     »» 

„  Austria     . 

2       „ 

7     i» 

(1888-91) 


(1894-95) 


69 

Germany 

102 

32 

1 
France 

36 

178 

II 

E  NOLAN  IJ            ' 

h 

76 

Italy 

75 

2         Austria           7 

274 


The  greatest  danger  will  consequently  threaten  England, 
which  imports  the  largest  quantity  of  grain,  by  far  the 
greatest  part  from  trans-oceanic  countries.     Germany  and 

*  Statistics  from  "  Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fiir  das  Deutsche 
Reich,"  "  Annnaire  Statistique  de  la  France,""  Ocsteneichisches 
Statistisches  Handbiich,"  "Annuario  Statistico  Italiano,"  "  Obzor 
Vneshni  Torgovli,"  &c. 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  297 

Italy  will  find  themselves  in  a  better,  allhough  still  in  a 
difficult  position.  Germany  imports  foreign  grain,  for  the 
greater  part  Russian,  for  2-3  months,  and  Italy  for  about 
2h  months.  France  will  suffer  only  from  a  month's 
deficiency,  while  Austria  may  be  considered  as  fully 
supplied. 

The  most  favourable  position  will  be  occupied  by- 
Russia,  which  with  her  export  trade  interrupted  will  not 
only  not  suffer  from  deficiency  but  will  possess  so  much 
superfluous  grain  that  her  population  can  in  no  way 
suffer.  The  export  from  Russia  of  wheat,  barley,  and 
rye  in  the  course  of  the  periods  considered  shows  a 
yearly-  average  of  3,967,213  tons,  or  a  superfluity  after 
the  satisfaction  of  local  requirements  of  21.6  per  cent. 

In  addition  to  wheat,  barley,  and  rye,  we  find  a  con- 
siderable deficiency  in  oats  ;  for  all  the  states  of  Central 
Europe  mentioned,  with  the  exception  of  Austria,  produce 
less  oats  than  is  required  for  local  needs. 

Production  and  Import  of  Oats. 


.5  <«• 

3   0 

E  0 

C  JC 

EH 

1888-91. 

1894-95. 

Import  in 

Thousands 

of  Tons. 

Imp  rt  constitutes 

Percentage 

of  Production. 

Import  in 

Thousands 

of  Tons. 

Import  constitutes 

Percentage 

of  Production. 

o'B 

S.2 

V    ifl 

o'i: 

Ic3 

Germany  . 
France 
England    . 
Italy  . 
Austria 

4759 
3279 
3065 
213 
2792 

183 

131 
426 

13 

4 

82 

262 

II 

3-9 

6.5 

22.4 

II-5 

263 
227 
625 

66 

63 

187 

163 

5 

48 

6.8 

12.6 

25-7 

2.3 

4.1 

From   which    appears   the  following   deficiency  of  home 
production  : 


298         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE': 


1888-91. 

1894  95. 

In  Germany     . 

.     18  davs 

31  days 

„    France 

21     „ 

41     .» 

,,    England 

66     „ 

76    » 

„    Italy 

38     „ 

8    „ 

„   Austria 

j» 

15    M 

66 


Number  of  Days  on  which  Oats  would  be  Lacking, 
1888-91.  1894-95. 


18 


21 


38 


Germany 


France 


England 


: 


Italy 


Austria 


3i 


41 


15 


76 


Russia,  on  the  contrary,  yearly  exports  836,065  tons  of 
oats,  or  a  superfluity  of  16.7  per  cent,  after  the  satisfaction 
of  her  own  needs. 

Such  deficiencies  of  grain,  of  course,  are  not  everywhere 
the  same.  In  each  country  there  are  localities  which  pro- 
duce sufficient  of  these  products.  In  other  localities,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  need  to  import  grain  arises  immediately 
after  harvest. 

The  following  table  shows,  for  instance,  the  distribution 
of  harvests  in  Germany  : 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  299 


Superfluous  Local 

Deficiency  of  Local 

Production, 

Production, 

District. 

comparatively  with 

comparatively  with 

the  Requirements  for 

the  Requirements  for 

One  Inhabitant,  in 

One  Inhabitant,  in 

Hundredweights 

Hundredweights 

Posen           .... 

1.78 

Pr.  Saxony 

1.63 



Bavaria       .         .         ._       . 
E.  and  W.  Prussia     . 

0.84 



0-57 

— 

Hesse-Cassel 

0.21 



Average  for  all  Prussia 

— 

0.65 

Silesia         .... 

— 

0.624 

Westphalia 

— 

1.888 

Brandenburg  (and  Berlin) 

— 

1.844 

Hesse- Nassau     . 

— 

2.06 

K.  Saxony  .... 

— 

2.43 

Wurtemburg 

— 

2.834 

Pri.  Rhine  Provinces 

— 

2.892 

G.  Duchy  Baden 

— 

2.938 

Other  parts  of  the  Empire 

0.4 

Thus  the  harvest  appreciably  .exceeds  the  demand  in 
Prussian  Saxony,  the  kingdom  of  Bavaria,  Eastern  and 
Western  Prussia — that  is,  in  the  Eastern  territories  of 
Germany  near  the  Russian  frontier.  A  considerable 
superfluity  is  also  found  in  Hesse  Cassel  and  in  other 
parts  of  the  Empire  v^^hich  for  the  sake  of  brevity  are 
not  set  out  separately.  In  all  the  other  provinces  the 
demand  exceeds  the  supply,  and  in  certain  parts  of  the 
empire — as  in  Brandenburg,  Baden,  Wurtemburg,  the 
Rhine  provinces,  and  Saxony — by  more  than  half. 

And  as  in  these  parts  of  the  empire  agriculture 
occupies  about  42  per  cent,  of  the  population,  agriculturists 
through  dread  of  famine  will  hold  their  stocks  of  pro- 
visions for  themselves,  and  for  the  remainder  of  the 
population  it  will  be  necessary  on  the  very  day  after 
harvest  to  draw  grain  from  other  localities. 

In  times  of  peace  the  industrial  districts  may  import 
grain  from  America,  Austria,  Roumania,  and  Russia,  and 
even   from    the    eastern    provinces   of   Prussia    where   a 


300         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

surplus  exists.  With  the  declaration  of  war,  for  the 
reasons  we  have  indicated,  this  import  must  cease.  To 
rely  on  supplies  from  Austria  and  Roumania  is  out  of  the 
question  when  we  consider  local  needs  and  decreased 
efficiency  of  the  railway  system  resulting  from  military 
operations.  To  avert  famine,  even  temporarily,  the 
eastern  provinces  might  be  drawn  upon,  but  in  conse- 
quence of  its  proximity  to  the  theatre  of  war,  grain  there 
will  be  bought  up  for  the  use  of  the  d^my. 

Mr.  V.  1.  Hedzvetski,  in  a  remarkable  article  on  ^'  The 
Struggle  with  Famine  in  a  Future  War,"  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  in  the  granaries  of  the  future  base  of  the 
German  army  near  the  Russian  frontier  there  will  be  but 
a  month's  or  a  month  and  a  half  s  provisions  for  960,000 
men  and  220,000  horses.  But  on  the  figures  of  General 
Leer  we  find  that  the  number  of  men  to  be  fed  will  amount 
to  1,200,000.  And  as  armies  at  the  theatre  of  war  will 
not  be  in  a  condition  to  supply  their  needs  from  local 
sources,  it  is  plain  that  the  above-mentioned  stores  must 
be  constantly  replenished,  if  not  for  the  whole  number  of 
men  mentioned,  at  least  for  the  greater  part. 

Even  if  Posen  and  Eastern  Prussia  were  in  a  condition 
after  the  satisfaction  of  military  requirements  to  distribute 
part  of  their  superfluity  among  the  neighbouring  pro- 
vinces which  require  grain,  which  is  very  unlikely  in  view 
of  the  demands  of  the  commissariat,  still  prices  must  so 
rise  that  among  the  poorer  classes  famine  will  be 
inevitable. 

To  form  a  general  idea  of  the  commotion  which  war 
would  cause  in  Germany,  we  must  take  into  account  not 
only  average  figures  of  production,  import  and  dernand, 
but  also  the  operation  of  undetermined  forces,  the  influence 
of  which  may  be  disastrous.  The  very  fear  of  need, 
owing  to  the  impossibility  of  drawing  supplies  from  the 
usual  sources,  may  not  only  appreciably  raise  prices,  but 
even  call  forth  a  panic.  In  the  famine  of  189 1  we  had  a 
living  example  of  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  the  full 
possibility  of  import  of  corn  by  sea  and  land,  the  dread  of 
need  may  have  immense  influence  on  the  rise  of  prices. 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  301 

It  is  necessary  also  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that 
between  the  harvests  of  different  years  a  considerable 
difference  exists.  If  we  take  the  average  yearly  harvest 
in  the  period  188 5- 1889  in  different  countries,  in  millions 
of  bushels,  at  a  hundred,  then  for  separate  years  in  each 
country  we  will  find  the  following  departure  from  the 
average : 


Average 

Harvest 

1885-89. 

Harvest  in 

1885-89 

in  Millions 

Maximum. 

Minimum. 

of  Bushels 
taken  at 

100. 

Year. 

Per  Cent. 

Year. 

Per  Cent. 

Russia 

1725-7 

1887 

1 14.7 

1889 

86.2 

Germany  . 

701.8 

1886 

106.2 

1889 

91.9 

France 

701.8 

1886 

102.6 

1888 

96.6 

A  u  st  ria- 

Hungary 

692.9 

1887 

108.4 

1889 

87.1 

Gt.  Britain 

312.8 

1885 

104.5 

1887 

95-4 

Italy. 

221.2 

1887 

I05-5 

1888 

91.9 

Roumania 

140.9 

1887 

135-5 

1885-86 

77-7 

Servia 

25-9 

1888 

131-9 

1885] 

1886 

1887 

91-5 

1889) 

From  these  statistics  we  see  that  the  departure  in 
Germany  amounts  to  6  per  cent,  above  the  average  and 
to  8  per  cent,  below  it.  In  other  countries  the  difference 
is  still  more  striking,  as  for  instance  in  Russia  and 
Austria,  where  in  consequence  of  a  lower  culture,  harvests 
are  more  unequal.  In  Russia  this  difference  amounts 
on  both  sides  to  14  per  cent.,  while  in  Austria  the  differ- 
ence amounts  to  8  per  cent,  on  the  good  side  and  13  per 
cent,  on  the  bad. 

All  these  conditions:  the  small  production  in  comparison 
with  the  demand,  the  cessation  of  import  from  abroad,  the 
indispensable  supply  of  millions  of  soldiers  who  consume 
much  more  than  ^vhen  fed  at  their  own  expense  at  home, 


302         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

and  finally,  the  efforts  of  the  prosperous  part  of  the  popu- 
lation tc  guarantee  themselves  by  storage  against  the 
danger  of  famine — all  these  conditions  must  inevitably 
give  rise  to  vast  speculations  in  wheat  which  will  cause 
an  unprecedented  rise  in  prices. 

The  disasters  which  will  take  place  in  consequence  of 
the  want  of  bread  in  time  of  war  have  not  failed  to  attract  the 
attention  of  statesmen  and  economists.  Still  this  question, 
notwithstanding  its  gravity,  has  up  till  to-day  remained  an 
abstract  one,  and  has  never  permeated  to  the  minds  of  the 
people. 

In  the  German  parliament  the  problem  was  raised  more 
than  once,  but  was  not  considered  publicly,  and  each  time 
its  solution  was  entrusted  to  the  consideration  of  a  secret 
committee.  The  Government  revealed  to  this  committee  its 
project  for  furnishing  Germany  with  corn  from  Egypt 
through  the  Suez  Canal,  through  Italy  by  the  Swiss  and 
Austrian  railways,  and  partly  from  Hungary  and  Roumania. 
How  vain  these  hopes  would  prove  to  be  might  easily  be 
shown  by  an  examination  of  the  probable  condition  of 
maritime  communications  in  time  of  war.  In  any  case, 
even  if  under  the  protection  of  the  Italian  and  English 
fleets  it  were  possible  to  import  grain  through  the 
Suez  Canal,  the  risk  and  costliness  of  such  an  undertaking 
would  cause  so  great  a  rise  in  the  price  of  bread  that  the 
difficulty  would  in  no  way  be  surmounted. 

In  view  of  this,  other  means  for  the  solution  of  the 
question  have  been  devised.  Thus  the  author  of  the 
brochure  A  u/  der  Sc/iwel/e  desKriegs,  on  the  supposition  that 
war  may  break  out  suddenly  with  France,  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  at  present  only  three  Great  Powers  may  be 
considered  independent  as  relates  to  the  feeding  of  their 
population — ^the  United  States,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Russia.  Germany  after  the  stoppage  of  the  export  of 
bread  from  Russia  would  find  herself  in  the  position  of  a 
besieged  fortress.  What  would  her  position  be  in  case 
of  a  prolonged  war  when  home  production  would  be 
diminished,  and  transport  from  oversea  would  be  threatened 
by  the  powerful  fleets  of  her  enemies  ? 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  303 

The  author  of  this  pamphlet  proposes  to  found  state 
granaries,  not  only  for  the  supply  of  the  army,  but  also  as 
a  guarantee  against  famine  among  the  civil  population. 
Such  granaries  would  have  the  further  advantage  of 
serving  as  a  corrective  against  exceptional  rises  in 
price. 

But  from  the  statistics  given  above  as  to  the  quantity 
of  grain  needed  yearly,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  difficulties 
which  present  themselves  in  the  execution  of  this  project. 
The  quantity  of  provisions  whicli  it  would  be  necessary  to 
hold  and  renew  would  require  such  great  yearly  expenditure 
that  the  consent  of  parliaments  would  be  extremely  difficult 
to  obtain. 

II. 

The  deficiency  of  bread  is  but  one  of  the  difficulties 
with  which  nations  will  have  to  contend  upon  entering 
upon  war.  A  similar  deficiency  will  appear  in  many 
other  necessaries  of  life.  Of  these  meat  is  the  chief,  and 
it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  relations  between  the  local 
supply  and  the  quantity  imported.  The  following  table 
sets  forth  the  relation  : 


Trade  in  Meat  in  Tons  (looo  Kilogrammes). 

Import. 

Export. 

Superfluity. 

Deficiency. 

Austria  . 
Russia  . 
Italy      . 
Germany 
France  . 

328 
20 

123 
28,787 
20,262 

8,820 
1,623 

1,443 

16,721 

2,016 

8492 
1603 
1320 

12,066 
18,246 

From  this  it  appears  that  Austria,  Russia,  and  Italy 
produce  more  meat  than  they  require,  while  Germany  and 
France  are  compelled  to  supply  their  deficiencies  by 
import.  In  Germany  in  1890  the  import  exceeded  the 
export  by  12,066  tons,  in  France  by  18,246  tons.     Thus 


3^4 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


those  countries  which  produce  sufficient  grain  are  also 
guaranteed  against  deficiency  of  meat.  In  the  event  of  a 
prolonged  war,  Germany  and  France  will  suffer  from  a 
deficiency  in  both  the  chief  necessaries  of  life. 

It  is  true  that  both  in  Germany  and  in  France  the  stock 
of  cattle  is  so  great  that  it  seems  possible  by  increasing 
the  number  killed  to  compensate  for  the  diminution  in 
import,  but  in  view  of  the  high  value  of  the  cattle  raised 

Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Meat  in  Thousands  of  Tons. 

Superfluity.  Deficiency. 


8.5 

1 

1 

i 

Austria 

1.6 

Russia 

1-3 

Italy 

Germany 

France 

■^imm.^ 

i 


12. 1 


1 8.2 


in  those  countries,  the  cost  of  meat  will  be  raised  to  an 
extreme  height  so  as  to  compensate  the  producer. 

In  relation  to  salt  Russia  is  in  a  less  favourable  position 
than  the  Western  Powers. 


Trade  in  Salt  in  Tons  (looo  Kilogrammes). 

Import. 

Export. 

Superfluity. 

Deficiency. 

Austria 
Germany   . 
Italy  '. 
Russia 

20,967 
17,246 

10,098 
199,607 
191,475 

7,475 

10,098 
178,640 
191,475 

9771 

EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  305 


Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Salt  in  Thousands  of  Tons. 

Superfluity 

lO.i 


178.6 

t9t.9 


Deficiency 

\ 


Austria 


Germany 


Italy 


Russia 


I 


9.1 


But  the  deficiency  ot  salt  in  Russia  of  9771  tons 
yearly  may  be  supplied,  with  but  an  insignificant  increase 
in  price,  by  the  increase  of  local  production. 

As  relates  to  the  supply  of  kerosene,  which  has  now 
become  a  product  of  the  first  importance,  Russia  is  in  an 
enviable  position : 


Trade  in  Keiosene  in  Tons  (looo  Kilogrammes). 

Import. 

Export. 

Superfluity. 

Deficiency. 

Russia 
Austria  . 
Italy 
France  . 
Germany 

252,459 

70,000 

129,770 

647,295 

12,459 
6,230 

12,459 

246,229 

70,000 

129,770 

647,295 

The  known  richness  of  the  naphtha  springs  of  the 
Caucasus  makes  it  possible  to  export  a  considerable  quan- 
tity of  kerosene.  Germany,  Italy,  and  France  ^11  import 
kerosene  from  abroad.  The  import  into  Austria  is  also 
considerable,  although  local  production  (in  Galicia)  grows 
constantly,  and  in  a  short  time  Austria  may  be  fully 
supplied  by  local  production. 

u 


3o6         IS-  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Kerosene  in  Thousands  of  TonSc 


»2.4 


^PLOITY 

Hto.o 

Deficiency 

1 

Russia 

Italy 

France 

Austria 

[246.2 

Germany 

bhhh 

647 


1  he  question  of  stone  coal  presents  itself  as  follows. 
The  net  import,  after  deducting  the  export,  is,  in  France, 
8049  thousand  tons,  in  Austria  1623  thousand  tons,  and  in 
Russia  1525  thousand  tons.  The  export  of  coal  from 
Germany  exceeds  the  import  by  4492  thousand  tons. 


Superfluity  or  Deficiency  of  Stone  Coal  in  Thousands  of  Tons. 


SuPERPLUITY 


4.J 


Oeficiencv 


1 

T 
1 

■■ 

Germany 

Russia 

1 

U 

Austria 

1.6 

France 

■ 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

8.0 


Thus  in  regard  to  coal  Germany  finds  herself  in  the 
most  favourable  position,  after  her  coming  Austria,  which 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  307 

may  supply  decreased  import  by  increased  local  working, 
although,  in  consequence  of  the  stoppage  of  many  factories, 
this,  in  all  probability,  would  not  be  required. 

In  Russia  the  supply  of  coal  is  thus  obtained  :  From  the 
Dombrovsk  mines  about  2475  thousand  tons,  from  the 
remaining  mines  3754  thousand  tons.  In  time  of  war  the 
supply  from  the  Dombrovsk  mines  might  cease,  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  demand  would  inevitably  diminish  owing 
to  the  stoppage  of  factories.  A  considerable  part  of  the 
Russian  population  employs  wood  for  heating  purposes, 
and  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  this  respect. 

As  regards  cotton,  Russia  is  to  a  considerable  extent 
guaranteed  by  supply  from  Bokhara.  Of  wool,  skins, 
and  linen  there  will  be  no  deficiency. 

A  grave  question  also  arises  whether  all  these  countries 
will  be  in  a  position  to  renew  their  armaments  and  muni- 
tions of  war.  In  this  respect  the  majority  of  states  are 
guaranteed.  With  the  exception  of  Italy,  Turkey,  and 
Roumania,  there  exist  everywhere  immense  factories  for 
the  production  of  arms  and  ammunition,  so  that  in  any 
case  war  will  not  be  stopped  through  want  of  arms. 

Thanks  to  the  energetic  measures  taken  by  the  govern- 
ment, the  working  and  manufacture  of  iron  and  steel  in 
Russia  has  grown  uninterruptedly,  as  the  following  figures 
demonstrate : 


' — 

Production  in  Thousands  of  Tons. 

Pig-iron. 

Iron. 

Steel. 

I88I .... 

1890  .... 

460,000 
908,035.7 

286,071 
424,286 

287,678.6 
371*250 

This  quantity  of  material  is,  of  course,  more  than  suffi- 
cient for  military  purposes.  In  an  Imperial  decree  of 
October  1866  we  find  the  following  directions  :  *' To  cease 
for  the  future  to  give  government  orders  abroad  .  .  ,  and 


3o8         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

all  orders,  both  of  the  Ministry  of  War,  the  Ministry  of 
Paths  and  Communications,  and  of  the  other  departments 
of  state  to  fulfil  inside  the  country,  notwithstanding  the 
difficulties  and  inconveniences  which  may  arise  at  first." 
As  the  result  of  this  decision  there  arose  a  large  number 
of  factories  furnished  with  the  latest  mechanism  and 
machinery  for  the  manufacture  of  articles  of  military 
equipment.  It  is  enough  to  mention  that  even  in  1880 
out  of  686  guns  on  the  fleet,  498  were  cast  in  the  Obukovsk 
factory  alone,  and  that  these  guns,  as  was  demonstrated  by 
test  against  armour,  were  in  every  way  equal  to  the  guns  of 
Krupp.  Thus  the  12-inch  gun,  at  a  distance  of  7000  feet, 
penetrated  armour  of  a  thickness  of  12.6  inches,  the  9-inch 
gun  armour  of  a  thickness  of  6  59  inches,  and  the  6-inch 
gun  armour  of  a  thickness  of  3.1  inches. 


III. 

It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  the  disastrous  con- 
sequences of  war  will  be  especially  felt  in  countries  with 
highly  developed  industries — that  is,  in  Germany,  France, 
and  England.  With  the  interruption  of  the  ordinary  com- 
munications, with  the  diminution  in  demand,  and  the 
approach  of  danger,  factories,  mines,  and  workshops,  with 
the  exception  of  those  whose  products  are  necessary  for 
the  equipment  of  armies,  will  be  forced  to  discontinue  work- 
ing. The  fathers  of  families,  taken  from  their  homes  and 
sent  to  join  the  arm.y  at  a  few  hours'  notice,  will  leave 
their  families,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  unprovided  against 
the  needs  of  the  morrow. 

The  following  statistics  are  interesting  as  giving  an  idea 
how  far  the  population  of  Germany  is  guaranteed  against 
hunger  by  the  income  it  receives  in  time  of  peace : 

Millions  of 
Pounds  Sterling.     Per  Cent. 

Insufficient  incomes  amount  to      .  16.3        i.e.    22.1 
Small  „  „  .  22.53       „     30-5 

Limited  „  ,,  .  13.345     „     18.1 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  309 


Millions  of 
Pounds  Sterling. 

Per  Cent. 

Moderate  incomes  amount  to 

.  12.33      i.e. 

16.7 

Large                „                „ 
Very  large        „                „ 

•     6.555      ,> 
.     2.69       „ 

8.9 

3-7 

It  is  unquestionable  that  these  incomes  **  insufficient " 
for  supplying  the  first  necessaries  of  life,  and  "  small  " 
and  *'  limited "  incomes  represent  the  earnings  on  which 
an  immense  proportion  of  the  population  lives,  and  that 
the  stoppage  or  even  the  diminution  of  income  will  place 
this  proportion  in  a  critical  position.  The  earnings  of 
those  in  these  classes  constitute  more  than  70  per  cent,  of 
the  entire  income  of  the  people.  The  class  which  enjoys  a 
**  moderate  "  income  can  only  to  a  small  extent  help  those 
in  need  in  the  moment  of  danger.  There  remain  the 
rich  classes,  and  on  them  must  fall  the  chief  duty  of 
helping  the  majority.  But  the  income  of  this  class,  with 
"  large  "  and  *•  very  large  "  mcomes,  forms  only  ;^9,250,000, 
or  I2|  per  cent,  of  the  whole  income  of  the  people. 
In  what  way  can  the  incomes  of  the  rich  class  com- 
pensate the  majority  of  the  population  for  the  decrease 
by  a  considerable  extent,  a  decrease  of  a  half  or  even  a 
third,  of  the  incomes  of  that  majority  which  constitute 
i;52,i75,ooo? 

Is  it  possible  that  12J  per  cent,  of  the  total  income, 
even  though  it  went  entirely  to  the  aid  of  the  needy 
classes,  could  appreciably  compensate  the  latter  for  the 
losses  to  which  they  would  be  subjected  (70  per  cent,  of  the 
total  income  of  the  people)  ?  And  this,  when  we  bear  in 
mind  that  the  incomes  of  the  rich  themselves  will  be 
reduced  in  time  of  war  ? 

As  relates  to  the  provision  which  the  working  classes 
in  a  time  of  crisis  would  find  in  their  own  savings,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  these  savings  are  very  inconsider- 
able. Here  is  the  picture  drawn  by  Dr.  Von  Schulze- 
Gavernitz  in  his  work,  **  Der  Grossbetrieb "  (Leipzig, 
1892).  "  In  the  great  majority  of  cases  the  earnings 
hardly  cover  expenses,  and  very  often  a  deficiency  appears 
which  is  supplied  by  recourse  to  charity,  often  to  prostitu- 


3IO         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

tion,  while  in  many  cases  families  are  compelled  to  endure 
privation  and  even  hunger." 

In  the  investigations  of  Chief  Factory  Inspector  Vari- 
schoffer,  issued  by  the  Bavarian  Government,  it  is  explained 
that  even  in  large  manufactures  (for  instance,  in  chemical 
factories)  the  workers  receive  barely  enough  to  satisfy  the 
"  physiological  minimum "  of  existence.  In  the  great 
industries  wages  hardly  suffice  for  necessary  food,  which 
consists  chiefly  of  potatoes  and  rye  bread.  But  these 
earnings  are  nevertheless  higher  than  those  yielded  by 
handicrafts  and  work  at  home.  Under  the  most  favour- 
able circumstances  the  wages  of  workers  are  sufficient 
only  for  food,  nothing  remaining  over.  It  is  plain,  there- 
fore, that  in  a  critical  time  savings  cannot  be  counted 
upon. 

The  unfortunate  fact  must  be  noted  that  need  will 
appear  with  especial  force  in  those  very  localities  in 
which  there  is  a  deficiency  of  grain,  and  where  the  supply 
of  grain  will  present  the  greatest  difficulties.  In  the 
kingdom  of  Saxony,  as  we  have  already  seen,  there  is 
an  average  deficiency  for  each  inhabitant  of  267.3  lt)S.  of 
grain,  or  about  50  per  cent,  of  the  demand,  while  in  that 
kingdom  only  22.6  per  cent,  of  the  population  lives  by 
agriculture,  and  77.3  per  cent,  by  trade. 

In  the  Rhine  provinces  we  find  a  deficiency  of  278.1  lbs. 
kilos  of  grain  per  inhabitant,  or  about  60  per  cent,  of  the 
demand,  while  65  per  cent,  of  the  population  lives  on 
incomes  derived  from  trade  and  industry. 

In  addition,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  pro- 
portion of  the  population  living  by  industry  grows  rapidly. 
In  an  inconsiderable  period  of  time  the  industrial  popula- 
tion of  Germany  has  been  quadrupled.  This  increase  has 
already  gone  too  far.  The  working  forces  newly  appearing, 
.competing  ceaselessly  with  the  old,  lower  the  wages  of  the 
older  workmen  to  an  extreme  level.  Statistics  witness  that 
even  now  a  great  part  of  the  workmen  in  Prussia,  though 
working  twelve  or  fifteen  hours  a  day,  earn  extremely 
little. 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON   IHE  PEOPLE  311 


Industry. 

Glass  and  kerosene  production 

Iron  foundries     . 

Working  of  iron  ore 

Cotton  factories 

Chemical  factories 

Spinning 

Cigar  factories    . 

Preparation  of  agricultural  products 

Milling  of  all  kinds 


Weekly  Wages. 

15s.  gd. 

14s.  Sd. 

14s.  lod. 

13s.  od. 

10s.  Sd. 

los.  jd. 

gs.  6d. 

gs.  2d. 

gs.  lod. 


Taking  these  circumstances  into  consideration,  we  must 
conclude  that  in  certain  portions  of  Germany  the  Govern- 
ment, especially  in  view  of  the  propagandas  and  tendencies 
which  now  operate  among  the  masses,  will  not  be  able  to 
remain  indifferent  to  the  needs  of  the  population. 

A  war  with  the  terrible  methods  of  destruction  now 
employed  and  in  view  of  the  masses  of  people  which  will 
be  sent  to  the  front  ma}^,  in  spite  of  the  predictions  of 
military  authorities  who  prophesy  years  of  struggle,  prove 
to  be  short  and  decisive.  But  even  in  that  event  the  danger 
for  the  present  social  order  cannot  be  considered  small. 

By  a  very  natural  coincidence  the  greatest  deficiency  of 
food  will  be  experienced  in  those  localities  where  trade  and 
industry  are  most  highly  developed — that  is,  in  districts 
thoroughly  permeated  b}^  socialism.  A  glance  at  the  chart 
on  the  next  page,  which  illustrates  the  voting  for  Socialists 
and  Freisinnigen  at  the  elections  of  1890,  is  sufficient  to 
confirm  this  statement.  In  the  districts  marked  in  black 
were  elected  for  parliament  Socialists  (Socialdemocraten, 
Socialistes  -  democrates),  in  those  fined  Freethinkers 
(Deutschfreisinnig,  progressivists),  those  with  black  dots  in- 
dicate that  Socialist  candidates  stood  but  were  not  elected. 

In  1890  were  elected  for  parliament: 


Conservatives   . 

73 

Popular  Party 

,     10 

Adherents  of  the  Govern- 

Wollfites 

II 

ment 

.     20 

Alsatians 

.     10 

Freisinnigen 

108 

Dane 

I 

Members  of  the  Centre 

106 

Anti-semites   o 

.       5 

Poles 

16 

Others 

2 

Socialists  = 

35 

312 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Chart  showing  tJic  Comparative  Development  of  Socialists 
and  Freethinkers  in  Germany  according  to  the  Elec- 
tions of  1 89 1. 


0    j«  10 

M6     #    Mil 

■^  '  0   M  18 


1.  lierlin. 

2.  KunigsLerg. 

3.  Dantzig. 

4.  Stettin, 

5.  Breslau. 


6.  Magdeburg. 

7.  Wiesbaden. 

8.  Cologne. 

9.  Diisseldorf. 
10.  Aachen. 


11.  Bavaria. 

12.  Saxony  with  Dresden. 

13.  Saxony  with  Leipzig. 

14.  Hamburg. 

15.  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 


%*  In  the  localities  marked  in  black,  Socialists  were  elected  ;  in  the  shaded 
localities,  Freethinkers  ;  tlie  black  dots  indicate  socialist  candidatures  which 
failed. 


Even  if  it  be  assumed  that  the  Socialists  and  their 
adherents  in  the  ranks  of  the  army  will  fulfil  their  duties 
as  other  citizens  fulfil  them,  still  the  question  remains  : 
Will  disarmament  be  carried  out  as  easily  as  armament  ? 
To  answer  this  question  definitel}^  is  impossible  now. 
But  before  war  is  decided  upon  it  is  worth  considering 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  7  HE  PEOPLE  313 

whether  the  most  splendid  successes  can  compensate  for 
the  dangers  that  hasten  on  the  path  of  war. 

In  France  the  position  will  be  somewhat  better.  Of 
17,798,000  persons,  whose  incomes  together  constitute 
^900,000,000,  almost  five-sixths  belong  to  the  class  of 
poor  people  whose  incomes  are  quite  inconsiderable  : 

Persons.  Per  Cent. 

Working  in  industry, trade,  and  transport     3,835.000    i.e.    21.5 
Serving  for  salaries         ....     1,132,000      „       6.4 
Domestic  servants  .         ....     1,950,000      „      11 
Small  producers,  workers  and  subordi- 
nates whose  incomes  do  not  appre- 
ciably  exceed  the  highest  wages  of 
workmen 3,700,000     „     20.8 


Total    ,         .         .  10,617,000     „     59.7 

The  incomes  of  the  above-mentioned  categories  amount 
to  ;^400,000,000.  Agricultural  labourers  number 
3,435,000,  t'.c.^  19.3  per  cent.  Their  incomes,  amounting 
to  ;^8o,ooo,ooo,  are  also  not  guaranteed. 

No  better  will  be  the  position  of  England,  where  the 
question  of  the  feeding  of  the  people  has  recently 
awakened  great  interest.  The  National  Review  quotes  a 
speech  of  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  in  which  we  find  an 
argument  which  touches  closely  upon  our  subject.  **  To 
such  a  degree  have  we  become  accustomed  to  have 
everything  necessary  for  the  support  of  life  and  unin- 
terrupted work  arrive  in  our  ports  in  due  time,  that  we 
cannot  even  imagine  a  different  position.  Yet  there  is 
not  the  slightest  doubt  that  in  the  event  of  war  with  a 
naval  power  the  price  of  wheat  would  rise  greatly  in 
England,  and,  reacting  immediately  on  all  industries, 
produce  an  unprecedented  catastrophe.  In  her  present 
state  of  defence,  England  has  not  the  strength  to 
guarantee  the  transport  of  provisions."  Lord  Charles 
Beresford,  with  similar  confidence,  declared  that  in  time 
of  war  England  could  not  count  upon  the  supply  from 
oversea   of  the   necessaries   of    life.     Admiral    Hornby, 


314         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

presiding  at  a  meeting  with  the  object  of  presenting  a 
petition  to  the  Government  on  the  subject  of  the  taking 
of  precautions  against  the  stoppage  of  suppHes,  said 
*'  that  if  England  gained  several  victories  at  sea,  and 
the  regular  transport  of  provisions  were  still  inter- 
rupted, it  would  be  worse  for  the  people  than  several 
defeats." 

In  Russia,  at  first  sight,  the  position  of  the  people  in 
the  case  of  war  seems  enviable ;  86  per  cent,  of  the 
population  is  engaged  in  agriculture.  But,  as  the  price 
of  agricultural  products  is  very  low,  the  agricultural  class 
earns  an  income  amounting  only  to  52  per  cent,  of  the 
general  income,  while  in  Germany  an  agricultural 
population  of  37  per  cent,  earns  35  per  cent,  of  the 
income,  in  France  42  per  cent,  of  agriculturists  earn  40 
per  cent,  of  the  total  income,  and  in  Austria  49  per  cent, 
of  agriculturists  earn  45  per  cent,  of  the  income. 

But  worse  than  this  is  the  fact  that  savings  in  Russia 
are  inconsiderable,  and  thus  the  consequences  of  war  for 
Russia  might  be  not  less  terrible  than  for  other  countries. 
Such  a  proposition  is  all  the  more  probable  since  the 
poverty  arising  from  war  springs  not  only  from  direct 
losses,  but  from  the  disorganisation  caused  by  the 
destruction  of  ordinary  relations,  and  by  the  fall  of 
values.  To  cover  the  expenditure  on  war  all  states  will 
be  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  the  raising  of  loans  or  the 
issue  of  paper  money. 

The  price  of  all  the  necessaries  of  life  must  grow, 
and  the  purchasing  power  of  the  inconsiderable  savings 
possessed  by  the  people  will  be  greatly  diminished. 

All  this  leads  to  the  conclusion  that,  nolens  ixolcns^ 
governments  will  be  forced  to  take  on  themselves  the  care 
of  feeding  the  families  of  those  serving  with  the  army. 
The  results  of  such  an  undertaking  cannot  be  foreseen. 
If  we  suppose  that  governments  will  be  forced  to  interfere 
in  the  regulation  of  prices,  and  to  support  the  population, 
we  must  ask,  will  it  be  easy  after  the  war  to  abandon  this 
practice  and  re-establish  the  old  order  ?  And  will  not  this 
moment  of  transition  to  the  normal  order  of  things  be 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  315 

characterised  by  events  similar  to  those  which  took  place 
in  France  after  the  war  of  1870-71  ? 

The  destitute  position  of  the  population  in  time  of  war 
may  be  extremely  dangerous  to  social  order  if  w^ar  be 
prolonged,  and  in  the  opinion  of  very  authoritative  military 
writers  this  is  more  than  probable.  In  connection  with 
this  subject  we  may  quote  the  opinion  of  General  Leer  : 
"Even  with  small  armies,  the  years  18 12- 13- 14  present 
a  continuous  three  years  war.  How  much  time  will  be 
needed  to  conquer  (to  employ  the  expression  of  Von  der 
Goltz)  the  modern  Antaeus  and  tear  him  from  the  earth, 
sending  against  him  army  after  army  ?  The  impending 
struggle  will  not  be  decided  by  swift,  heavy  blows,  but 
will  be  prolonged,  it  may  be,  even  for  years."  Such  is  the 
opinion  of  the  best  German  and  French  military  special- 
ists— war  with  Russia  cannot  be  finished  in  one  year,  but 
will  require  several  campaigns. 

In  the  composition  of  the  German  army  will  be  found 
the  whole  male  population  fit  for  service,  from  17  to  45 
inclusive.  Considering  that  for  agricultural  labour  the 
working  age  is  between  15  and  65  years,  it  will  be 
shown  that  56  per  cent,  of  the  working  class  will  be 
called  under  the  flag.  Even  if  we  suppose  that  not  all 
Germans  liable  to  service  will  be  employed  in  war,  still  if 
Germany  proposes,  as  was  announced  by  Caprivi,  to 
carry  on  an  offensive  war  on  both  frontiers,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  withdraw  from  work  such  a  quantity  of 
working  forces  that  the  remaining  population  will  not 
be  able  to  accomplish  a  work  which  in  times  of  peace 
occupies  the  whole  working  male  population.  For  this 
reason  alone  production  in  time  of  war  must  be  greatly 
diminished  ;  the  need  for  the  import  of  food  will  grow  ; 
and  the  question  of  suppl}'  will  become  a  hopeless  one. 

In  addition  to  this  insufficiency  of  workers,  we  may 
point  also  to  the  difficulty  which  will  arise  in  the  matter 
of  horses.  If  we  may  believe  the  statistics  given  in 
L Annee  Militaire  in  1892  the  demand  for  horses  in  the 
different  states  on  mobilisation  will  be  as  shown  in  the 
following  table  : 


3i6 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


In  Thousands. 

From  each 
Hundred  Horses 

In  Time  of 

In  Time  of 

Number  of 

will  be  required 

Peace 

War  will 

Horses  in  the 

for  War  Purposes : 

Army  holds 

be  required 

Country. 

Russia 

1 60 

340 

25,000 

1.36 

France 

142 

308 

3,000 

10.26 

England    . 

15 

14 

2,000 

0.70 

Italy  . 

45 

75 

750 

lO.O 

Austria 

77 

173 

4,000 

4-32 

Germany  . 

116 

334 

3,000 

II. 13 

Percentage  of  Horses  which  would  be  taken  for  Military  Purposes, 


Russia 


France 


■  1 

1 

l.d 

___ 

___ 

WW 

l...»-**» ■ ■■■■■■•■ .••••.•..I 

10.; 


England 


Italy 


li;  0.7 


■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■I 


10 


•0 


Austria 


- 

r- 

-- 

- 

-- 

Germany 


ll.i 


Of  the  334,cx)0  horses  which  will  be  required  by 
Germany  the  majority  will  of  course  be  taken  from  farmers. 
But  this  cannot  fail  to  react  injuriously  on  agriculture. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  with  the  intense  system  of 
farming  in  Germany,  fields  never  rest,  one  crop  follows 
after  another,  and  delay  in  working  will  undoubtedly  cause 


EFFECT  OF  WAR  ON  THE  PEOPLE  317 

difficulties  unknown  under  the  more  primitive  systems  of 
farming.  As  is  well  known,  a  holiday  is  kept  in  Germany 
at  the  beginning  of  field  labours,  the  so-named  Biisstag 
(day  of  prayer  and  penitence),  and  after  this  work  is 
carried  on  through  the  whole  summer  without  in- 
termission on  Sundays  or  holidays.  In  Germany,  even 
under  normal  conditions,  labour  is  so  intensely  utilised 
that  to  supply  the  labour  of  those  serving  with  the  army 
by  working  the  remaining  labourers  on  holidays  is  im- 
possible. 

In  the  German  army  will  be  found  38  per  cent., 
in  the  French  42  per  cent.,  and  in  the  Austrian  49  per 
cent,  of  the  total  number  of  agriculturists.  Even  if  we 
suppose  that  a  certain  proportion  of  factory  labour  will 
be  diverted  to  agriculture,  it  is  nevertheless  unquestion- 
able that  the  harvests  in  time  of  war  will  be  sensibly 
diminished. 

In  Russia  this  question  rests  on  an  entirely  different 
basis.  There  the  absence  of  working  agriculturists  will 
be  supplied  more  easily  than  elsewhere,  for  an  important 
proportion  of  the  peasants'  land  is  held  in  common.  It  is 
easy  to  be  an  opponent  of  this  system  of  agriculture  and 
even  to  attribute  to  it  the  low  condition  of  agriculture  among 
the  peasantry ;  but  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  the 
diversion  to  war  of  a  great  number  of  woiking  hands  will 
be  borne  much  more  easily  under  this  system  than  under 
individual  proprietorship.  In  general  the  land  abandoned 
by  the  labourer  who  has  been  summoned  under  the  flag 
will  not  remain  wholly  neglected.  Without  doubt  it  will 
be  cultivated  by  the  Mir^  and  the  owner  of  the  land  on 
return  will  re-assume  his  former  rights. 

In  addition  to  this,  agriculture  carried  on  on  a  low  level 
will  suffer  less  from  the  neglect  and  even  from  the  absence 
of  the  owner  than  a  more  intense  system.  In  the  absence 
of  a  system  of  progressive  improvement,  the  agriculturist 
on  returning  to  his  home  may  be  assured  that  he  will  find 
his  land  in  much  the  same  state  as  he  left  it  when  summoned 
to  the  front.  The  workers  in  factories  and  in  industries 
in  Russia  do  not  as  a  rule  cease  their  connection  with  the 


3i8         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

village  community.  On  the  stoppage  of  factory  work  at 
the  outbreak  of  war  they  will  return  to  their  villages  and 
devote  themselves  to  agriculture.  In  addition,  it  may  be 
noted  that  in  Russia  the  number  of  holidays  is  so  great 
that,  if  in  time  of  war  the  supreme  ecclesiastical  authority 
permitted  work  upon  holidays,  this  alone  would  compensate 
for  the  loss  of  working  forces  through  the  exigencies  of 
war. 

It  m.ust  not  be  forgotten  that  out  of  the  whole  population 
between  20  and  50  3^ears  of  age,  the  army  (considering 
only  attacking  forces)  will  take  in  Germany  31  per  cent. 
(3,000,000  men),  in  Austria  28  per  cent.,  in  France  47 
per  cent.,  while  in  Russia  (3,500,000)  it  will  take  onl}'  15 
per  cent.  As  Sundays  constitute  1 5  per  cent,  of  working 
time,  then  the  lost  contingent  of  working  hands  may  be 
compensated  for  by  Sunday  labour  alone,  without  trench- 
ing upon  the  immense  number  of  holidays  which  are 
observed. 

Upon  survey  of  the  facts  and  statistics  above  set  forth 
it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  following  conclusions  : 

(i)  The  advantage  rests  on  the  side  of  those  states  who 
possess  sufficient  means  of  production  and  who  in  conse- 
quence will  be  in  a  condition  to  carry  on  a  prolonged  war 
without  the  danger  of  internal  difficulties. 

(2)  In  view  of  the  prime  importance  of  the  feeding  of 
the  population,  those  states  whose  internal  resources  are 
deficient  must  see  that  crops  have  been  got  in  before  war 
breaks  out,  and  only  in  extreme  cases  decide  on  war  before 
harvests  are  over. 

(3)  It  is  most  probable  that  war  will  break  out  when  the 
harvest  of  the  country  which  intends  to  take  the  initiative 
is  above  the  average ;  with  a  bad  harvest  peace  may  be 
considered  as  guaranteed. 

(4)  The  most  serious  indication  of  approaching  war  will 
be  the  feverish  acquisition  of  provisions  by  those  states 
which  would  be  endangered  by  their  deficient  internal 
production. 

(5)  In  time  of  wai',  and  especially  after  it,  the  gravest 
popular  commotions  may  appear  in  Western  Europe. 


CHAPTER   VI 

PROBABLE    LOSSES    IN    FUTURE   WARS 

L — Statistics  for  Estimating  Losses. 

Cold  Steel. — The  use  of  the  bayonet,  the  lance,  and  the 
sword  have  not  changed.  As  we  have  shown  in  detail  in 
another  place  the  proportion  of  casualties  caused  by  cold 
steel  is  insignificant. 

Small  Arms. — Since  the  last  great  wars  the  power  of 
arms  has  grown  immensely  and  every  day  witnesses  fresh 
improvements. 

Let  us  quote  some  facts  as  example.  In  Germany, 
Austria,  France,  Russia,  England,  and  Turkey  a  rifle 
with  a  calibre  of  from  7.62  to  8  mil.  is  employed.  The 
distinctive  feature  of  these  weapons  is  the  force  of  the 
blow,  depending  from  greater  initial  speed  and  rotation 
of  the  bullet.  This  initial  speed  varies  from  680  to 
700  yards  a  second,  and  the  number  of  revolutions 
from  2475  to  2640  a  second.  In  the  Italian,  Dutch  and 
Roumanian  armies  rifles  have  been  adopted  with  a  calibre 
of  6.5  mil.,  with  an  initial  speed  of  750  yards,  and  rota- 
tion 3830  a  second.  In  the  United  States  a  6-mil.  rifle 
has  been  adopted.  In  Germany  and  Austria  experiments 
with  a  5.0-mi].  rifle  gave  remarkable  results.  The  signi- 
ficance of  these  changes  may  be  understood  from  the  fact 
that  the  penetrative  force  of  the  6.5-mil.  rifle  is  44  per  cent, 
greater  than  that  of  the  8-mil.  rifle. 

The  effect  of  a  rifle  shot  depends  first  of  all  upon  the 
energy  preserved  by  the  bullet  on  reaching  its  target  and 
then  upon  the  weight  of  the  bullet  in  relation  to  its  diameter 


320 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


and  upon  the  speed  of  its  flight.  The  following  diagram 
illustrates  the  difference  in  power  of  the  rifles  of  1877 
and  1890. 

Amount  in  Metro-Kilogrammes  of  Living  Force  of  a  Bullet  on  each 
Quadratic  Centimetre  of  its  Transverse  Area  on  Striking 
Obstacles  at  various  Ranges. 


Ul 


\SJ 


■III iiiim 

iiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiii 
lllllllllllllllllllll 
iiiiiiimiiiiiiiiiii 
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiinii 

iiiiiiiiiiiiii 

Miiiiiiiinii 
IIIIIIIIIIIIII 
IIIIIIIIIIIIII 
IIIIIIIIIIIIII 

Ullllllllllll 

~lllllllllll 

lllllllllll 
llillllllii 
lllllilllil 


115 


90.S 
63., 
46., 

36.7 


100 


400 


600 


J  000 


1.500 


2000 


1.500 


3.000 


6i4- 


570 


280 


21+ 
156 
124 

67.  „ 


54-. 


As  concerns  the  5-mil.  bullets  their  striking  force  very 
considerably  exceeds  that  of  the  7.66-mil.  bullet. 

What  will  be  the  effect  of  such  projectiles  when 
employed  in  war  by  soldiers  equal  in  equipment  and 
training  it  is  difficult  to  foretell  precisely.  Nevertheless 
such  experiments  and  investigations  as  have  been  made 
help  us  to  form  a  very  vivid  picture  of  the  future  battle- 
field. 

Experiments   in   the   use   of    the    5-mil.    Mauser   rifle 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS   321 

against  the  carcases  of  horses  gave  the  following  results. 
From  a  distance  of  2^ ,  220,  550,  1 100,  and  1870  yards, 
the  bullets  penetrated  5,  4,  3,  2,  and  i  carcases  of  horses,  in 
each  case  preserving  sufficient  energy  to  penetrate  to  some 
extent  the  following  carcase. 


Number  of  Horses'  Carcases  Penetrated  by  the  Bullets  of  the 
Mauser  5  Mil,  Rifle  at  various  Ranges. 

Range. 


27.5  yds. 


i 


220       „ 


550 


HOG       ,, 


1870      „ 


4 


. 


iXU 


The  enormous  energy  of  such  projectiles  will  for  another 
reason  cause  an  increase  in  the  losses  of  war.  Modern 
covered  bullets  are  effective  even  in  piercing  metal. 
When  the  old  round  leaden  bullets  were  used,  a  tree 
three  inches  thick  or  an  earthwork  twenty  inches  thick  was 
an  effective  protection  for  soldiers.  The  modern  small- 
calibre  bullet  will  penetrate  earth  to  the  thickness  of 
78 i  inches,  pierce  through  a  tree  and  strike  those  who 
shelter  behind  it.  In  olden  times  the  second  rank  con- 
sidered itself  protected  from  danger  by  the  first,  the 
coward  took  refuge  behind  a  companion.  The  modern 
bullet  may  not  only  penetrate  soldiers  in  the  first  two, 
but  even  m  the  third  rank. 

From  this  we  see  that  the  number  of  victims  of  the 
modern  bullet  may  be  five  times  greater  than  that  of  the  old. 


322 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


In  considering  the  degree  of  danger  in  battle  the 
number  of  revolutions  of  a  bullet  has  great  importance. 
The  following  diagram  shows  the  weight  and  rotation  of 
bullets  in  use  at  various  times. 


Rotation  and  Weight  of  Bullets  of  Various  Rifles. 

Number  of  Revolutions.  Weight  of  Bullets  in  Grammes. 


3830 


42c 

1 
)            Needle  Gun.    i       | 

!      !  1 

1 

25 

732 

Berdan. 

1    i| 

24 

80 

1 

1                                       I'            ' 
New  Russian   i  | 

Rifle,  1891.       ! 

; 

1 

13.6 

1 

1 

Dutch                 1 

6.5  MiN.  Rifle.          i 

10.5 

This  question  has  much  importance,  for  upon  striking 
something  hard,  such  as  the  branch  of  a  tree  or  a  thick 
bone,  the  bullet  takes  an  irregular  position,  and  as  its 
revolution  continues  it  causes  very  serious  wounds.  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  the  intervention  of  a  tree  or  a  brick  if 
it  be  insufficient  to  stop  the  bullet  only  makes  it  more 
dangerous.  In  Nirschau,  in  crushing  the  disturbances 
among  the  miners,  but  ten  shots  were  fired,  yet  seven 
persons  were  killed  and  twenty-five  wounded  from  a 
distance  of  from  thirty  to  eighty  paces.  Many  others 
slightly  wounded  concealed  their  injuries  so  as  to  escape 
legal  prosecution.  Each  bullet  struck  from  three  to  four 
men.  This  is  explained  by  the  thickness  of  the  mob  and 
the  shortness  of  range.  Of  the  wounded  men  six  died, 
so  that  the  percentage  of  death  from  wounds  was  24  per 
cent.,  while  in  the  war  of  1 870  it  was  only  12  per  cent. 
The  general  mortality  among  those  struck  by  bullets  was 
40.6  per  cent. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  immense  increase  in  the 
penetrative  force  of  bullets,  and  the  gravity  of  the  injuries 
inflicted,  will  be  one  of  the  most  striking  characteristics  of 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  323 

a  future  war.  The  effect  of  the  deformation  of  bullets  on 
striking  hard  substances  will  also  be  considerable,  but 
concerning  this  we  have  no  statistics. 

The  first  quality  of  a  rifle  is  accuracy  of  fire.  In  this 
respect  modern  weapons  possess  qualities  which  ensure  a 
number  of  casualties  incomparably  greater  than  in  the 
past.  The  bullet  of  the  6-mil.  Mannhcher  rifle  for  a 
distance  of  750  yards  will  fly  so  close  to  the  ground  that 
it  will  strike  everything  in  the  line  of  fire  for  that  distance. 
With  the  rifles  employed  in  the  war  of  1870,  the  effective 
distance  in  a  range  of  650  yards  was  30  yards  for  the 
Dreuze  and  35  yards  for  the  chassepot.  In  other  words 
the  field  of  death  has  grown  twenty  times.  At  a  greater 
range  than  750  yards  the  bullets  of  1870  almost  always 
struck  soldiers  on  the  point  of  fall ;  at  the  present  time  the 
Mannlicher  bullet  aimed  at  a  target  960  yards  away,  flies 
so  low  that  it  would  strike  a  man  for  no  3^ards  of  its 
flight.  Even  at  a  range  of  1300  yards  it  would  be 
effective  for  62  yards.  The  following  diagrams  show 
this  difference  more  plainly. 

Zone  of  Effective  Fire  against  Infantry  (i  m.  70  cm.  in  height) 
at  various  Ranges, 

Chassepot        f.       ^  Mannlicher 

Rang6 


700 


324 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 


Breadth  of  Zone  of  Effective  Fire  against  Cavalry  {2  m.  70  cm, 
in  height)  at  various  Ranges 


Chassepot 


97 


Range 


Mannljcher 


r:::: 

1 

1              J. 

t :    : 

400 

1      ■ 

t::  : 

■ 

48 

600    > 

*■ ' 

600 

700    > 

Li 1 i 

800    > 

250 

i.,,.1- 

,      900     : 

180 

1.000  > 

135- 

1.100    > 

110 
100 

1.200   > 

700 


In  all  armies  firing  drill  has  been  brought  to  perfection. 
The  quantity  of  cartridges  expended  in  training  is  incom- 
parably greater  than  before,  and  the  most  ingenious 
methods  have  been  devised  for  showing  inaccuracy  of  fire 
or  nervousness. 

It  is  easy  to  see  how  these  circumstances  will  influence 
future  losses.  At  the  present  time  the  success  of  aim 
depends  only  upon  the  proper  holding  of  the  rifle. 
Raising  the  small-calibre  rifle  to  the  shoulder  and  firing 
mechanically  and  horizontally,  at  the  present  day  the 
rifleman  covers  a  space  of  650  to  750  yards.  Where  in 
1870  a  special  order  was  needed  and  attention  had  to  be 
paid  to  its  execution,  the  mere  mechanical  use  of  the 
weapon  is  now  necessary.  For  this  reason,  too,  the 
range  of  useful  fire,  which  will  not  involve  waste  of 
cartridges,  has  immensely  increased,  as  the  following 
diagram  shows : 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  325 


o 


0     ::::::! 

^^ 

S                                                                 c 

^                                                                                   c 

4     :::iii::::::i: 

^                                                                        .— .         - 

''^                                                                       ^ 

tance  of  Useful  Fire  in 

0 

^^ 

Q         ■  ■  ■ 

0 

WHM 

0                .   ,_,_.    ■"" 

0     ::::::: ::: 

yjj ... 

cp     ::::::::::::::::: 

r^        ^^     ::::::::::::::::: 

10      ::::::: 4.- 

^     '.".LI LI  iiizz..  ...::l::  '.z. 

•2          c3          ^ 

1 

Under  Cover 

or 
Lying  Down. 

Standing 

or  on 

Knees. 

On  Horse- 
back. 

rroups  of  not 
an  Four  Men. 

A  Platoon. 

Haifa 
Detachment. 

A 

JJetachment. 

nst  Company 
adron  Columns 
fJatteries. 

nst  Troops  in 
Formation  or 
ling  Columns. 

Agai 

of  Squ 

or 

Agai 
Close 
Marc 

The  effect  of  improved  training  may  be  shown  by  the 
following  figures.  In  Russia  up  to  1874,  at  650  yards 
range  the  accuracy  of  fire  of  a  battalion  was  25  per  cent. ; 
to-day,  with  improved  training,  it  is  as  high  as  69  per  cent., 
or  almost  three  times  better.  The  modern  rifle  so  nearly 
approaches  perfection  that  a  w^ell-trained  marksman 
almost  certainly  hits  his  mark.  In  the  French  and 
German  armies  the  percentages  of  successful  fire  against 
an  infantryman  are  shown  by  the  following  diagrams ; 


326         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


Percentage  of  Hits  in  Fire  at  One  Infantryman. 

French  Army.  Range.  German  Army. 

Lying  down. 


17.0  7, 


7 

^             1                                 OQQ  rr..rr..        1 

.4'/o    :::::    300     ^ 

1 1 1 1 1 

3.9  Vo  1  i  i    400     ^ 

18  7. 

2.3  Vo  :  500  > 

127. 

1.4  Yo  I    600     . 

87. 

700     *               6'/o 

25  7. 


24  9  Vo 


II  6  '/. 


6.3  '/o 


3.8  '/ 

2.4  '/. 


Kneeling. 


200   metres 


300 


400 


500 


600 


700 


33  7. 


257. 


18  7. 


137. 


9  7. 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  327 


Percentage  of  Hits  in  Fire  at  One  Infantryman. 

French  Army.  Range.  German  Army 

Staoding. 


24.3  v. 


37  V, 


32  7. 


Besides  these  improvements  in  weapons  all  tending  to 
the  increase  of  casualties,  the  systems  of  measuring 
distances  have  been  improved  at  the  same  rate.  The 
improved  instrument  of  Colonel  Paskevitch  adopted  by 
the  Russian  army  ten  years  ago  measures  up  to  7000 
yards  in  three  minutes,  while  it  weighs  less  than  72.6  lbs. 
The  accuracy  of  this  instrument  may  be  seen  from  the 
following  diagram  : 

Deviation  of  the  Paskevitch  Instrument  in  Metres. 

At  a  Ran.e  of 


328 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


In  later  years  even  more  accurate  instruments  have 
been  constructed. 

The  increase  in  the  number  of  cartridges,  aheady 
mentioned  in  another  connection,  carried  by  soldiers  is 
another  factor  increasing  losses.  With  the  Berdan  rifle 
a  Russian  infantryman  carried  84  cartridges,  with  the 
new  weapons  150  cartridges;  with  the  5-mil.  rifle  the 
number  carried  will  reach  270. 


Number  of  Cartridges  carried  by  one  Soldier  lejith  Different  Rifles, 


Berdan 


Modern 


5-mil. 


84 


150 


:|27 


With  an  even  smaller  calibre  the  number  of  cartridges 
carried  will  be  from  380  to  575.  If  we  assume  that, 
without  having  recourse  to  the  reserve,  the  number  of 
cartridges  now  carried  will  be  expended,  it  is  easy  to  see 
how  losses  will  be  increased.  The  smokelessness  of 
powder  is  another  factor  in  increasing  losses.  But  to 
this  we  have  already  referred  more  than  once. 

On  the  above  statistics  we  have  constructed  the  follow- 
ing table  showing  how  the  old  loss  of  18  per  cent,  from 
rifle  fire  will  be  increased,  in  all  cases  the  lowest  conceiv- 
able increase  having  been  taken  : 


From  increase  of  energy      .... 
„  „        in  revolutions  and  from  de- 

formation of  bullet  . 
„  „        in  accuracy  .... 

„      improved  means  of  observation  and 

measuring 

„      absence  of  smoke.  &c. 

„      increase  in  quantity  of  cartridges      , 


7  per 

cent. 

4 

» 

18 

V 

2 

)f 

2 

ff 

13 

» 

From  which  it  appears  that  the  general  loss  from  rifle- 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  329 

fire  will  grow  to  6^  per  cent.  That  this  estimate  is  not 
exaggerated  is  shown  by  the  Chilian  war.  Yet,  as  already 
stated  in  the  beginning  of  this  work,  Professor  Gebler 
gives  even  a  higher  value  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  new 
weapons  : 


Rifle  of  1871 

^ 

100  per  cent 

French  rifle  of  1886   . 

• 

•      433        „ 

German  rifle 

• 

.       474         „ 

5-mil.  rifle 

• 

•     1337         „ 

In  comparison  with  this  our  calculations  appear  very 
moderate. 

Artillery. — Of  the  effect  of  artillery  fire  the  past  can 
give  little  idea.  Such  authoritative  writers  as  General 
Wille,  Professor  Pototski,  and  Captain  Moch  declare  that 
the  quick-firing  guns  now  built  in  France,  German}^,  and 
Russia  are  at  least  twice  as  effective  as  the  1891  type,  of 
which  Langlois  said  :  '^  We  have  before  us  a  whole  series 
of  improvements  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  must 
admit  that  war  material  has  become  entirely  different 
from  that  employed  in  past  wars."  In  addition  to  this 
the  quantity  of  artillery  has  increased  immensely. 

In  the  present  day  as  many  projectiles  can  be  fired  in 
the  course  of  a  few  minutes  as  were  before  fired  during 
a  whole  battle,  the  best  guns  giving  in  the  course  of  three 
minutes  83  shots  and  the  worst  65.  The  accuracy  of  fire 
is  no  less  remarkable.  From  a  distance  of  2000  yards 
guns  have  sent  four  projectiles  into  the  same  hole. 

A  comparison  of  the  effect  of  1000  rifle  bullets  fired 
by  infantrymen  attacking  in  open  order  with  the  effect  of 
shrapnel  showed  that  one  round  of  shrapnel  is  effective 
over  a  space  twice  as  long  as,  and  not  less  wide  than,  the 
rifle  fire.  Experiments  show  that  the  fragments  of  these 
shells  are  thrown  over  a  space  860  yards  long  and  420 
wide. 

On  the  basis  of  comparisons  made  by  Langlois,  it 
appears  that  the  French  gun  of  1 891  is  twenty  times 
more  effective  than  that  of  1870.  In  the  same  period  the 
number  of  guns  has  increased  from   780  to  4512.     From 


330         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

which  it  appears  that  the  French  artillery  of  1891  was 
116  times  more  powerful  than  that  of  1871.  When  the 
new  quick-firing  guns  now  being  prepared — which  in  the 
opinion  of  specialists  will  be  twice  as  effective  as  those  of 
1 891 — are  completed,  the  French  artillery  will  be  approxi- 
mately 232  times  more  effective  than  that  employed  against 
the  Germans  in  1870.  It  may  be  assumed  that  the  losses 
will  be  correspondingly  greater.  The  quantity  of  ammuni- 
tion carried  will  be  twice  as  great  as  was  carried  with  the 
former  arms.  On  the  estimates  of  Langlois,  in  a  future 
battle  lasting  only  two  days,  every  gun  will  require  no  less 
than  267  rounds  of  ammunition,  while  if  the  battle  extend 
over  three  to  four  days  500  rounds  will  be  required.  With 
the  136-140  rounds  per  gun  in  the  armies  of  the  Triple 
and  Dual  Alliances,  according  to  the  calculations  of  General 
Miiller,  more  than  11,000,000  men  might  be  killed  and 
wounded.  With  267  rounds  per  gun  22,000,000  might 
be  killed  and  wounded,  and  with  500  rounds  41,000,000. 
In  consequence,  it  appears  that  artillery  fire  alone  might 
exterminate  eight  times  the  number  of  the  armies  which 
could  be  placed  on  the  battlefield.  These  figures  seem 
absurd.  Nevertheless,  they  are  based  on  the  detailed 
calculations  of  Langlois. 

In  the  war  of  1870  the  losses  from  artillery  fire 
amounted  to  9  per  cent,  of  the  armies  engaged.  What 
they  will  be  in  a  future  war  it  is  impossible  even  to  guess. 
The  quantity  of  artillery  has  increased,  each  gun  being 
twenty  times,  and,  since  the  introduction  of  the  latest 
types,  forty  times  more  powerful  than  those  of  1870.  Even 
leaving  the  increase  in  the  number  of  guns  out  of  account, 
the  losses  of  9  per  cent,  would  be  replaced  by  losses  of 
180  per  cent.,  though  these  new  guns  must  in  a  short 
time  give  way  to  others  more  perfect.  If  we  base  our 
estimates  on  these  new  guns  the  results  would  be  absurd, 
not  through  irregularity  of  reasoning,  but  simply  because 
they  would  show  that  instruments  had  been  prepared 
capable  of  destro3'ing  armies  many  times  more  numerous 
than  could  be  placed  in  the  field. 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  331 


II. — Influence  of  Modern  Tactics  in  increasing  Losses. 

In  consequence  of  the  use  of  long-range  weapons  and 
smokeless  powder  armies  will  be  obliged  to  surround 
themselves,  for  a  considerable  distance,  with  commands 
of  sharpshooters  so  as  to  render  reconnaissance  by  the 
enemy  difficult.  The  discovery  and  destruction  of  such 
commands  will  be  a  task  of  no  small  difficulty.  In  1870 
for  the  protection  of  the  German  rear  145,712  men  with 
5945  horses  and  80  guns  were  employed.  And  since 
the  strength  of  the  infantry  then  operating  was  something 
over  455,000,  it  will  be  seen  that  a  sixth  part  of  the  whole 
army  had  to  be  set  aside  to  protect  communications. 
Nevertheless  the  French  sharpshooters  more  than  once 
succeeded  in  cutting  the  German  communications  and 
causing  confusion.  If  we  bear  in  mind  that  these /rawc 
tireurs  were  exclusively  on  foot  and  had  no  military 
training,  it  will  be  understood  what  vast  forces  would 
have  been  required  to  guard  communications  from  regular 
chasseur  commands  and  cavalry. 

In  the  present  time,  in  all  countries,  an  attempt  is  made 
to  give  some  military  training  to  all  men  who  might  be 
required  for  service  in  time  of  war.  Such  a  state  of 
affairs  as  resulted  in  France  in  1870,  when  Paris  was 
actually  besieged,  and  yet  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men 
liable  to  service  continued  to  attend  to  their  civil  occupa- 
tions, will  not  again  be  seen.  At  the  very  outbreak  of 
war  practically  all  the  population  liable  to  service  will  be 
either  summoned  to  the  operating  army,  or  appointed  to 
serve  in  the  second  and  third  strategical  lines. 

After  this  of  course  there  wull  remain  in  the  country  a 
sufficient  number  of  grown  men  for  such  work  as  the 
obtaining  of  information  as  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
burning  of  bridges  and  stores,  &c.  But  generally  it 
must  be  admitted  that  even  partisan  operations  will  be 
carried  on  by  organised  bodies,  and  systematically.  A 
result  of  this  will  be  that  even  a  little  war  in  the  future 
will  take  a  serious  form. 


332         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

During  the  manoeuvres  of  the  German  army  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  attempts  were  made  at  transporting  infantry  in 
carriages  for  the  purpose  of  doubhng  or  even  trebling 
rapidity  of  movement.  Two  experiments  were  made. 
The  infantry  either  covered  in  one  day  a  great  distance, 
namely,  49!  miles  with  halts  for  food  and  change  of 
horses,  or  made  two  marches  a  day,  one  on  foot  and  the 
other  in  carriages. 

Military  operations  will  begin  in  the  form  of  a  little 
war,  considerable  masses  of  cavalry  being  constantly 
maintained  on  frontiers,  which  will  be  immediately 
crossed,  upon  which  reconnoitring  detachments  from  both 
sides  will  come  into  contact  with  one  another.  It  will  be 
most  important  for  such  detachments  to  have  light 
infantry  with  them  in  carriages.  Of  course  their  move- 
ments will  be  characterised  less  by  regularity  than  by 
speed.  But  the  command  will  be  given  to  picked, 
experienced  officers,  and  as  a  result  such  bodies  will  be 
much  more  dangerous  than  the  French  franc  tireurs  of 
1870.  At  the  present  day  a  marksman  from  a  distance 
of  not  more  than  800  paces  may  pick  off  men  at  will,  and 
as  smoke  will  no  longer  betray  his  position  his  fire  may 
be  very  deadly. 

The  losses  suffered  in  attacks  on  fortified  positions  will 
constantly  grow,  side  by  side  with  improvements  in  arms. 
The  attackers  must  advance  in  loose  formation,  taking 
advantage  of  inequalities  in  the  ground,  and  of  the  light 
earthworks  which  they  will  throw  up  with  the  aid  of 
trenching  instruments.  In  the  war  of  1 877  the  Russian 
soldiers  were  imperfectly  equipped,  and  ill-instructed  in 
the  making  of  such  works.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  earth- 
works fully  proved  their  value.  It  was  such  earthworks 
which  prevented  the  Turks  from  driving  the  Russian  army 
from  the  Shipka,  notwithstanding  the  immense  sacrifices 
they  made.  On  the  other  hand  picked  Russian  troops,  with 
a  numerical  superiority  of  25  per  cent,  and  desperate 
bravery,  for  a  long  time  failed  to  take  the  redoubt  of  Gorni 
Dubnyak  althougli  they  got  within  a  hundred  paces  of  it. 
In    the   majority  of   unsuccessful  attacks  on  Plevna  the 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  Z2Z 

Russian  troops,  after  great  loss,  succeeded  in  getting 
within  bayonet  distance  of  the  enemy ;  cases  of  nearer 
approach  were  very  few. 

Relying  on  the  confidence  with  which  the  smokelessness 
and  long  range  of  his  rifle  inspire  the  soldier,  commanders 
will  stubbornly  hold  out  in  defensive  positions,  selecting 
natural  cover  and  supplementing  it  with  artificial  defences. 
That  earthworks  will  be  had  recourse  to  very  often  in  the 
field  is  shown  by  the  fact,  that  trenching  instruments 
enter  into  the  equipment  of  a  certain  proportion  of  all 
infantry.  As  further  evidence,  we  might  point  to  the 
instructions  delivered  to  the  Guards  Corps  in  1892 
recommending  defending  bodies  always  to  entrench  them- 
selves unless  special  orders  be  given  to  the  contrary.  It 
is  interesting  to  see  the  degrees  of  equipment  of  European 
armies  for  such  work. 


Number  of  Sappers  to  100  Infantrymen. 


Russia 


Germany 


Austria 


Italy 


RoUMANIA 


France 


The  Belgian  authority  General  Brialmont  considers  that 
even  the  last  proportion  is  insufficient.  He  declares  that 
six  sappers  should  go  to  ever}^  hundred  infantry  men. 
General  Killichen  goes  even  farther  and  would  have  a 
sapper  for  every  thirteen  infantrymen. 

In  former  times  every  irregularity  in  the  ground  was 


334         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

considered  an  obstacle  in  military  operations.  At  the 
present  da}'  knowledge  of  how  to  take  advantage  of  these 
irregularities  is  a  great  factor  of  success.  This  view  has 
become  so  generally  accepted  within  the  last  twenty-five 
years  that  all  governments  have  undertaken  the  examination 
and  measuring  of  all  fields  where  a  future  battle  might  take 
place.  This  circumstance  is  very  important.  If  a  Plevna 
could  spring  up  suddenly  upon  an  unexamined  and 
unprepared  spot,  what  will  be  the  case  in  a  future  war 
when  every  inch  of  frontier  territory  has  been  prepared 
for  defence  ? 

In  the  opinion  of  the  most  competent  authorities  the 
war  of  the  future  will  result  primaril}^  in  a  series  of  battles 
for  the  possession  of  fortified  positions.  In  addition  to 
field  works,  the  attacking  troops  will  have  to  overcome 
auxiliary  obstacles  of  every  kind  near  the  regular  fortifica- 
tions, that  is,  at  the  place  where  they  will  run  the  greatest 
risk  from  the  defenders'  fire.  Such  obstacles  will  be  con- 
structed of  beams,  wire  nets,  and  pitfalls.  Their  destruc- 
tion will  require  immense  sacrifices.  The  effect  of  artillery 
upon  such  defences  is  insignificant.  Wire  nets  can  only 
be  destroyed  by  taking  them  to  pieces  by  men  acquainted 
with  the  methods  of  construction.  But  for  this  much  time 
will  be  required.  Meantime  the  foremost  of  the  attackers 
will  be  under  strong  fire  from  the  defence,  and  may  very 
easil}'  fall  under  the  fire  of  their  own  artillery  which  will 
be  supporting  the  attack. 

Rifle  fire  over  the  heads  of  advancing  troops  will  be 
practised  more  often  than  before,  and  may  prove  the  cause 
of  great  losses.  ''  Observe,"  says  General  Skugarevski, 
"  the  results  of  firing  in  peace  time.  The  targets  stand 
at  some  hundreds  of  paces  aw^ay,  yet  bullets  sometimes 
furrow  the  ground  at  a  few  decades  of  paces  from  the 
marksman.  And  this  in  time  of  peace.  What  will  happen 
in  war  ?  "  Still  more  dangerous  will  prove  artillery  fire 
over  the  heads  of  troops,  since  want  of  coolness,  a  difficult 
locality,  the  distance  of  the  enemy  and  other  unfavourable 
circumstances  ma}'  cause  inaccurate  fire  from  which 
advanced  troops  might  suffer  severely. 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  335 

The  amount  of  losses  will  depend  more  or  less  upon 
the  skill  or  otherwise  with  which  men  are  led.  Yet 
even  in  peace  times  a  deficiency  of  fully  trained  officers  is 
felt.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  a  considerable  number 
of  the  higher  officers  in  modern  armies  have  never  been 
under  fire.  With  the  present  composition,  operating 
armies  can  never  be  properly  officered,  since  the  formation 
of  new  armies  will  so  exhaust  the  reserve  of  officers  of 
the  line  that  a  battalion  at  the  front  will  have  no  more  than 
eight  out  of  thirty.  Thus  for  every  one  of  such  officers 
there  will  be  three  from  the  reserve  who  will  be  inferior  in 
knowledge,  in  discretion,  and  in  applicability  to  conditions. 
Unskilful  tactics  will  immediately  react  unfavourably  on 
the  amount  of  the  losses.  The  deficiency  in  fully  trained 
officers  will  be  all  the  more  felt  as  they  will  lose  heavily 
in  the  very  beginning  of  the  campaign.  The  experience 
of  the  last  wars,  although  smokeless  powder  was  not 
used,  and  the  rule  that  officers  were  to  be  first  picked  of! 
was  not  generally  accepted,  shows  how  quickly  the  number 
of  officers  on  the  field  of  battle  will  diminish.  As  a  guide  in 
this  respect  the  Chilian  war  may  again  be  taken.  Figures 
referring  to  two  battles  only  show  that  while  the  number 
of  men  killed  and  wounded  was  13  per  cent,  and  60  per 
cent,  respectively,  the  number  of  officers  killed  and  wounded 
was  23  per  cent,  and  75  per  cent.  But  if  officers  are  not 
there  to  give  the  example,  men  will  not  attack.  Prince 
Hohenlohe,  in  his  **  Letters  on  Artillery,"  relates  the 
following  incident  which  occurred  in  the  vicinity  of  Paris  : 
"  After  driving  the  enemy  from  a  village  its  graveyard 
was  occupied  by  half  a  company  from  one  of  our  best 
regiments.  Quite  unexpectedly  the  enemy  made  a  new 
attack  and  regained  possession  of  the  graveyard,  which  we 
were  obliged  to  capture  anew.  On  this  being  done,  I 
asked  the  men  of  the  half-company  how  they  could  have 
given  up  the  graveyard  to  the  enemy.  The  soldiers 
answered  naively  :  '  But  all  our  officers  were  killed,  there 
was  no  one  to  tell  us  what  to  do,  so  we  also  went  off.' '' 

The  German  army  in  the  war  of  1877  lost  considerably 
in  officers,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  following  diagram : 


zz^ 


IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 


8.7  7c 


Losses  in  the  German  Army  in  the  War  of  1870. 

Killed.  Wounded. 


7.0  V. 
7. 


r.3V.J 


2.6  Ve 


StaffOfficers 


Captains 


VbuNGER  Officers 


Ran 


ANKS 


18.2  7« 


15.6  7o 

17^  7o 


IO.o7, 


That  is  to  say,  the  ofificers  sustained  twice  as  many  in 
killed  and  three  times  as  many  in  wounded  as  the  lower 
ranks. 

In  consequence  of  improved  means  of  destruction  every 
meeting  with  an  enemy  will  take  a  more  threatening  form 
than  before,  and  every  mistake,  every  delay,  will  have 
more  serious  consequences.  The  conditions  of  war  have 
become  enormously  more  complex.  Yet  for  every  hundred 
soldiers  serving  with  the  colours  there  will  be  taken  from 
the  reserves  : 

In  Italy 260  men. 

„   Austria 35o    „ 

„  Germany 566     „ 

„   France 573     „ 

„   Russia 361     „ 

The  majority  of  these  reserves  will  have  forgotten  what 
they  learnt  in  time  of  service.  Of  the  officers  also  only 
a  small  proportion  will  be  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency.  It 
would  seem  that  with  such  conditions  field  instructions 
should  be  elaborated  in  times  of  peace,  giving  precise  infor- 
mation as  to  tactical  measures  in  every  contingency.  But, 
as  we  have  already  mentioned  in  another  place,  in  this 
respect  the  different  armies  show  deficiencies  of  various 
kinds.     So  far  has  the  confusion  gone  that  in  the  French 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  337 

army  the  expression  is  used  '*  ordre,  contre-ordre,  des- 
ordre."  And  this  is  very  natural  when  we  bear  in  mind 
the  want  of  experience  of  the  new  conditions. 

Some  writers  express  the  opinion  that  it  is  a  mistake 
to  issue  general  instructions  regulating  tactics  in  a  future 
war,  as  under  certain  circumstances  their  literal  interpreta- 
tion has  the  most  disastrous  consequences.  In  former 
times  when  fire  was  incomparably  slower  and  weaker,  and 
escape  from  the  zone  of  fire  could  be  effected  quickly,  the 
losses  from  mistakes  in  tactics  were  insignificant.  But 
such  are  the  conditions  now  that  a  mistake  may  lead  to 
the  extermination  of  a  whole  body  of  troops  within  a  few 
minutes.  The  danger  has  grown  immensely,  while  the 
factors  of  safety  have  diminished.  Smoke  will  no  longer 
betray  the  position  of  an  enemy's  troops,  reconnaissance 
in  the  face  of  long-range  rifles  will  be  difBcult,  and  the 
attacking  troops  will  attempt  to  approach  the  defenders 
to  within  a  short  distance,  at  which  the  ballistic  forces  of 
projectiles  can  no  longer  receive  development,  from  this 
distance  the  deciding  weapon,  as  in  former  battles,  being 
the  bayonet. 

But  what  will  be  the  losses  sustained  by  attacking 
troops  before  they  get  within  such  a  distance  ?  The 
advance,  of  course,  will  be  carried  out  cautiously  and  in 
loose  formation.  Such  an  advance  against  an  enemy 
occup3nng  a  strong  position  and  firing  over  measured 
distances  will  be  extremely  difficult  and  may  even  require 
a  two-days'  labour. 

It  is  not  strange  then  that  certain  authors  declare  that 
battles  will  continue  three,   four,  and  even  fifteen   days. 
Other  specialists  find  that  we  are  returning  to  the  epoch 
of  sieges.     Belgrade,  Mantua,  and  Plevna  may  be  repeated 
It  is  very  likely  that  the  attacking  army,  finding  decisiv 
victory  impossible,  will  attempt  to  lock  up  the  enemy  (. 
the    spot,   entrenching   itself  and    making    raids   for    ' 
stoppage  of  his  supplies  until  the  besiegers  are  star^ 

out.  Q 

As    we   have    already  explained,   the   quick    and    fii 
decision  of  future  battles  is  improbable.     The  latest  ii 

Y 


338         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

provements  in  small  arms  and  artillery,  and  the  teaching 
of  troops  to  take  advantage  of  localities,  has  in- 
creased the  strength  of  defence.  The  modern  rifle  has 
immense  power,  and  its  use  is  simple  and  convenient. 
It  will  be  extremely  difficult  to  overcome  the  resistance  of 
infantry  in  sheltered  positions.  Driven  from  one  position 
it  will  quickly  find  natural  obstacles — hillocks,  pits,  and 
groups  of  trees — which  may  serve  as  points  for  fresh 
opposition.  The  zone  of  deadly  fire  is  much  wider  than 
before,  and  battles  will  be  more  stubborn  and  prolonged. 
Of  such  a  sudden  sweeping  away  of  an  enemy  in  the 
course  of  a  few  minutes  as  took  place  at  Rossbach  it  is 
absurd  even  to  think.  The  power  of  opposition  of  every 
military  unit  has  increased  so  greatly  that  a  division  may 
now  accept  battle  with  a  whole  army  corps,  if  only  it  be 
persuaded  that  reinforcements  are  hastening  to  the  spot. 
The  case  already  cited,  of  the  manoeuvres  in  Eastern 
Prussia,  when  a  single  division  sustained  an  attack  from 
a  whole  army  corps  until  reinforced,  is  sufficient  evidence 
of  this.  The  scattering  of  immense  masses  over  a  con- 
siderable space  means  that  a  successful  attack  on  one 
point  by  means  of  the  concentration  of  superior  forces 
may  remain  local,  not  resulting  in  any  general  attack  on 
the  chief  forces  of  the  defence. 

In  former  times  either  of  the  combatants  quickly 
acknowledged  that  the  advantage  lay  with  the  other  side, 
and  therefore  refused  to  continue  the  battle.  The  result 
and  the  trophy  of  victory  was  the  possession  of  the  battle- 
field. The  majority  of  military  writers  consider  the 
attainment  of  such  a  result  very  questionable. 

From   the  opinions  of  many  military  writers   the   con- 
clusion is  inevitable  that  with  the  increase  of  range  and 
ire,  and  in  view  of  the  difficulties  with  which  assault  is 
urrounded,  a  decisive  victory  in  the  event  of  numerical 
luality  is  possible  only  on  the  failure  of  ammunition  on 
e  side.     But  in  view  of  the  number  of  cartridges  which 
Dldiers    now  carry,   and    the    immense    reserves    in    the 
^munition   carts,  it  seems    more  likely,  that  before  all 
.rtridges  have  been  expended,  the  losses  wnll  have  been 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS   339 

so  great  as  to  make  a  continuation  of  battle  impossible.  To 
the  argument  that  night  will  interrupt  the  battle  we  find 
an  answer  in  the  fact  that,  thanks  to  the  adoption  of 
electric  illuminations,  the  struggle  will  often  continue  or 
be  renewed  at  night. 

In  all  armies  attempts  are  made  to  inspire  the  soldiers 
with  the  conviction  that  a  determined  assault  is  enough  to 
make  an  enemy  retreat.  Thus,  in  the  French  field  in- 
structions we  find  it  declared  that  "  courageous  and 
resolutely  led  infantry  may  assault,  under  the  very 
strongest  fire,  even  well-defended  earthworks  and  capture 
them."  But  the  above  considerations  are  enough  to  show 
the  difficulty  of  such  an  undertaking. 

Supposing  even  that  the  defenders  begin  a  retreat. 
The  moment  the  attacking  army  closes  its  ranks  for  assault 
partisan  operations  on  the  side  of  the  defenders  will  begin. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  the  present  rifle,  firing  smoke- 
less powder,  is  primarily  a  partisan  weapon,  since  armed 
with  it  even  a  small  body  of  troops  in  a  sheltered  position 
may  inflict  immense  losses  from  a  great  distance.  As  the 
attackers  approach,  the  thin  flexible  first  line  of  the  defence 
will  retreat.  It  will  annoy  the  enemy  with  its  fire,  forcing 
him  to  extend  his  formation,  and  then  renew  the  manoeuvre 
at  other  points. 

While  the  first  fine  of  the  defenders  will  thus  impede 
the  assault,  the  main  body  will  have  opportunity  to  form 
anew  and  act  according  to  circumstances.  The  attacking 
army,  though  convinced  of  victory,  finding  that  it  cannot 
get  into  touch  with  the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy,  which 
alternately  vanishes  and  reappears,  now  on  its  flanks,  now 
in  front,  will  lose  confidence,  while  the  defenders  will  take 
heart  again. 

It  is  obvious  that,  with  the  old  powder,  the  smoke  of 
which  betrayed  the  fighting  front  of  the  enemy  and  even 
approximately  indicated  its  strength,  such  manoeuvres 
were  too  dangerous  to  carry  out.  It  would  be  a 
mistake  to  think  that  for  the  carrying  on  of  such  opera- 
tions picked  troops  are  required.  The  ordinary  trained 
soldier  is  quite  capable.     Every  soldier  knows  that  two 


340         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

or  three  brigades  cannot  entirely  stop  the  advance  of  an 
army.  But  seeing  that  the  attackers  may  be  so  impeded 
that  they  will  gain  no  more  than  four  or  five  miles  in  a 
day,  the  defenders  will  have  good  cause  to  hope  and  wait 
for  a  favourable  turn  of  affairs. 

From  this  it  may  be  seen  how  immensely  smokeless 
powder  has  increased  the  strength  of  defence.  It  is  true 
that  in  past  wars  we  find  many  examples  of  stubborn  rear- 
guard actions  facilitating  orderly  retreat.  But  even  in 
those  cases  victory  was  too  evident  and  irrevocable,  and 
this  encouraged  the  pursuers.  The  vanquished  tried  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  get  out  of  fire.  Nowadays  with 
quick-firing  and  long-range  guns  the  first  few  miles  of 
retreat  will  prove  more  dangerous  than  the  defence  of  a 
position,  but  the  chain  of  marksmen  covering  the  retreat 
may  greatly  delay  the  course  of  the  attack. 

It  was  Marshal  St.  Cyr  who  declared  that  *'a  brave 
army  consists  of  one-third  of  soldiers  actually  brave,  one- 
third  of  those  who  might  be  brave  under  special  circum- 
stances, and  a  remaining  third  consisting  of  cowards." 
With  the  increase  of  culture  and  prosperity  nervousness 
has  also  increased,  and  in  modern,  especially  in  Western 
European  armies,  a  considerable  proportion  of  men  will  be 
found  unaccustomed  to  heavy  physical  labour  and  to  forced 
marches.  To  this  category  the  majority  of  manufacturing 
labourers  will  belong.  Nervousness  will  be  all  the  more 
noticeable  since  night  attacks  are  strongly  recommended  by 
many  military  writers,  and  undoubtedly  these  will  be  made 
more  often  than  in  past  wars.  Even  the  expectation  of  a 
battle  by  night  will  cause  alarm  and  give  birth  to  nervous 
excitement.  This  question  of  the  influence  of  nervousness 
on  losses  in  time  of  war  has  attracted  the  attention^  of 
several  medical  writers,  and  some  have  expressed  the 
opinion  that  a  considerable  number  of  soldiers  will  be 
driven  mad.  The  famous  Prussian  Minister  of  War,  Von 
Roon,  writing  from  Nikelsburg  in  1866,  said  :  ''  Increased 
work  and  the  quantity  and  variety  of  impressions  have  so 
irritated  my  nerves  that  it  seems  as  if  fires  were  bursting 
out  in  my  brain." 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  341 

We  have  already  referred  many  times  to  the  probability 
of  prolonged  wars  in  the  future.  Against  this  probability 
only  one  consideration  may  be  placed  :  the  difficulty  of 
provisioning  immense  armies  and  the  probability  of  famine 
in  those  countries  which  in  times  of  peace  live  upon 
imported  corn.  With  the  exception  of  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary,  not  a  single  country  in  Europe  is 
in  a  position  to  feed  its  own  population.  Yet  Montecuculli 
said  :  *'  Hunger  is  more  terrible  than  iron,  and  want  of  food 
will  destroy  more  armies  than  battles."  Frederick  II. 
declared  that  the  greatest  military  plans  might  be  destroyed 
by  want  of  provisions.  But  the  army  of  Frederick  II. 
was  a  mere  handful  in  comparison  with  the  armies  of 
to-day.  It  is  true  that  ancient  history  presents  examples 
of  immense  hordes  entering  upon  war.  But  these  wars 
were  generally  decided  by  a  few  blows,  for  there  existed 
neither  rapid  communications  for  the  purpose  of  reinforce- 
ment, nor  regular  defensive  lines.  Modern  history  shows 
many  instances  of  prolonged  wars.  But  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  the  Thirty  Years'  and  the  Seven  Years' 
wars  were  not  uninterrupted,  and  that  the  armies  engaged 
went  into  winter  quarters  where  they  were  regularly  pro- 
visioned, and  in  spring  recommenced  operations  resulting 
only  in  partial  successes,  the  gaining  of  a  battle,  the  taking 
of  a  fortress,  followed  by  another  stoppage  of  operations. 
Thus  the  long  wars  of  modern  history  may  be  regarded 
as  a  series  of  short  campaigns.  In  recent  times,  side  by 
side  with  the  long  Crimean  and  North  American  Civil 
wars,  we  find  the  short  campaigns  of  1859  and  1866. 
Taking  the  last  as  example,  the  German  military  waiter 
Riibtow  jumps  to  a  conclusion  as  to  the  **  shortness  of 
war"  which  is  guaranteed  by  improved  communications 
and  arms.  Such  theorists  were  surprised  by  the  fact  that 
even  the  war  of  1870-71  occupied  seven  months,  although 
it,  of  course,  may  be  considered  as  short  having  regard  to 
the  forces  emplo3^ed  and  the  vastness  of  the  results. 

In  the  future,  by  virtue  of  concluded  alliances,  the 
whole  populations  of  great  states  will  take  the  field,  every 
state  having,  in  the  course  of  years,  made  immense  efforts 


342         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

to  fortify  its  frontiers.  In  the  last  ten  years  France 
expended  forty  millions  of  pounds  sterling  on  fortifications, 
the  very  nature  of  these  having  entirely  changed.  Instead 
of  the  old  fortresses  visible  from  afar  and  isolated  forts 
easily  passed  or  taken,  we  have  fortified  camps  which 
can  hardly  be  seen  from  a  short  distance,  polygons 
with  casemated  quarters,  where  whole  armies  may  be 
sheltered. 

On  whatever  plans  operations  are  founded  the  side 
which  carries  the  war  into  an  enemy's  territory  will  meet 
with  tremendous  resources  for  defence.  Uncounted 
millions  have  been  spent  to  ensure  that  no  great  superi- 
ority of  force  can  be  attained  by  an  invader  whatever  the 
diff"erence  in  the  time  of  mobilisation.  Preparations  have 
been  made  by  all  governments  to  stop  the  invaders,  if  not 
at  the  very  frontier,  then  not  very  far  in  the  interior  of  the 
country. 

In  the  present  condition  of  military  organisation  the 
responsibility  for  the  supply  of  armies  will  rest  upon  the 
higher  commanders  who  in  times  of  peace  have  little  to  do 
with  this  affair.  Meantime  the  more  numerous  the  army 
and  the  slower  its  movements  the  greater  will  be  the 
difficulty  met  with  in  supplying  its  wants.  And  in  view  of 
the  long  delay's  ensured  by  fortifications  and  defensive 
lines,  the  labour  of  provisioning  troops  will  be  immense. 
In  former  times  it  was  comparatively  easy  to  feed  troops 
in  time  of  war.  Armies  were  small  and  moved  rapidly 
from  place  to  place.  The  present  state  of  affairs  is  very 
different ;  and  delay  in  the  provisioning  of  armies  will  not 
only  cause  great  difficulties,  but  will  have  its  influence  in 
increased  losses. 

We  have  attempted  elsewhere  to  treat  briefly  of  the 
difficulties  attendant  on  the  care  of  the  w^ounded  in  future 
wars.  This  question  has  also  an  important  bearing  on 
the  question  of  losses,  as  the  number  of  killed  to  a 
considerable  extent  depends  upon  the  efficiency  of  the 
ambulance  service. 

The  percentage  of  killed  will  grow  considerably.  The 
diagram  opposite   shows   how    modern  small  arms,    not- 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS  343 


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344       IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

withstanding  their  small  calibre,  are  more  dangerous  than 
the  old.  Which  shows  that  if  all  armies  had  been  equipped 
with  the  Mannlicher  rifle  the  proportion  of  killed  would 
have  been  as  high  as  49.4  per  cent.,  or  practicall}'  equal  to 
the  number  of  wounded.  This  diagram  has  been  formed 
from  the  general  figures  of  losses,  and  to  ensure  accuracy 
it  would  be  necessary  to  deduct  the  victims  of  artillery 
fire  and  cold  steel.  But  as  we  have  elsewhere  explained 
an  immense  proportion  of  casualties  are  caused  by  rifle 
fire,  so  that  the  diagram  is,  probabl}',  approximately 
correct. 

The  losses  from  wounds  constitute  but  a  small  part  of 
the  total  number  of  sacrifices.  In  past  wars  they  have 
been  but  a  fifth,  the  remaining  four-fifths  representing 
losses  from  sickness  and  exhaustion.  Napoleon  in  the 
march  to  Moscow  lost  two-thirds  of  his  army  though  he 
fought  only  one  general  engagement.  The  Russian 
armies  operating  against  him,  in  the  course  of  five  months 
lost  four-fifths  of  their  strength.  The  losses  of  the 
Federal  armies  in  the  Civil  War  in  two  years  (June  186 1 
to  June  1863)  amounted  to  53.2  deaths  in  the  thousand, 
of  which  only  8.6  were  caused  by  wounds,  and  44.6  by 
sickness.  The  mortality  from  sickness  among  the  officers 
amounted  to  22  in  the  thousand,  while  among  the  men  it 
rose  to  46.  In  the  Franco-Prussian  war  the  losses  of  the 
Germans  were  34.7  per  cent,  from  wounds  and  only  30 
per  cent,  from  sickness.  But  this  is  explained  by  the 
shortness  of  the  campaign,  and  by  the  fact  that,  being 
greatly  superior  in  numbers,  the  Germans  were  able  to 
send  their  sick  home.  On  the  French  side  these  propor- 
tions were  reversed. 

During  the  last  war  with  Turkey  the  Russian  armies, 
numbering  in  all  592,085  men,  lost  16,578  in  battle  and 
44,431  from  sickness.  In  LHygihie  Militairey  1886, 
Morache  draws  up  the  following  analysis  of  losses  in 
modern  wars : 


PROBABLE  LOSSES  IN  FUTURE  WARS    345 

Losses. 

Deaths  in 

1000  Men. 

War. 

Strength 

of 

Army. 

From 
Wounds. 

From 
Sickness. 

From 
Wounds. 

From 
Sickness. 

Crimean,     French 

army    . 
Crimean,     English 

309,268 

20,240 

75.375 

64 

236 

army    . 
War    of    1859,    in 

French  army 
Mexican,  in  French 

97,864 
128,225 

4,607 
5.498 

17.580 
2,040 

47 
42 

179 
15 

army    . 
Franco-German,  in 

35.000 

1,729 

4.925 

49 

140 

the  German  army 
Russo-Turkish,    in 

900,000 

30,49T 

14.259 

55 

15 

the      Russian 

armies 
Bosnian      Expedi- 
tion, in  the  Aus- 

737'355 

36,455 

83,446 

49 

113 

trian  army  . 

260,000 

1,326 

2,168 

5 

8 

In  a  future  war,  for  many  reasons,  we  must  expect  even 
more  deadly  results.  Bad  and  insufficient  food,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  difficulty  of  provisioning  immense  masses, 
will  mean  the  increase  of  sickness ;  and  the  overcrowding 
of  the  sick  at  certain  points  will  complicate  the  danger 
both  from  sickness  and  from  wounds,  and  thereby  increase 
the  mortality. 

It  is  further  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  modern 
armies  will  consist  of  soldiers  less  accustomed  to  marching 
and  deprivation,  while  notwithstanding  the  lightness  of 
his  rifle,  the  infantryman  has  to  carry  a  greater  weight 
than  before.  The  German  writer  Turnwald,  who  especially 
studied  the  question  of  the  weight  which  the  soldier  can 
bear,  finds  that  it  ought  not  to  exceed  57  pounds,  that  is,  a 
third  of  his  own  weight.  At  the  present  time  the  infantry- 
man carries  88  pounds.  The  weight  of  the  equipment  is 
undoubtedly  a  factor  in  causing  the  exhaustion  and  sus- 
ceptibility to  sickness  observed  among  the  soldiers  during 


346         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

manoeuvres.  During  manoeuvres  carried  on  by  tlie 
garrison  of  Strasbourg  no  less  than  a  third  of  the  soldiers 
fell  out,  and  the  hospitals  were  filled  with  sick  soldiers. 
It  is  true  that  this  was  in  winter,  and  many  cases  were 
caused  by  frostbite. 

Basing  his  judgment  on  the  war  of  1 870-71,  in  which 
he  took  part,  General  Von  der  Goltz  observes  that  ^'  in  a 
long  and  wearisome  war  armies  undoubtedly  deteriorate 
in  qualit3\  Exhaustion  and  weariness  may  be  borne  for 
several  weeks,  but  not  for  many  months.  It  is  hard  to 
remain  a  hero,  ever  ready  for  self-sacrifice,  after  daily 
battles  and  constant  danger,  after  long  marches  through 
the  mud,  and  nights  passed  on  the  wet  earth ;  all  this  has 
a  bad  effect  on  courage." 


CHAPTER   VII 

MILITARISM    AND    ITS   NEMESIS 

Those  who  have  considered  the  facts  briefly  set  out  in 
the  foregoing  chapters  can  hardly  fail  to  agree  that  if 
European  society  could  form  a  clear  idea,  not  only  of  the 
military  character,  but  also  of  the  social  and  economic 
consequences  of  a  future  war  under  present  conditions, 
protests  against  the  present  state  of  things  would  be 
expressed  more  often  and  more  determinedly.  But  it 
cannot  be  affirmed  that  even  this  would  bring  about  an 
amelioration  of  the  present  state  of  affairs.  In  all  countries, 
with  the  exception  of  England,  the  opinion  obtains  that  great 
armies  are  the  support  of  government,  that  only  great 
armies  will  deliver  the  existing  order  from  the  perils  of 
anarchism,  and  that  military  service  acts  beneficently  on 
the  masses  by  teaching  discipline,  obedience  and  order. 

But  this  theory  of  the  disciplinary  influence  of  military 
service  is  overthrown  by  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding 
conscription,  anarchism  constantly  spreads  among  the 
peoples  of  the  West.  It  even  seems  that  by  teaching  the 
use  of  arms  to  the  masses,  conscription  is  a  far  weaker 
guarantee  than  the  long  service  of  the  professional 
soldier. 

But  the  views  of  those  interested  in  the  present  order 
do  not  extend  so  far,  and  are  generally  limited  by 
considerations  of  safety  at  the  present  time.  This  safety 
the  propertied  classes  see  in  large  armies.  As  concerns 
the  views  of  other  orders  of  society,  views  which  are 
expressed  openly  and  constitute  the  so-called  public 
opinion,  these  are  too  often  founded  only  on  those  facts 


348         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

to  which  accident  gives  prominence.  The  pubHc  does 
not  investigate  and  does  not  test  independently,  but  easily 
gives  itself  up  to  illusions  and  errors.  Such,  for  instance, 
is  the  conception  of  great  armies,  not  only  as  guarantors 
•  of  security,  but  even  as  existing  for  the  encouragement  of 
those  industries  which  equip  them,  and  those  trades  which 
supply  them,  with  provisions  and  other  necessaries. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  to  decide  the  question  whether 
militarism  is  inevitable  or  not  is  no  easy  task.  We  con- 
stantly hear  the  argument  adduced,  that  there  always  have 
been  wars  and  always  will  be,  and  if  in  the  course  of  all 
the  centuries  recorded  in  history,  international  disputes 
were  settled  only  by  means  of  war,  how  can  it  be  possible 
to  get  along  without  it  in  the  future  ?  To  this  we  might 
reply  that  not  only  the  number,  equipment,  training,  and 
technical  methods  of  armies,  but  the  very  elements  from 
which  they  are  constructed  have  essentially  changed. 

The  relations  of  the  strength  of  armies  in  time  of  war 
to  their  strength  in  time  of  peace  in  former  times 
was  very  different.  Wars  formerly  were  carried  on  by 
standing  armies  consisting  mainly  of  long  service  soldiers. 
The  armies  employed  in  future  wars  will  be  composed 
mainly  of  soldiers  taken  directly  from  peaceful  occupations. 
Among  the  older  soldiers  will  be  vast  numbers  of  heads  of 
families  torn  from  their  homes,  their  families  and  their 
work.  The  economic  life  of  whole  peoples  will  stand 
still,  communications  will  be  cut,  and  if  war  be  prolonged 
over  the  greater  part  of  a  year,  general  bankruptcy,  with 
famine  and  all  its  worst  consequences,  will  ensue.  To 
cast  light  on  the  nature  of  a  prolonged  war  from  all 
sides,  military  knowledge  alone  is  not  enough.  The 
study  and  knowledge  of  economic  laws  and  conditions 
which  have  no  direct  connection  with  military  specialism 
is  no  less  essential. 

Consideration  of  the  question  is  made  all  the  more 
difficult  by  the  fact  that  the  direction  of  military  affairs 
belongs  to  the  privileged  ranks  of  society.  The  opinions 
expressed  by  non-specialists  as  to  the  improbability  of 
great  wars  in  the  future,  are  refuted  by  authorities  simply 


MILITARISM  AND  ITS  NEMESIS     349 

by  the  declaration  that  laymen  are  ignorant  of  the  subject. 
Military  men  cannot  admit  to  be  unnecessary  that  which 
forms  the  object  of  their  activity  in  time  of  peace.  They 
have  been  educated  on  the  history  of  warfare,  and 
practical  work  develops  in  them  energy  and  capacity  for 
self-sacrifice.  Nevertheless,  such  authorities  are  not  in  a 
position  to  paint  a  complete  picture  of  the  disasters  of  a 
future  war.  Those  radical  changes  which  have  taken 
place  in  the  military  art,  in  the  composition  of  armies, 
and  in  international  economy,  are  so  vast  that  a  powerful 
imagination  would  be  required  adequately  to  depict  the 
consequences  of  war,  both  on  the  field  of  battle  and  in 
the  lives  of  peoples. 

Yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that  popular  discontent  with 
the  present  condition  of  affairs  is  becoming  more  and 
more  keenly  noticeable.  Formerly  only  solitary  voices 
were  raised  against  militarism,  and  their  protests  were 
platonic.  But  since  the  adoption  of  conscription  the 
interests  of  the  army  have  been  more  closely  bound  with 
the  interests  of  society,  and  the  disasters  which  must  be 
expected  under  modern  conditions  have  been  better 
appreciated  by  the  people. 

It  is  impossible,  therefore,  not  to  foresee  the  constant 
growth  of  the  anti-military  propaganda,  the  moral  founda- 
tions of  which  were  not  so  indisputable  in  the  past  as  they 
are  to-day.  To  this  moral  sentiment  has  lately  been 
added  a  consciousness  of  the  complexity  of  the  business 
relations  threatened  by  war,  of  the  immense  increase  of 
means  of  destruction,  and  of  the  deficiency  of  experienced 
leadership  and  the  ignorance  and  cloudiness  now  pre- 
vailing on  the  subject  of  war. 

All  these  tend  to  make  the  people  see  in  war  a  misfor- 
tune truly  terrifying.  And  if,  even  in  the  past,  it  was 
found  that  the  sentiments  of  peoples  are  more  powerful 
than  any  force,  how  much  more  so  now,  when  in  the 
majority  of  states  the  masses  indirectly  share  in  the 
government,  and  when  everywhere  exist  strong  tendencies 
threatening  the  whole  social  order.  How  much  more 
significant  now  are  the  opinions  of  the  people  both  directly 


350         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

as  to  the  system  of  militarism  and  in  their  influence  on  the 
spirit  of  armies  themselves  ! 

It  is  impossible  here  even  to  outline  the  energetic 
struggle  against  militarism  w^hich  is  being  carried  on  in 
the  West.  It  is  true  that  the  advocates  of  the  settlement 
of  international  disputes  by  peaceful  means  have  not 
attained  any  tangible  success.  But  success,  it  must  be 
admitted,  they  have  had  if  the  fact  is  taken  into  account 
that  the  necessity  of  maintaining  peace  has  been  recog- 
nised by  governments,  and  that  dread  of  the  terrible 
disasters  of  war  has  been  openly  expressed  by  statesmen, 
and  emphasised  even  from  the  height  of  thrones. 

As  a  chief  factor  tending  to  preserve  the  system  of  mili- 
tarism the  existence  of  a  professional  military  class  must  be 
considered.  It  is  true,  that  the  changes  which  have  taken 
place  under  the  influence  of  conscription  and  short  service 
have  given  to  armies  a  popular  character.  On  the  mobili- 
sation of  armies  a  considerable  proportion  of  officers  will 
be  taken  from  the  reserve :  these  officers  cannot  be  con- 
sidered professional.  Nevertheless,  a  military  professional 
class  continues  to  exist,  consisting  mainly  of  officers 
serving  with  the  colours. 

It  is  natural  that  the  existence  of  such  a  numerous  and 
influential  class,  which — in  Prussia,  for  instance — is  partly 
hereditar}^  a  class  m  which  are  found  many  men  of  high 
culture,  should  be  one  of  the  elements  supporting  the 
system  of  militarism,  even  independently  of  its  other 
foundations.  Even  if  the  conviction  were  generally 
accepted  that  it  is  impossible  to  carry  on  war  with  ipodern 
methods  of  destruction  and  in  view  of  the  inevitable 
disasters,  yet  disarmament  would  be  somewhat  delayed 
by  the  existence  of  the  military  caste,  which  would^  con- 
tinue to  declare  that  war  is  inevitable,  and  that  even  the 
decrease  of  standing  armies  would  be  accompanied  by  the 
greatest  dangers. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  from  the  nature  of  modern 
life,  the  power  and  influence  of  this  class  will  tend  to 
decrease  rather  than  increase.  The  conditions  of  war 
are  such  that  military  life  is  much  less  attractive  than  it 


MILITARISM  AND  ITS  NEMESIS     351 

was  of  old,  and  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  will  be  even 
less  attractive.  In  the  far  past  the  military  class  pre- 
ponderated in  the  state  and  the  very  nobility,  as  in  Rome, 
and  at  the  beginning  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  formed  of 
knights  (Equites,  Ritter,  Chevaliers).  The  carrying  on  of 
constant  wars  in  the  period  embraced  by  modern  history 
created  anew  a  military  profession  enjoying  a  privileged 
position. 

But  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  political  and 
social  conditions,  the  increased  importance  of  knowledge, 
industry,  capital,  and  finally,  the  immense  numbers  of  the 
military  class,  considerably  reduced  its  privileges  in  society. 
Rivalry  in  the  acquisition  of  means  for  the  satisfaction  of 
more  complex  requirements  has  caused  the  majority  of 
educated  people  to  see  in  military  service  an  ungrateful 
career.  And,  indeed,  there  is  no  other  form  of  exacting 
activity  which  pays  so  badly  as  the  military  profession. 
Owing  to  the  immense  growth  of  armies,  governments 
cannot  find  the  means  for  improving  the  position  of  officers 
and  their  families,  and  a  deficiency  in  officers  is  every- 
where felt. 

Thus,  insufficient  recompense  will  inevitably  result  in 
the  military  profession  losing  all  its  best  forces,  all  the 
more  so  because  the  fascination  for  society  of  persons 
bearing  arms  has  departed.  The  movement  against 
militarism  leads  to  views  diametrically  opposite.  Modern 
ideals  every  day  see  less  to  sympathise  with  in  the  old 
ideals  of  distinction  in  battle,  and  glory  of  conquest. 
Everywhere  the  idea  spreads  that  the  efforts  of  all  ought 
to  be  devoted  to  the  lessening  of  the  sum  of  physical  and 
moral  suffering.  The  immense  expenditure  on  the  main- 
tenance of  armies  and  fleets  and  the  building  and  equip- 
ment ot  fortresses,  acts  powerfully  in  the  spreading  of  such 
sentiments.  Everywhere  we  hear  complaints  that  mili- 
tarism sucks  the  blood  of  all — as  it  has  been  expressed, 
**  in  place  of  ears  of  corn  the  fields  produce  bayonets  and 
sabres,  and  shells  instead  of  fruit  grow  on  the  trees." 
Those  who  adopt  the  military  career  are,  of  course,  not 
responsible  for  these  conditions,  which  they  did  not  create 


352  IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

and  which  react  injuriously  on  themselves.  But  popular 
movements  do  not  analyse  motives,  and  discontent  with 
militarism  is  inevitably  transferred  to  the  military  class. 

It  might  be  replied  that  scholars,  too,  are  often  ill 
rewarded,  notwithstanding  which  they  continue  their 
work.  But  every  scholar  is  sustained  by  the  high  in- 
terests of  his  work,  by  the  hope  of  perpetuating  his 
name,  and  finally,  by  the  chance  of  enriching  himself 
upon  success.  The  position  of  officers  is  very  different. 
For  an  insignificant  salary  they  bear  the  burden  of  a 
petty  and  monotonous  work.  Year  after  year  the  same 
labour  continues.  Hope  of  distinction  in  war  is  not, 
for  none  believe  in  the  nearness  of  war.  For  an  officer 
with  an  average  education  the  limit  of  ambition  is  the 
command  of  a  company.  The  command  of  a  battalion 
little  improves  his  position.  For  the  command  of  regi- 
ments and  larger  bodies  of  troops,  academical  education 
is  required. 

But  even  among  those  officers  who  console  themselves 
wnth  the  thought  that  war  will  break  out,  presenting 
occasion  for  distinction,  there  is  little  hope  of  attaining 
the  desired  promotion.  We  have  had  many  opportunities 
for  conversing  with  military  men  of  different  nationalities, 
and  everywhere  we  were  met  with  the  conviction  that  in  a 
future  war  few  would  escape.  With  a  smokeless  field  of 
battle,  accuracy  of  fire,  the  necessity  for  showing  example 
to  the  rank  and  file,  and  the  rule  of  killing  off"  all  the  officers 
first,  there  is  but  little  chance  of  returning  home  uninjured. 

The  times  are  passed  when  officers  rushing  on  in 
advance  led  their  men  in  a  bold  charge  against  the  enemy, 
or  when  squadrons  seeing  an  ill-defended  battery  galloped 
up  to  it,  sabred  the  gunners,  and  spiked  the  guns  or  flung 
them  into  ditches.  Courage  now  is  required  no  less  than 
before,  but  this  is  the  courage  of  restraint  and  self- 
sacrifice  and  no  longer  scenic  heroism.  War  has  taken 
a  character  more  mechanical  than  knightly.  Personal 
initiative  is  required  not  less  than  before,  but  it  is  no 
longer  visible  to  all. 

It  is  true  that  warfare  and  the  military  profession  will 


MILITARISM  AND  ITS  NEMESIS     353 

continue  to  preserve  their  attractions  for  such  restless, 
uncurbed  natures  as  cannot  reconcile  themselves  to  a 
laborious  and  regular  life,  finding  a  charm  in  danger 
itself.  But  even  these  will  find  that  the  stormy  military 
life  and  feverish  activity  of  battle  are  no  more  surrounded 
by  the  aureole  which  once  set  them  above  the  world  of 
work. 

It  is  .notable  that  the  younger  and  the  better  educated 
they  are,  the  more  pessimistically  do  officers  look  on  war. 
And  although  military  men  do  not  speak  against  warfare 
publicly,  for  this  would  be  incompatible  with  their  calling, 
it  cannot  escape  attention  that  every  year  fewer  and  fewer 
stand  up  in  defence  of  its  necessity  or  use. 

As  the  popularity  of  war  decreases  on  all  sides,  it  is 
impossible  not  to  foresee  that  a  time  will  approach  when 
European  governments  can  no  longer  rely  on  the  regular 
payment  of  taxes  for  the  covering  of  military  expenditure. 
The  extraordinary  resource  which  has  been  opened  by 
means  of  conversion  of  loans — that  is,  by  the  lowering  of 
the  rate  of  interest — will  soon  disappear.  In  1894  a  sum 
of  five  hundred  and  twenty  millions  of  pounds  sterling  was 
converted,  meaning  for  the  proprietors  of  the  securities, 
a  loss  of  four  millions  seven  hundred  and  sixty  thousand 
of  pounds.  To  defend  themselves  against  this,  capitalists 
have  rushed  into  industry.  In  Europe,  in  recent  times, 
industrial  undertakings  have  immensely  increased,  and  a 
vast  number  of  joint-stock  companies  has  been  formed. 
The  Conservative  classes,  considered  as  the  best  support 
of  authority,  foreseeing  the  loss  of  income,  dispose  of  their 
Government  securities  and  invest  in  industrial  securities, 
which  bring  a  better  dividend.  State  securities  tend  to 
fall  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of  the  middle  classes — 
that  is,  the  classes  which  live  on  incomes  derived  from 
work,  but  who  are  nevertheless  in  a  position  to  save. 

These  changes  tend  to  make  the  economic  convulsions 
caused  by  war  far  greater  than  those  which  have  been 
experienced  in  the  past.  The  fall  in  the  value  of  Govern- 
ment securities  at  the  very  time  when,  owing  to  the  stop- 
page of  work,  many  will  be  compelled  to  realise,  must  cause 

z 


354         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE? 

losses  which  will  be  intensely  felt  by  the  middle  classes  and 
cause  a  panic.  And,  as  out  of  the  number  of  industrial 
undertakings  some  must  reduce  their  production  and  lose 
their  profit  and  others  altogether  cease  to  work,  the  richer 
classes  will  suffer  great  losses  and  many  even  ruin. 

A  detailed  examination  of  the  vexed  questions  of 
Europe  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  not  one  is  of 
such  a  nature  to  cause  a  great  war.  France  has  no  ally 
in  an  offensive  war  for  the  recovery  of  her  lost  provinces, 
and  single-handed  she  cannot  be  assured  of  success. 
From  an  offensive  war  over  the  Eastern  question  neither 
Russia  nor  Austria  could  draw  compensatory  advantages, 
and  such  a  war,  which  in  all  probability  would  involve  the 
participation  of  England,  France,  Germany  and  Italy, 
would  lead  only  to  exhaustion  of  forces.  Germany  cannot 
think  of  attacking  France,  while  out  of  an  offensive  war 
with  Russia  she  could  draw  no  profit. 

Of  new  territory  in  the  West,  Russia  also  has  no  need, 
and  a  war  with  Germany  would  involve  such  immense 
expenditure  as  could  hardly  be  covered  by  an  indemnity, 
all  the  more  so  because,  exhausted  as  she  would  be  by  a 
struggle  with  Russia,  Germany  could  not  pay  an  indemnity 
corresponding  to  the  case.  Generally,  the  political  question 
for  Russia  lies  in  the  Far  East  and  not  in  the  West. 

As  concerns  other  possible  pretexts  for  war,  exa- 
mination would  show  that,  in  the  present  conditions  of 
Europe,  none  are  of  sufficient  gravity  to  cause  a  war 
threatening  the  combatants  with  mutual  annihilation  or 
complete  exhaustion,  nor  need  those  moral  misunder- 
standings and  rivalries  which  exist  between  European 
states  be  seriously  considered.  It  cannot  be  supposed 
that  nations  would  determine  to  exterminate  one  another 
merely  to  show  their  superiority,  or  to  avenge  offences 
committed  by  individuals  belonging  to  one  nation  against 
individuals  belonging  to  another.  Thus  a  consideration 
of  all  the  reasonable  causes  of  war  would  show  that  not 
one  was  probable. 

But  even  if  peace  were  assured  for  an  indefinite  time, 
the  very  preparations  made,  the  maintenance  of  armed 


MILITARISM  AND  ITS  NEMESIS     355 

forces,  and  constant  rearmaments,  would  require  every 
year  still  greater  and  greater  sacrifices.  Yet  every  day 
new  needs  arise  and  old  needs  are  made  clearer  to  the 
popular  mind.  These  needs  remain  unsatisfied,  though 
the  burden  of  taxation  continually  grows.  And  the 
recognition  of  these  evils  by  the  people  constitutes  a 
serious  danger  for  the  state. 

In  our  time  both  military  and  political  affairs  have 
ceased  to  be  high  mysteries  accessible  only  to  the  few. 
General  military  service,  the  spread  of  education,  and 
wide  publicity  have  made  the  elements  of  the  polities  of 
states  accessible  to  all.  All  who  have  passed  through  the 
ranks  of  an  army  have  recognised  that  with  modern 
weapons  whole  corps  and  squadrons  may  be  destroyed 
in  the  first  battle,  and  that  in  this  respect  the  conquerors 
will  suffer  little  less  than  the  conquered. 

Can  it  be  possible  that  the  growth  of  expenditure  on 
armaments  will  continue  for  ever  ?  To  the  inventiveness 
of  the  human  mind  and  the  rivalry  between  states  no 
limits  exist.  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  that  the 
immense  expenditure  on  military  aims  and  the  conse- 
quent growth  of  taxation  are  the  favourite  arguments  of 
agitators,  who  declare  that  the  institutions  of  the  Middle 
Ages — when  from  thousands  of  castles  armed  knights 
pounced  upon  passing  merchants — were  less  burdensome 
than  modern  preparations  for  war. 

The  exact  disposition  of  the  masses  in  relation  to 
armaments  is  shown  by  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
opponents  of  militarism  and  preachers  of  the  Socialist 
propaganda.  In  Germany  in  1893,  the  opponents  of  the 
new  military  project  received  1,097,000  votes  more  than 
its  supporters.  Between  1887  and  1893  ^he  opposition 
against  militarism  increased  more  than  seven  times.  In 
France  the  Socialist  party  in  1893  received  600,000  votes, 
and  in  1896  1,000,000. 

Thus,  if  the  present  conditions  continue,  there  can  be 
but  two  alternatives,  either  ruin  from  the  continuance  of 
the  armed  peace,  or  a  veritable  catastrophe  from  war. 

The  question  is  naturally  asked  :  What  will  be  given  to 


356         IS  WAR  NOW  IMPOSSIBLE  ? 

the  people  after  war  as  compensation  for  their  immense 
losses  ?  The  conquered  certainly  will  be  too  exhausted 
to  pay  any  money  indemnity^  and  compensation  must  be 
taken  by  the  retention  of  frontier  territories  which  will  be 
so  impoverished  by  war  that  their  acquisition  will  be  a 
loss  rather  than  a  gain. 

With  such  conditions  can  we  hope  for  good  sense 
among  millions  of  men  when  but  a  handful  of  their  former 
officers  remain  ?  Will  the  armies  of  Western  Europe, 
where  the  Socialist  propaganda  has  already  spread  among 
the  masses,  allow  themselves  to  be  disarmed,  and  if  not, 
must  we  not  expect  even  greater  disasters  than  those 
which  marked  the  short-lived  triumph  of  the  Paris 
Commune  ?  The  longer  the  present  position  of  affairs 
continues  the  greater  is  the  probability  of  such  convul- 
sions after  the  close  of  a  great  war.  It  cannot  be  denied 
that  conscription,  by  taking  from  productive  occupations  a 
greater  number  of  men  than  the  former  conditions  of 
service,  has  increased  the  popularity  of  subversive  princi- 
ples among  the  masses.  Formerly  only  Socialists  were 
known  ;  now  Anarchism  has  arisen.  Not  long  ago  the 
advocates  of  revolution  were  a  handful ;  now  they  have 
their  representatives  in  all  parliaments,  and  every  new 
election  increases  their  number  in  Germany,  in  France,  in 
Austria,  and  in  Italy.  It  is  a  strange  coincidence  that 
only  in  England  and  in  the  United  States,  where  conscrip- 
tion is  unknown,  are  representative  assemblies  free  from 
these  elements  of  disintegration.  Thus  side  by  side  with 
the  growth  of  military  burdens  rise  waves  of  popular  dis- 
content threatening  a  social  revolution. 

Such  are  the  consequences  of  the  so-called  armed  peace 
of  Europe — slow  destruction  in  consequence  of  expendi- 
ture on  preparations  for  war,  or  swift  destruction  in  the 
event  of  war — in  both  events  convulsions  in  the  social 
order. 


INDEX 


Agricultural  Class  (see  names  of  Countries) 

Algiers,  French  Army  in,  delective  ambulance  arrangements,  155 

Alsace-Lorraine  : 

Loss  of,  ultimate  economic  benefit  to  France,  277,  278 

Russian  Alliance,  probable  effect  on,  of  return  of  provinces  by 
Germariy,  90 
Aluminium,  vessels  constructed  with,  impenetrability  alleged,  102 
Ambulance  work  (see  title  Wounded) 
Ammunition  (see  title  Artillery) 
American  Civil  War: 

Armoured  ships,  final  supersession  of  wooden  ships,  96 

Expenditure,  130 

Losses,  343  345 

Overcharged  rifles  found  on  field  of  battle,  21 

Wheat,  rise  in  price.  295 
Anarchism,  spread  of,  effect  on  militarism,  347,  356 
Arms,  Small  : 

Bayonet,  reliance  on,  impossible  in  modern  warfare,  33,  34 

Chassepot,  effectiveness  of  fire  compared  with  modern  rifle,  5, 

323 

Improvements  in,  4  : 

Increased  number  of  casualties  resulting,  319-329 

Renewal  in  time  of  war,  307 

Rifles  (sc-e  that  title) 

Russia,  manufacture  in,  242,  243,  307 
Artillery  and  Artillery  Ammunition  : 

Amount  effective  for  war,  63 

Bombs : 

Illuminating,  used  in  night  attack,  52 
Improvements  since  Franco-Prussian  war,  9 

Coast  batteries,  fire  from,  ineffectiveness,  104 

Destructiveness,  calculations  as  to  possibilities,  20 

Electric  projectile  used  in  night  attack,  52 

Entrenchments,  time  taken  in  construction,  45 

Explosion,  premature,  danger  of,  20,  21,  22 

Fire  over  heads  of  advancing  troops,  dangers  attending,  334 

Gases,  extent  of  direct  action,  22 


3s8  INDEX 


Artillery  and  Artillery  ammunition  {continued) : 
Guns  : 

Cost  of  firing,  99,  100 

Effect  on  future  warfare,  8 

Number  of  rounds  required,  20 

Russian  factory  at  Obukovsk,  308 
Improvements  in,  7-19,  38,  329 

Nerves,  strain  on,  in  dealing  with   highly  explosive  ammuni- 
tion, 21 
Preliminary  action,  before  infantry  attack  suggested,  32 
Role  in  future  warfare,  17-23 
Shells  : 

Decreased  use  of,  in  future  warfare,  9 

Increase  in  destruciveness  since  Franco-Prussian  war,  9 

Premature  explosion,  danger  of,  20 
Shrapnel : 

Area  of  dispersal,  8 

Destructiveness,  8,  9,  329 
Wounds  caused  by  artillery  fire,  148,  149,  152 
Attack  : 

Artillery,  losses  inflicted  by,  10 
Cavalry,  50 

Difficulties  under  modern  conditions,  337-340 
Direct,  rarity  of,  45 

European  armies,  comparative  efficiency,  62 
Infantry,  defects  of  modern  tactics,  25-34 
Loose  formation,  5 
Night  attack,  50 
"  Auf  der  Schwelle  des  Kriegs,"  statement  as  to  food  supplies  in 

time  of  war,  302,  303 
Austria  : 

Agricultural  Class; 

Earnings,  314 

Proportion  of  population,  317 
Attack  and  defence,  efficiency  in,  62 
Bachelors,  percentage,  290 
Coal  supply,  306,  307 
Crime,  convictions,  232,  237 
Danish  war,  expenditure,  130 
Declaration  of  war  improbable,  354 
Drunkenness,  statistics,  229,  230 
Expenditure  on  Army  and  Navy,  133-138 

Future  war,  estimates,  142,  143,  144 
Fires,  losses  by,  192 

Food  supply,  sufficient  in  event  of  war,  302 
France,  war  with,  expenditure  on,  130 
Frontier  defences,  expenuiture  on,  57 
Grain  Supply  : 

Home  production  and  import,  295,  296,  297 


INDEX  359 

Austria  {continued) : 
Grain  Supply  : 

Inequalities  of  harvests,  301 

Oats,  home  production,  297,  298 

Price,  rise  in,  probable,  in  event  of  war,  141 
Horses  for  military  purposes,  statistics,  316 
Infantry,  re-armament,  estimated  cost,  5 
Kerosene  supply,  deficiency,  305,  306 
Marriages,  statistics,  208 
Meat  supply,  superfluity,  303,  304 
Military  strength,  36,  63,  318 
Naval  expenditure,  133,  137,  138 

Russian  compared  with,  125 
Officers,  proportion  possessing  good  preparatory  training,  43 
Population,  increase,  292 

Old  men  and  children,  percentage,  289 

Town  and  country,  comparison,  193 
Reserve,  proportion  lo  be  drawn  upon,  42,  336 
Revenue,  distribution,  145,  146 
Rifle,  calibre  adopted,  319 

Russo-Austro-German  war  of  the  future  (see  that  title) 
Salt  supply,  superfluity,  304,  305 
Sappers,  number  in  army,  333 
Securities  held  in  Germany,  275,  276 


Bachelors,  proportion  to  population  in  leading  European  States, 

290 
Baker,  Sir  F.,  on  probable  effect  of  war  on  people  of  England,  313 
Baltic  Fleet,  introduction  of  steam,  95 

Bardleben,  Professor,  on  destructiveness  of  modern  rifles,  151 
Battles  : 

Accidental,  description  of,  46 

Area,  increased  by  modern  conditions,  5,  39 

Descriptions  of  future  battles,  47,  48 

Duration,  prolonged,  52,  337,  338 

Indec  sive,  probable  increase  in  number,  49,  338 

Opening  from  great  distance,  5 
Bayonet,  reliance  on  in  modern  warfare  impossible,  33,  34 
Beck,  Dr.,  on  humanity  of  modern  bulkts,  150 
Belgium  : 

Crime,  statistics,  232 

Drunkenness,  229,  230 

Fires,  losses  by,  192,  193 

Frontier  defences,  expenditure,  57 

Rifles,  experiments  with,  4 
Berdan  Rifle  : 

Cartridges,  number  carried,  328 

Range  of  fire,  6 


360 


INDEX 


Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  on  food  supply  in  England,  in  time  of  war, 

313 
Bilroih,  Professor,  on  aid  to  wounded,  156 

Bircher,  experiments  in  rifle  fire,  152 

Births  : 

France,  low  rate,  288,  292 

Illegitimate,  statistics,  225 

Russia,  rate  compared  with  other  countries,  207,  208 
Bismarck,  Prince  : 

Russian  designs  against  Germany,  report  spread  by,  136 

Sea   and   land   victories,   statement   as    to   comparative    im- 
portance, 122 
Black  Sea  Fleet,  composition,  95 
Blockade  of  ships  in  ports  and  harbours,  104,  105 
Bombardment  (see  Naval  Warfare) 
Bombs,  9,  52 

Boots,  defective,  supplied  in  the  Russo-Turkish  war,  158 
Bones,  penetrative  power  of  bullets,  153 

Botkin,  Professor,  on  defective  ambulance  arrangements  in  Russo- 
Turkish  war,  154 
Brest-Litousk,  strategical  importance,  71,  79,  80,  82 
Brialmoiit,  General,  on  : 

Fortresses,  investment,  55 

Franco-German  War  of  the  future,  65 

Russia : 

Economic  effect  of  war,  163 

Route  of  i.ttack  by  Ausiro-German  Army,  probable,  76,  78 

Sappers,  number  required  in  army,  333 
Brisant  shell,  destructiveness,  9 
Bruns,  Herr,  on  modern  bullets,  150,  151 
Bullets  : 

Penetrative  power,  3,  6,  149,  319 

Revolution  and  deformation,  destructiveness  affected  by,  322, 

Wounds  (see  title  Rifle  Wounds) 
Bunge,  M.  N.  H.,  on  fluctuation  in  Russian  securities,  166 
Bur  eau,  M.,  on  abandonment  of  investigation  of  economic  condi- 
tions accompanying  war,  91 


Canada,  losses  by  fires,  statistics,  192,  193 
Captains,  importance  in  modern  warfare,  38 
Cartridges  : 

Explosion,  premature  risk  of,  21,  22 

Supply  cariied  by  modern  soldiers,  5-7,  328 
Casualties,  increase  in,  5,  319-346 
Cattle-breeding,  303,  304 

England,  254-256 

Russia,  198-201,303,  304 


INDEX  361 

Cavalry,  role  in  modern  warfare,  11 

Attack,  14,  50 

Losses  under  fire,  comparison  with  infantry,  14 

Pursuit,  role  in,  16 

Reconnaisances,  11,  12,  16 

Rifle  fire  a^^ainst,  effectiveness,  324 
Chassepot,  effect. v  ness  of  fire,  5,  323 
Chasseurs,  artillery  hampered  by,  18,  19 
Chilian  War  : 

Losses,  statistics,  343 

Officers  and  men,  comparison,  42,  335, 

Rifles,  modern  deadliness  proved  by,  6,  29,  329 

Torpedoes,  use  in,  loi 
China,  foreign  trade  with,  125,  126 
Coal  supply  of  European  States,  comparison,  306,  307 
Coast  batteries,  ineffectiveness,  104 

Commander-in-Chief,  position  in  modern  warfare,  38,  39,  46 
Commissariat,  difficulties  of,  2)7-  300,  301,  303,  341,  342 

Rise  in  price  of  provisions  in  evtnt  of  war,  140,  141,  143 
Companies,  Joint  Stock,  in  England,  262 
Conscription  : 

Anarchism,  increase  since  introduction  of,  347,  356 

Defects  of  system,  35,  36,  37 
Consols,  ln)lders  of,  statistics,  260,  261 
Corea,  possession  of,  unde-irable  for  Russia,  126,  127 
Corn  supply,  effect  of  war  on,  [41,  294-303,  313,  314,  318 

(See  aUo  Names  of  Countries,  sub-heading  C^rain  Supply) 
Coumes,  Professor,  on  difficulties  encountered  by  modern  officers,  38 
Crete,  bombardment,  ineffectiveness  of  tire  from  war-ships,  118 
Crime,  statistics,  228-240 
Crimean  War : 

Armoured  ships,  introduction,  96 

Black  Sea  Fleet,  composition,  95 

Casualties,  148,  343-345 

English  national  debt  increased  by,  265 

Expenditure,  129,  168 

Provisions,  rise  in  price,  143,  295 

Success  of  invading  fleets,  Van  der  Goltz  on,  119 
Cronstadt,  committee  to  consider  defence  of,  97 


"  Dandola,"  guns  carried  by,  99 
Danish  War  (1864),  expenditure,  130 
Death  statistics,  209-213 

Drunkenness,  230 

Killed,  in  proportion  to  \\  ounded,  in  modern  warfare,  342-345 

Typhoid,  death  from,  in  Russia,  224 
Declaraiion  of  war  by  any  European  Power  improbable,  354 


362  INDEX 

Defence  : 

Advantages  on  side  of  defensive  force,  63 

European  armies,  comparative  efficiency,  62 

Strengthening  necessitated  by  modern  arms,  5 
Dementyeff,  E.  M.,  on   condition    of   industrial   class   in  Russia, 

185-187 
Doctors  : 

Army  medical  work  (see  title  Wounded,  aid  of) 

Civil,  statistics,  Russia   compared  with  other  countries,   220, 
221 
Dragomiroff,  General,  on  advantages  of  night  attack,  51 
Dreuze  rifle,  range  of  effective  fire,  323 

Drunkenness,  crime,  suicide,  and  insanity  resulting  from,  226-228 
Dijppel,  Battle  of,  casualties  resulting  from  rifle  fire,  148 
"Duilio": 

Cost  of  construction,  98 

Guns  carried  by,  99 
Duration  of  battle,  statements  as  to,  52,  337,  338 
Duration  of  war,  probably  prolonged  by  modern  conditions,  341 


Economic  effects  of  war,  61,  91,  92,  348,  349,  353 

England,  251-265 

France,  277-293 

Germany,  266-276 

Naval  warfare,  effects,  no,  112 

Russia,  163,  242,  250 

Summary  of  effect  on  vital  needs  of  people,  294-318 
Education  : 

Crime  in  relation  to,  statistics,  238 

Expenditure,  contrasted  with  that  on  war,  139 

Russia,  condition  in,  216-219 
Efficiency  of  armies,  elements  constituting,  61,  62 
Electric  projectile  for  use  in  night  attack,  52 
Emigration  of  Germans  to  America,  decline  in,  274 
England  : 

Bachelors,  percentage,  290 

Companies,  Joint  Sto.k,  262 

Consols,  holders  of,  statistics,  260,  261 

Crime,  convictions,  232,  237 

Drunkenness,  227,  229,  230 

Economic  effect  of  war,  251-265 

Expenditure  on  Army  and  Navy,  133-138,  263,  264 
Russian  Naval  expenditure  compared  with,  125 

Factories,  large  proportion  cf  people  engaged  in,  262 

Fires,  losses  caused  by,  192,  193 

Food: 

Production  and  importation,  251-258 

Supply  in  time  of  war,  probably  inadequate,  313 


INDEX  363 

England  {continued)  : 
Grain  Supply: 

Harvests,  inequality,  301 

Importation  and  home  production,  251-254,  295 

Insufficiency  ot  local  products  in  time  of  war,  296 

Oats,  home  production  insufficient,  297,  298 
Horses  for  military  service,  statistics,  316 
Income  Tax,  statistics,  259,  260 
Marriages,  statistics,  208 
Meat,  importation,  254-256 

National  Debt,  increase  owing  to  past  wars,  264,  265 
Navy : 

Expenditure,  125,  133-138 

Increase,  123,  124 

Superiority  over  other  nations,  in 
Poor  Law  Relief,  number  of  people  receiving,  261 
Population  : 

Distribution  between  town  and  country,  262 

Increase,  statistics,  292 

Occupation,  258,  259 

Percentage  of  old  men  and  children,  289 
Potatoes,  cultivation  and  importation,  254 
Revolution,  possibilitv  of,  as  result  of  war,  263 
Rifle,  calibre  adopted,  319 
Savings  banks,  deposits  in,  statistics,  261 
Wages  and  incomes,  probable  effect  of  war  on,  258-263 
Entrenchments  : 

Dead  bodies  cast  out  of,  157 
Importance  in  modern  warfare,  10,  i  r,  332-334. 
Sappers,  number  of  m  different  armies,  333 
Tactics  in  relation  to,  26-33,  45 
Envelopment,  varying  opinion  as  to  value  in  military  tactics,  30,  34 
Equipment,  weij^ht  carried,  36,  345 
Expenditure,  Military  : 

Comparative  statement  as  to  expenditure  on  armies  and  navies, 

III 
Future  wars,  estimite,  140-146 
Past  wars,  128-139 
(See  also  names  of  Countries) 
Explosives  (see  title  Artillery  and  Artillery  Ammunition) 

Finland,  crime,  statistics,  236 
Fires,  losses  by,  statistics,  192,  193 
Food  Supply  : 

Armies  (see  title  Commissariat) 

Effect  ('f  war  on.  294-305,  313-315,. 3i 8 

Three  Great  European  Powers  only  in  position  of  independence 
in  event  of  war,  302 

(See  also  title  Grain  Supply) 


364  INDEX 


Fortresses  : 

Auxiliary  obstacles  used  in  defence,  334 

Declaration  of  war,  probably  followed  by  immediate  breaking 

through  frontier  defences,  57,  58 
Losses  during  siege,  probable  mcrease,  332-334,  342 
Strength  of  investing  force,  modern  requirements,  55 
Time  pr -bably  required  for  siege,  55 
Use  in  modern  strategy,  52,  113 
Fougasse  cartridges  and  shells,  danger  of  premature  explosion,  20, 

21,  22 
France  : 

Agricultural  Class  : 

Effect  of  war  on,  287 

Incomes,  313.  3^4 

Percentage  of  population,  284,  285,  287,  317 

Wages,  286 
Algiers  and  Tunis,  armies  in,  defective  care  of  wounded,  155 
Alliance  wiih   Russia,  probable  effect  on  of  return  of  Alsace 

and  Lorraine  by  Germany,  90 
Artillery  : 

Effective  in  event  of  war,  amount,  63 

Improvements  in,  19,  329,  330 
Assistance  given  to  poor,  statistics,  287,  288 
Bachelors,  proportion  to  population,  290 
Coal  supply,  306 
Crime,  statistics,  232,  236,  237 
Debt,  National,  growth  of,  281,  282 
Declaration  of  war,  improbable,  354 
Drunkenness,  227,  229,  230 
Economic  effects  of  war,  277-293 
Efficiency  in  attack  and  defence,  comparison,  62 
Estates  passing  by  legacy  and  gift,  statistics,  282,  283 
Expenditure  on  war,  statistics,  133-139 

Future  war,  estimates,  142-144 

Past  wars,  128,  130 

Revenue,  distribution  with  regard  to.  145,  146 
Fires,  losses  by,  192,  193 
Foreigners  engaged  in  industry,  283 
Franco-German  War  (see  that  title) 
Frontier  defences,  57,  342 
Grain  Supply  : 

Harvests,  inequalities,  301 

Insufficiency  of  local  production  in  time  of  war,  296,  297 

Import  and  home  production,  of  wheat,  barley,  and  rye, 
295 

Oats,  home  production  insufficient,  297,  298 
Horses  for  military  service,  statistics,  316 
Imports  and  exports,  278-281,  283,  295,  303-305 
Incomes,  statistics,  286,  313 
Insanity  resulting  from  arunkenness,  227 


INDEX  365 

France  {continued) : 

Kerosene  supply,  deficiency,  305,  306 

Marriajj;es,  statistics,  208 

Meat  supply,  deficiency,  303,  304 

Militarism,  attitude  ot  people  towards,  355 

Military  strength,  statistics,  36,  63 

Mobili^ation  of  army  in  time  of  war,  expense  estimated,  141 

Navy  : 

Armoured  ships,  introduction,  96 

Expenditure,  133,  137,  138 
Russian  compared  with,  125 

Increase,  123 
Officers,  proportion  possessing  good  preparatory  training,  43 
Paris  (see  that  title) 
Population  : 

Birth-rUe,  low,  288-292 

Distribution  according  to  industry,  284 

Town  and  country,  comparative  growth,  193 

Value  of  growth,  comparison  with  Germany,  293 
Re-armament,  estimated  cost,  5 
Reserve  forces,  42,  336 

Defective  training  proved  by  manoeuvres,  yj 
Revenue  and  Expenditure,  281 
Rifles  : 

Calibre  adopted,  319 

Effectiveness  : 

Comparison  with  other  nations,  4 
Diagrams  illustrating,  325-327 
Russo-Austro-German  war  of  the  future  (see  that  title) 
Sappers,  number  employed,  333 
Savings-banks,  deposits  in,  282 
Socialist  propaganda,  268 
Tactics,  delects  of,  25 
Tonkin  War,  torpedoes  used  in,  loi 
Unemployed,  proportion  of  population,  287,  288 
Women,  active  snare  in  industry  and  trade,  287 
Franco-German  War,  1870  : 

Economic  condition  of  country,  improvement  resulting  from, 

277-283 
Fortresses  captured,  54 
Improvement  in  arms  since  : 

Artillery,  9,  19,  78,  329,  330 

Small  arms,  4,  5,  323.  324 
Losses,  statistics,  130,  131,  343-345 
Metz,  battle  indeci>ive,  49 
Mobiles,  second  day's  attack  generally  necessary  for  dislodg- 

ment,  53 
Navy,  unimportant  part  played  by,  120,  121 

Moltke,    statement    as    to   improbability    of     attack    on 
German  coast,  117 


266 


INDEX 


Franco-German  War  {cotitinucd) : 
Night  attacks,  51 
Officers  : 

Disablement,  adopted  as  principle  in  battle,  42 

German  : 

Losses,  statistics,  335,  336 

Superiority  in  independence  and  self-reliance,  46 
Paris,  siege  of,  number  of  men  required  for  investment,  55 
Sharpshooiers,  important  part  in,  331,  332 
Wounded  : 

Ambulance  arrangements,  defective,  154.  155 

Cold  steei,  wounds  by,  percentage,  148 

Explosive  bullets,  charge  as  to  use  of,  1 50 

Shells  and  bullets,  wounds  by,  percentage,  149 

Total  losses,  131,  343-345 
Franco-German  War  of  the  future,  63 
Distribution  of  troops,  64 
Effectiveness  in  attack,  comparison,  66 
Invasion  of  France  by  Germany,  65 
Invasion  of  Germany  by  France,  67 
Paris,  siege  of,  difficulties  attending,  66 
Strength  of  forces,  almost  equal,  65 
Frontier  defences,  52,  57,  58 
Franco-German,  65,  66 
Russian,  -Ji,  75 


Gebler,  Professor,  on  effectiveness  of  modern  rifle,  4,  5,  329 
Gerbinus,  on  movements  initiated  by  the  masses,  60 
Germany  : 

Agricultural  Class  : 

Earnings,  314 

Effect  of  war  on,  267,  314,  316 

Peicentage  of  population,  266,  268 
Artillery : 

Increase  in  power,  19 

Strength  m  1896,  63 
Bachelors,  proportion  to  population,  290 
Coal  supply,  306 
Crime,  statistics,  232,  236,  338 
Danish  War,  expenditure  of  Prussia  on,  130 
Drunkenness,  227,  229,  230 
Economic  effects  of  war,  266-276 
Efficiency  in  attack  and  defence^  62 
Emigratii  n,  decline  in,  274 

Expenditure  on  future  war,  estimates,  142,  143,  144 
Expenditure  on  maintenance  of  Army  and  Navy,  133-138 
Fires,  losses  by,  192,  193 


INDEX  367 

Germany  {continued)  : 

Franco-German  War  (see  that  title) 
Franco-German  War  of  the  Future  (see  that  title) 
Frontier  defences,  expenditure  on,  57 
Grain  Supply  : 

Harvests,  inequality,  298,  299,  301 

Home  prcKluciion  and  import,  295 

Insufficiency  in  time  of  war,  296,  297,  299,  302 
Plans  for  remedying,  302,  303 

Oats,  home  production  insufficient,  297,  298 
Horses,  number  required  for  military  service,  314-316 
Incomes,  distribution,  269,  270,  272,  308 
Industrial  classes,  effect  of  war  on,  266-275 
Infantry : 

Carriages  used  for  transport  during  manoeuvres,  332 

Re-armament,  estimated  cost,  5 
Kerosene  supply,  deficiency,  305,  306 
Manoeuvres,  45,  332 
Marriages,  statistics,  208 
Meat  supply,  irnporis  and  exports,  303,  304 
Militarism,  attitude  of  people  towards,  355 
Military  strength : 

Proportion  of  population  engaged  in  army,  318 

Total,  36,  63 
Military  writers,  caution  of,  26 
Navy: 

Expenditure,  125 

Increase,  123 
Officers  : 

Hereditary  class  in  Prussia,  350 

Proportion  possessing  good  preparatory  training,  43 
Population  : 

Distribution  by  occupation,  266,  268 

Growth,  290-293 

Town  and  country,  growth  in  compared,  193 

Old  men  and  children,  percentage,  289 
Production  of  necessities  of  life,  decrease  in  time  of  war,  by 

withdrawal  of  nien  for  military  service,  315 
Reserve,  statistics,  42,  336 
Revenue,  145,  146 
Rifles : 

Calibre  adopted,  319 

Effectiveness,  4,  326,  327 
Russian  designs  against,  report  spread  by  Prince   Bismarck, 

136 
Russo-Austro-German  War  of  the  Future  (see  that  title) 
Salt  supply,  superfluity,  304,  305 
Sappers,  number  in  army,  333 
Savings  of  people,  inconsiderable,  269,  271,  309,  310 


368  INDEX 

Germany  {continued) : 

Securities,  effect  of  war  on,  275,  276 

Socialist  propaganda,  activity,  271,  311,  312 

Wages,  low  standard,  evils  of  war  increased  by,  308-311 

Women,  effect  of  war  on  wage-earning  class,  272-274 
Gilyarovski,  P.,  on  condition  of  children  in  Russia,  211 
"  Gloire,"  construction,  96 
Goltz,  Van  der,  Qi  otations  from  : 

Accidental  Battle,  description,  46 

Deterioration  of  armies  during  long  war,  346 

Importance  of  reinforcements,  45 
Gorni-Dubnak,  night  attack  on,  51 
Grain  supply,  effect  of  war  on,  141,  294-303,  310,  313,  314,  318 

(see  also  naines  of  Countries) 
Grardimay,  defective  ambulance  arrangements,  1 56 
Great  Britain  (see  England) 
Gulletta,  defective  ambulance  arrangements,  156 
Guns : 

Field  guns  (see  title  Artillery,  subheading  Guns) 

Naval,  99,  103 

Hedzvetski,  V.  I.,  on  insufficiency  of  grain  supply  for  German 

Army  on  Russian  frontier,  in  event  of  war,  300 
Hoenig,  F.,  Quotations  from  : 

Night  attacks,  51 

Sieges,  in  modern  warfare,  52 
Hohenlohe,  Prince,  on  : 

Franco-Prussian  War,  incident  in,  335 

Shrapnel,  destructiveness,  8 
Holland  : 

Fires,  losses  by,  192 

Rifle,  calibre  adopted,  319 
Hornby,  Admiral,  on  msufficiency  of  food  supply  in  England  in 

time  of  war,  313 
Horses,  use  of  for  military  service,  315,  316 

Russia,  large  supply  available,  240-242 
Hungary  : 

Bachelors,  percentage,  290 

Crime,  statistics,  232 

Grain  production,  295 

Population,  percentage  of  old  men  and  children,  289 

Illuminating  bomb  for  use  in  night  attacks,  52 
Incomes,  Statistics  : 

England,  259 

France,  286,  313 

Germany,  269,  270,  272,  308 

Russia,  314 


INDEX  369 

Infantry : 

Attacking  party,  number,  proportion  to  defenders.  31 

Bayonet,  reliance  on  in  modern  wariare  impossible,  ^;^,  34 

Carriages,  use  for  rapid  transport,  332 

Cavalry,  attack  on,  15 

Enve  oping,  varying  opinions  as  to,  30,  34 

Equipment,  weight,  36 

Losses,  estimates,  14,  27-32 

Marches,  endurance  required,  25,  36 

Officers,  great  ability  required,  27 

Reconnaissance,  duties  in  relation  to,  12,  13,  24 

Re- armament,  estimated  cost,  5 

Rifle  fire  against,  effectiveness,  323,  326,  327 

Role  in  future  warfare,  23 

Tactics,  differences  of  opinion  as  to  modern  system,  25-34 
Inkerman,  battle  of,  casual- ies  caused  by  bullet  wounds,  148 
Instructions  as  to  tactics,  elaboration   in  time  of  peace  desirable, 

336,  337 
Iron  and  steel  manufacture,  working  of  in  Russia,  242,  243,  307 
Ironclads  : 

Aluminium,  vessels  protected  by,  alleged  impenetrability,  102 

Boilers  and  engines,  protection  of,  102 

Cost  of  construction,  98 

Guns  and  ammunition,  98,  99 

Introduction,  96 

Machinery,  complexity,  106 

Thickness  of  armour,  98 

Water-tight  compartments,  102 
*'  Italia  »  : 

Cost  of  construction,  98 

Guns  and  ammunition  carried  by,  99 
Italy  : 

Crime,  statistics,  232,  236. 

Drunkenness,  deaths  from,  230 

Efficiency,  comparative,  in  attack  and  defence,  62 

Expenditure  on  war  estimates,  133-139,  142-146 

Frontier  defence,  expenditure,  57 

Future  \\  ar,  distribution  of  troops,  64 

Marriages,  statistics,  208 

Grain  Supply  : 

Harvests,  inequalities,  301 
Home  production  and  importation,  295 
Insufficient  in  event  of  war,  296,  297 
Oats,  home  productions   297,  298 

Horses  for  military  service,  statistics,  316 

Infantry,  te-armament,  cost  estimated,  5 

Kerosene  supply,  deficiency,  305,  306 

Losses  in  war  with  Austria,  343,  345 

Meat  supply,  superfluity,  303,  304 

2  A 


370  INDEX 

Italy  {continued)  : 

Military  strength,  total,  36,  63 
Navy,  exnenditure  on,  133,  138,  139 

Russia  compared  with,  IJ5 
Population,  rate  of  increase,  292 
Reserve,  proportion  to  regular  army,  25,  42,  336 
Revenue,  distribution,  145,  146 
Rifle: 

Calibre  adopted,  319 

Effectiv'eness,  4 
Salt  supply,  superfluity,  304,  305 
Sappers,  number  in  army,  333 
Securities  held  in  Germany,  275,  276. 

Janson,  General,  on  : 

Infantry  attack,  32 

Officers  in  Franco-Prussian  War,  independence  of,  46 
Japan  : 

Foreign  trade  with,  125,  126 

Russia,  relations  with,  124,  125,  127 
Jung,  General,  on  mobilisation  of  French  Army  in  time  of  war,  141 

Kagaretch,  night  attack  on,  51 

Kars,  night  attack  on,  51 

Kef,  defective  ambulance  arrangements  at,  156 

Kerosene  supply,  305,  306 

Killed,  proportion  to  wounded  in  modern  warfare,  342-345 

Killichen,  General,  on  number  of  sappers  required  by  army,  '>>'hl) 

"  Koenig  Wilhelm,"  cost  of  construction,  98 

Konigsberg,  sections  of  bridges,  and  materials  for  railways  stored 

at,  83 
Kotid,  S.  N.,  on  effect  of  war  on  price  of  corn  in  Austria,  141 
Kovno,  strength  of  fortress,  79 
Kuropatkin,  General,  night  attack  advocated  by,  51 

'*  La  Poudre  sans  Fumee"  : 

Battle  described  in,  47 

Night  attack  advocated  in,  51 
Langlois,  Colonel,  statements  as  to  artillery  fire : 

Effectiveness,  7,  8,  329,  330 

Number  of  rounds  required  for  one  field-piece,  20 
Le  Mans,  night  attack  on,  51 

"  Le  Progres  Militaire"  on  cost  of  naval  weapons,  99 
Leer,  General,  on  : 

Duration,  probable,  of  war  with  Russia,  315 

German  Army  on  Russian  frontier,  statistics,  300 
Liebert,  on  diflicuhies  ol  pursuit  under  modern  c  nditions,  50 


INDEX  371 

Lissa,  destruction  of  Italian  fleet  at,  120 

Losses,  probable,  in  future  wars,  319-346 

Luzeux,  General,  on  modern  teaching  of  tactics,  26 

"  Magenta,"  cost  of  construction,  98 
Makarof,  Admiral,  on  machinery  of  the  "  Rurik,"  106 
Malshinski,  Mr.,  on  growth  of  population  in  Russia,  190 
Mannlicher  rifle,  effectiveness  of,  323,  324,  343,  344 
Manoeuvres,  information  obtained  from,  incomplete  and  unsatisfac- 
tory, 41 
Maps  and  plans,  Russo-Austro-German  War  of  the  Future  : 

Prussia  invasion  by  Russia,  89 

Russian  defensive  system,  74 

Visiula-Bug-Narev  theatre  of  war,  ']'],  ']Z 
Marches,  endurance  required,  25,  36 
Marriages,  statistics,  207,  208 
Mauser  Rifle  : 

Effectiveness,  4,  320,  321 

Number  of  shots  fired  per  second,  4 
Mayence,  investment  difficulty,  67,  68 
Meat  Supply  Statistics  : 

Continental  Powers,  280,  303,  304 

England,  254-256 
Melinite,  danger  of  premature  explosion,  20 
"  Merrimac,"  exploit  of,  96 
Mexican  war,  losses  in,  analysis,  345 
Migncl,  Colonel,  on  French  tactics,  25 

"  Militarische  Essays"  ;  statements  as  to  cavalry  in  modem  war- 
fare, 14,  15 
Militarism,  opposition  to,  347-356 
Mobilisation  : 

French  Army  in  time  of  war,  estimate  of  cost,  141 

Rapidity  of  modern  methods,  36,  64,65 
Moltke,  General  \^on,  statement  as  to  possible  invasion  of  German 

coast  by  French  Navy,  117 
"  Monitor,"  battle  with  "  Merrimac,"  96 
Monteculli  on  effect  of  insufficient  food  upon  troops,  341 
Morache,  analysis  of  losses  in  modern  wars,  344 
Moscow,  attempt  to  occupy,  possibility,  in  event  of  war,  84-87 
Movements  of  enemy,  observation  of: 

Auxiliary  instruments  for,  10 

Cavalry  and  infantry,  duties  in  relation  to,  12,  13 

Sharpshooters,  duties,  331,  332 
Miiller,  General,  on  effectiveness  of  modem  artillery,  20,  31,  330 
Murder,  convict  ons,  statistics,  232 

Napoleon  I  : 

Moscow  campaign,  strength  of  French  and  Russian  armies  at 
Smolensk  and  Moscow,  86 


372  INDEX 

Napoieofi  I.  {continued) : 

Plan  of  battle,  allowance  made  for  accidents,  45,  46 

Success  in  battle,  statement  as  to  chances  of,  44 
Naval  Warfare  : 

Accident,  strong  element  in,  108,  109 

Austrian  Navy,  expenditure  on,  133,  137,  138 
Russian  expenditure  compared  with,  125 

Blockade  of  ports,  104 

Bombardment  of  towns,  103,  118,  119 

Undefended  towns   not  to  be  bombarded,  principle  not 
acknowledged,  103 

Coast  batteries,  ineffectiveness,  104 

Cruisers  :  Light  and  swift,  preference  for,  100 

Destruciiveness,  increase  in,  105 

English  Navy  (see  England) 

Expenditure  entailed,  98,  99,  no,  in,  Wi,^  133-138 

French  Navy  (i-ee  Fnmce) 

Future  of  naval  warfare,  93-n2 

German  Navy,  expenditure,  123,  125 

Guns,  99,  103 

Ironclads  (see  that  title) 

Italian  Navy,  expenditure,  125,  133,  138,  139 

Ordnance,  improvements  in,  97 

Privateering,  109,  295 

Result  of  batile  between  fleets  of  equal  strength,  107 

Russian  Navy  (see  title  Russia) 

Shells  : 

Cost  of,  99,  100 

Destructive  power,  99,  to6,  108 

Social  and  e  onomic  results,  no,  112 

Steam,  adoption,  95 

Torpedoes,  100-103 
Ner^e  of  soldiers  : 

Artillery  fire,  effect  of,  10 

Deterioration,  52,  340 

Rifle  fire,  effect  of,  6 

Strain  in  dealing  with  highly  explosive  ammunition,  21 
Night  Attack  : 

Effectiveness,  difference  of  opinitm  as  to,  50-52 

Nerves  of  soldiers  affected  by  possibility  of,  340 
Nigote,  Captain  : 

Battle  described  by,  48 

Duration  of  battles,  52 
Nirschau  riots,  casualties  caused  by  rifle  fire,  322 
Norway  marriage  statistics,  209 


Oats,  home  production  insufficient  in  Central  European  States, 
297,  298 


INDEX  J73 


Obukovsk,  ordnance  factory  at,  308 
Officers : 

Decline  of  popularity  of  military  profession,  350 

Disablement  of,  chief  aim  of  enemy,  41,  335 

Efficiency  under  modern  conditions  questioned,  27,  34,  yj^  335 

Militarism  supported  by,  350 


PARIS: 

Siege  of  (1870),  number  of  men  required  for  investment,  55 

Siege  of,  in  Franco-German  War  of  the  Future,  difficulties,  66 

Unerr  ployed  in,  288 

Workmen  trained  to  light  trades,  incapacity  for  heavy  tasks,  272 
Paskevitch,  Colonel,  instrument  for  measuring  d-stances  of  rifle  fire 

invented  by,  327 
Peroxylene,  danger  of  premature  explosion,  20 
Pestitch,  General,  on  cost  of  firing  naval  guns,  100 
Peterhead,  bombardment  threatened  during  naval  manoeuvres,  103 
Pigorof  on  : 

Defective  care  of  wounded,  1 54 

Frost-bitten  feet  caused  by  defective  boots,  158 
"  Piotr  Veliki,"  guns  carried  by,  97 
Pistols,  Mauser,  rate  of  fire,  4 
Plans  of  campaign  in  future  warfare,  63 
Plevna,  siege  of,  54 
Poland: 

Crime,  statistics,  231,  236,  238 

Population,  town  and  country,  comparative  growth,  193 

Strategical  importance  in  event  of  Russo-Austro-German  War, 
82-85 
Pont  de  Fahs,  defective  care  of  wounded  at,  156 
Populace : 

Attitude  towards  militarism,  347,  353 

Effect  of  war  on  vital  needs  of,  294 
Porth,  Dr.,  on  aefective  care  of  wounded,  153,  157 
Potatoes,  cultivation  and  importation  into  England,  254 
Powder,  smokeless,  effect  of,  3 

Artillery,  17,  18 

Assault,  difficulties  increased,  337,  339 

Battle  described  in  "  La  Poudre  sans  Fumde,"  47 

Cavalry  attack  favoured  by,  15 

Deadliness  of  modern  warfare  increased,  6 

Infantry  action,  24 

Night  attack  aided  by,  51 

Reconnaissances,  difficulty  increased,  12 

Sound  of  shot,  distance  of  penetration  lessened,  24 
Prisons,  expenditure  on,  in  Russia,  239 
Privateering  in  future  warfare,  109,  295 
"  Prokhor,"  guns  carried  by,  97,  98 


374  INDEX 

Propaganda  against  war,  effect  on  minds  of  soldiers,  30 
Prussian  needle-gun  (1870),  range  of  effectual  fire,  6 
Psychological  aspect  of  war,  59 
Pursuit : 

Cavalry,  role  in,  16 

Difficulty  under  modern  conditions,  50 
Puzuirevski,  General,  on  night  attacks,  51 

Quarters  for  soldiers,  difficulty  of  procuring,  37 

Reconnaissances  : 

Cavalry  and  infantry,  duties  defined,  12,  13,  24 

Sharpshooters,  employed  for  prevention  of,  331 
Reger,  Dr.,  on  modern  bullets,  150 
Reserve  Soldiers  : 

Drawbacks  to  employment  of,  25,  27,  37,  340 

Officers,  efficiencv  doubtful,  27,  37,  42,  335 

Statistics,  42,  336 
Retreat : 

Cavalry  pursuit,  16 

Dangers  under  modern  conditions,  340 
Revenue,  distribution  in  different  countries,  145,  146 
Revolutionary  movements,  effect  of  war  on,  91,  356 
Rhine,  probable  difficulty  of  crossing,  in  Franco-German  War  of 

the  Future,  67 
Richter,  Professor,  on  defective  care  of  wounded,  155 
Rifle  wounds,  148 

Explosive  character  of  bullets  fired  at  great  velocity,  150,  151 

Increased  number  of  casualties,  150,  152,  319 
Penetrative  power  of  bullets,  3,  149,  319 
Proportion  of  killed  to  wounded,  342 
Rifles : 

Accuracy  increase,  6,  7,  323,  324 

American  Civil  War,  over-charged  rifles  found  on  field,  21 

Artillery  fire,  comparative  destructiveness,  148 

Calibre,  diminished,  advantages,  5 

Cartridges,  number  carried,  5-7,  328 

Chilian  W\ir,  deadliness  of  modern  arms  proved  by,  6 

Effectiveness  of  modern  weapons,  3,  319 
Diagrams  illustrating,  32  r,  343 
Rate  of  increase  in  power,  38 

Fire  over  heads  of  advancing  troops,  dangers  of,  334 

Measuring  distances,  instrument  for,  327 

Penetrative  power  of  bullets,  3,  6,  149,  319 

Random  shots,  losses  from,  29 

Range  of  effective  fire,  3,  324 

Rate  of  fire,  4,  45 

Revolution  and  deformation  of  bullet,  destructiveness  effected 
by,  322,  328 


INDEX  375 

Rifles  {conti7iued)  : 

Self-loading,  made  of  alloy  of  aluminium,  4 
Shrapnel  fire,  comparison  with,  8,  329 

Sound  of  shot,  distance  of  penetration    lessened   by  use   of 
smokeless  powder,  24 
Rohne,  General,  on  : 

Attack  on  fortified  position,  10 
Sharpshooters,  use  of,  19 
Roon,  Von,  on  stram  on  nerves,  340 
Roumania  : 

Army,  number  of  sappers  in,  i^'^ 
Harvests,  inequalities,  301 
"Rurik,"  machinery  of,  106 
Russia : 

Agricultural  Class,  196-203 

Conditions  subsequent  to  Crimean  War,  114 

Earnings,  314 

Effect  of  war  on,  249,  317 

Indebtedness  of  peasants,  203 
Arms  and  ammunition,  manufacture,  242,  243,  307 
Births  : 

Illegitimate,  223,  225 

Proportion,  compared  with  other  countries,  207 
Cattle  supply,  198-201,  303,  304 
Character  of  population  and  country,  163,  203,  214 
Children,  condition  of,  209-213 
Chinese  trade,  125,  126 
Coal  supply,  306,  307 

Corea,  possession  of  undesirable,  126,  127 
Cotton,  wool,  skins,  and  linen  supply,  307 
Crime,  statistics,  228 
Crimean  War  (see  that  title) 
Death-rate,  209 

Declaration  of  war  improbable,  354 
Defensive  war,  advantages  m,  246 
Doctors,  number,  comparison  with  other  countries,  220 
Domestic  animals,  198 
Drunkenness,  227 
Duration  of  war,  probability,  315 
Economic  effects  of  war,  163 

Summary,  242,  250 
Education,  popular,  216 
Efficiency  in  attack  and  defence,  62 
Expenditure  on  ju  tice  and  prisons,  239 
Expenditure  on  War  : 

Comparison  with  other  States,  133,  245 

Daily,  in  time  of  war,  142,  143,  169,  248 

Decrease,  probab'e,  249 

Future  war  estimates,  142-144.  169,  248 


37^ 


INDEX 


Russia  {confirmed) : 

Expenditure  on  War : 

Incre<ise,  133,  I34-I39.  '69 

One  inhabitant,  expenditure  by,  169,  170 

One  soldier,  cost  ot  maint^. nance,  yearly,  136,  169 

Past  wars,  131,  132,  168 

Revenue,  distribution,  145,  146 
Families  of  soldiers,  contribution  towards  support  during  time 

ol  war,  169,  171,  314 
Finances,  1 15 

Difficulties  attending  war,  247,  248 
Fires,  lo'^ses  by,  192-195 
Food  supply,  sufficient,  in  event  of  war,  302 
Germany,  Russian  designs  against,  report  spread  by  Prince 

Bismarck,  136 
Grain  Supply  : 

Effect  of  war  on  prices,  249 

Harvests,  inequalities,  301 

Oats,  yearly  exports,  298 

Sufficient  in  time  of  war,  297 
Horses  for  military  service,  240,  316 
Incomes  of  people,  effect  of  war  on,  314 
Indebtedness  of  population,  203 
Infantry,  re-armament,  cosi  estimated,  5 
Iron  and  steel,  working  and  manufacture  of,  242,  243,  307 
Japan,  danger  from  improbable,  127 
Kero-ene  supply,  305,  306 
Marriages,   proportion   compared   with   other   countries,  207. 

208 
Meat  supply,  303,  304 
Medicine,  outlay  on,  per  inhabitant,  222 
Military  strength,  36,  63 

Proportion  of  population  engaged  in  army,  318 
Navy  : 

Armoured  ships,  introduction,  97 

Expenditure,  124,  125,  133-139 

Increase,  116,  124 

Need  of,  questioned,  113 

Shipbuilding  works  executed  in  England,  116 

Steam  introduction,  95 
Nerve  of  soldiers,  probaole  superiority,  52 
Officers,  proportion  possessing  good  preparatory  training,  43 
Population  : 

Distribution,  igo 

Effect  of  war  on,  188 

Growth,  114,  115,  189,  190,  193,  206,  207,  292 
Posts  and   lekgraphs,  expenditure  on,  181 
Renewal  of  army,  circumstances  affecting,  240 
Reserve,  proportion  to  regular  army,  25,  42,  336 


INDEX  377 

Russia  {continued)  : 

Revenue,  distribution,  145,  146 
Rifles  : 

Accuracy,  improvement  in,  325 

Calibre  adop  ed,  319 

Paskevifch  instrument  for  measuring  distances,  327 
Salt  supply,  304,  305 
Sapper-,  number  employed  in  army,  333 
Savings,  inconsiderable,  193,  196,  314 
Securities  : 

Depreciation  in  event  of  war,  166-168,  247,  248 

Germany,  securities  held  in,  275 
Settlement^,  average  number  of  houses  in,  igi 
Sickness,  prevalence,  223,  224 
Siberian  railway,  124,  126 

Statistics,  official,  compiled  first  under  Nicholas  I.,  164 
Suicide,  statistics,  225 
Towns,  growth  of,  193 
Trade,  effect  of  war  on,  172,  244,  249 

Exports,  172 

Imports,  177 

Manufacturing  crisis  probable,  182 

Maritime  trade,  125 

Undertakings  in  1892,  180 
Wages,  1 86,  314 

Wounded,  c.ire  of,  reforms  needed,  158 
Russo-Austro  German  War  of  the  Future  ; 
Allies  of  Germany,  weakness,  70,  71 
Distribution  of  troops,  64 
Defensive  attitude  of  Germany,  72,  73 
Economic  ani  social  conditions,  affecting,  91,  92 
France,  probable  change  of  attitude  in  tne  event  of  return  of 

Alsace-Lorraine,  90 
Invasion  of  Austria  by  Russia,  8^,  %"],  90 
Invasion  of  Eastern  Galicia  by  Russia,  improb.ible,  90 
Invasion  of  Germany  by  Russia,  87 

Bombardment  by  fleet,  small  cities  only  accessible,  121 
Invasion  of  Russia,  improbable,  82,  85,  1 17-120 
Maps  and  plan-,  74,  "j"]^  78,  89 
Moscow,  attempt  to  occupy,  74,  84-87 
Number  of  men  available,  63,  'j^^  76,  79,  80,  81,  85,  86 
Plan  of  campaign,  69 

Poland,  strategical  impoitance,  72,  "jt^^  82-85 
Prolongation  of  war,  advantageous  to  Russia,  86 
Results,  probable,  90 
St.  Petersburg,  attempt  to  occupy,  84 
Vistula-Bug  Narev  District,  operations  in,  T^^  76,  84,  85,  86 

Plans,  77,  78 
Winter,  difficulties  of  advance  in,  '^'] 


378  INDEX 

Russo-Turkish  war  : 

Entrenchments,  value  proved  in,  332 

Expenditure,  131,  132,  t68 

Frost-bitten  feet  ascribed  to  wet  boots,  158 

Industrial  produciion  of  Russia  at  time  of,  182 

Losses,  statistics,  343-345 

Nerve  of  soldiers,  52 

Night  attack,  51 

Revolutionary  movement  strengthened  by,  91 

Torpedoes,  use  in,  loi 

Wounded  : 

Cast  out  of  trenches,  157 
Defective  care  of,  154 
Steel  weapons,  148 
Riistow,  on  probable  duration  of  future  campaign,  341 


St.  Cyr,  Marshal,  on  composition  of  a  brave  army,  340 

St.  Petersburg,  German  occupation  possibly  attempted  in  war  of 

the  future,  84 
Salt  supply,  Russia  contrasted  with  Western  Powers,  304 
Sappers,  number  required,  ^;i^ 
Sardinia,  war  (1859)  expenditure  on,  130 
Saur,  General  Von,  on  attack  on  fortresses,  56 
Saxony : 

Gram  production,  299 

Incomes,  amount  and  distribution,  270 

Population,  town  and  country,  comparative  growth,  193 
Scheibert,  Major,  on  Russo-Austro-German  War  of  the  Fuiure,  72, 

82 
Schultze-Gavernitz,    Dr.    Von,     on    low    standard    of    wages    in 

Germany,  309 
Scotland,  population  distribution,  262 
Securities,  Government,  probable  effect  of  war  on,  353 
Servia : 

Harvests,  inequality,  301 

Securities  held  in  Germany,  275,  276 
Sharpshooters  : 

Artillery-men  hampered  by,  18,  19 

Use  of  in  future  warfare,  331,  332 
Shells  : 

Decreased  use  in  future  warfare,  9 

Explosion,  premature,  danger  of,  20 

Increase  of  destructive  power,  9 

Navy,  99 

Destructive  power,  106,  108 

Wounds  caused  by,  148,  149,  152 
Shrapn  1  : 

Area  of  dispersal,  8 


INDEX  379 

Shrapnel  {continued)  : 

Chief  artillery  ammunition  of  the  future,  9 

Destructiveness,  8,  9 

Rifle  fire  compared  with,  8,  329 
Siberian  railway,  important  only  as  means  of  transport,  124,  126 
Sickness,  losses  from,  in  armies,  344 
Sieges  (see  title  Fortresses) 
Sinope,  battle  of,  cost  of  firing  guns,  100 
Size  of  armies,  difficulties  of  warfare  increased  by,  36 
Skugarevski,  General,  on  : 

Attack  by  infantry,  31,  32 

Rifle  fire,  334 
Smokeless  powder  (see  title  Powder) 

Social  conditions,  effect  of  war  on,  59,  91,  1 10,  112,  163,  347 
Socialism,  developmeni  in  Germany,  311 
Sokolovski,  Mr.,  on  indebtedness  of  Russian  peasant,  205 
Spain  : 

Crime,  statistics,  232 

Rifle,  effectiveness,  4 
Steel  Weapons  : 

Casualties  caused  by,  148,  319 

Russia,  manufacture  of,  307 
Stein,  on  provisioning  of  army,  141 
Strasburg,  siege  of,  sickness  amongst  soldiers,  346 
Suicide,  statistics,  225 

Supporting  bodies  in  attack,  deadliness  of  artillery  fire  to,  10 
Sweden  : 

Crime,  statistics,  236 

Fire,  losses  by,  192 

Marriages,  statistics,  108 
Switzerland,  frontier  defences,  expenditure  on,  57 

Tactics  : 

Deadliness  of  warfare,  increased  by  modern  system,  331 

Differences  of '^pinion  as  to,  25 
Tchernaya,  battle  of,  bullet  wounds  in,  148 
Torpedoes,  100-103 
Trenches  (see  title  Entrenchments) 
Tunis,  French  Army,  defeciive  care  of  wounded,  155 
Turkey  : 

Revenue  expenditure,  145 

Rifle,  calibie  adopted,  319 

Russo-Turkish  War  (see  that  title) 

Securities  held  in  Germany,  275 
Turnwald,  on  weight  of  equipment,  345 
Typhus,  death  from,  frequency  in  Russia,  223,  224 

United  Statiis  ; 

Chilian  War  (see  that  title 


38o  INDEX 

United  States  {continued)  : 

Civil  War  (see  title  American  Civil  War) 

Fires,  losses  by,  192,  193 

Food  supply,  independence  in  time  of  war,  302 

Population  increase,  292 

Rifle: 

Calibre  adopted,  319 
Effectiveness,  4 
Universal  Service  : 

Anarchism,  increase  since  introduction  of,  347,  356 

Defe  ts  of  system,  35-37 

VARlsCHOEFFEk,  Inspector,  report  on  wages  in  Germany,  310 

Wages  : 

Agricultural  population,  proportion  of  national  income  earned 

England,  258 

France,  286 

Germany,  272-274,  308-312 

Russia,  186,  314 
"Warrior": 

Cost  of  construction,  98 

Shells  carried  by,  99 
Werner,  Admiral,  on  character  of  modern  naval  warfare,  109 
Wheat  (see  title  Grain  Supply) 

Wissenberg,  battle  of,  defective  care  of  wounded  at,  154 
Women,  Economic  Position  : 

France,  287 

Germany,  272,  273 
Worth,  battle  of,  dead  and  wounded  soldiers  cast  out  of  trenches, 

Wounded  : 

Aid  to,  147,  152 

Defective  arrangements  in  recent  wars,  154 
Difficulties,  under  modern  conditions,  30,  156 
Reforms  needed,  152,  156 

Artillery  fire,  148,  149,  152 

Character  of  wounds,  effect  of  improvements  in  firearms  on, 

Killed,  proportion  to  wounded  in  modern  warfare,  342 

Rifle  wounds  (see  that  tide) 

Steel  weapons,  casualties  caused  by,  148,  319 


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